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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the major perspectives on 
the social and economic situation of "blacks" in Britain and the U. S. A.
As part of this alternative concepts are suggested which we feel are of 
greater theoretical depth and relevance than race relations theory. By race 
relations theory we mean any text which implicitly or explicitly docs not 
treat "race relations" as a concept. That is to say, one which attempts to 
explain race relations rather than investigate it epistemologically. 'The 
race relations perspective justifies itself with reference to the actors' 
definition of the situation, namely, race consciousness, racism and racial 
discrimination. Wo hope to demonstrate that its epistemological and 
methodological basis generates a formidable theoretical incoherence and 
unavoidable inconsistencies. Our method is to take the theory at its word 
and confront its conclusions and propositions with its methodological principles. 
We then extract the inadequacies and trace them to epistemological 
assumptions.
This procedure is accompanied by a suggested resolution of the 
problems identified by race relations theory, namely,that to explain the 
social and economic situation of "blacks" it is necessary to analyse the 
class structure of capitalist society. In other words, the most theoretically 
consistent approach would lx.* that whose point of departure is capitalist 
relations of production. Such an explanation, however, must be prefaced by 
the analysis of race relations as a concept, i.e . as a term within a specific 
epistemological and theoretical tradition.
This development displaces "race relations" as a theory and paves the way 
for the posing of different questions about modes of labour exploitation, and 
capitalist production. Thus the last two chapters are concerned with the 
explanation of the conditions of existence of social segregation and changes 
in the processes of labour exploitation via an investigation of the relations 
of pnxluctlon within the capitalist mode of production.
Cl I API KR 1
THE SOCIOLOGY OF "RACE RELATIONS"
Writing between the years 1913-1940, Robert E. Park did more
than any other sociologist to pioneer and popularise the "race relations"
approach, and place it within a body of definitions and sociological concepts^ \
For Park, "race relations" were those relations between people of different
racial characteristics which had entered into their consciousness and
become socially significant: "Race relations, as that term, is defined in
use and wont in the United States, arc the relations existing between peoples
distinguished by marks of racial descent, particularly when these racial
differences enter into the consciousness of the individuals and groups so
distinguished, and by so doing determine in each case the individual's
(21conception of himself as well as his status in the community" . Races
respond to one another as such for they are set apart by peculiar morphological
characteristics. TTiese differences penetrate social awareness and create
feelings of group identity, solidarity and status; without race consciousness
there are no "race relations", yet it must be a status-determining
consciousness. Park offered, however, four other definitions of "race relations’'
as if as testimony to the theoretical weight of the conceptual problems he was
grappling with: "Race relations in this sense are not so much the relations
that exist between individuals of different races as between individuals
(3)conscious of these differences"' , Here Park offers a more inclusive definition 
for instead of: "particularly when these racial differences enter into the 
consciousness of individuals . . .  " as a determinant of status we have a 
consciousness of racial differences as the basis of "race relations". In his 
third definition, Park introduces ethnicity and conflict: "Race relations" are 
" . . .  all the relations that ordinarily exist between members of different
1) Robert F. Park, Race and Culture (The Free Press, New York 1950).
2) ibid. p. 81.
3) ibid.
4ethnic and genetic groups which axe capable of provoking race conflicts and
race consciousness or of determining the relative status of the social groups
’ H ) ,
of which a community is composed . Park's fourth definition of race relations
partly banishes race consciousness: " . . .  the term race relations, as here
conceived, includes relations which are not now conscious or personal,
though they have been; relations which are fixed in and enforced by the custom,
convention and the routine of an expected social order of which there may be
( 2 )
at the moment no very lively consciousness" . Here Park is suggesting that 
"race relations" are not static and that they become routiniscd and stable 
without disappearing. Park's final definition is a development of the fourth 
and by the same token strikingly distinct from the third in that phenotypical 
differences are considered to be irrelevant,and race conflict need not be 
evident. "Race relationrf'are: "All these relations of cultural or racial minorities 
with a dominant people may be described, for our purposes, as types of race
relationship, even though no evidence exists either of active race conflict, on
(3)the one hand, or of obvious racial diversity on the other" . This definition 
also introduces a new element of minority group relations of sub- and super­
ordination, and displaces both racial diversity and race conflict at the 
observational level.
Park's definitions condense the two substantive bases of "race relations", 
the biological and the phenomenological. The first implies that since there 
are races, as defined by biologists, then relations between them can simply
be designated "race relations". It involves global descriptions of multifarious
(4)
race contacts taking place as a result of human migration . Thus, in Park, 
"Europe's expansion" in the 15th and 16th centuries appears as: "A 
progressive extension of European culture and domination in the world, 
accompanied by an increasing integration of, and intimacy with the races and
1) ibid. p. 82.
2) ibid. p. 83.
3) ibid. p. 84.
4) ibid. ch. 26.
peoples within this imperium"^. Race problems are .seen as an efflux of
racial confrontation, competition and conflict within which would fall frontier
clashes, slavery, and ultimately, racial segregation in the post-emancipation
( 2 )
period . The second would justify "race relations" in terms of actors 
consciousness of racial differences, i.e . the existence of racial definitions 
and identities.
Park's implicit assertion that " races" meet suggests that he favoured
the biological over the phenomenological justification of "race relations".
He only marginally discusses the economic and social conditions or the
structures which make men racially conscious. Indeed, this race consciousness
is circularly explained, as both expression and cause of conflicts: "Race
conflicts have their biological and economic aspects but it is the attitudes that
(3)they express and provoke which are of first importance"' '. The race problem'
"arises from the difficult)', if not the impossibility, of peoples of a markedly
different racial type, as well as standard of living, entering freely and without
conflict, into the competitive co-operation of an individualistic and democratic
(4)
society . . . "  . Park, however, does not attempt to work out the determin­
ants of the difficulty of racial harmony among sharply differentiated phenotypes 
with markedly different standards of living. Instead, he shifts into a world 
historical cyclical paradigm.
Park's race relations cycle was published almost 50 years ago 
apparently as a liberal protest against the American Government's Exclusion 
Law of 1924, which, in his view, effectively created, 'our racial frontier in 
the Pacific '^ . After surveying the relationships between Pacific 'face relations" 
and "geography", "the world economy", "world politics" and "the melting pot", 
he suggested and predicted that the struggle for existence among races is 
climaxed by an inexorable global integration. "In the relations of races,
1) ibid. pp. 107-108.
2) ibid. p. 104.
3) ibid. p. 159.
4) ibid.
5) This is the title of the article in which Park espoused the race relations 
cycle. R. Park, op. cit. Ch. 9.
there is a cycle of events which tends everywhere to repeat itself" ^ \  This 
cycle, "which takes the form, to state it abstractly, of contacts competition, 
accommodation and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and 
irreversible. Customs regulations, immigration restrictions and racial 
barriers may slacken the tempo of the movement; may perhaps halt it
( 2 )altogether a time; but cannot change its direction at any rate reverse it"'
However, apart from these official obstacles, Park regarded the existence
of divergent physical traits as a major barrier to acculturation, assimilation
and amalgamation. For him, peoples of strongly dissimilar anatomical
characteristics cannot but be conscious of these differences and seek to
establish "social distance" among themselves. Thus, the intensity of "the
race problem" varies in direct proportion to the tempo of assimilation and
this, in turn, is related to the degree of racial contrasts among the population:
" . . .  the chief obstacle to the cultural assimilation of races is not their
(31different mental traits but rather their divergent physical traits"' . Thus, 
in Park's sociological analysis, social relationships build directly out of 
racial morphologies.
Park's work appears to be as seminal on "race” as Tannenbaum's on
(4)
slavery and "race relations' . Indeed, they both share a deep concern with 
"races" and racial movements^. Scattered throughout the former's
1) Ibid. p. 150.
2) ibid.
3) ibid. pp. 252-253.
4) We say "appearsto be" in order not to confuse "seminality" with 
"commonality". Mcxlern race relations theories simply share with Park 
certain epistemological assumptions which go beyond Park's writings.
5) Compare Park's essay "Race Relations and Certain Frontiers", op. cit. 
Ch. 8., with this strain in Tannenbaum's thought: "The Negro now has 
physical occupancy - possession would be a more accurate word - of a 
very large part of the Western Hemisphere and this non-political Negro 
Fmpire Is increasing because Negro fertility is relatively high in 
comparison to whites. The biological hold which the Negro has on this 
part of the Western world is more Important than the slave trade and 
its cruelties, than slavery, thun race discrimination, than capitalism, 
socialism, communism, democracy, fascism, centralism, federalism, 
art, music, culture and whatever". In Vera Rubin (ed.) Caribbean 
Studies: A Symposium (University of Washington Press, London 1971) 
p. 62.
7writings are core statements which foreshadow the postulates of such
major theorists of "race relations" as E. Franklin Frazier, E.T. Thompson,
Harmannus Hoetink, Pierre L. van den Berghe, Tamotsu Shibutani and
Kian M. Kwan, Gunnar Myrdal, George Simpson and T. Milton Yinger,
Michael Banton,and John Rex^\ Moreover, some of these sociologists have
explicitly expressed an indebtedness to, or affiliation with, Robert Park's
( 2 )
development of "race relations" . This reflects an uncritical reading of 
Park, when we consider his definitional ambiguities, inconsistencies and 
other theoretical lapses. For example, Park's construction and treatment of 
his race relations cycle show him to be remarkably ambivalent and he 
rigorously avoided economic structures in his global study of race and culture 
contacts. Thus apart from peripheral descriptions of the market, commerce 
and division of labour, the theoretical focus of his political economy does not 
rise above Adam Smith's man as innately a trader' . Mis analyses are 
shot through with a xenophobic and static philosophical anthropology and a 
(related) methodology based on the abstracting of consciousness from its 
social milieu and then treating it as an autonomous thing. Thus Park begins
with "race consciousness" and seeks to explain its origin not in the social
, (4)
structure but human nature .
1)
2 )
3)
4)
For key insights on the perspectives which stress "stranger", "status 
consciousness", and "white prejudice", see Robert Park, op. cit. pp. 252, 
260 and 236 respectively.
See E. Franklin Frazier, Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World 
(Beacon Press, Roston 1957). Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan,
Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (MacMillan, London 1969). 
George Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities 
(Harper and Row, New York 1958) pp. 13-14. John Rex, Race Colonialism 
and the City (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1973) P. XIII.
Robert E. Park, op. cit. p. 90.
Cf. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations ( Ihe Modern Library, New 
York, 1937) p. 13.
"Racial antipathies in a somewhat more positive sense than is true 
of racial prejudices, have their sources in fundamental human nature", 
ibid. p. 237. See also pp. 77 and 373.
f
8Park's cycle posits the inevitability of the processes involved in the 
transitions to assimilation. Hut two important observations can be made 
about this cyclical determinism. Firstly, it is nowhere stated what are the 
political, economic and social conditions which reduce economic and 
biological competition among races to the extent that a universal socio­
cultural homogeneity emerges. Park's cycle is thus prophetic and 
teleological^. It expresses a vision, a hope; but it is not theoretical 
analysis and demonstration. Secondly, and not surprisingly, Park contradicts 
himself: "It does not follow' that because the tendencies to the assimilation and
eventual amalgamation of races exist, they should not be resisted and, if
( 2 )
possible, altogether inhibited" . Hie processes of assimilation are therefore 
reversible and the cycle is shown to have a political axis which Park leaves 
unexamined.
Park's definitions of "race relations" do not constitute an adequate 
demarcation of a field of study which can be called race relations sociology.
The definitions have distinct objects, each individually emphasising 
race consciousness, racial morphology, status, conflict and mores. In 
consequence, as Pierre van den Berghe noted " . . .  the field of "race relations" 
has come to resemble a theoretical no-man's-land between psychology,
(3)
sociology and anthropology ' . But this amorphousness is a prcxluct of Park's 
refusal to think out the problem of theory construction. He assumes there 
is a ready-made world of facts (race consciousness) and observable phenomena 
(racial differences). This assumption subjectively absolves him of the 
responsibility of welding his observations and insights into a coherent unity 
of concepts. This his various definitions not only borrows from history, 123
1) A pertinent criticism of its teleology was voiced by Robert Staples 
" . . .  this particular theory could be used to sanction the existing social 
order. Whatever state of race relations exists is acceptable because
it Is part of a natural process that is Inevitable whenever two different 
cultures come into contact". Introduction to Black Sociology 
(McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York 1976) p. 7.
2) Robert Park, op. cit. p. 131.
3) Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective 
(John Wiley and Sons Inc., London 1967) p. 6.
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psychology, economics and anthropology, hut Park felt no need to evaluate
their comparative adequacy or their internal consistency.
We have suggested that race relations theorists read Park
uncritically. We should add,and selectively. For,despite Park's dramatic
repudiation of his race relations cycle,a sizeable literature has grown up
around it which does not treat assimilation as conceptually and theoretically
problematic^. Secondly, although Park's writings do not lend themselves
to periodisation - there are no theoretical-chronological breaks - there is a
particular development worthy of consideration. In 1921, Park writes of
ra^e problems as natural phenomena evolving from race and culture contacts.
lie writes ambiguously, failing to specify what is an "instinctive factor" or why
colour becomes a symbol of moral divergences . In 1923, the race problem
( 2 )
is identified with the problem of economic inequality . Sixteen years later,
class relations behind“race relations"are alluded to and indeed,Park predicts
the transformation of'Yace relations'into relations of culture and class: "The
same forces which brought about the diversity of races will inevitably bring
about,in the long run,a diversity in the peoples of the modern world
corresponding to that which we have seen in the old. It is likely, however,
that these diversities wi l l  lx: based in the future less on inheritance and race
and rather more on culture and occupation. That means that race conflicts
in the modern world which is already or presently will be a single great
society, will be more and more in the future confused with.and eventually
(3)
superceded by the conflict of classes"' . It is not that Park moved from
race to class. He does not appear to have had more than a glance at Marx's
(4)
writings in 1942 . Rather, the end-product of his historical cycle suggests
both assimilation and class conflict. 1234
1) See Brcwton Horry, Race and F.thnic Relations (Houghton Mlffin, Boston 
1965); Emery Bogardus,Immigration and Race Attitudes (D.C. Heath, 
Boston 1928). Indeed, the 'school1 of ethnic assimilation derives from 
Park's cyclical vision.
2) Robert Park, op. cit. p. 159.
3) ibid. p. 116,
4) See Robert Park, Society (The Free Press, New York, 1955), pp. 336-337.
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Park's analysis of "race relations" moved uneasily between biologically
and phenomenologically defined races. One of his students, E. Franklin
Frazier, has superbly summarised his racial historiography. "As in Park's
frame of reference, the biological and ecological aspects of race relations
are regarded as the first phase of race relations. The next phase involves
the development of economic relations between the white and coloured races.
The third aspect of race relations includes the various types of political
systems which have been established in order to maintain control and resolve
the conflicting interests of white and coloured peoples. In the final stage, the
racial problem becomes a problem of social organisation in what are called
multi-racial communities and a problem of world organisation involving
European and coloured peoples who have achieved political independence, or
European states and coloured peoples who are struggling to become independent
nations"^. Yet this is more than a summary of Park's approach; it
constitutes the organisational structure of Frazier's account of "the three racial
frontiers" of the world, the American South, Latin America and South
( 2 )
Africa . Frazier's major contribution to the clarification of what are'Yace 
relations"can be found in his analysis of the development of the sociology of 
"race relations"within the emergence of sociology in the United States.
According to Frazier, sociological theorising on "race relations" prior 
to Robert Park was guided by assumptions of Negro inferiority and the 
undesirability of racial accomodation. In Park, however, the analysis moved 
to a sophisticated plateau untilising "such social psychological tools as
(3 )attitudes, social distance and Sumner's concept of the mores"' . At the 
same time, Frazier censures Park's uncritical appropriation of Sumner's 
fatalistic biologism, his superficial treatment of ecological,political,and 
economic factors and the static nature of his perspective prior to the publication
1) E. Franklin Frazier in G. Franklin Edwards (ed .) E. Franklin Frazier 
on Race Relations (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1968),
p. 106.
2) E. Franklin Frazier, Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World 
(Beacon Press, Boston 1957).
3) G. Franklin Edwards (ed .) E. Franklin Fruzier on Race Relations, 
op. clt. p. 41.
£
of "the Nature of Race Relations" in 1939. For Frazier,Parks major contribution 
is his later emphasis on the dynamic nature ofrace relations? This changing 
nature of'race relations'Frazier attempted to develop into a global,racial 
historiography. Not surprisingly, then, Frazier did not identify Park's 
writings as derived from an empiricist epistemology, or even from the 
sociology of Georg Simmel. His corrective to Park's lapses is a plea that the 
sociology of'Vace relations"!« not insensitive to economic and ecological 
factors. The concept,class is virtually absent from his work so that his 
brief analysis of the economic organisation emerging during racial contacts 
is restricted to descriptions of "white capital and coloured labour". Frazier's 
theoretical contribution,then, constitutes an unoriginal continuation of Park's 
theories.
Park’ s inconsistencies are the inevitable consequence of the epistemological
tradition within which he theorised - em piricism ^. It means that the theorist
genuflects before what is considered to be the real, everyday events and
experiences of actors . But this olieisance to reality is a self-imposed
hallucination which has fatal consequences for theoretical investigation. We have
seen how the reality of "race relations" receded from each of Park's definitions
until race lost all conceptual specificity. What needs to be explained is: why
was the sociology of race relations developed as a sub-discipline within sociology
despite the formidable incoherence of Park's works? This continuous repetition
of Park's definitional ambiguities ami general theoretical superficiality can only
be explained as a necessary consequence of a dominant empiricist tradition.
It demonstrates too the common epistemological principles between Robert Park and
contemporary sociologists of "race relations".
Despite the absence of any explicit acknowledgment of Robert Park's
influence, British sociologist of the post-war years followed Park in
( 2 )
his emphasis on colour as a determinant of status and conflict. The
1) See Don Martindale's exposition of the consanguinary relationship between 
philosophical schools and sociological theories, lie writes: Positivistic 
orgunlclsm is made possible by the fusion of older forms of philosophical 
idealism and empiricism. Conflict sociology is the scientific extension
of historical empiricism. Formalism was suggested by neo-Kantian 
empiricism and phenomenology". The Nature and Types of Sociological 
Theory (Routledgc and Kegan Paul, Ixwdon 1961) p. X. 2
2) See Kenneth Little, Negroes in Britain (Routlcdge and Kegan Paul, London 
1947); Michael Banton, White and Coloured (Jonathan Cape, London 1959).
12
now disabused term "coloured people" is a legacy of the 'colour-class' and
'stranger' hypotheses initially proposed by Kennth Little and Michael Banton
respectively. For Little, Britain's colonial past had bequeathed a legacy of
stigmatised conceptions of the Negro so that they were found unacceptable to
Englishmen. Banton posited that the impact of the Negro's racio-cultural
strangeness contributes to his rejection by the British people^. But Banton’s
hypothesis evinces an ambivalence toward race and culture. It is not stated
whether it is the Negro's distinct anatomical characteristics or, customs and
mannerisms which constitute this strangeness. If the latter, then,how do we
explain the social rejection of Anglicised Negroes? If the former, however,
then the stranger hypothesis can be subjected to the same criticisms which
E. Franklin Frazier made of Robert Park's early fatalism. For example,
many European explorers have related their first contact with natives as
comprisingfascination, curiosity and friendliness. The European was sometimes
( 2 )
regarded as a visitation of the Gods,or an evil omen . These phenomena
hardly support the postulate of an Instinctive attitude to strangers. Moreover,
the theses of both Banton and Uttle ignore the more general problem of status
( 3 )stratification and patterns of social intercourse.' '  Neither author discussed
the social rejection of "English people" by "English people".
These theses were subsumed within the immigrant-host model which
(4)
was adopted by a considerable number of theorists in the early 1%0’s 
In "Dark Strangers," Sheila Patterson argues that coloured people were above 
all immigrants,and their socio-economic situation is explicable in terms of 1
1) Compare this viewpoint to Robert Park's "We at once fear and are 
fascinated by the stranger, and an individual of a different race always 
seems more of a stranger to us than one of our own". Introduction to 
the Science of Sociology (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1921), 
p. 578.
2) Cf. E. Franklin Frazier, Race andCulture Contacts in the Modern 
World, op. cit. Ch. II. See also Brewton Berry, op. cit. pp. 98-104.
3) See below, Ch. V.
4) Ruth Glass, Newcomers(Allen and Unwin, London 1960). Sheila 
Patterson, Dark Strangers (Penguin, Middlesex 19o3).
Peach, West Indian Migration to London (Oxford University 
Press, London 1968).
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an immigrant-absorption cycle. Colour, however, Increases visibility and
thereby complicates the generational cycles of the absorption of immigrants.
In her opinion, students of "race relations" had erred in stressing either
race or colour: " . . .  what we have in Britain is not or not yet basically
a colour or a race situation, however much it may appear to be so to many
colour conscious immigrants - it is an immigrant s i t u a t i o n I n
Patterson's view, the social status of West Indians is a consequence of
their economic situation rather than preconceptions from the colonial past.
ilms the situation must be explained,in terms of socio-economic class
affilitations, of cultural contacts and conflicts, of rural and urban differences
of adaptation and acceptance between immigrants or a minority group and
,  . ( 2 )the receiving society" . The host society was not particularly prejudiced 
or hostile toward West Indian immigrants,for the antipathy which often 
confronted them was directed also at Polish immigrants,or residents of another 
street or village.
Patterson's work,allegedly within the immigrant absorption perspective, 
made a significant concession to the orthodox emphasis on colour. West 
Indians were above all immigrants like any other,but noticeably,dark strangers. 
This concession to the social psychological approach is absent in Ceri Peach's 
analysis. Peach explained the West Indian presence in Britain in terms of 
push-pull factors, i.e. the constellation of social economic and political 
determinants of population shifts between two distinct regions. The push 
element was the absence of opportunities for economic advancement for large 
sections of the labour force in Britain's colonies' . Peach focused on the pull 
element in West Indian migration to Britain seeing it as a direct response 
to Britain's labour needs. There was, however, a disequilibrium between 
these labour requirements and social welfare provisions so that:"..Migration 
produced a conflict between the economic and social needs of Britain. The 
shortage of workers made West Indians economically acceptable: the shortage 123
1) Sheila Patterson, op. cit. p. 17.
2) ibid. p. 19.
3) For an analysis of this factor, see R.B. Davison, West Indian Migrants 
(Oxford University Press, London 1962).
an immigrant-absorption cycle. Colour, however, increases visibility and
thereby complicates the generational cycles of the absorption of immigrants.
In her opinion, students of "race relations" had erred in stressing either
race or colour: " . . .  what we have in Britain is not or not yet basically
a colour or a race situation, however much it may appear to be so to many
colour conscious immigrants - it is an immigrant situation" ^ \  In
Patterson's view, the social status of West Indians is a consequence of
their economic situation rather than preconceptions from the colonial past.
Thus the situation must be explained,in terms of socio-economic class
affilitations, of cultural contacts and conflicts, of rural and urban differences
of adaptation and acceptance between immigrants or a minority group and
, , „(2)the receiving society . The host society was not particularly prejudiced 
or hostile toward West Indian immigrants,for the antipathy which often 
confronted them was directed also at Polish immigrants,or residents of another 
street or village.
Patterson's work,allegedly within the immigrant absorption perspective, 
made a significant concession to the orthodox emphasis on colour. West 
Indians were above all immigrants like any other,but noticeably,dark strangers. 
This concession to the social psychological approach is absent in Ceri Peach’s 
analysis. Peach explained the West Indian presence in Britain in terms of 
push-pull factors, i.e. the constellation of social economic and political 
determinants of population shifts between two distinct regions. The push 
element was the absence of opportunities for economic advancement for large
( 3 )sections of the labour force in Britain's colonies' . Peach focused on the pull 
element in West Indian migration to Britain seeing it as a direct response 
to Britain's labour needs. There was, however, a disequilibrium between 
these labour requirements and social welfare provisions so that:"..Migration 
produced a conflict between the economic and social needs of Britain. The 
shortage of workers made West Indians economically acceptable: the shortage 123
1) Sheila Patterson, op. cit. p. 17.
2) ibid. p. 19.
3) For an analysis of this factor, see R.B. Davison, West Indian Migrants 
(Oxford University Press, London 1962).
an immigrant-absorption cycle. Colour, however, Increases visibility and
thereby complicates the generational cycles of the absorption of immigrants.
In her opinion, students of "race relations" had erred in stressing either
race or colour: " . . .  what we have in Britain is not or not yet basically
a colour or a race situation, however much it may appear to be so to many
colour conscious immigrants - it is an immigrant s i t u a t i o n I n
Patterson's view, the social status of West Indians is a consequence of
their economic situation rather than preconceptions from the colonial past.
Thus the situation must be explained'/in terms of socio-economic class
affllitations, of cultural contacts and conflicts, of rural and urban differences
of adaptation and acceptance between immigrants or a minority group and
( 2)
the receiving society . The host society was not particularly prejudiced 
or hostile toward West Indian immigrants,for the antipathy which often 
confronted them was directed also at Polish immigrants,or residents of another 
street or village.
Patterson's work,allegedly within the immigrant absorption perspective, 
made a significant concession to the ortlxxiox emphasis on colour. West 
Indians were above all immigrants like any other,but noticeably,dark strangers. 
This concession to the social psychological approach is absent in Ceri Peach's 
analysis. Peach explained the West Indian presence in Britain in terms of 
push-pull factors, i.e . the constellation of social economic and political 
determinants of population shifts between two distinct regions. The push 
element was the absence of opportunities for economic advancement for large 
sections of the labour force in Britain's colonies' . Peach focused on the pull 
element in West Indian migration to Britain seeing it as a direct response 
to Britain's labour needs. There was, however, a disequilibrium between 
these labour requirements and social welfare provisions so that:"..Migration 
produced a conflict between the economic and social needs of Britain. The 
shortage of workers made West Indians economically acceptable: the shortage 123
1) Sheila Patterson, op. clt. p. 17.
2) ibid. p. 19.
3) For an analysis of this factor, see R.B. Davison, West Indian Migrants 
(Oxford University Press, Ixmdon 1962).
of housing made them socially undesirable"^. ’ •nmigratlon.then.is a 
function of the cyclical gyrations of the British economy,while the ensuing 
residential problems - the seed-bod of racial conflict - was responsible 
to the housing shortage in central urban areas as well as the prejudices of 
landlords.
Peach's conception of acceptability is problematic. Were West 
Indian workers acceptable or profitable? 'rhus, to whom were they acceptable? 
The merit of the analysis, however, lies in the attempt to develop a structural- 
conflict approach as well as the conceptualisation of the West Indian as 
immigrant workers rather than Negroes,or strangers.
Are West Indians a racial group,coloured immigrants,or immigrant 
workers? This question forms the background to race relations dissertations 
between 1947-1973^. The title of Little's book "Negroes in Britain" had set 
the tone of discussion and in the intervening years colour and immigration 
theses co-existed peacefully, especially since theorists did not systematically 
discuss one another's works.
In 1967, Michael Bant on initiated an unnoticed revolution by translating 
his earlier emphasis on colour into "race relations". Banton’s "Race 
Relations" was the first major exposition of the race relations prospective 12
1) Ceri Peach, op. cit.p. 100.
2) In 1960, Ruth Glass ftill had not found an answer "Migrant is a 
defective substitute for the even less suitable work ’ immigrant'.
The terms 'race', 'racial' or 'race relations' are worst of all:
'race' is not a scientifically valid category; 'race relations' are 
not discrete phenomena, but the term implies that they could be 
thus considered. Although I have avoided such words as much as 
possible, I must apologise for not having been able to do so altogether".
- op. cit. p. XIII. What, however, is the alternative to "race 
relations"?
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to he published in Britain^. Like Park and Frazier lie 'mapped' "race
relations" globally and historically and proposed "six orders of race relations":
institutionalised contact, acculturation, domination, paternalism, integration,
and pluralism. These are,in his view,"typical sequences in the changing
( 2 )
patterns of "race relations' . "Race relations’for Banton.are the observed 
behaviour of races in their various contact situations or sequences. The 
nature of these relations, however, is related to people's beliefs about race.
In Bunion's words: "Patterns of race relations during the last two hundred 
years have been influenced by what people believed to be the nature of race
.(3 )and it is necessary, therefore,to take account of these ideas' . Race relations 
then, pre-exist the beliefs which social scientists are advised to merely take 
account of. It is not a case of social scientists designating particular social 
relations as racial in confirmity with actors' definitions. Rather, social 
relations are by definition "race relations','when the actors are of a different 
race. Banton's approach then, belongs to the biological variant of race 
relations studies.
The rejection by Sheila Patterson and (marginally) Ruth Glass of the 
race relations perspective was a novel attempt to break away from a then 
rapidly developing orthodoxy. However, Patterson's cyclical explanation cum 123
1) An Institute of Race Relations was established in Britain as early as 
1957 "to encourage and facilitate the study of the relations between 
races". For indispensable analyses of its politics, see Robin Jenkins,
The Pnxluction of Knowledge at the Institute of Race Relations (National 
Libour Press lid ., London 1971); A. Sivanandan, Race and 
Resistance: 'Pie 1RR Story (The Institute of Race Relations, Iondon 1974).
Up to 1973*the Institute received financial support from various firms 
and Foundations which was used to sponsor race relations research and 
publications, niese studies were part of this sponsoring» Michael 
Banton, Race Relations (Tavistock, London 1967). John Rex and Robert 
Moore, Race, Community and Conflict (Oxford University Press 1967). 
Between 1947-1967 colour had become race relations. But just as the 
coloured-immigrant perspective is an assimilation of the two divergent 
emphases so a certuin genius for compromise re-asserted itself in 
1969 with the publication of E.J.B. Rose and Nicholas Deakin, Colour 
and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations (Oxford University 
Press, London 1969». Colour, class and race had come full circle.
2) Michael Banton, op. cit. p. 75.
3) Ibid, p. 3.
prediction is as speculative as Park's. Like Park,she failed to specify the
economic and political conditions of the transition to absorption. Moreover,
in a culturally pluralistic society,to which culture must the immigrants
conform before they can be said to have been assimilated? These silences
on Patterson's part are compounded by the absence of any theoretical
substantiation of her rejection of face relations" Significantly, however,
it came at a time when the theory of race was being disputed in scientific
circles^ \ Indeed, over the last two decades the theory of race has been
subjected to severe and sustained criticisms from certain biologists. Debate
has settled around the arbitrary nature of classificatory criteria and the
impossibility of unambiguously demarcating racial frontiers. Sociologists
are necessarily involved. For, if the sociology of'Vace relations'is concerned
with races as they interact, it inevitably becomes embroiled in controversy
over the scientific status of racial classifications. Tims the multiplicity of
"scientific" definitions of "race" would make'tace relations',' as the study of
relations between races, an enterprise based on biology rather than
sociological theory^ \loreover, how can relations between actors lie termed
racial,if race is a disputed biological category?
Sociologists of "race relations" attempted to resolve this problem
by recourse to a complex sociological perspective, but one already contained
in Park's definitional efforts - phenomenology. In the words of one of its
prqionents : "If men define situations as real then they are real in their
( 3 )consequences"' Ilius, irrespective of the scientific status of race,in so 
far as actors define their situation racially, then race is a social reality.
The sociology o fh ice relations"then can be an autonomous theoretical activity 
with It! Avn object - ’bace relations'.’ litis movement from a biological to a 
phenomenological constitution of'hice relatlons"represents an important
1) See Ashley Montagu, Statement on Race (Oxford University Press,
London 1972). 23
2) See Leonard Lieberman, "The Debate over Race" in James E. Curtis
and John Petr as (eds.) The Sociology of Knowledge, (Duckworth, London 1970).
3) Morris Janowitz (ed .) W .I. Thomas on Social Organisation and Social 
Personality, Selected Papers (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1966), 
p. 301.
re-conceptualisation of social structure. In the biological approach,social 
structure is perceived as the observable behaviour of physically divergent 
racial types. In the phenomenological, social structure is conceived in 
terms of unobservable categorisations and expectations. It is not race,but 
the social interpretation of racial differences which matters.
As we have seen, Park was poised uncomfortably between defining 
his object on the basis of competitive biological races and the phenomenology 
of race, i.e . the actor’ s consciousness of race. It is therefore correct to 
say that he also pioneered the phenomenology of social interaction between 
"blacks" and "whites". This can be explained with reference to the 
'intersubjective' social analysis which was developed at the Chicago School 
of Sociology in the first three decades of the twentieth century^ . The 
phenomenological justification then,belongs to a complex sociological tradition 
whose epistemological and theoretical inter-relationships deserve considerable 
analysis. Thus Patterson's rejection of phenomenologically defined'Yace 
re!ations"had been much too summary. Indeed, she rejected the intersubjective 
approach without nullifying it,and thereby left space for its subsequent 
development in Britain. This development can be identified in the writings of 
John Rex.
Among post-war sociologists of'bace relationtyjohn Rex presents the 
most ambitious attempt to define and justify the sociology of'Vace relations'.'
As regards specifying its object, Rex confessed to a certain discomfiture*. 
"There is, however, a particularly difficult problem in defining the field of 
the sociology of"race relations," which arises from the important role of 1
1) Cf. R. W. Fredricks, "George Herbert Mead's social behaviourism 
carried the intersubjective standard over into the graduate education 
of a whole generation of sociologists trained at the University of 
Chicago, many of whom have played leading roles in the development 
of the discipline over the last three decades", A Sociology of 
Sociology (The Free Press, New York 1970) p. 209; E. Franklin 
Frazier also testifies "The sociological theories of Park in regard to 
race relations were developed originally in close association with 
Thomas. Park who was observing race relations in the South was 
on constant communication with Thomas'.', in G. Franklin Edwards 
(ed .) op. cit. p. 37.
beliefs In the very constituting of the p.ohlcm in question" . What is the 
problem in question? " . . .  race relations situations and problems have 
the following characteristics: they refer to situations in which two or more 
groups with distinct identities and recognisable characteristics are forced 
by economic and political circumstances to live together in a society.
Within this they refer to situations in which there is a high degree of conflict 
between the groups and in which ascriptive criteria are used to mark out 
tlie members of each group in order that one group may pursue one of a 
number of hostile policies against the other. Finally, w ¡thin this group of 
situations true race relations situations may be said to exist when the practices 
of ascriptive allocation of roles and rights referred to are justified in terms 
of s( me kind of deterministic theory, whether that theoiy lie of a scientific, 
religious, cultural, historical, ideological or sociological kind . . .  \ Rex
is singular in the consistency of his attempt to justifyhraoe relations"as a 
distinct field of study within sociology. For,in both Park and Frasier,we see 
sustained attempts to constitute "race relations" in a multi-disciplinary context. 
Ilms when they encroached on other fields it was justified in terms of the 
overall compK xity of social interaction. Hanlon continued this tradition by 
conceiving the sociology of'Vace relatlons"as "an applied social science" 
which ncce' arily encompasses other disciplines . lie did not concern 
himself with the implications of competing explanations of "race relations" being 
offered by the various sciences, since: "The psychologists and sociologists 
examine the same data, the same 'facts' but from different aspects . . .  " ^
Hie interpretations of the facts are .assumed to lie complementary. Rex, on 
the other hand,emphasised his interest in race relations sociology ns an auto­
nomous sub-discipline, a sui generis.
Rex's concern with the independenceandspecificity of'Vace relations" 
sociology may be seen in the context of his opposition to the immigrant-host
0  John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory (Weldcnfeld and 
Nlcolson, 1/n id on 1970) p. 7,
ibid. p. 159-1h0.
Michael Haiiton, Race Relations, op. cit. p. 2.
Ibid. p. t().
2 )
3)
4 )
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framework. In his first major work on "race',' lie criticised its conception
of the host society as one of order and stab ility^ . His alt rnative conception
posited a social system with dysfunctional attributes of ini igroup conflicts.
Seven years later,Rex expressed his opposition to other approaches from the
same conflict position. In his view, the Marxist model of race relations,
the contributions of minority group and stratification theories all fail to
clarify the distinct dimensions of’Vace relations’.' For "race re!ations"are not
a case of stratification, cultural diversity or ideology, but inter-group
( 2 )
conflict of a special kind
When are problems, relations, and situations racial? For Rex, the
decisive element is actors racial beliefs or deterministic rationalisations.
Rex goes further, however, and delineates what lie feels to be the structural
underpinnings of race relations situations. He lists the following: frontier
situations of conflict over scarce resources, the existence of unfree, indentured,
or slave labour, unusually harsh class exploitation, strict legal intergroup
distinctions and occupational specialisation, differential access to power and
prestige,cultural diversity and limited group interaction and migrant labour
(31as an underclass fulfilling stigmatised roles in a metropolitan context' .
These are in Rex’s words " . . .  historical situations in which it is frequently 
the case that the problem of relations between men are defined as problems
(4)
of race relations' . Three significant postulates emerge from Rex's analysis; 
Race relations problems are situations of conflict and discrimination which 
are deterministically justified. Hie social structural basis of these phenomena 
is Furopean colonialism, imperialism and migrant labour to metropolises.
The sociology of'race relations"is concerned with the study of these processes 
and is so designated because of actors' racial conceptions and beliefs.
1) John Rex and Robert Moore, Race Community and Conflict, op. cit. p. 14.
2) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. clt. Ch. 1.
3) John Rex, Race Colonialism and the City (Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London 1973) pp. 203-204.
4) ibid. p. 203. Hie grammatical error "the problem . . .  are" Is not 
Insignificant. It is a Freudian slip which shows that it Is the sociologist 
who defines the problem as'Vace relations','while what Rex tells us is 
that relations arc defined by actors as'Vace relations'.' '
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Rex's analysis contains serious inadequacies. Those that are 
particularly dish alive concern his confusion of taxonomy and theorising and 
liis idealist conception of social structure.
He defines his field of study on the basis of actors' beliefs,or more 
precisely.deterministic justifications. Rut lie does not explain them in that 
it is not stated whether the relationship between the factors in his definition 
are necessary ones. Must all ascriplivc procedures lx; accompanied by 
deterministic expressions? Rex does not even pose this qn stion. He is 
concerned not with explanation but categorisation. This educes social 
analysis to the mere elaborating of a ' hoc taxonomy which d signates 
phenomena rather than clarify the necessary conditions of I ir existence. 
"Actors" frequently come to define their relations as "rui altions". 'Ihe 
key term here is frequently. How frequently? Since Rex i unwilling,or 
unable to posit theoretical relationships he reduces social n lysis to a 
positivistic enumeration of characteristics. 'Hie problem ' c i v  is that since 
no theoretical relationship is postulated, Rex is free to di idi what is 
ascriptive and what are deterministic justifications, hide ■ d, ote the scope 
of his determinism:"scientific, religious, cultural, historical, ideological or 
sociological" as well as the omnibus underpinnings whirl Include slavery, 
colonialism, capitalism, imperialism and division of 1 alxn r. Ilius, even at 
the taxonomic level, where Rex’s analysis begins and ends, hi definition of 
race relations situations encompasses all social relations. How then does 
he conceive the sociology of'race relatlons"as a sub-dlsciplln within 
sociology? What are non-race relations situations? Moreover, since the 
breadth of Rex's definition makes'Vaee relatlons"iiulistlnguishable from 
general relations of exploitation,why a sociology of'race re1ations"and not 
of exploitation? Nor Is Rex consistent in accusing 'Immigrant' theorists of 
ignoring conflict while himself asserting that the metropolitan working class 
had become quiescent through its acquisition of citizen's welfare rights^ . 1
1) John Rex and Robert Moore, Race Community and Conflict, op. clt. p. 15.
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in an "integrated social o rd er"^ .
Rex's approach posits a highly generalised neo-Parkian model of
inter-group relations with a structural-functionalist variable (ascriptive
processes) as its core element. Ilis attempt at a synthesis produced such
eclectic opacities as: "Our own view is that the element of ascriptive allocation
is an intermediate term between such factors as class conflict and exploitation
( 2 )on the one hand, and racist theories on the other . We may note the 
confusion of levels of analysis. For if ascriptive allocation is an intermediate 
term, it has no place between the "factors" of class conflict and "racist 
theories". Nothing is explained here merely terminologically categorised. 
Moreover, the mention of class conflict and exploitation is rhetorical in so 
far as Rex nowhere clarifies their content and significance. At root, the model 
of race relations situations constitutes a simple notion of racial discrimination 
as practised by one group against another and justified in terms of race. 'Iliis 
is hardly innovatory or a theoretical improvement on Park.
Rex’s works on "race relations" constitute a sophisticated defence of 
the phenomenological tradition in social analysis. His epistemology is empiricist 
in that he thinks "actors" refer to real people rather than a relation within 
liis theory. lie writes: "The sociologists seek to apply concepts to the 
understanding of social relations, and social relations in turn depend upon
(3 )the conceptualisations which actors make of their world and of other actors'" ' . 
Tims Rex, like most sociologists of "race relations", take a prefatory bow 
to "the actors’ definition of the situation". The general view is that in so far 
as actors define themselves in racial terms, there exist social races and a 123
1) For Rex,"Tile peculiar position of minorities arises from the fact 
that they are unintegrated minorities in a relatively stable and 
integrated social order". Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. 
cit. p. 88. Note the tautology Involved in the notion of an
"unIntegrated minority".
2) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. cit. p. 118.
3) Ibid. pp. 8-9.
(sociological) race problem^. Thus the sociology of'Vacc relntion^'studies 
relations between phenotypically different people not because of tliese 
differences, but by virtue of the social significance of racial identities in 
social interaction.
’Hie suggestion that the actors' definition of the situation l>e the starting
point of social analysis is of questionable theoretical virtue. Is a definition
an attitude, an expressed belief,or interpretation of an actor's state of mind?
Sociologists of "race relations" have not as yet documented the existence of
racial definitions of the situation. Indeed, it seems quite likely that the
"actors" are the race relations theorists themselves, litis is related to the
further problem of choice of actors. There is considerable evidence of "whites"
justifying their opposition to "blacks" and immigration in terms of the increased
competition over jobs as well as housing, e ducational and welfare amenities.
For example, in August 1972, as part of the opposition to the influx of
Ugandan Asians to Birmingham, one shop steward remarked "We are concerned
for the future of our children. There are not enough jobs or houses for our people'
A month later,factory workers drew up a petition and demonstrated against
Ugandan Asians entering the city. An Asian worker was "happy" to sign the
petition. One shop steward who led the demonstration emphasised: "This is
not a racial protest at all, black and white must stick together and keep these
(3)
Asians out to make sure our children have a future" . During the "Nolting
Hill race riots", a Manchester Guardian reporter wrote: "Another youth who
had also lx-en calling for a lynching, turned to me and said: "Tell them we've
got a bad enough housing shortage ¡1 round here without them moving in. Keep
(4)
Britain white" . ihis remark can be interpreted as an 'economic' definition 1
1) This is no doubt the ultimate justification of race relations studies to l>e 
found in virtually every such work published from the 195l)'s. Ihe term 
"social race" appears to have been first used by Charles Wagley (ed .) 
Race and Class in Rural Brazil (Unesco, Paris 1952) p. 14. But for a 
review of the consensus, see Andrew Und (ed .) Race Relations in World 
Perspective (Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1955), Introduction.
2) Birmingham Mail, 22.8.1972.
3) Birmingham Mail, 2.9.1972.
4) Manchester Guardian, September 2, 1958. Cited In Ruth Class, op.clt. 
p. 138. See also BBC Interview with "Teddy Boys", pp. 261-269.
of the situ.it'm,for the "keep Britain white" is a function of a perceived 
housing shortage. 'Hie question then is: why do sociologists of "race 
relations" ignore those actors who do not define "race relations situations" 
racially?
In our view, racial sentiments, although themselves responses to 
racial questions can lie inter])reted in the context of the type of working 
class organisation. We would argue that the fact of some'kshltetf’justifying 
their opposition to'blacks'Mn economic terms invites a consideration of the 
relationship between racial definitions and class organisation. For their 
opposition is as workers in struggle. 'Hie object of this opposition to black 
workers suggests that the struggle is within the relations of distribution - 
the wage and price levels. We would postulate that in conditions of struggle 
against distribution relations, particularistic forms of working class 
organisation must prevail. For in so far as the totality, capitalist processes 
of production as contradictory commodity relations dominated by capital, is 
not "grasped by the masses" class organisation is necessarily fragmented.
Thus the unemployed, the nun-unionised worker, and all "swellers" of 
the labour market are seen as the threat, or malaise. If, on the other hand, the 
hasi •; of capitalist it lal ions of product inn is seen through,the bourgeoisie 
become the object of opposition and proletarian organisation and struggle 
would ensue. We shall return to tin se themes in our final chapter. Suffice 
to observe here that a methodological emphasis on the actors definition of 
the situation cannot obscure the fact that the necessary choosing of "actors" 
and "definitions" is guided by the theoretical judgement of the sociologist. 
Sociologists of race relation^then, merely say they arc loyal to the actors 
definition of the situation. We shall see more evidence of this Inconsistency 
in their treatment o f groups" and "social races".
For the concept of social races is amenable to a threefold 
interpretation. It can lie taken to lie a referent of a sense of belonging to 
a particular race. A sociologist would therefore be able to designate relations 
between phenotypes as’Vace relatlons"as long as expressions of a racial 
identity are evident, 'lids we would regard as the conservative interpretation
in that race is aeen ns (structuring) tlie social reality^ . "Social races” ,
however, contain a radical kernal. For the term social suggests that the
problem is not one of race but the racialisation of social interaction - if
that indeed be the case - by particular socio-economic condition . Race is then
•m ( n as afft . ting the social n ably. However, actors define but do not
design their social relations, They come to express their conceptions
racially under specific social circumstances. The theoretical problem then
becomes not, as Rex would have it "taking account of the actors own definition
( 2 )
of the situation" , but the constructing of logically interconnected concepts 
demonstrating relationships between the social structure and racial expressions. 
This cannot be effected by an analysis whose departure point is the actors' 
definition. For then this definition ceases to be problematic and is not 
theoretically analysed. Moreover, understanding the actors' definition does 
not necessitate defining a field of study in correspondence with it. Many 
actors define their situation, and this is understood by sociologists, as one 
of exploitation. Yet it would be extremely difficult to find these sociologists 
suggesting a sociology of class exploitation in its own right, lhe subservience 
to the actors' definition is thus seen to be specific to sociologists of "race 
relations". We shall see, however, that they tire not aware of the 
complexities of this methodology and indeed, abandon it completely.
A radical understanding of "social races" means that if racial 
expressions are taken as evidence of race affecting social reality, then 
social relations are not racial but racialised. 'Hie object of social analysis 
must therefore be not "race relations" hut racialised relations. A more 
radical, or revolutionary conception of "social races" abolishes both "race 
relations" and racialised relations: Social relations are not reducible to 12
1) Cf. Ijco Kuper "Clearly racial differences are of a more enduring 
nature than class differences and there are very extensive social 
correlates of class differences in many racially structured societies.
In some critical respects relevant to conceptions, class structures 
and racial structures constitute different systems of stratification, 
however much they may overlap . . . "  Ideology and Revolutionary Change 
in Plural Societies (Duckworth, Ix>ndon 1974) p. 67.
2) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. cit. p. 161.
This methodological structure is ambiguous to the point of obscurantism. 
Does "take account" mean consider, examine, or treat as canons of 
theoretical validity? For Rex’ s rejection of it, see p. 281 lx iow.
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men's opinions and theories. Tlius going further we may say that it is not 
ihe relations which are raciallsed but that verbal behaviour lakes a 
particular!st_ic (racial,or si vuni, or regional) form under determinate 
social and poltlcal conditions. The investigation of this relationship does not 
require and cannot be designated the sociology of'race relations'.’ Thus on 
its own terms such a sociology is an indefensible theoretical practice.
It is now easier lo understand why the writings of both the biological 
and phenomenological theorists of race relations cover the same terrain of 
"racial contacts". Indeed, the phenomenological variant o f "race relations" 
merely preserves a racial historiography in which the history of the post- 
Columbus world is a history of racial struggles,conflict and domination.
Hither way, "race relations" are necessarily historicised and eternalised. 
Sociologists can thus dissertate on race ad infinitum. Hiis is clearly brought 
out in two revealing passages from John Rex: "On the other hand, there will 
lx? some situations in which the hostile policies are justified and 
rationalised in terms of racist theory, and these are obviously to lie included 
in core race relations studies. On the other hand there are cases in which 
racist assumptions are implicit in the policies pursued and in which it is the 
i-.rV 0f the» sociologists of race relations to understand tlie in "^ . Hither 
way, then, the sociologist deckles when racist values are operative. Hie 
actors' definition is discarded and the object of race relations studies is now 
seen to be not a reality 'out-lherc', but a pnxluct of particular sociological 
theories.
The second passage is even norc revealing in that the sociologist 
Is asked to continue studylng'rncc relations'even after racist beliefs and 
definitions have been exposed: "But the fact that the sociologist studying race 
relations finds himself unmasking racist liellefs by no means implies that 
there is no field of race relations studies. Social categories depend for their 
existence on the subjective definition given to them by social actors. Race is 
v no exception. So long as it exists in the minds ol men there will Ik- race
relations problems to study just ¡is there will be men who can lx; helped to fight 
against the buttressing of injustice by the use of pseudo-scientific
I) ibid. 1. 134.
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be lie fs "^ . Rex is not concerned with tlie relationship between hjs
theoretical practice and the content of men's minds. lie ignores the
possibility that hijs definitions may well be the only basis of race relations
sociology. For surely so long as Institutes and Research on Race Relations
persist, then race will be in mens' minds? Are not these men to lie
helped,therefore, fighting a shadow created by race relations research? It is
arguable that if the intellectual and material resources which have been
alloted to race studies to date had been devoted to research on class
exploitation, then the proletariat would be seeing itself as belonging to a
different race from the bourgeoisie and engaging in massive conflict to
realise its interests. In doing so, both "blacks" and "whites" might well
have been liberated in the process.
From our criticisms,it should not be assumed that some sociologists
of "race relations" are not aware of the inadequacies of their discipline,
although it is doubtful if they perceive its fundamental untenability. Pierre
van den Berghe, for example, accuses his colleagues of lxung athcoretical,
and look a critical stance towards the construction of a theory of "race
relations". lie wrote: "Part of the reluctance of race scholars to indulge
in theory construction may be the fear of cogitating themselves out of a
speciality. Or, phrased differently, the failure to arrive at a theory of
race relations may simply reflect the fact that the subject has no theoretical
(2 )
K g to on" . In v.'in ilen Rerghc's view, an independent theory of
"race relations" is Impossible even if scholars Intensify their efforts at theory
construction. For "race relations" are to be situated within a general
theory of culture and social institutions. This is because .firstly, " . . .  the
sheer unequal co-existence of two or more groups that look objectively
(3)different does not constitute a system of race relations"' Secondly, 123
1) John Rex, Race Colonialism and the City, op. cit. p. 192.
2) Pierre L. van den Berghe, op. cit. p. 6.
3) ibid. p. 23.
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"race" or "ethnic" relations are, in tlie last analysis, a special type of
relations of power and relations of production . . .  Thus, among
sociologists of "race relations", van den Bcrglie comes closest to a
repudiation of the sociology of'Vace relatlons"as an autonomous theoretical
enterprise. Hut he lias not analysed race relatlons'as a concept and his
objections to race relations theory becomes a call for its greater
sophistication. v
The importance of van den Rerghe's critical suggestions lies in
their apparently genuine attempts at theoretical enquiry. The major
problem with his analysis, however, is a peculiar inconsistency, a
significant antinomy lx tween his conception of theorising and his actual
investigations. Studies of "race relations", be asserts, are theoretically
sterile. Van den Berghe's identification of the source of this sterility then
lapses into an equally sterile personalism,visible in his charge that the
fear of abolishing race as a speciality is responsible for the low-level
theorising by race theorists. We think the problem to lx.* an epistemological
one. Race theorists, including van den Berghe, conceive their task as
one of explaining "race relations" as a theory-free social fact. They take
their conceptualisation "race relations" to be a real object in society
'out-there' to which their explanations must then correspond. Ibis
objectively militates against rigorous abstraction and thereby fosters
the fatal ambiguities which we earlier discerned. Van den Be rghe's
analysis is not an exception. Consider, for example, bis emphasis on
race as "a special case of differentiation and stratification" and "an
( 2 )
extreme case of ascribed status and lack of social mobility" , together 
with his equally powerful rejection of its Independent study. Surely 
the assertion of the speciality of race already contains a special theory - 
race relations theory. 1
1) Pierre L, van den Bcrghe, Race and Ethnicity (Basic Books Inc., 
New York, 1970) p. 12.
Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, op. cit. p, 22.2 )
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For van den Berghe, race relations exist when racial differences
are socially recognised and given stratificatory and behavioural significance.
Racism is thus inseparable from race: "The existence of races In a given
society presupposes the presence of racism, for without racism, physical
characteristics are devoid of social significance^. Racist beliefs,then,
define "race relations". However, one of van den Rerghe's major theses is
that elements of the social structure fundamentally condition these relations. 1
Thus "race relations" lake a paternalistic or competitive form,depending on
(lie relations of production. Pre-industrial societies are characterised by
paternalistic "race relations" while competitive "race relations", "the polar
opposite of the paternalistic type", are a feature of urban, industrial societies
with a complex division of labour. Van den Rerghe's conception of social
structure appears to deviate from tlie subjectivism of his colleagues in that
he makes explicit reference to relations of production as determining the
type of "race relations". The first problem here is that given the psychological
breadth of the concept "race relations^ it is impossible to refute the proposition
that they are influenced by social structure. Indeed, van den Rerghe's typology
of "rare relations" was originally (1958) designated a'typology of race
prejudice^. Secondly, is paternalism an attitude or a policy? Van den Rerghe
conflates the two categories, but this blurs an important point. If paternalism
is a po..-y then it is necessarily a policy of the ruling "whites”who,by definition,
cannot Ire competitively orientated towards "blacks". Paternalism and
competitiveness cannot lie placed at opposite ends of a spectrum. Finally,
van den Rerghe has a tcchnicist conception of relations of production. This
allows him to escape the defining ofcapitalist production and posit such
economies as: non-manufacturing, agricultural, pastoral handicraft,
, (3)
mercantile capitalism and plantation . It is obvious that van den Berghe 
takes the productive forces as tlie relations of production. He does not discuss, 
or even suggest,what constitutes mercantile capitalism as an economy and 123
1) ibid. p. 24.
2) See Pierre I,, van den Berghe, Race and F.thnicity, op. clt. p. 21.
3) Pierre I,, van den Rerghe, Race and Racism, op. cit. p. 31
whether capitalist agriculture is impossible, as an economy. His analysis 
thus becomes not theoretical explanation but description and classification 
of his race relations facts. Tills enterprise is not in itself illegitimate, but 
only in so far as it is not regarded as a contribution to theoretical knowledge 
where necessities of connection between phenomena and relations of consistency 
between explanatory categories must lie guaranteed^ \
As is evident,race relations theorists return again and again to the 
definitional problem. Phis is not unique to social scientific practices. What 
is peculiar, however, is an omnipresent circularity in the attempts to define 
"race relations*! Economics is popularly di fined as the study of that behaviour 
aimed at the allocation of scarce n sources between competing ends. The 
behaviour is not pre-defined as economic. The matter is different in race 
relations literature in that theorists,in attempting to define simultaneously 
both race relations as a sub-discipline of sociology and the phenomena w'ith 
which it is concerned,presuppose what is to lie demonstrated. Hie rubric of 
a particular perspective on social relations is thus taken to be a description 
of real social relations. Hie re is racial behaviour, the object, and the theory 
which attempts to explain it, race relations sociology. However, where 
does the theory begin and the racial social relations end? It is principally 
through the separation of the observed and conn ptualising llial'Vace relations" 
liecome the social reality and the sociological theory its explanation rather 
than its creator. Obviously race relations sociology cannot pre-exist racial 
social relations. What then explains and justifies the race perspective? Ibis 
is not an innocent question for the answer, actors and their definitions, 
illustrates the epistemological lineage and basis of race relations sociology -  
empiricism.
Theorising is conceived as a mapping of the real world: People are 
black and white and do perceive themselves as such, litis epistemology 
leads to a concentration on the racial constitution and consciousness of 
actors, and, Inevitably, to a loss of theoretical rigour: If social relations 
build out of different racial morphologies,lit.dr explanation is Impossible 
in conditions of racial homogeneity, for example, relations of int ra- racial
1) Cf. Paul Q, Hirst, Social Involution and Sociological Categories 
(Allen and Unwin, london 1976) p. 125.
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exploitation. 'Die history of the world then has to be a Ivstory of racial 
confrontations. Hiis explains why this history flourishes in the analysis 
of the post-Columbus world. 'Hiis mode of producing knowledge has to 
lie a theoretical nullity. For the means of validation are posed as 
extrinsic to the theory, as within the object. Yet the theory is construed 
is a textual reproduction of the object, reality. Which is primary? Moreover, 
the consciousness of real actors is a chimera,and its attempted reproduction in 
texts obscures the theoretical pre-suppositions of the theorist.above all, 
from himself, lie cannot rigorously interrogate his concepts in their 
logical ramifications,while pursuing a correspondence to the (average?) 
actor’ s definition.
An anti-empiricist analysis situates itself within the conceptual 
scheme it constructs. Hie analysis is not regarded as ontologically separate • 
from "die real world" and thus its theoretical and political implications 
are within an i iter-defined set of concepts. In contrast, an empiricist 
analysis not only seeks to abstract knowledge from the "real" but considers 
this knowledge to lx: independent,and even ’value-free’ . Thus race rclatiois 
theorists do not consider the relationship between the dissemination of 
their biological and social justifications of ’face relations"and race 
consciousness. They dissertate on "the real world" without seeing race relat­
ions theory as acting upon it. llitis these theorists do not consider the 
possibility that the explanation of the popularity of racial identities, 
designations and interpretations lies in their continuous production of race 
relations concepts.
In the empiricist tradition, theories are abstractions to be applied 
to concrete reality. Thus, given the assumption of a real world of Tace 
relations" it becomes logical to apply theories of conflict, power and roles 
to their study. Ihe racial conflict position is itself situated within the 
Parkian tradition of viewing group competition and conflict as the basis of 
historical and social processes. Park, in turn, was instrumental in 
popularising the conflict paradigm which was developed in the early years 1
1) It is therefore not surprising that race theorists have written-off
"the (white) working class" which is the safest explanation of their
preference for conceptualising "blacks" as a race, rather than as
workers.
of tlie Chicago School of Sociology^\
Modern race conflict writings postulate a general conflict
system, and direct their analysis towards group interests and struggles .
Society is seen as consisting of continuous processes of conflict amongst
fractions and strata. In opposition to the functionalist picture of a
consensual social system based on value integration, conflict theory stresses
pluralities of dissension and the omnipresence and inevitability of
reciprocal opposition. On the other hand, according to a leading
functionalist-conflict analyst, conflict is functional to the equilibrating needs
’ ( 3 )of the social order . Thus one race theorist could argue that race conflict
(4)functions to integrate the races by eliminating sporadic strain and tension'
R. A. Schermerhorn provides us with what is perhaps the most 
representative formulation of the epistemological and theoretical assumptions 
of the conflict model; "Power conflict theory begins with an initial 
advantage over system analysis since it appeals to the facts of familiar, 
everyday observation tracing out their relations by gradual and easy stages,
( 2 )
1) See Rolxirt Park and Ernest Burgess, Introduction to the Sciences 
of Sociology (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1921) Chs.
S-14. It is in this then dominant sociological text that the Chicago 
School's debt to Simmel'sdialectic of conflict is most obvious. 
Indeed, it may be categorically stated that the conflict approach to 
to race relations derives from Simmel's and Park's contept of 
conflicting social forms. See Robert Park, Hie Crowd and the 
Public and Other Essays (The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago 1972),
2) See William J. Chambliss (ed .) Sociological Readings in the conflict 
Perspective (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Massachusetts 1973). 
John Rex,Key Problems of Sociological Theory (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London 1961). N.J. Demcrath III and Richard A. Paterson 
(eds.) Systems Change and Conflict (The Free Press, New York 
1962); Ralph Dahrendorf,Class and Class Conflict in Industrial 
Society (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ixjndon 1972).
3) lewis Coser, The Function of Social Conflict (The Free Press,
New York 1956). 4
4) See Joseph S. Mimes "The Functions of Racial Conflict" In Claggct
C. Smith (ed .) Conflict Resolution: Contributions of the Behavioural 
Sciences (University of Notre Dame Press, London 1971) pp. 
175-177.
often avoiding the baffling complications encounter! 1 in the contrasting 
view. Beginning with the immediate experience of nited social encounters, 
the power conflict theory stresses the obvious fact f ii quality in most 
interactions, i.e. that what one has, the other wants, or what one wants the 
other has. Confrontations like these are unavoidable, and each of the two 
parties will focus on these items because they are either crucial to 
survival or the self-esteem of either one. What divides the two contenders 
is the inherent scarcity of means. 'Hie attempt to control these means 
leads directly to open or concealed conflict in which the exertion of power 
is needed to attain the goal. Such sorts of concrete groupings like nations, 
political parties, regional associations, ethnic groups, hbourvs. 
management, rural vs. urban sectors and the lik e "^ . These core assertions 
of the conflict perspective allegedly demonstrate its superiority over systems 
analysis as well as its relevance to ethnic relations.
For Schermerhorn, " the obvious fact of inequality" in conditions
of scarcity generates organisational and physical struggles t «wards
incompatible goals. lie is not certain, however,as to what c lstitutes
conflict and what should l>e regarded as symptoms of it. I hi problem
citinrirps from the low level of abstraction in conflict theory. In*begi lining1'
witii die facts of immediate observation and experience,a concept of conflict
cannot be systematically developed. Thus it is arbitrarily suggested that
( 2 )
con.. 1«  !s the actual physical confrontation between g r o u j . 'Ihis implies 12
1) R.A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for 
Theory and Research (Random House, New York 1970). p. 40.
2) 'Die following remarks on the theme of racial conflict a»evidence of the 
conception of conflict favoured by race theorists. For John Horton,
"The hostile action of Negro masses destroying white property is 
perhaps a more convincing demonstration of conflict theory than the 
iiopes of Negro intellectuals". "Order and Conflict Theories of Social 
Problems" in James E. Curtis and John W. Petras (ed s .) op. cit. p. 622. 
In the opinion of Cuy 11. Johnson, "a look or a gesture" may signify 
conflict, "Patterns of Race Conflict" in Edgar T. Thompson (cd .) Race 
Relations and the Race Problem (Greenwood Press Publishers, New 
York 1968) p.127.ln contrast, John Rex noti s that race relations conflict 
may be of several kinds, "In the first place there is a kind of conflict
in which a minority group is seeking to enter the stratification system 
from below. In the second, there is a sort of conflict which exists 
because two or more groups are In competition for limited resources."
Race Relations In Sociological Theory, op. cit. p. 121.
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that there is no conflict if the forms of social control of the balance of 
power aborts the organisation of protest. 'Hius there is no conflict in a 
concentration camp. !
We recall that Rex's delineation of race relations situations
fused the categories of identity, group conflict, roles and ascriptive
policies cum racist theory. The fact that his own 'conflict' sociology
borrows heavily from functionalist and phenomenological theories of
society can be seen as a manifestation of the idealist theory of social action
which conjoins them. Where Rex appears to depart from functionalism
is in his focus on group conflict: "In those cases which concern us there
is always a high potentiality for conflict inherent in tlie situation. Amongst
those situations, however, there are some in which groups rather than
individuals are parties to the conflict. That is to say, groups do not form
as Marx classes in themselves were assumed to form, in the course of
the conflict. Their existence is recognised as preceding the conflict so
that conflict positions are assigned in terms of recognisable group
characteristics"^. For Rex, the necessary and sufficient condition for
a problem to be defined as one of race relations'is the rationalising of
ascriptive modes of reward in terms of deterministic beliefs. In positing
the critical salience of beliefs,this approach stands opposed to that which
identifies the objective class structure as having definitional and historical
primat, ' «.¡al analyses. Hut Rex's search for "a non-Marxist
alternative leads him into a cavalier treatment of class evinced by his
indifference to: the labour situation of the white working class, the labour
market competition intrinsic to wage-labour exploitation, the inadequate
social welfare provisions in capitalist societies and the political economic
significance of "black labour" to capital accumulation.Indeed, rather
than a (white) working class in conflict with a ruling class, it is proposed
( 2 )
that we think in terms of black and white groups in conflict.
Indeed, conflict theorists on "race relations" appear to be 
involved in sustained efforts to transform, through widely disseminated
1) ibid. p. 132 (emphasis In the original).
2) ibid. p. 161.
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race relations textbooks and media commentaries, races "in themselves" 
(biological) into races "for themselves". Scattered throughout their 
writings are dire predictions of the inevitability of race war and the 
immorality of white oppression and exploitation.side by side with a rejection 
of Marx's emphasis on the revolutionary potential of the working class, 
and while Marx's apocalyptic clash culminates in a classless society, they 
see no solution and, indeed, cannot see an end to the racial inferno to 
which their vision condemns us. One needs to be careful not to draw a parallel 
with Enoch Powell's prophecy of "rivers of blood" . Rut if, or when, the 
chickens come home to roost,we at least are already informed of the 
intellectual-political origins.
In our view,conflict theories of'Vacc rclations"are remarkably
unsystematic. Indeed,there arc five distinct weaknesses which demonstrate
this approach to lie unequivocally untenable. Nowhere in the literature
do we see a theoretical specification of different levels, dimensions and
types of conflict or a clarification of whether physical confrontation is a
necessary condition of conflict. 'Ibis absence of any conceptual and
theoretical rigour follows logically from an attenuated view of social
str,.!f’ *"**r> i" which all observable relations are given equal structural salience^.
Secondly, by the simple expediency of not differentiating types of social relations,
( 2 )
conflict and scarcity are posited as being endemic to society . Thirdly, 
thei e a simplistic attempt to reduce'" class conflict to a sub-type of group 
conflict in order to strengthen (lie picture of plural tension and dissension. 
Fourthly, the approach to group formation is idealist and fundamentally 12
1) See John Rex, Key Problems In Sociological Theory, op. cit. Chs. 
VII and VIII; Ralph Dahrendorf, op. cit. p. 162.
2) David Lockwood marshalled an impressive set of criticisms of the 
conflict and coercion models of Rex and Dahrendorf. In his view, 
they confuse social conflict and system conflict and fail to account 
for social change as "arising from the functional incompatibility 
between an institutional order and Its material base . . . "  David
(.ockwood "Social Integration and System Integration" In George 
Zollschan and Walter T. Hlrsch (eds.) Explorations in Social 
Change (Routlcdge and Kogan Paul, London 1%4)p. 2S6.
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inconsistent. Finally, the concept power is systematically vulgarised 
within the power-conflict perspective on "race relations".
What is the meaning of the concept, conflict,and what is Its relationship 
to social structure? Race theorists as we have seen have not been helpful. 
Lewis Closer's functionalist analysis of conflict suffers a similar absence 
of conceptual specification as opposed to a taxonomy of empirical conflicts. 
These empirical descriptions merely widen the applicability of the concept 
to the point of limitless freedom for the theorist. Thus Raymond Mack’s 
and Richard Snyder's criticism is very pertinent: "Conflict is for the most 
part a rubber concept, being stretched and molded for the purposes at 
hand ...  Relatively little effort has been made to specify analytically 
different properties of conflict as a generic phenomenon and to differentiate 
explicitly between conflict anil closely related concepts"^ ^ Conflict,they 
argued,must be distinguished from anti-locution, aggressiveness, rivalry, 
misunderstandings and physical confrontations. These phenomena may 
accompany conflict, but they are not synonymous with it. Following Coser, 
however, Mack and Snyder proposed the typi fi cat ion of realistic and non- 
realistic conflict. The former refers to a logical irreconcilability of goals 
or interests while the latter "arises from the need for tension release, 
historical tradition,and ignorance or error"^ . Race conflict, in the sense 
of "whites" and "blacks" identifying each other as the source of their 
..oclo-economic problems, would Ik: an expression of non-realistic conflict.
For it reflects a political misjudgement rather than an irreconcilability 
of the goals of "blacks" and "whites"-.
However, to consider a "conflict" unrealistic because the parties 
arc unaware of their true interests is an arbitrary Intervention. It contains 
hidden conceptions of real interests, conflict and social structure. These
1) Raymond Mack and Richard Snyder, '"ITie Analysis of Social 
Conflict - Toward an Overview and Synthesis" in Claggct G. Smith 
(ed.) op. cit. p. 3. 2
2) Ibid. p. 9.
:<6
concepts are related in that the identification of conflict must lie part of 
a theory of social structure. For example, in Marx's writings the social 
structure is conceptualised as the relationship between classes, a 
relationship of exploitation from which class conflict derives. To posit 
racial conflict is to imply that there is a determinate relationship between 
races. This position is impossible to sustain. Races are located according 
to a relationship to biological criteria. There can lie no political, economic 
relations between races, which can become exploitative or conflictual.
For once contact and relations are established, the races are no longer 
"races" but agents or units within autonomous relations of production.
Closer's own elucidation of the reallstic-non-realistic conflict 
distinction did not resolve the problem of defining conflict. Hie nature of 
conflict is interpreted within a means end scheme: conflict as an end in 
itself is non-realistic, serving a cathartic function, while realistic conflict 
is a means to an end of realising a specific goal: "Thus anti-semitism, 
except where it is causal by conflicts of interests or values between the 
Jewish or other groups or individuals wi 11 be called non*realistic in so far 
as it is primarily ¡1 response to frustrations in which the object appears 
suitable for a release of aggressiveness. Whether this object l>e Jews, Negroes 
or some other group is of secondary importance to the aggressor"^ .
Coser has here used conflict in two distinct senses as a physical confrontation 
and as a situation o f mutual Incompatibility - a "conflict of Interests". 
Moreover, the cathartic function of conflict Itself can be a means to an end: 
Negroes could l>e lynched for the pleasure of tension release so that the 
distinction between realistic and non-reallstlc conflict becomes a mere 
speculation. The problem Is that conflict theorists dissertate on conflict 
without constructing a rigorous abstract concept. This results in an omni­
present transgression of their original definitions and imperceptible lapses 
into consangulnary notions. These ambiguities must raise serious doubts as 
to the degree of research which goes into theses on race relations'which 
utilise the conflict perspective»
1) Lewis Coser (cd .) Georg Simmcl, (Prentlce-llall, Fnglewoixi Cliffs, 
New Jersey, 1965), p. 1/2.
On examination, we have seen that conflict theorists have not 
specified what is conflict. They are ambivalent as to cause and effect, applying 
'tonflict' to both actual clashes and situations of mutually exclusive goals 
because of a scarcity constraint. 'Die first meaning describes, and that 
vaguely, without explaining. The second suggests that in the absence of 
scarcity there is no conflict situation. Crucially, then, the concept of 
scarcity must Ik- specified. Here, however, conflict theorists present us 
with a silence. Ibis is surprising. For indeed, scarcity is the bedrock of 
conflict and,we may note,en passant, functionalist theory of society^ .
Cowls are scarce, or are they? Ibis is an important theoretical issue.
Our first observation concerns the absence of any deliberations in 
the writings of both conflict and functionalist theorists as to the relationship 
between scarcity and demand. Ibis results in certain conceptual confusions. 
Scarcity refers to a spatio-temporal Insufficiency of resources relative to 
demand. Thus, demand for power or prestige can be a means to an end.
Piat is to say, men may ’demand' authority or prestige in order to acquire 
material gowls. Thus we need to differentiate desires according to their 
purposive interrelationships. In this sense, van den Rerghe's criticism of 
Dahn'ivtorf is itself severely defective: "I would therefore suggest a more 
geneial theory of group conflict, where authority would not occupy a 
privileged position but would rather be one of the many desirable "goods" 
along , i. ‘material rewards, control of the means of production, power, 
prestige, spheres of cultural, linguistic, ideological, Intellectual, or 
religious influence, e t c . "^ .  There is no theory here, merely incohate 
rhetoiie and an extremely simplistic suggestion that when masses of people 
desire the same things which are not instantly available, they are in 
conflict. Moreover, what, for example, is the relationship between "power"
1) See John Rex, Key Problems in Sociological Theory, op. cit. p. 100;
K.R. Schmcrhorn, op. clt. p. 255; Ralph Dahrendorf, op. cit.
p. 209. 2
2) P. I,, van den Berghe, "Dialectics and Functionalism" In Demerath III 
and Peterson (eds.) op. cit. p. 53. For a similar postulate, see Ira 
Kat/nelson, Black Men, White Cities (Oxford University Press,
London 1973) p. 17.
and "control over the means of production" which justifies their both 
being treated as "desirable goods"? Isn't tbe latter itself the power to 
dispose of society’s surplus labour?
To illustrate further, power,or authority may be 'in demand' and 
scarce because the material goods which its possession appears to ensure 
are themselves unavailable without it. If it is for this reason that actors 
engage in conflictual behaviour, the theorist is obliged to explain the 
origin and nature of scarcity. We may discover that the scarcity of goods, 
i.e . the means of life, is responsible to the mode of labour exploitation or 
the private appropriation of the socially produced surplus. We need, then, 
a sociology of labour exploitation, not of conflict or"race relations".
Indeed, a sociology of "race relations" would then be an unjustifiable 
describing of class exploitation and intra-class competition as group 
exploitation and group conflict. Thus the'higli'level of black unemployment 
is frequently cited as a racist statistic prior to and in lieu of any sustained 
analysis of the labour market. Similarly, inadequate housing and education 
of "blacks" are seen as racial phenomena on the "evidence" of "racist" 
remarks,or employers, estate agents and housing authorities being "white".
For conflict theorists, the basis of racial conflict is a scarcity of 
goods. Tit is scarcity, however, is simply taken for granted. The means 
of consumption are assumed to be in short supply: it is an empirical fact.
This ....piiicism fixates their analyses within relations of distribution. It 
is not that they cling to the obviousness of real shortages in modern 
society, but that they sever goods-distrihution from capitalist relations 
of production by use of the concept of scarcity. Given the imminence of 
scarce resources,social relations are necessarily problematic in a world 
of infinite human wants^\ Hence the inevitability of group conflict as seen
1) Again we see'how much the sociology of’Vace relatlons"mlrrors the
object of sociology - the problem of order within"scurce"wor!d resources, 
and human nature. Yet,in this sense(soclologists nave been left standing 
by 'liberal1 economists. As Harry G. Johnson observed:'Heal scarcity 
has been succeeded by contrived scarcity,and the successful functioning 
of the economy depends on reiterating this contrivance;' Harry G.
Johnson paraphrasing j. K. Galbraith's attack on the "conventional 
wisdom" of classical economics. On Economics and Society, ( Die 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1975) p. 33.
in John Rex’s "classic conflict situntion": "The parties are engaged in 
a zero sum game. Hie more one gets the loss is available to the other.
In this case, the expectation is that each group will do all it can to 
restrict the right to compete of the other. 'Hie structure of the problem 
here is similar, whether we are dealing with a metropolitan or a 
colonial country, and whatever the area of competition"!^ kex posits 
here that scarcity is a consequence of actors' perceptions. Rut there is 
no necessity for actors to struggle against each other liecause they 
perceive resources to be scarce. They may decide to cooperate in the 
producing of more goods, or lessen their consumption as a collectivity.
Rex is not explaining group conflict but legitimising its existence
with reference to scarcity. Within his analysis, it is assumed that one
group's gain is the other's loss, lie does not consider the possibility of
IxDfh groups losing because of their conflict. For example, restrictions
on the employment of black labour contribute to the under-utilisation of labour
resources and thereby decrease the total output of goods available to
( 2 )
both "blacks and "whites" . In this case, the more one group gets,
(greater white employment), the less goods are available to both groups. 12
1) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological 'llicory, op, cit. p. 126.
2) Ijconard Bloom reminds us that "During the three years 1965-7 
in the I1. S. A. , rioting and racialism cost the deaths of 130 
citizens . . .  and the estimated damage to property and the 
economic loss was about $714 millions". The Social Psychology
of Race Relations (fleorge Allen and Unwin Ltd., London 1971) p. 141. 
In Andrew Brimmer's view, " . . .  one could aggregate the loss in GNP 
accruing from racial discrimination over the years. During the period 
1954-1963, the failure to use fully present skills of non-whites cost 
the nation approximately $129.4 billion; the persistence of educational 
differences (which i^t self reflects the legacy of discrimination) added 
a further loss of $85. 8 billion. 'Diese two sources combined were
responsible for aggregate losses in UNP of $215.2 billion......Hie
Negro in the National Economy" in John P. Davis (od.) The American 
Negro Reference Book (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey 1966) pp. 272-274.
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"Racial discrimination" by employers and white workers' restriction 
on black labour competition are therefore not a classic situation of 
conflict. Indeed, the latter may be regarded as a particular form of 
protest against the cheap labour policies of employers. The analysis 
should therefore move away from racial conflict toward the general 
problem of the utilisation of labour resources in the capitalist mode of 
production. Such a change of object is, however, beyond the resources 
of sociology and especially conflict sociologists for whom Marx is a 
"conflict theorist". Is it possible, however, to read Marx is this way?
Sociologists of knowledge are divided among themselves as to 
what constitutes the most significant theoretical polarisation in the history 
of social thought The dominant view is that social theories exhibit a 
tradition of order-conflict opposition. This position situates Marx 
alongside Simmel within the conflict perspective. Van den Rerghe has 
attempted a synthesis of these two traditions, a synthesis which has 
implications for the analysis of the relationship between "race conflict" 
and'¿lass conflict". Since he isolates class from the relations of production,
1) Discussions of the competing epistemological and methodological
slructureiof classic social scientific texts are generally and t 
incorrectly subsumed under the problem of'the origin of sociology'.'
See Robert Nisbet, 'Hie Sociological Tradition (Hi inemann, I/mdon 
19671. Nisbet merely traces certain unit ideas to tlie "two revolutions". 
Although Parsons lapses into an ’history of ideas' approach, lie 
tangcmtally focusses on an opposition between positivism and 
voluntarism. The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 (The Free Press,
New York 1968) p. VIII. Relatedly, Parsons sees Sociology as being 
genetically split into order and conflict theories. For a summary 
prcauitution see John Horton, "Order and Conflict Theories as Competing 
Ideologies" in J. E. Curtis, ed. op. clt. pp. 605-23. For a criticism 
of Parsons' and Nisbet's readings of the origin of sociology, see Anthony 
Guldens, "Four Myths in the History of Social Thought", Economy and 
Society, Vol. 1, 1972. Giddens himself champions an individualism- 
holism dichotomy. Frederick Engels and V. I. Ixmin favoured an 
idealist-materialist struggle. See Frederick Engels Socialism: Utopian 
and Scientific, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,Selected Works, Vol. II, 
(Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962). V.I. Ixmin, 
Materialism and Empirlco-Criticism (International Publishers, New 
York 1927). The ’Structuralist" reading championed by Fouls 
Althusser deviates somewhat from this with a focus on Marx's 
scientific ruptures with empiricism. Reading Capital (New left Rooks, 
liondon 1970). He does not, however, explain the origin of empiricism, 
or the relationship between epistemology and methodology.
*
his project leads to a subsumption of class under groups. This paves 
the way for an explanation of class,status, sexual and generational 
conflict as empirically discrete phenomena^ .
Van den Bcrghe conceived "Marx's dialectic" to lx? limited because
of its stress on a binary opposition. Following Simmel, he argued that
polarisations can lx? multi-dimensional. This means that conflict and
contradictions may exist between two or more elements at the level of
values, ideologies, role,institutions,or groups. A reformulation of the
dialectic was therefore necessary in order that it may lx? useful for
analysing society since: "in any society different groups (defined by sex,
age, "race, culture, education, relation to the means of production,
wealth power prestige, descent, e tc .) have by virtue of their differing
( 2 )
roles and statuses interests which are often conflicting" . Van den 
Berghe's summary Juxtaposition of sex, and age groups, and relationship 
to the means of production is enigmatic, for these terms are patently 
not theoretically inter-related. Moreover, the whole argument becomes
1) ’Hie theoretical convergence between Simmel and Weber as well
as the theoretical origin of the (conflict) sociology of "race relations" 
become palpably evident. Arguing for the application of Weber's 
stratification theory, Ira Kat/.nelson writes: "W eb er... urged that 
society lx? seen conceptually as composed of discrete, separate, yet 
interacting spheres, each marked by the uneven distribution of 
available and scarce resources . . .  Within his schematic framework 
a multitude of ty|x?s of displacement, interaction, and conflict is 
conceivable". Black Men, White Cities (Oxford University Press, 
IiOttdon 1973) pp. 18-19. It is important to stress that the notion 
of racial conflict is alien to Marx's object, class conflict and thus 
there can lx? no Marxist, structural explanation of race conflict. 
Simmel and Weber, and Marx are not theoretically supplementary. 2
2) Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism, Toward
a Synthesis" in N.J. Dcmerath III and R.A. Peterson (eds.) op. cit. 
pp. 300-301. Compare this remark to Simmel's " . . .  age groups 
may function as a sociological criterion and may become a basis 
of division for the entire group. IJke the division between the 
sexes age groups stand midway lx?tween the organic and the 
rational". Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations ( ’Hie Free 
Press, New York 1955)p. 134.
speculative, given the lack of theoretical content in van den Rerghe's 
facile use of "roles, "statuses" and "Interests which are oftcm conflicting". 
For, if these groups are not intrinsically conflict groups, then any 
society can have different groups, without conflict. To illustrate the 
extent of van den Rerghe's distorted conception of "Marx's dialectic", 
we re-read Marx briefly.
Marx theoretically constructs the concept of class conflict on the 
basis of the conditions of existence of capitalist relations of production 
and the productive forces. Capital is an element of these social relations, 
an embodiment of the estrangement of the labourers from the means of 
production and the product of their labour. It exists only through processes 
of self-augmentation. Each movement of expansion, however, reduces the 
value of the product accruing to the labourers,not in a zero-sum sense, 
but through the rising productivity of labour engendered by the development 
of the productive forces. Conflict between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat therefore does not take place because of scarcity,but in 
conditions of potential abundance.
There is another reason why we must consider a Simmellan reading 
of Marx to be theoretically impossible. Marx's concept the relations 
of production specifies limited possibilities of economic structures. 
Simmel's central concept, the "Web of Social A ffilia tions"^  expresses 
, infinitude of forms of interaction. What conflict theorists fail to 1
1) Rcinhard Rendix's translation of Simmel's "Die Krauzung sozlaler
Krelse" into "The Web of Croup Affiliations" is highly idiosyncratic. 
Why does "sozialer" become "group" and not social? "Social 
AffiIllations" is conceptually distinct from "group affiliations" and 
the former translation makes it possible to analyse the 
relationship between social affiliations and group formation. Clear 
evidence of Rendix's "free" translation is provided in the following 
confession: "In using the word circle as a synonym for "group", 
Simmel often plays with geometric analogues; it has seemed 
advisable to me to minimise tltis play with words . . .  I have used 
the term "group formation" when Simmel refers to the origin 
of a social circle and the term "group affiliation" he has In mind 
that an individual belongs to a social circle". Rcinhard Rcndix 
in Georg Simmel; Conflict and the Web of Croup Affiliations, 
op. clt. p. 125.
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observe is that Simmel can only posit tlie omnipresence of groups and
group conflict because he lacks criteria of differentiation and significance^.
He subsumes all social relations under social forms and cannot therefore
investigate the relationships between them, ('lasses and generations
lielong to the same form of conflict groups,even though their content may
( 2 )
be different . Simmel's lack of rigour is also visible in his view
of conflict as "caused by hate, envy, need, desire . . .  It is a violent
symptom of a disease which represents the effort of the organism to free
(3 )itself of disturbances and damages caused by them' . Conflict thus
functions to generate unity "through the annihilation of one of the conflicting
(4)
parties . These are speculations,not theorising in pursuit of logical
1) Simmel's model is a simple conflict-unity dichotomy which he 
plays upon under the guise of a dialectic: "Contradiction and 
conflict not only precede unity but are operative in it at every 
moment of its existence" Georg Simmel, ibid, p. 15. Unity is thus 
a Hegelian Spirit which cannot lx: dismembered even by the most 
violent convulsions. As in Hegel, the problem is that of speculation 
driving out elementary logic. For it there is unity (A) then there must 
be disunity (non-A), unless this unity is considered the only existing 
substance. There is no place then for conflict.
2) it is beyond the ambitions of this chapter to discuss to what extent 
Simmers work is a positive critique or a continuation of the Social 
Darwinism of Ludwig Gumplovicz for whom racial conflict is the 
core of the emergence of States and civilisational progress. Cf. 
Robert C. Angell, "The Sociology of Human Confllct"ln l-’ lton B.
McNeil (ed .) The Nature of Human Conflict (Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Fnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1965) p. 96. It may be of interest
to mote here that just as modern race theorists are divided on the 
issue of whether race conflict is functionally specific or an 
eternal prime mover, so pioneer sociologists in America were 
divided in their allegiance to Gumplovicz and Simmel. Gf. Robert 
C. Angell "The Sociology of Human Conflict" in Klton B. McNeil (ed .) 
op. cit. p. 97. See the Gumplovfczian perspective in Ronald Segal, 
'Die Race War (Jonathan Cape, London 1966).
The functionalist approach to race conflict is lx’st exemplified in 
Joseph S. Himes "The Functions of Racial Conflict" in Clagget
G. Smith (ed .) op. cit.
3) Georg Simmel, op. cit. p. IT.
4) ibid.
connections. Is conflict a necessary and sufficient condition for unity?
What is the relationship between conflict and cooperation, since the
latter also produces unity? Moreover, following Simmel, the annihilation
of Jews.or the expulsion of immigrants should l>e construed as attempts
to preserve the identity of the race or nation^ .
For conflict theorists of "race relations", group identities are an
inexplicable, immanent fact of social life. 'Hie inexplicability is expressed
in Rex’s: "We should find that many members of the society had what Maclver
calls like and common interests and that these tend to join up into groups.
(2 )
Between the groups there would be a conflict situation" . The immanence is 
clearly brought out by Robin Williams: "From the earliest records to those of 
our day, human history reveals that men have always regarded themselves 
as members of particular groups or societies and have always 
distinguished themselves from persons belonging to other groups and
(3)
societies" . iliis usage of "groups" in the sociology of "race relations" 
betrays a curious lack of conceptual differentiation. Prof. Eli Chinoy 
has correctly distinguished between statistical aggregates, social 
categories and social groups. The line of demarcation being the existence
1) Simmel does not distinguish between different typos of conflict 
merely the forms since for him conflict is omnipresent and 
everlasting. Ibis, however, because he failed to distinguish 
between conflict and tension and indeed uses the term in senses 
different from his definition. It is not surprising that Pitrim 
Sowokin lost patience with Slmmel’ s method and wrote: "What 
has lieen said of the fundamental conceptions of Simmclian 
sociology may be said of its many other propositions. Although 
valuable in some respects, they are stamped by the same 
vagueness, Indefiniteness, changeable meanings and often by
a purely speculative character". Contemporary Sociological 
Theories (Harper and Row, New York 1928) p. 502.
2) John Rex, Key Problems of Sociological 'Theory, op. clt. p. 112. 
Elsewhere Rex mentions scarcity! Competition for the scarce 
resource of housing leads to the formation of groups very often on 
an ethnic basis... Race Community and Conflict, op. cit. p. 16.
But how often and whence this "ethnic basis"? 3
3) Robin Williams, Strangers Next Door: Ethnic Relations in 
American Communities (Prentice-llall, Fngelwoixi Cliffs,
N.J. 1964), p. 1.
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and profundity of a common identity and identification^. Prior to 
confrontation and conflict, individuals may constitute statistical 
aggregates or social categories, i.e. sharing common attributes and 
interests but not goals and identity. A confrontation between social 
categories and statistical aggregates may generate group-formation in 
direct proportion to its intensity and protraction. For example, 
passengers in a bus constitute a statistical aggregate or a social category 
in so far as they communicate and share an awareness of commonly 
held characteristics. They may stand as a group in opposition to the 
bus-driver or an incoming-passenger, but only as a result of some 
disagreement, or procrastinating behaviour on the part of the new 
entrant. Croups are the ultimate in social identification, affinity and 
cohesiveness among individuals emerging not prior to, but during social 
interaction. Thus, Williams’ emphasis on ethnocentrism as the source 
of the formation of socially significant groups is an irresponsible speculation 
which assumes an inflexibility of the human psyche.
What, however, is the ultimate source of Williams' confusion and 
the Inadequacies of the conflict model of "race relations"? It is difficult 
to decipher whether it is the racial (group) reading of history which 
propels some social scientists into constructing conflict and power models 
of "race relations", or the commitment to power and conflict theories 
of society. Nor is it very Important for us to Investigate whether it is their 
epistemology, or philosophical anthropological assumptions about men 
and power, which sustains the efforts of sociologists of "race relations".
We would, however, point out the interesting congruence between normative 
functionalist theory and the conflict model of "race relations". Hie 
idealism of normative functionalism is manifest in its studied accentuation 1
1) Hit Chlnoy, Sociological Perspective 2nd Edition (Random House 
New York 1966) pp. 70-71. See also Michael Hanlon who asserts: 
"Social scientists now analyse the interaction between "blacks" 
and "whites" as the interaction of categories of people who are 
identified by race. They are not groups, for a group is a collection 
of Individuals who are held together by the contact which members 
have with one another, They are categories because their unity 
derives from the tendency of others to classify them as similar with 
respect to social relations". Racial Minorities (Fontana/Collins, 
lyondon 1972) p. 9.
of values, their institutionalisation, internalisation and integrative function. 
We shall see its influence especially in the postulate of a white racist 
value consensuson "blacks". A similar methodology is discernible in the 
race conflict model which explains group formation in terms of the ideas 
men have about one another. The concern is with real historical men and 
these ideas are given in their psyche as a philosophical anthropological 
attribute - ethnocentrism. Thus empiricism and idealism come full circle 
in the fatalism of instinctually based social relations.
Race conflict also presupposes racial power. Thus a mjaor thesis 
of conflict theorists and sociologists of "race relations" generally,is 
that'blacks"and Whites '^can be regarded as groups differentially placed in 
an empirical power setting. This thesis is a logical development out of 
both the rejection of the Marxian concept of class and the empiricist 
enterprise of describing the real world of power relations. Prof. R. A. 
Schermerhorn's remark captures the general assumption: " . . .  from the 
standpoint of power-conflict theory one can view each ethnic group as 
being in an embattled position, fighting for its life, its identity or its 
prestige subject to perpetual constraints that threaten its survival, its 
freedom or its life chances in a precarious world"^ . Ihis is a position 
he shares with almost all race relations theorists^. For the notion of 
a racial or ethnic power system is an inevitable consequence of the 
Weberian conception of social stratification, which dominates sociological 
texts. What is most interesting about these analyses is their direct
1) R.A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework 
for 'riieory and Research, op. cit. p. 20. 2
2) Hubert Blalock put the matter forcefully: "Clearly what is needed is a 
general theory of power relationships between dominant and subordinate 
parties. Relationships between racial and ethnic groups can then be 
taken as a special case". Toward a Theory of Minority Croup Relations 
(John Wiley and Sons Inc., London 1967) p. 112; see also Stokeley 
Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power (Jonathon Cape, 
London 1968); John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op, 
cit; Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, op. cit.; Ira 
Katznelson, op. cit. William J. Wilson, Power, Racism and Privilege 
(The MacMillan Company, New York 1973). We may say that the 
notion of mclal power blocks is a consequence of the textual popularity 
of the Weberian analysis of power.
lineage wi’ h the zero-sum conception which lx>ih elitists and pluralists 
adhered to in the early debate over power in American society. As a 
result,the thesis of a racial power structure suggest no more than that 
whites" are super-ordinate by virtue of having a larger share of national 
power resources. IVoissucs which remain un-resolved, however, are: 
is power measurable and can the power of "whites" 1« designated white 
power without suggesting racially-motivated "whites"?
In review ing the major contributions to the analysis of power,
we may distinguish Weberian, structural functionalist, and structuralist
approaches. In the Weberian tradition, power is a zero-sum phenomenon.
iltat is to say, it is conceived as a finite substance distributed among
actors in mutually exclusive magnitudes^ . Power is any kind of capacity,
political, institutional or personal. Within a society,it is shared by a
multiplicity of contending groups with their own wills, or interests, 'Phis
conception cuts across the renowned pluralist-elitist controversy over the
distribution or degree of concentration of power in American society. Thus
the analyses of C, Wright Mill, Peter Daclirach and Morton Poratz (elitists)
on the one hand, and Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby on the other, are not
( 2 )
methodologically distinct . In both ’ schools' the emphasis is on the 
behaviour of social actors in empirical settings of decision making 
involving a conflict of subjectively perceived interests. Polsby writes:
One can conceive of power-influence and control as serviceable synonyms 
- as the capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor 
which changes the probable pattern of specified future events. Ibis can be 12
1) Of Max Weber, "Power is (lie probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will he in a position to carry out his own will 
despite resistance regardless of the basis on which tills 
probability rests". Max Weber, llic Theory of Social and 
Economic Organisation, op. eft. p. 152.
2) C. Wright Mills writes . . .  'Die elite are simply those who have 
most of what there Is to have . . .  Ry the powerful we mean, of 
course, those who are able to realise their will even if others 
resist it". The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, New 
York 1959) p. 9.
envisaged most easily in a decision-making situation^. Robert Dahl’ s
recognition of the State's political salience takes a characteristically
personalised form: "The State is, then,a power of key importance in
struggles over power for the relatively great resources of the State and
its exclusive claim to regulate severe physical coercion means that those
( 2 )
who control the State inevitably enjoy great power" . Note here the 
focus on persons as well as the ambivalence over power evident in 
regarding the State as "a power . . .  in struggles over power".
In criticising this approach to power, the 'elitists' draw attention 
to its omission of the processes of non-decision making as well as its 
undifferentiated conception of decision making situations. Thus there are 
two serious defects in the pluralist model: "One is that the model takes 
no account of Hie fact that power may lx.* and often is exercised by confining 
the scope of decision making to relatively safe issues. Die other is that 
the model provides no objective criteria for distinguishing between
( 3 )"important" and "unimportant" issues arising in the political arena" .
For Hie 'elitists', the real measure of A's power over B is observable 
in not only how A's decisions affect B's wishes, but also in A's capacity 
to actually define B's preferences. Thus, the political theorist should 
focus on both decision and non-decision making,for the latter often
determines the nature of B's preferences as well as the definition of
. • (1 234)key issues
Power, then,must be discussed in the context of the shaping of 
subjective Interests. For,in social realtlons,interests are hith
1) Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (Yale 
University Press, Ixindon 1%3)pp. 3-4.
2) Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Prentice-Mall Inc.,
Fnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963) p. 51.
3) Peter Bachrach and Morton Raratz, "The Two Faces of Power" 
American Political Science Review , 56, 1962, p. 94R.
4) See Peter Rachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non Decisions: 
An Analytical Framework", American Political Science Review, 57, 
1963.
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interdependent and, to introduce Steven Lukes’ three dimensional critique,
"real"^ \  In Lukes' view, every conception of power is based on a
conception of interests. A subjective conception is common to the texts'of
both pluralist« and interests. Lukes, on the other hand, analyses the
concept of power in relation to real interests, namely, 13's preferences
had alternative choices lieen placed before him: " . . .  A exercises power
( 2 )
over 13 when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests' . Lukes 
argues for the superiority of his "three dimensional approach on the 
grounds of its crucial shift away from observable behaviour and overt 
conflict: "What one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in 
a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the 
real interests of those they exclude" . Lukes’ criticisms of the elitist 
and pluralist analyses are impressive, lie lists: a debilitating commitment 
to studying " . . .  a series of individually chosen acts rather than
(4)
culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions" 
as well as an unrealistic concentration on overt conflict and consequent 
ignoring of "'Hie possibility of false or manipulated consensus by 
definitional fia t^ . Yet Lukes does not transend the limitations of the 
pluralist and elitist analyses.
Firstly, he docs not resolve the ambiguity of the problem the way 
it is posed. Is it that A has more power than 13 or power over 13? In the 
former case, the Implication is that power exists independently of both 
A and 13, embodied, for example in State apparatuses. In the latter case,
A must lie shown to lie a sovereign agent in order to forestall a counter­
argument that A is really subordinate to C. Lukes is not aware of these 
implications because he has not questioned the way the problem Is posed.
Hence, a second weakness manifests itself in his analysis. Me discusses power 
in isolation from capital and the reproduction of the political conditions of its 1
1) Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (MacMillan, Ixmdon 1974).
2) ibid. p. 34.
3) ibid. pp. 24-25.
4) ibid. p. 22.
5) ibid. p. 24.
production by the State, but covertly introduces both notions. For what 
is the cource of A's capacity to obscure the alternatives open to B except 
in the former's control of the dissemination of knowledge?^. Moreover, 
an awareness of other choices does not necessarily lead to their 
implementation. Thus in defining real interests in terms of preferences 
based on knowledge of alternatives, Lukes circumvents the crucial 
problems of realising these preferences and, derivatively, State power. 
Thirdly, Lukes trivialises his analysis by not specifying whether A is a 
referent of an empirical actor or, the concept of class. The fact that A has 
the capacity to and does not place subversive alternatives before B suggests 
that these are intrinsically divergent interests. The point of departure, 
in the analysis of power, should therefore be the objective situation in 
which they find themselves.
A truly radical breakthrough would involve pursuing such questions
as why real interests are in conflict and whether, at a determinate level
of development of the productive forces,all conflicts could be resolved without
power, if private ownership of the means of production were to lie
abolished. Lukes radicalism merely develops the elitist position to a point
wher.> .in exercise of power means that A does rake decisions which
do not allow B an awareness of other choices. Thus, one implication of
this 'third dlmension'is that a democratic society would eliminate differential
opportunity structures by making all available Information,material
( 2 )
resources and choices open to its members . Lukes notion of real 
Interests contains therefore, a hidden postulate of "objective interests".
For TalcottParsons, these objective interests are collective goals 
which reflect the integrative needs of the social system. Parsons  ^conception of 
power as a functional medium of the social system introduces us to the
1) Nor is Lukes consistent in insisting on "the empirical basis for 
identifying real Interests" while postulating that the empirical 
reality is defined by the powers that be, in that: "thought control 
takes many less total and more mundane forms, through the control 
of Information, through the mass media and through the process 
of socialisation," ibid, p. 23.
But again, Lukes nowhere mentions the 'material' conditions of 
existence of "democratic participation".
2 )
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'structural' analysis. For him: "Power then is generalised capacity to
secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of
collective organisation when the obligations are legitimised with reference
to their bearing on collective goals and where in the case of recalcitrance
there is a presumption of enforcement by negative situational santions . . .
This conception posits legitimation and the 'collectiveness' of goals as
necessary conditions for the existence of power. There are two problems
here. Firstly, given the legitimacy of the goals, there is no need for
power and, indeed, no possibility of recalcitrance so that Parsons'
definition is tautologous - power is already contained in the legitimating
of goals. Secondly, if a system of organisation has "binding obligations",
"recalcitrance", and negative sanctions of enforcement, it cannot be
designated as "collective". These phenomena suggest that we are dealing
with class-structured, rather than "collective goals".
Both Parsons and Lukes reject the analysing of power in relation to
"class". Lukes, however, in stressing latent conflict and real interests,
is closer to the structuralism of Nicos Poulant/as for whom power is "the
„(2 )capacity of a social class to reali/.e its specific, objective interests"
Poul.inUuo argues that power cannot be defined in abstraction from class
conflict and class struggle. The concept intervenes, therefore, at the
political, ideological and economic levels of the structure - the form of
combination between agents of production and means of production. Power
indicates the effect of the structure on classes struggling to realise their
(3 )interests . This implies that any changes in the nature or form of these 
struggles are a consequence of structural transformations. 123
1) Tclcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power", in Reinhard 
Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (eds. ) Class Status and Tower 
(The Free Press, New York 1953) p. 244.
2) Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (New Ixjft 
Books, Ijondon 1973) p. 104.
3) For a more lucid analysis of objective Interests than Poulantzas 
presents, see Isaac D. Balbus, " Ihe Concept of Interest in Plural 
and Marxist Analysis", Politics and Society, 1, 1971.
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Poulantzas lias been accused of dissolving power into a form of
structural determinism^ . This criticism, however, does not pinpoint the
source of Poulantzas' inadequate analysis. At root, it is his separation, a
la Max Weber, of the economic, political, and ideological levels. For, then,
he cannot perceive that what unites these levels, as for Marx, is capital. He
is thus forced into two distinct definitions of power: "the capacity of a social
class" anil introduce a specific relations of domination and subordination of
( 2 )
class practices as a relations of power" . Poulant/as rejects the methodological
individualist conception of power by emphasising class struggle, but he still
adheres to the conception of power as a thing, a capacity of agents. We observe
here how his second definition attempts a merger between structuralism and
methodological individualism: "If we consider power as an effect of the structures
in the field of the class struggle, we shall see that the capacity of a class to
realise its interests, a capacity which depends on the struggles of another class,
(3)depends thereby on the structures of a social formation"' '. Ilis discomfiture as
to the source of power comes because he "ignores Marx’s suggestion that power is
not a property of individuals. 'Iliis juridico-ideological reproduction of the social
relations of production serves the interests of capitalist in so far as it maintains
labourers as wage labourers. However, this docs not mean that capitalists have
power over workers such that power can be an explanatory category of social
behaviour and processes within the capitalist inode of production. For, in Marx's
words: " . . .  looking at things as a whole all this docs not, indeed, depend on the
goixi or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition brings out the inherent
laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power
(4)over every individual capitalist" . What Marx's formulation avoids is the analysis 
of power as power over others. For, whether agents conceived as A and B, or 
classes, power as the attribute of a subject necessarily leads to the moralistic 
category of domination and the infinite regress involved in demonstrating its 
"legitimation".
The term "power" suffers at the hands of the empiricist attempts to 
utilise it to explain observable behaviour and social phenomena. 'Hicse are taken to lx*
1) Steven lotkes, op. c it ., p. 63.
2) Nicos Poulantzas, op. c lt ., pp. 104-105.
3) ibid, p. 118.
4) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. clt., p. 270.
characterised by relationships of domination and subordination. The
dominance of this approach in political science and sociology could not
but reflect itself in race relations theory. Power is seen as a relation •
among people, a facility of empirical men. Race theorists merely
correlated the skin colour of these men with particular socio-economic
indices and deduced racial power or powerlessncss^, It is then argued
that it is the domination of "blacks" by "whites" which is responsible for
tlie former's material deprivation. This domination is placed in the
( 2 )
context of whites control over the value system .
We shall offer three sets of criticisms of the notion that "blacks"
and "whites" can be regarded as being in a relationship of dominated and
. . (3)dominant .
Our first criticism concerns the methodological limitations of the 
zero-sum conception of power on which the notion of a monolithic, white 
power-structure is based. In this conception, as Poulantzas observed, power 
is not differentiated at its ideological, political and economic levels or 
according to its distribution among "whites". This differentiation is 
crucial to a further distinction, that between power and the exercise of power. 
"Blacks" are not politically powerless in terms of their capacity 
for disrupting the particular unity of the various levels or fractions within
4
1) ... .^¡aimony to the superficialityjhe power approach to "race relations" 
that it contains no systematic analysis of the various conceptions of 
power found in political science and sociology. This level of theorising 
should he ignored, were it not for the popularity of this approach.
For example, see Ira Katznelson, black Men, White Cities, who quickly 
reviews the debate over power and agrees with C. Wright Mills that "the 
problem of who Is involved in making [decisions) (or not making them) 
is the basic problem of power", op. cit. p. 23; See also Peter Bachrach 
and Morton Baratz, Pow'er and Poverty Theory and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, New York 1970), Part III; see Steven Lukes' critical 
comments, op. cit. pp. 37-38.
2) Schermerhorn regards dominance as "authority to dispose of the controlling 
value system". Comparative Fthnic Relations, op. cit. pp. 12-13.;
S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton approvingly cite a definition of political 
power as"the psychological control over the minds of men,"op. cit. p. 51.
3) Note that power theorists of "race relations" too do not specify whether
it is that "whites" have more power than "blacks" or power over "blacks". 
To suggest the latter implies an Incompatibility of their Interests. We 
are therefore back with the untenable proposition of blacks and whites 
being in "conflict".
state apparatuses. Riots and demonstrations can cause policy changes 
or the downfall of a particular Government. They are not capable, however, 
of transforming capitalist relations of production. One implication of 
this is that a diminution of white power does not necessitate an increase in 
black power, since a particular fraction among "blacks" can be the 
beneficiary. Thus "black capitalism" could exacerbate the economic condition 
of ghettoised black workers by confining their job opportunities to black- 
owned and unviable low-paying businesses^ .
Secondly, to be more than a mere assertion of a skin colour-power 
correspondence, the argument that "whites" have a greater share of 
power resources must mean that these resources are racially used. Yet 
there is no logical entailment between racial power distribution and racial 
power operation. A subsidiary thesis of racist motivation must be adduced. 
This renders the major argument enigmatic in that "racism" is not applied 
to intra-racial power differentiation. If "whites" use their power to 
subordinate "blacks” what explains the subordination of "whites" by "whites" 
and why, if the explanation is different, different explanations of the single 
phenomenon of subordination? What we have discovered, then, is that 
hidden behind the notion of white domination is an idealist methodology which 
imputes an effectivity to racist values.
Even at this level of analysis, however, race theorists are 
inconsistent. The State is appealed to as a major instrument of value 
control. Yet the source of rarial values is located exclusively in history, 
culture and personality, lliere is no consideration of the possibility that 
the State's dissemination of racial definitions is a part of a political 
socialisation organised around the relations of distribution. Consider the 
nature of the interventions of the State which resolve "racial conflict" 
over economic, educational and social welfare resources. These 
interventions constitutionalize the sociologists' racial definition of the 
situation by legalising racial solutions. Thus we have a gamut of Race 
Relations Acts and State and Federal legislation to ensure "racial 
equality", or universal citizenship rights. These interventions do not resolve
1) See Timothy Bate8, Black Capitalism: A Quantitative Analysis (Pracger 
Publishers, New York 1973). Bates' arguments arc Interesting in the 
debate over Black Capitalism. But see also Earl Ofari, The Myth of 
Black Capitalism (Monthly Review Press, New York 1970).
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the conflicts in favour of either "whites" or "blacks',' for surely such
a resolution necessarily demands the alternative society implied in Lukes'
conception of power. The State is neither black nor white. What its
"racial" resolutions do, is consolidate the race relations perspective and
"race relations" as a social reality.
A more important criticism, however, parallels that which Marx
made of the State's attempt to resolve the Jewish Question. The attempt
to establish an equality of citizens fails because of the peculiar nature of
a merely egalitarian emancipation. In attempting to put "blacks" on an
equal footing with "whites", the State merely accentuates the existence of
social and economic distinctions. In decreeing equal rights for "blacks",
the State assumes that the whole society exists in order to guarantee the
preservation of racial rights, property, and security. It thereby solidifies
the racial ethos and racial comparisons; it presupposes the eternality of
the estrangement whose symptoms it opposes^ \
The errors of omission and commission which we have discovered in
the power approach to "race relations" cannot be explained on the grounds
of scientific immaturity. For the source of this theoretical adolescence
lies in the very "theory of race relations,"arguably the most developed
sub-discipline within sociology. "Race", however, is not a sociological-
theoretical construct. It is no doubt a disputed concept within biology and,
as a teim, it may be of interest to certain theorists. Sociological concepts
are abstract categories in a specific logical relationship to one another to
constitute a theoretical field. The sociology of "race relations" then,is
built on an edifice of a pseudo-theoretical construct.
A partial recognition of this can lie seen in a certain withdrawal
from "race relations" into role theory and minority-majority and ethnic
relations. Michael Banlon expressed his disenchantment with race,without being
certain as to the alternative; "The misleading biological associations of the
word 'race', when used to identify a social category, are reduced by using
( 2 )the terminology of minority-majority relations' . Prof. Ronton, however, 1
1) Sec Karl Marx, The Jewish Question in Robert Tucker (ed .) The Marx- 
Engels Reader (W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd., New York 1972), pp. 31-41.
Michael Banton, Racial Minorities, op, clt. p. 11.2 )
is not satisfied with this terminological reconstitution of "race relations. 
Elsewhere he writes: "Strictly speaking 'race relations' might be better 
renamed 'ethnic relations', but while crude concepts of 'race' still have 
so much influence upon popular thinking such a change might be premature 
in Britain. Australians and Pakistanis are both ethnic groups but Pakistanis 
are also a racial minority" Finally, Banton focused his emphasis on 
role relationships: "In a society in which blacks are subordinated, black 
people are in certain situations ascribed a role which gives them fewer 
privileges than the role ascribed to white people. Their social categorisation 
is used as a clue. Telling people in the dominant category how to treat them, 
so that in this society race becomes a role sign. Physical characteristics 
do not of themselves decide a person's place in society; it is the
( 2 )
significance that is placed on these characteristics which is important . 
Banton is not investigating the theoretical origin or status of "race 
relations". "Race relations" simply are. But the word race creates 
difficulties, which cast doubt oil their study. For this reason he suggests 
that it must be abandoned. British society, however, is not yet ready for 
this rejection for Pakistanis,but not Australians,are a racial group. Thus 
thi' study of their treatment is best effected within the framework of race 
as a "role sign".
At this point,Banton Introduces the Parsonlan ascription-achievement 
distinction, arguing that black people can be seen as having specific social 
roles Involving subordinated rights, obligations and expectations. Their race 
is an ascribed as opposed to an achieved role sign ensuring their inferior 
treatment, protestations about which incur sanctions from the dominant 123
1 ) ibid, pp. 1 1 - 1 2 .
2) ibid, p. 9.
3) The application of role theory to "race relations" is a development
of one of Park's suggestions. Park on the other hand appropriated 
the role concept from Georg Simmel, although it was Ralph .
Linton who firmly introduced It into American Sociology. Cf. 
lewis Cose:, Georg Simmel, op. clt. p. 26.
whites^. With this stress on roles, Banton sought to minimise the
significance of "race" in accounting for relations between "black and
white people". Race is merely a sign through which a social category is
identified. On the other hand, Harold Baron merged the two notions -
race and roles: "It cannot be denied that individual attitudes and prejudices
are significant for perpetuating racial discrimination, but in order to
understand racism as an institutions! phenomenon, it is necessary to view
( 2 )
individual behaviour in terms of norms and roles" . It was Baron's 
contention that the dynamics of urban racism are best understood within 
a framework of norms and roles. He suggested that social interaction 
in Institutional settings creates and is structured by enduring standards 
of achievements and expectations. Furthermore: "The control systems 
have been bolstered in the abstract by Ideological justifications, 
institutionally by normative prescriptions, and individually by adjustments to
(3)
roles either of superordination for white or subordination for blacks"' . 
These arguments are aimed principally at demonstrating the structural 
determination of social Interaction. Role-incumbents are assumed to 
be acting out mutual sets of noi matively controlled expectations and 
obligations which are, in the case of "blacks" and "whites", hierarchically 
arranged. How pertinent, however, are "roles" to the explaining of 
"black-white interaction" without an analysis of role theory?
Role theory has a well established position in sociology and 
social psychology, it is crucial to the "functionalism" of both Talcott 
Parsons and Robert Merton, as well as the cultural anthropology of 
Ralph Linton, whose definitions of "roll1" are of seminal status among 12
1) The distinction between ascribed and achieved roles is also often 
cited as defining ’ race relations situations'. See John Rex
op. cit. Pierre L. van den Berghe, op. cit.
2) Harold M. Baron "The Webb of Urban Racism" in I/wls Knowles 
anti Kenneth Prewitt (cals.) Institutional Racism in America 
(Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1969) p. 161.
ibid. p. 138. See also T. F. Pettigrew. Racially Separate or Together 
(van Nostrand, New York 1964).
3)
theorists^ . Yet (he theoretical status of "role" is still a matter of
dispute and its analytic value was seriously undermined by two leading
role-analysts: "The concept role is at present still rather vague, nebulous,'
and non-definable. Frequently in the literature, the concept is used
without any attempt on the part of the writer to define or delimit the
concept, the assumption being that both writer and reader will achieve
( 2 )
an Immediate compatible consensus" . Thus it is extremely surprising
that "ro le" has not been given any systematic analysis in the literature
on "race relations". This can be said of the writings of Harold Raron, T. F.
Pettigrew, John Rex, Pierre van den Berghe, and other sociologists of
"race relations"and it requires us to consider the utility of "roles" in
analysing "race relations". We shall argue that its widespread use in
race relations studies reflects not only the dominance of functionalist
( 3 )sociology but also the attenuated view of social structure peculiar to 
race (relations) theorists.
Most simply put, a "role" is a part played by a person, a sort of
(4)
feigning or play-acting . Rut the recognition that men arc consciously 
and unconsciously acting out roles in society opens up other and related 
areas of investigation. For example, how are roles created and why do 
men act out roles? What are the relationships between roles, personality 
and culture? It is in attempting to answer these questions that two 
categories of role-theories were discovered by "role-analysts". 1234
1) Cf. Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McFachern, 
Explorations in Role Analysis (John Wiley Si Sons Inc., New York 
1966)p. 3. Sec almost any work of Talcott Parsons, but especially 
Talcott Parsons et a l., Toward a General Theory of Action 
(Harper and Row, Publishers, New York 1961), Talcott Parsons,
'Hie Social System ( Hie Free Press, New York 1951). Ro!x.*rt 
Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (The Free Press, New 
York 1968). Ralph Linton, Hie Cultural Background of Personality 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1968).
2) Lionel J. Nelman and James W. Hughes "The Problem of the Concept 
of Role - A Re-survey of the Literature" quoted in Neal Gross ct al. 
(eds. ) op. cit. p. 4.
3) See Robert Merton, op, cit. p. 319.
4) Tills is the sense in which It is used by T. F. Pettigrew, op. cit. Ch. 3.
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Ralph Linton sees role as being inseparable from status. Society 
for him, is a set pattern of statuses occupied by individuals. Fach 
status has its particular role which: "Represents the dynamic aspect of 
status . . .  When (the individual) puts the rights and duties which 
constitute the status into effect, he is performing a ro le "^ . Linton 
not only sees status and role as inseparable, but also argues that any 
distinction between them is purely academic. On the other hand, role is
not actual behaviour but the normative standards of behaviour of persons
, , , , ( 2 )in given positions
The second meaning of role differs from this in two respects. 
Firstly, within the second definition and equally popular use of "role", 
the emphasis is on the nature of the standards of behaviour which are 
considered by some sociologists to 1«  internally determined, or at least 
created by the individual's definition of the situation. Berger, for
,.(3)example, defines a role as "a typified response to a typified expectation"' .
While Linton stressed the cultural (external) element in roles, the
’ ¡ntcractionists' assert that roles have two other equally important ones,
the personal and the situational: "A person's role is a pattern or type
of social behaviour which seems sltuationally appropriate to him in terms
(4)
of the demands and expectations of these in his group" . In the 
interaction!st perspective, a role is not behavioural standards expected 
of a given position but a mode of behaviour derived from the individuals 
subjective assessment of himself and others, Talcott Parsons, at different 
times used both these conceptions of role, a fact which testifies to its 
importance in his theoretical system as well as its definitional diffuseness, 
lie saw "roles" as both individual orientations to expectations influenced 
by the value standards which govern Interaction, and as behaviour. Roles 1
1) Ralph IJnton, The Study of Man, quoted in Neal Gross, Ward S. 
Mason and A. W. McFachern (eds.) op. cit. p. 12.
2) Ralph Linton, op. cit. p. 50.
3) Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Pelican Books lid ., Middlesex
1971)p. 112.
4) Stansfleld Sargent, Concepts of Role and Fgo in Contemporary 
Psychology, quoted In Neal Gross et a l., op. cit. p. 13.
i
have integrative functions; they facilitate the meshing of individual
behaviour and the needs of the social system^ .
In Linton's conception, a role is not subjectively induced but
( 2 )
obligatory performances within a social position . Every position has 
what are called role-prescriptions, although because role is a relational 
term, i.e . one plays a role vis-a-vis another person's role, it is 
impossible to faithfully reflect them. In other words, since the actor 
has multiple relations with various people, no theory can do more than 
describe some of his roles. Thus, in Davis' use of role, the actual 
behaviour which it describes may dcvitate from both the expectations of 
others and the obligations which the status of position imposed. This use 
of role as actual performance makes role Inseparable from a description 
of behaviour.
We are faced with two sets of issues in these different and 
divergent usages of "role". Firstly, it seems that it is necessary to make 
a distinction between the substantive role (parts, rights, duties, obligations) 
its internalisation in learning social expectations, from rolc-incumbcnt or 
positions, and the actual performing of roles. Secondly, role is used as 
a way of labelling a group of individuals by virtue of the possessing of 
certain common attributes, or as an indication of how a given individual 
should behave, or to refer to a conscious or unconscious piece of deception.
To summarise then, among role analysts and theorists, the concept "ro le" 
refers to actual, idealised, prescribed,or interpretive behaviour^and can 
be placed within a context of culture, perception, or function within a 
social system.
'lliis tangled complexity of role theory should restrain sociologists 
of "race relations" from using role as an explanatory category. There 
are two major criticisms to be made the application of role to "race relations".
1) Talcott Parsons, The Social System, op. cit. p. 38-39; Talcott 
Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (The Free Press, New York 
1954)p. 239. 2
2) As Kingsley Davis put it, "An individual carries his social position 
around in his head, so to speak, and puts it into action when the 
appropriate occasion arises". Human Society (MacMillan, New 
York 1963) p. 87.
Firstly, role theory by itself offers no explanation of different perceptions 
of norms; states of transition and changed behaviour. It homogenises 
disparate responses to social situations under role behaviour so that the 
argument becomes circular. Thus, the deferential,or the arrogant black 
is still performing a role. A change in behaviour is merely rc-named 
role-change in order to preserve the notion of racial roles. However, if 
this changed behaviour means changed roles, what is the evidence for the 
existence of a racial role in the first place? Role theory thus contributes 
nothing to the understanding of allegedly racial liehavlour. Moreover, do 
these separate roles for "whites" and "blacks" refer to expectations, 
obligations or standards of behaviour? Hiis is important. For we would 
then be able to analyse whether particular "blacks" or "whites" can step 
outside of their roles. Role avoidance , for example, is impossible if roles 
are obligatory. Thus, the suggestion that roles are obligatory must make 
reference to the structural situation of role-incumbents. Hiis introduces 
our second criticism. Racial role theorists express a studied indifference 
to the concept of class, yet it is argued that society is (racially) stratified. 
What is not perceived is that with the rejection of the concept of class 
"whites" must become the dominant group and "blacks" the subordinated.
'Hieso theorists are therefore brought back to a power model of "race 
relations".
In replacing racism with "roles", and racial discrimination with
"ascrlptive role allocation", race relations theorists present verbal
solutions to the Irrepressible theoretical threats to their field of study.
The explanation is that these threats are not recognised as theoretical
problems but minor Inconveniences to the constructing of race relations
theory. Tamotsu Shibutani and Klan M. Kwan,for example,abandoned
"races" in favour of "peoples". Their purpose: " . . .  a better understanding
of race relations through a comparative study of the contact of peoples"' .
Although admitting to being heavily influenced by Park and bis many
( 2 )
students" , Shibutani and Kwan reject his blologlsm In preference for 12
1 ) Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, op. cit. p. V.
2 ) ibid, p. 8 .
a focus on the historical culture or ethnic allegiance of a people. Is
"ethnicity", however, different from or theoretically superior to
phenomenologically construed "race relations"? We think not and shall
substantiate our viewpoint by analysing some definitions and postulates
contained in the works of Shibutani and Kwan as well as R. A. Schermerhorn.
These writers all define an ethnic group in terms of the existence
of a "consciousness of kind", a term derived from Franklin Glddlngs^.
An ethnic group is defined as people who share similar cultured
characteristics and conceive of themselves as being of a kind. R. A.
Schermerhorn's definition is exemplary: "  . . .  a collectivity within a larger
society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared
historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements
defined as the epitome of their people-hood . . .  a necessary accompaniment
( 2 )
is some consciousness of kind among members of the group" . This 
definition of an ethnic group lacks even the pretence of theoretical 
delimitation. What, in other words, determines the selection of particular 
cultural attributes as evidence of'kind? In a strict biological sense,all 
members of homo sapiens have a common ancestry, the amoeba,and a 
shared historical past, the Ice Age. All peoples have a cultural focus on 
language, per se, as well as a consciousness of kind,as against other 
members of the animal kingdom, and Martians. Schermerhorn's conception 
„f an ethnic group has not clarified ethnicity. There is no mention of 
Itehavioural attributes but an emphasis on the subjectivity of the collectivity 
« 0  that the sociologists is given infinite scope in the Identifying of an 
empirical ethnic group. This is related to the general confusion over the
i3 )concept of a group in the sociology of'lace relations' . Does the 123
1) Franklin Giddings, we remind, was one of the founding fathers of the 
Chicago School of Sociology. According to E. Franklin Frazier, 
"Giddings did not offer any broad and systematic theory of race relations 
although he thought his concept of the consciousness of kind explained 
racial exclusiveness" in E. Franklin Edwards (ed .) op. cit. p. 32.
2) R.A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, op. cit. p. 12.
3) As Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt observe: "Much of the 
literature analysing the effect of group life on political life has thrown 
what we are calling "social groupings" and "secondary groups" together 
under the label "group". Political Socialisation (Little, Brown and Co., 
Boston 1969) p. 182f".
collectivity constitute a group even if it is rent with internal divisions and
does not always respond to external phenomena as a collectivity?
This problem of the relationship between ethnic identification and
behaviour is given considerable attention by ethnic and identity theorists.
Common to them all is the assumption of a straightforward translation of
self-identity into behaviour. As Shibutani and Kwan put it: "Those who
develop consciousness of kind also become convinced that outsiders are
basically different from themselves. This is a matter of decisive
importance, for if outsiders are different kinds of creatures, then they
should be treated d if fe r e n t ia l This proposition is simplistic and moreover,
the authors elsewhere make contrary assertions where the relationship
between consciousness of kind and treatment is made coincidental,and then
reversed: "Lines of demarcation between ethnic categories develop to
coincide with the evolving patterns of differential treatment, and Uie people
so classified then begin to conceive of themselves as a kind . . .
Consciousness of kind . . .  develops from being subjected to differential
( 2 )
treatment" . The circularity here is an example of a fundamental 
weakness of the text. The authors focus on ethnic identity and behaviour 
is the key to the understanding of world historical social processes. Yet 
it is an elementary tenet of sociological textlwoks that social behaviour 
and processes are constituents of interaction. Thus, self-conceptions 
•unot be the determinant of behaviour, but reciprocal conceptions existing 
within a framework of norms, customs, economic interests, in a word, social 
structure. The problem here is that the authors purport to be studying 12
1) Tomotsu Shibutani and Klan M. Kwan op. cit. p. 43. This 
assertion can l>e contrasted with Orlando Patterson's " . . .  people 
never make economic decisions of the basis of ethnic allegiance, 
but, on the contrary, that the strength, scope, viability, and 
bases of ethnic identity are determined by, and are used to serve, 
the economic and general class interests of individuals". Orlando 
Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance" in Nathan 
Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Iheory and 
Experience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1975), 
pp. 347-348.
2) Ibid. p. 223, (our emphasis).
empirical behaviour patterns but. place a singular emphasis on cognitive 
instances^ . This is no accident. It is precisely where an empiricist 
epistemology and an idealist methodology are shown to be in a relationship 
of logical entailmcnt. Wedded to (lie "subjective perceptions" of men, 
the ethnic and minority theorists fail to observe that people cannot 
interact in a causal sequence to their ethnic perception. Hence, once 
they enter into relationships their behaviour can only be investigated as 
embodiments of objective economic relations. They therefore cease to be
i> ( 2 )"ethnics* or "minorities"' .  To ignore this leads to extremely broad
(3 )
definitions of ethnic and minority groups' '  and the impossibility of explaining 
intra-ethnic interaction. 123
1) It does appear that ethnic theorists have attached themselves 
to those antrhopologists who emphasise the "cultural nature of 
ethnicity". Abner Cohen criticises this approach citing Evan- 
Pritchard that "a continued preoccupation with problems of 
culture inevitably leads to psychology or history". 'Hie I^esson 
of Ethnicity" in Abner Cohen (ed .) Urban Ethnicity (Tavistock 
Publications, Ixindon 1974), p. XIII. Cohen himself defines
an ethnic group in terms of shared normative behaviour 
arguing that "The definition of ethnicity as cognition of identity 
obscures even nullifies the conception of differences in degree 
of ethnicity", p. XV.
2) The minority-majority relations approach of G. E. Simpson and 
J. Milton Yinger constitutes another case of verbal innovation.
The authors present a familiar set of race relations concepts - 
proup conflict, discrimination, dominant group and self­
conceptions. Indeed, as the authors confess: "It is the thesis 
of this book that relations among races have a great deal in 
common with groups that think of themselves as different on 
other groups - culture, nationality, religion. Race differences are 
primarily important for what people believe them to be". Racial 
and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and 
Discrimination (Harper and Row, New York 1958) p. 55.
3) As in Louis Wirth's oft-quoted definition: "We may define a 
minority group as a group of people who, because of their 
physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the 
others in the society in which they live for differential and 
unequal treatment and who therefore regard themselves as objects of 
collective discrimination". Cited in G. E. Simpson and J. Milton 
Yinger, ibid, p. 22.
The ethnic theorists are enjoined with race relations theorists
in an idealist methodology which approachcs"empirical"behaviour through
the prism of the actors' definition of the situation. What is peculiar to
the ethnic 'school' is a stronger focus on identity. The strength of the
focus, however, is grounded in a fatalistic physiologism and presents a
certain paradox. According to E.H. Erikson, an ethnic identity is a
result of "man's deep-seated conviction that some providence has made
his tribe and race or class, caste, or religion" naturally superior to
others. This fact is, of course, rooted in tribal psychology and based on
all the evolutionary changes which brought about man"^\ Identity, then,
is pre-social, even primordial. Schermerhorn, too, defined an ethnic
( 2 )
group as a culturally monolithic and impermeable collectivity and yet 
he regarded "the central question" as:"What are the conditions that foster 
or prevent the integration of ethnic groups into their envi roning societies? 
'Hie com pt of ethnic integration may lx? more politically acceptable than 
"racial integration". Hie question, however, is can culturally hermetic 
entities integrate?
. .(3)
1) E.H. Erikson, "The Concept of Identity" in Talcott Parsons and 
Kenneth Clark (eds.) The Negro American (Houghton Mifflin Co., 
Boston 1966) p. 235,
llarmannus Iloetink locates perception in society's "genetic past" 
and thus outside the reach of contemporary politics. Slavery and 
Race Relations in the Americas: Comparative Notes on the Nature 
and Nexus (Harper and Row Publishers, New York 1973).
2) It may well be pertinent to cite a refreshing contrast to the 
analytical superficiality of Schermerhorn et al. J.C. Mitchell begins 
his analysis with: "Differences supposed or real, in the customs, 
beliefs and practices that are identified as characteristic of 
particular sets of persons have long been accepted as an almost 
universal aspect of human behaviour. The awareness of these 
differences has been referred to as nationalism, as tribalism and 
more generally as ethnicity. However, these words, when used
as anthropological and sociological constructs, have often led 
to confusion. Much of this confusion, I contend, arises out of the 
somewhat different epistemological bases of various notions of 
ethnicity. 1 wish to distinguish first between 'ethnicity' as a 
construct of perceptual or cognitive phenomena on the one hand, and 
the 'ethnic group' ns a construct of behavioural phenomena on the 
other; and second, between commonsense notions and analytical 
notions of ethnicity. "Perception of Ethnicity and Ethnic Behaviour: 
An Empirical Exploration" in Abner Cohen (ed .) op. cit. p. 1. 3
3) R.A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, op. clt. p. 14.
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Given the obvious idealism of even the efforts to transcend "race
relations" it is not surprising that Marxist sociologists have not initiated
any systematic study of "race". Thus we can appreciate the dramatic title
of Percy Cohen's summary of "the nio -Marxist approach to race
relations" ^ \  He interprets it as asserting that: "All racial antagonisms
result from the exploitation of one race by another, which, in turn, produces
beliefs concerning the alleged, inferior characteristics may even be, to
some extent, produced by the system of exploitation. A structure of
racialism also produces full-fledged, doctrines of racism which purport
to explain the differential success of races in terms of their inherent
characteristics and which serve to justify the structure of oppression and
exploitation. Hie rise of extreme forms of racial inequality and racist
ideas is due largely to slavery, which is capitalist exploitation at its most
extreme: in this system, whole men, not only their labour power, are
bought and sold as commodities, and they are thereby wholly dehumanised
by their oppressors and inevitably prcceived as inferior beings, which in
’ turn makes it easy tojustify their total exploitation, economic, political
( 2 )
and sexual" . Prof. Cohen goes on to stress an interaction between
ideology and exploitative economic processes so that racist beliefs become
part of a historical process in which "the descendants of slaves are seen
(3)to be fit for exploitation"' ' .
The central deficiency of Cohen’ s exposition is its bland use of "race", 
racial antagonisms" and "racial inequality". It betrays flic now familiar 
empiricism-idealism which begins with the experiences of real subjects. 
Antagonisms and exploitation are never "racial" in Marxian terms. The 
relationship of exploitation inheres in the exchange relation between 
classes and it is this which allows us to speak of capitalist exploitation.
If the capitalist class has a different skin colour, or Is absolutely 
phenotypically different from the working class, we still identify their 1
1) Percy S. Cohen, "Need there be a Sociology of Race Relations", 
Sociolog)’, Vol. 6 , No. 1, Jan. 1972.
2)
3)
ibid. p. 1 0 1 . 
ibid.
relationship as one of economic, not racial exploitation. A race cannot
exploit another; a class does, for it is a class because it is in a
relationship of exploitation. Even if we concede that there are Caucasian,
Mongoloid and Negro races, it has always been the case of a given class
exploiting dispossessed classes. Exploitation, therefore, remains non-
racial, however much racial hierarchies may exist in mental structures.
Paradoxically, Prof. Colien went on to repudiate his concept of
racial exploitation: "After all the upper and middle classes of any
nationality homogenous society exploits their own internal porletariat just
as mercilessly as is necessary, while justifying this in terms of various
doctrines (including that of eugenics a parallel to scientific racism)
engage in sexual practices not dissimilar to those of Alabhama or the
Orange Free State, and stereotype their social inferiors as lazy, immoral
and unsuited to participate in political community"^. But this attempt
at a class analysis comes as an afterthought and was followed by Cohen's
own race relations approach which stressed man's xenophobic waywardness.
The source of Prof. Cohen's emasculated Marxist presentation is not
difficult to discover. He appears incognisant of Marx's analytical method
and critique of bourgeois political economy. . Thus, he allows as
"Marxist", analyses which regard "tribal" and "racial" phenomena as
real social problems rattier than conceptual elements of particular
theoretical structures. We are not here counterposing the "race question"
to'fclass" Such an analysis liegs the question by accepting that there is
( 2 )
a race problem . Rather we would insist that the field of investigation 
should begin with the structure of the social theory which generates "race 
problems" as objects of study.
The Marxist approach to "race relations" is generally represented 
by the works of O. C. Cox, Paul liaran and Paul Sweezy. Cox accepted the 12
1 ) ibid.
2) As In John Carl leggett, Class, Race and labor: Working-class 
Consciousness in Detroit (Oxford University Press, London 1968), 
Leggett's view will be discussed in our final chapter, since it
is more of an analysis of the relationships between race and 
class consciousness.
sociological perspective which defines "race relations" as "that 
behaviour which develops among peoples who are aware of each other's 
actual or imputed physical differences" ^ \  "Race relations", then, 
are that type of social interaction determined or accompanied by race 
consciousness. He rejected, however, the categories "ethnocentrism", 
"intolerance" and "racism" as starting points for the explanation of 
"race relations” . Racism is a cultural legacy of the enslavement of 
Africans by an emergent European bourgeoisie. Its role is restricted 
to providing functionally significant categorisations of groups in 
competitive, exploitative relationships. For Cox, the sociology of 
"race relations" should be concerned with historic confrontations of 
peoples which lead to hierarchical political and economic relationships. 
Specifically, his focus is on bourgeois economic and political practices 
vis-a-vis the Negro and their "ideological" and attitudinal consequences. 
Cox identified seven types of contact situations:
1) "Situations in which the coloured person is a stranger in a white 
society, such as a Hindu in the United States or a Negro in many 
parts of Canada and Argentine - we shall call this the stranger 
situation.
2) Situations of original white contacts where the culture of the 
coloured group is very simple, such as the conquistadors anti Indians 
in Jit* West Indies, and the Dutch and Hottentots in South Africa - 
tne original contact situation.
3) Situations of coloured enslavement in which a small aristocracy 
of whites exploits large quantities of natural resources, mainly 
agriculture, with forced coloured labour, raised or purchased like 
capital in a slave market, such as that in the pre-Civil War South 
and in Jamaica before 1834 - the slavery situation.
4) Situations in which a small minority of whites in a coloured society 
is bent upon maintaining a ruling class status, such as the British 1
1) O. C. Cox, Caste, Class and Race : A Study in Social Dynamics
(Monthly Review Press, New York 1959), p. 373; Paul Baran and Paul 
Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic 
and Social Order (Penguin, Middlesex 1970) Ch. 9.
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in the West Indies or the Dutch in the Fast Indies - the ruling 
class situation.
5) Situations in which there are large proportions of both coloured 
and white persons seeking to live in the same area, with whites 
Insisting that the society is a "white man's country" as in the 
United States and South Africa - the bipartite situation.
6 ) Situations in which coloured and white amalgamation is far 
advanced in which a white ruling class is not established, as in 
Brazil - the amalgamative situation.
7) Situations In which a minority of whites has been subdued by a 
dominantly coloured population, as that which occurred in Haiti 
during the turn of the eighteenth century, or the expulsion of 
whites from Japan in 1638 - the nationalistic situation"^.
Like Prof. Cohen, (b>\ conceptualised the exploitation of black labour as 
racial exploitation and the same criticisms apply to his works. But an 
even more serious inadequacy in a "Marxist" work on caste, class and 
race is the absence of a systematic treatment of intra-class struggles, namely 
labour competition between "blacks" and "whites". Moreover, these seven 
race relations situations expose a methodological flaw in Cox's study. The 
selection of criteria defining the contact situation reflect a curious concern with 
racial characteristics. It shows Cox to be heavily influenced by "the race 
and culture contact school" and the Weberian technique of typology- 
construction. The result is a highly compressed, somatic 
social intercourse between phcnotypically different groups in colonial settle­
ments, slavery, capitalist exploitation in colonial territories and contemporary 
United States and Brazil. Finally, the designation and elaboration of the 
stranger, original-contact, slavery, ruling class, bipartite, amalgamative, 
and nationalistic situations constitute an eclectic and arbitrary juxtaposition 
of profoundly competitive paradigms and situations. Nor are their 
interrlatlonships explored. What, for example, Is the relationship between 
the ruling class and slavery situations? Cox's theoretical affinity with 
Robert Park, whom he trenchantly criticised, Is illustrated in the
1 ) Ibid. pp. 353-354.
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following: "Indeed, we now liave a conceptual basis for a world study of 
race relations. By following Europeans in their contacts with peoples of 
colour, a world map . . .  This inconsistency in Cox is a reflection
of an uneasy tension between the race relations and class analyses which 
permeates the works of "Marxists" and radical economists.
Eighteen years after the publication of Cox’s work, another notable 
"Marxist” analysis of "the race problem" was made by Paul Baran and 
Paul Sweezy. They, too, saw white-supremacist ideas as an ideological 
justification of the exploitation of coloured peoples and their propagation 
nowhere more intense and systematic than in the United States. Yet, 
they emphasised, prejudice and hostility had been directed too against 
East and Southern European immigrants to America up to the middle 
1920's. Impoverished newcomers are invariably greeted with discrimination 
from the indigenous population until they and their descendants are 
upwardly assimilated in the economic and social system. But this is not 
inevitable and thus, the real issue is why Negro immigrants to Northern 
cities became "permanent immigrants".
This problem was to be explained economico-historically, in terms 
of a burgeoning Northern capitalist economy 'pulling' surplus rural 
labour (Negroes) into an urban complex after World War I, and especially 
in consequence of the restricting of East and Southern European immigration 
to the United States after 1924. In Baran's and Sweezy's view, three sets of 
developments further explain the roots of the chronic poverty of Negro 
migrants and their descendants. Firstly, external immigration which 
after 1924 tended to be relatively highly-skilled, and which restricted 
occupational mobility for Negroes who were at any rate generally illiterate 
and unskilled. Secondly, the prejudice and discrimination with which the 
already established workers greet all impoverished newcomers also 
operated to encircle the Negro in a poverty trap. This prejudice and 
discrimination often escalated into violent protests by 
indigenous American workers against competition from both European 
immigrants in the 19th century and Negro labour in the early twenties.
7 1
In the latter case, Baran anil Sweezy stressed that the protestations were 
not racially inspired but largely a result of the employers' use of Negroes as 
cheap labour and strike-breakers. The net result of these cumulated 
restrictions on occupational mobility in the urban environment was the 
ghettoisation of the Negro in the already decaying central areas which 
in turn was not unrelated to urban pollution, spiralling land prices induced 
by a phenomenal surge of office construction, the profit-oriented housing 
market and the rise of the motor industry. The second wave of Negro 
migration after World War II exacerbated the above-mentioned developments 
and culminated in half the present Negro population being classified as 
just on or below the poverty line and over one-third vegetating in the 
tangled pathology of the ghetto. The third set of developments coincides 
with the monopoly capitalist phase of the American economy: "First, 
a formidable array of private interests benefit, in the most direct and 
immediate sense, from the continued existence of a segregated sub­
proletariat. Second, the socio-psychological pressures generated by 
monopoly capitalist society intensify rather than alleviate existing racial 
prejudices, hence also discrimination and segregation. And, third, as 
monopoly capitalism develops, the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour declines, both relatively and absolutely, a trend which affects the 
Negro more titan any other group and accentuates their economic and 
social in feriority"^ . More specifically, the chronic sub-proletarian 
status of the American Negro can lie explained in terms of the gains 
accruing to employers, real estate owners, the petit-bourgeoisie, the 
'white' proletariat who are understandably interested in diminishing labour
competition, the status anxieties of socially mobile 'whites' and, finally,
.  ( 2 )the technological revolution in American industry since 1950
In their brief chapter on "race relations", Baran and Sweezy discuss 
two other related developments, namely, socio-economic stratification 
among Negroes and the ruling class response to the increasing scope and 
militancy of the black liberation movement. In their view, capitalism
1)
2 )
ibid. p. 257. 
ibid. pp. 260-261.
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cannot solve the economic problems of the Negro masses, however much 
" black bourgeoisie" may emerge due to the following circumstances:
a) The specific service demands of the black community for doctors, 
teachers, lawyers.
b) Ruling class concessions in the name of economic and political 
rationality in the desegregation of the Armed Forces and expanded 
employment of Negroes in the public service.
c) Tokenism ‘is  part of a strategy for national and international 
pacification and prestige.
Thus, paradoxically, side by side with the overall stagnation and relative 
deterioration of the Negro's situation we may observe: "The growth of 
the black bourgeoisie has been particularly marked since the Second World 
War. Between 1950 and 1960 the proportion of non-white families with 
incomes over $10, 000 (1959 dollars) increased from 1 per cent to 4. 7 per 
cent, a rate of growth close to three times that among whites. During the 
same years, the total distribution of income among Negro families became 
more unequal, while the change among white families was in the opposite 
direction"^, This tiny majority has managed to reach high income 
lovpic either because of exceptional abilities and prowess, tokenism, or the 
opening up of particular "black" markets. From this, and other developments, 
Baian and Sweezy deduce that the economic and political overlords in the 
V. * ' ••are not governed "by personal prejudices but by their conception 
oi ciass in terests"^. Even though the ruling class may exhibit bouts of 
short-sightedness, in the long run, concessions to the Negro will be made 
if the whole capitalist system is being threatened. The crucial question 
then becomes; if some Negroes can make economic advancement, what is the 
epistemological or methodological justification for designating the problem 
and problems of those who do not, a 'race problem'? This question Baran 
and Sweezy and Cox left unraised because of their concentration on economic 
history rather than conceptual analysis. This is also the root of their
1 ) ibid. p. 266.
2) ibid. p. 264.
{ '
confusing inconsistency as regards the solution of "the race problem".
Capitalism they assert cannot solve the economic problems of the Negro
m asses^. On the other hand, we are told that, in the long run, concessions
will be made to black militancy without any clarification of the solution,
the nature of this militancy, or the concessions which will be made.
A related and even more crucial inadequacy in the radical and
Marxist expositions is the absence of a theoretical analysis of the labour
(2 )
market . The Negro's problems in the labour market can be fully explained
only if the category itself is conceptually transcended. This means that
the labour market must be seen as an institutional manifestation of the
commoditisation of labour. It is not an autonomous historical fact. Moreover,
an emphasis on the disappearing labour market as the cause of problems
of black unemployment is suggestive of capital being the power,not prejudiced
capitalists. If the central problem is that "blacks have moved from slave
labour, to cheap labour, to no labour at all", then we need to explain the last
two movements as processes determined by the rigors of capital
accumlation in order to both transcend the limitations of the race relations
framework and indicate political strategies consistent with our analysis.
Thus, the ostensibly radical but fundamentally uncritical approach to the
labour situation of "blacks" would be that which stresses the desirability
of a perfect labour marketeer full employment. Here, just as,in Marx's
words: "Classical political economy borrowed from everyday life the
(3)category price of labour without further criticism , '  so Marxists uncritically 123
1) ibid. pp. 272-273.
2) Tills in turn involves the model of capitalism being used. Geoffrey 
Pilling has justly criticised the neo-Keynesian framework of Paul 
Baran and Paul Sweezy's "Monopoly Capital". He dismissed it as an 
exercise in conventional economic analysis where the central 
contradiction of capitalism becomes not "the contradiction between 
the accumulation process and the social relations of production" but
the realisation of an economic surplus. Sec Economy and Society, Vol. I, 
1972, pp. 301, 302 and 306. For other criticisms, see Maurice Dobb, 
Marxism and Monopoly Capital: A Symposium, Science and Society,
No. 30 (Spring 1966).
3) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 537.
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appropriate the notions of the labour market and "race relations".
Baran's and Sweezy's analysis incorporates many of the insights 
of immigration theorists. Their epistemological position, however, is a 
cause for concern. "Race relations" are not perceived as an object or 
problem peculiar to a theoretical structure. They are assumed to be part 
of social reality, of which Marxists can give a materialist,rather than an 
idealist explanation. The difficulty with this assumption is that it lacks 
criteria for demarcating those problems which are unique to a given 
theoretical structure. Theories, and their objects of study appear 
supplementary and explanations of (race) problems inferior or superior, 
according to the level of emphasis on the economic factor. In consequence, 
the Marxist explanation (unwittingly) follows "the enemy" into his definitions 
and materialises his theoretical regress. In our view, to avoid this, the 
Marxist explanation of "race relations" must begin with an investigation of 
their epistemological lineage. "Race relations" and race problems are 
then seen to be a theoretical problem specific to phenomenological and 
structural functionalist social analyses, in a word, empiricism. The 
compulsion which radicals and Marxists feel to follow up with explanations 
of problems derived from these analyses is inexcusable. It makes their 
Marxism a soft, pluralist one and above all, legitimises and consolidates 
those theoretical and political practices to which Marx was resolutely 
opposed.^
Why it may be asked a race relations investigation of the social
and economic conditions of "blacks"? 'rwo answers must be instantly
rejected. 'The first is: because "blacks" are exploited because they are
black and the second: ljecause "blacks" are super-exploited. These replies
are untenable. They cannot be the reasons for the investigation only
assumptions to lie verified via an investigation. What then is the real
reason? Why not Investigate the conditions of "blacks" within the
( 2 )
framework of immigrants and the class structure? Here Baran and Sweezy
and Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack are agreed that ’blacks" are to be
1) Marx took’workers of the world unite’ seriously enough to dissertate 
on exploitation per se and not on the exploitation of German workers, 
or Jews.
Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class 
Structure In Western Europe. (Oxford University Press, Ixmdon 1973).
2 )
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seen as members of the proletariat^. On the other hand, unlike Baran 
and Sweezy, Castles and Kosack firmly disassociate themselves from 
the race relations perspective.
This perspective they see as an unfortunately dominant approach to
immigration in Britain. A less parochial perspective, an internationally
comparative investigation of immigration would demonstrate structurally
induced similarities in the position of all immigrants in Western Europe.
It would invalidate "race relations” and those studies which concentrate
on socio-psychological variables. Defending this position they claim:
"Virtually every advanced capitalist country has a lower stratum, distinguished
by race, nationality or other special characteristics, which carries out the
worst jobs and has the least desirable social conditions. In the United States,
this situation consists mostly of black people, a fact which is often used to
justify the race relations approach. But few British social scientists have
paid any attention to the immigrants in the far closer countries of
continental Western Europe. In these countries there are about eight million
immigrants. At the most two million of them can be considered as being
racially distinct from the indigenous population. Yet - as we hope to show
in the present work - the problems experienced by all immigrants to Europe
ami their impact upon society are very similar to those of coloured
immigrants to Britain. If that is the case, race and racialism cannot be
( 2 )
0  d as the determinants of immigrants' social position"
British race relations sociologists had opted for the narrow 
American conceptualisation rather than make intra-European comparisons 
of the patterns of immigration and the social position of immigrants. The 12
1) Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack argue against immigrant workers 
as a'new proletariat',or a ’sub-proletariat'. "The first term implies 
that the indigenous workers have ceased to be proletarians and 
have been replaced by immigrants in this social position. The 
second postulates that immigrant workers have a different 
relationship to the means of production from that characteristic
of the proletariat. All workers whether immigrant or indigenous, 
manual or non-manual,possess the basic characteristics of a 
proletariat . . .  "op . cit. p. 476.
2 ) ibid, p. 2 .
tendency lias been to let the social or ethnic origin and characteristics of 
immigrants dictate the mode of investigation of the problems of 
immigration. In doing so, they missed the crucially determining function 
of immigrant labour in the capitalist economy.
Castles and Kosack contend that labour migration is a function of 
both the demographic-economic disparity endemic to economically 
underdeveloped regions and the post-war full employment and welfare 
policies of advanced capitalist societies. Full employment meant steadily 
rising wages and a drift from stigmatised and inconvenient occupations.
Thus, labour shortages appeared in low paying industries, the service 
sector and other infrastructural areas of the advanced capitalist economies 
at a time when vast labour reserves were cumulating in the backward 
countries of Southern Europe, Africa, Asia and the West Indies. Labour, 
including colonial migration,must be understood in "the historical context 
of the international capitalist system"^ .
One of the justifications for an immigration rather than a race
relations approach is the palpable similarities in social positions among
immigrants regardless of their ethnic and cultural characteristics. As the
authors note: " . . .  subordinate position on the labour market, concentration
in run-down areas and poor housing, lack of educational opportunities,
widespread prejudice, and discrimination from the indigenous populations
and authorities. 'JTiese similarities, we contend, make it necessary to
regard immigrant workers and their families in all the four countries as
having the same function and position in society, irrespective of their
( 2 )
original backgrounds" . 'Hie common clement is the sub-proletarian 
status of immigrants on the labour market exemplified by their higher 
frequency of unemployment, concentration in low paid and declining industries, 
and the generally unskilled nature of their occupations.
Castles and Kosack identify four ’causes’ of the immigrants' inferior 
position on the labour market^. These are: their initially low level of
1 ) ibid. p. 7.
2 ) ibid. pp. 4-5.
3) ibid. pp. 97-107.
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skills and qualifications, their peculiar socio-economic goals, official 
restrictions on migrant labour, and discrimination.
Given the disparity in the levels of industrialisation between sending 
and receiving countries, it is not surprising that the vast majority of 
migrants possessed relatively inferior industrial skills and training. Castles 
and Kosack quote several studies which support the observation that 
colonial migration in particular was of poor industrial quality. The 
background of poverty has another implication for the goals and behaviour 
of immigrants on the labour market. Immigrants are generally imbued 
with a desire or obligation to remit financial resources to their kith and kin.
If this is a pressing responsibility then their job preferences deviate from 
normal market principles. Similar distortions are created by Governments' 
and employers ' policy of utilising immigrant labour to offset cyclical 
fluctuations in economic growth and expansion. Official policy toward 
immigrant labour would therefore contain restrictions on internal mobility, 
professional upgrading and permanent settling. Castles sees the growing system 
of political repression, repatriation threats and juridical persecution of 
immigrants as an elongation of labour policy in the advanced capitalist 
societies of Western Europe. He writes: "In Switzerland, the Schwarzenbach 
Referendum of 1970 which would have led to the expulsion of a large 
proportion of immigrants was supported by no less than 46% of the voters.
:.i Cwimany, the employers campaigned against trade union demands for 
snorter working hours wiih (he slogan that this would mean bringing in even 
more foreigners, ibe French Government used the spectre of 'foreign 
agitators' against the movement of May 1968. Enoch Powell's campaign 
against immigrants fits into the same pattern. Prejudice and discrimination 
against immigrants takes much the same form whatever their colour or 
country of origin. Ibc Italian who goes to the neighbouring country of 
Switzerland finds himself as unpopular as the Pakistani who goes half way 
round the world to Britain"^. For Castles, these 'official' forms of 
discrimination cannot be explained in terms of racio-national prejudices.
All Immigrants are transformed into second cluss citizens by Government- 1
1) Stephen Castles "Some General Features of Migration to Western
Europe", New Community, Vol.1, No. 3, Spring 1972. pp. 1 8 5  - 1 8 6 .
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employer coalitions in order to augment labour exploitation. The final
causal factor was the pervasive discrimination against immigrant workers
perpetrated by both employers and indigenous workers through their
Unions. Employer discrimination is part of the mechanism of exploitation^.
They discriminate not because of their prejudice but in order to facilitate
the extraction of surplus value from all workers. On the other hand, working
class discrimination is to lx? explained in terms of critical socio-economic
conditions and the material insecurity of the indigenous workers. Workers
must become prejudiced, and discriminate against immigrants regardless
of their skin colour in conditions of labour competition and "a split in
( 2 )
working class consciousness" . "Race problems'hre therefore not problems
of race,but of class exploitation of immigrant labour.
Castles and Kosack posit that all workers by definition have the
same relationship to the means of production. This position docs not
appear congruent with their object of study, Immigrant workers. The
definition of one's object of study is ipso facto the theoretical justification
of the study. If an immigrant worker is'h worker born outside of Western
(3)Europe", dien,the justification of the study *s place of birth. Rut by this 
same token,why not anyone born outside of a given region within Western 
Europe? Pm«.- problem here is that since the term working class is 
conceptualised within the theory of the capitalist mode of production, the 
r. *' '  ' «¡{grant workers is a conceptualisation outside of this theory.
It imposes aji extraneous geographic clement on capitalist relations of 
production. Iliis imposition has specific consequences of arbitrariness 
and inconsistency. Are intra-urban labour movements immigrant labour?
By the implicit terms of the concept they must lie. Yet Castles and Kosack do 
not include them in their study, 'nils omission is not innocent. It is related 
to the fact that the boundaries of the concept of immigrant labour are 123
1) For a useful elaboration of this, see M. Nikollnakos,"Germany: The 
Economics of Discrimination kace Today, Vol. 3, No. 11,
November, 1971.
2) Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, op. cit. p. 459.
3) Stephen Castles and Codula Kosack, "The Function of Labour Immigration 
in Western Europe Capitalism", New Left Review, No. 73, May-June 
1972, p. 7fn.
nowhere theoretically specified. Indeed, Castles and Kosack admit to 
a reliance on the statistical categories of various European Government 
Labour Offices^ . Their study shows immigrant workers to be part of 
the working class and not a distinct or separated stratum of proletarians. 
What,then,justifies the designation immigrant workers? If, as the study 
demonstrates, the exploitation of labour is indigenous to capital, labourers 
cannot be either indigenous or immigrant to countries.
To conclude this chapter, race relations theories are conceived 
as representations of the real world of race relations behind which there 
is some sort of social structure. For immigration theorists,it is immigrant 
labour exploitation; for Marxists, class exploitation; for Blalock, 
Schermcrhorn, and Carmichael and Hamilton,power or power and conflict; 
for Rex, van den Bcrghe and Hi ilip Mason,domination and scarce resources; 
for Banton, xenophobia; for immigrant theorists, culture and policy 
conflicts; forKenncth Little, the colonial past; for E. Franklin Frazier, 
ecology and forms of economic exploitation; for Robert Park,almost all of 
the above-mentioned factors. As far as we are concerned, the structure 
behind'tace relations'in all its guises is a particular epistemological 
tradition. There are no "race relations" outthere. They are the problem 
of an empiricist-idealist mode of generating knowledge. Needless to say, 
they are imaginary within the protocols of this very mode.
1) Stephen Castles and Godilla Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class 
Structure in Western Europe, op. cit. pp. 483-486.
CHAPTER II
RACISM. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND RACIAL IDEOLOGY
We have observed that sociologists of "race relations" are agreed 
in principle on the need to place race in a structural context. However, 
their empiricism and idealism cause an inflation of race into a structural 
ethos so that the search for a structure comes a full racial circle in 
"racism" as an explanatory category. "Race relations",as a sub-discipline 
within sociology, is a variant of the tradition of investigating pre-given 
minds - beliefs, values,and meaning - as part of the explanation of 
observable behaviour,or social action. The empiricism is contained in the 
assumption that consciousness and behaviour are not concepts but terms 
which describe real, theory-neutral phenomena. Hie idealism inheres in the 
postulate that since social actions are belief-bearing, beliefs can be 
abstracted and their causal efficacy discovered by measuring their strength 
and pervasiveness. Thus the project is not the production of coherent 
and systematic knowledge, but the explanation of on-going behaviour. Terms 
»re  seen as representations of actual social relationships and their 
validation dependent on the accuracy of this representation. "Racism" is not 
alysed as a concept gleaned from a textual study, but a thing active in 
uiw consciousness of "whites” .
This epistemological position pervades the literature on "race 
relations" - although it is rarely presented in any systematic way - in official 
and semi-official reports on "race relations", and the publications of most 
"anti-racist" movements and organisations. For the last-mentioned especially, 
Euro-American society is redolent of a virulent racism consistent with 
the enslavement of Africans and plagued with "racial discrimination", 
"exploitation" and "oppression". We are regularly treated with propositions 
such as:
The racist restrictions that strike at people of color in America result in 
a system of special privileges for the white m ajority^. 1
1) Robert Rlauner, Racial Oppression in America. (Harper & Row, New
York 1972) p. 22.
What white Americans have never fully understood - hut what the Negro
can never forget - is that white racism is deeply implicated in the ghetto.
White institutions maintain it, and white society condones it . . .  white
racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has
been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War 11^  .
America is a racist nation. Indeed, racism is so universal in this country,
so widespread and deep-seated, that it is invisible because it is so normal.
Yes, the central issue of mid-20th century America has been, and still is,
racism. Racism has accounted for more than physical segregation and
discrimination in obtaining the basic necessities of life, jobs, housing and
education. It is the most evil, pervasive and systematic destruction of
( 2 )
personality, the negation of one's humanity
What we are discovering, in short, is that the United States - all of it,
North as well as South, West as East - is a racist society in a sense and
(3)
to a degree that we have refused so far to admit, much less face . . .
The saliency of racism in American society is indicated by its pervasive­
ness in all areas of life from the most formal operations of government
(4)
to the most casual types of interpersonal contact .
It would, therefore, be no exaggeration to assert that the most frequently 
used explanatory variable in dissertations on "race relations" is "racism".
P. van den Berghe has pertinently observed on the diversity of its 
j . "To the physical anthropologists "race" in the genetic sense is a 
case of subspeciation in homo sapiens; to a social psychologist racism 
is a special instance of prejudice; for the philosopher racism is a particular 
body of ideas; the political scientist may regard racism as a special kind 
of political ideology; to an economist race is one of the "non-rational" 1
1) Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(P. Dutton & Co. Inc., New York 1968) pp. VII.
2) Shirley Chisholm In D. G. Bromley & Charles F. I>onglno Jnr. (eds.) 
White Racism and Black Americans (Schenkman Pub. Co., Cambridge 
Mass. 1972) p. XVIII.
3) Charles SiIbcrman, Crisis in Black and White (Random Mouse, N. Y. 
1964)pp. 9-10.
4) Harold Baron "The Web of Urban Racism" In L. Knowles & K. Prewitt 
(eds.) op. cit. p. 38.
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factors, influencing, to lie sure, economic behaviour but falling outside 
the scope of his discipline; a historian may look at race and racism as 
by-products of, and rationalisations for, Western slavery and colonial 
expansion; a cultural anthropologists may regard race and racism as 
traits in the cultural envcntory of a peop le"^ . It is debatable whether 
this heterogeneous understanding of "race" and "racism" conforms to,or 
reflects,the sub-divisions within social science. The problem may be one 
of conceptual analysis. Van den Berghe appears too, to have over- 
generalised. For, to be sure, not every economist regards or is obliged 
to regard race as the lion-rational element in economic behaviour. But 
van ilen Berghe has unwittingly raised an important issue to which we 
shall return. For a considerable number of social scientists display an 
unawareness of the need for specification of "racism” .
Racism appears particularly popular among "white-liberal" social
scientists, usually employed in Government Commissions and semi-official
( 2 )
studies, and "black" militants . It possibly functions to morally unite 
"blacks" for political action as well as demoralise "whites',' via the inculcation 
of guilt feelings. Not unrelatedly, admitting to "racis'm" may be a sporadic 
self-flagellation, characteristic of the sado-masochistic , or a posture of 
honesty intended to pacify black insurgents. Observe, however, that the 
use of "racism" is twofold. It not only identifies a particular body of 
’ . ’ dge, beliefs, attitudes and feeling, but also refers to and accounts for
me jnactice of "discrimination" against "blacks" at the social, political and 
economic levels. Racist ideas are assumed to have penetrated minds and 
become transmuted into racist attitudes which ultimately realise themselves 
in institutional practices.
Stokcly Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton expressed this 
transmutation when defining racism as: "the prediction of decisions and 
policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial
1) P. van den Ikirghe, Race and Racism, op. cit. p. 132.
2) See Gunnar Myrdal, "An American Dilemma" Vol. I (Harper & Bros.
New York 1944) for an emphasis on "beliefs" and "white prejudice".
Twenty-four years later this tradition re-appeared in the Kerner
Commission's stress on "white racism".
group and maintaining control over that group"^\ Racism is, therefore, 
not just a convenient idea with which "whites" explain away black 
subordination and exploitation, it is an elemental part of their cultural 
heritage which structures their behaviour. As such it is of some independent 
causal significance. This movement from theory or cognition to action takes 
place through racism's materialisation into a racist social structure.
However, while racist beliefs function to create institutionalised forms of 
racism, race prejudice - a socio-psychological phenomenon - was of 
secondary importance in the allocating of responsibility for the socio­
economic condition of "blacks".
A distinction is therefore made l)ctwcen "individual racism" and
"institutional racism": "Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two
closely related forms: individual whites acting against individual blacks,
and acts by the total white community against the black community. We
call these individual racism and institutional racism. 'Hie first consists of
overt acts by individuals, which cause death, injury or the violent
destruction of property. 'Ihis type can be reached by television cameras;
it can frequently be observed in the process of commission. The second
type is less overt, far more subtly less identifiable in terms of specific
individuals committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human life.
The second type originates in the operation of established and respected
fo i . - s L. .society and thus receives far less public condemnation than 
(21
the first' . "Individual racism" is considered to be related to the Inner 
dynamics of personality systems. It is a form of prejudice often caused 
by stunted tgo-development, sexual diffidence, aggressiveness and 
authoritarianism. Those individuals with limited political horizons and the 
socially insecure too find the simplifying nature of a racial world view 
irresistably attractive. Thus to focus on the prejudice (as in Cunnar Myrdal's, 
'American Dilemm.-f) is to misunderstand the level of analysis necessary to 12
1) Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, op. cit. p. 3.
2) Stokely Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, op. cit. p. 4.
L. Knowles and K. Prewitt et al. stated the dominant view: "It is
our thesis that institutional racism is deeply enilx'dded In American
society". Louis L. Knowles & Kenneth Prewitt (eds .) op. cit. p. 6 .
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expose covert, inadvertent racist practices.
Professor Robert Blauner elaborated on what later became, and 
still is, an influential perspective^: "The processes that maintain 
domination - control of whites over non-whites - are built into the major 
social institutions. These institutions either exclude or restrict the 
participation of racial groups by procedures that have become conventiona, 
part of the bureaucratic system of rules and regulations. Thus there is 
little need for prejudice as a motivating force. For this reason, the 
distinction between racism as an objective phenomenon, located in the 
actual existence of domination and hierarchy, and racism's subjective
( 2 )
concomitants of prejudice and oilier motivations and feelings is a basic one" .
In Blauner’ s view, American society is shot through with racism and racial
oppression. This pervasive racism Is held responsible for the ghettoisation
of Afro-Americans as well as the emergence of a unique black culture.
Racial oppression is endemic to the American social structure manifested
therein by "iron laws of white privilege", exploitation and control, testricted
mobility and dehumanisation of non-whites. Racism is an objective,structured
system, not a psycho-pathological phenomenon. It is "a principle of social
domination by which a group as inferior or different in terms of alleged
biological characteristics is exploited, controlled and oppressed socially
(3)and psychically by a superordinate group" ' . It interacts dynamically with 
American capitalism to create internal black colonics. Thus Blauner sees 
the ghetto as "a major device of black colonisation" differing from other 
ethnic enclosures in terms of its involuntariness, permanence and external 
domination. Rejecting the immigrant and Marxist positions, he argued for a 
new theoretical perspective on American society and the black experience, 
which would accentuate "the combined existence, historical interaction and
mutual interpenetration of the colonial, racial and the capitalist class 
, (4)realities" . To do this, he proposed developing the notion of internal 1
1) See especially Sidney Willholm, Who Needs The Negro (Schenkman Pub. 
Co. Inc., Cambridge, Mass. 1974) and D. G. Bromley and C. F.
I/ingino (eds.) op. cit.
2) Robert Blauner, op. cit. pp. 9-10.
3) Ibid. p. 84.
4) ibid. p. 13.
S5
colonialism^.
Tlie major components of America's internal colonies, or ghettoes,
are the following: the involuntary nature of black entry into it, the peculiar
cultural configurations, its control anti domination by external institutions
and urban racism. The usefulness of the colonial analogy inheres in its
focus on the historical similarities in the experiences of racial minorities
subjugated by western imperialism. For the same forces which generated
the enslavement and subjugation óf overseas races, generate the ghettoisation
of "blacks" in America's cities. Their permanent-immigrant status is
inexplicable except with reference to white privileges and political-cultural
manipulation by a white elite. One of Blauner's special concerns was to
repudiate immigrant-assimilation models as applied to racial minorities.
In his view, hopes of assimilation and integration of "blacks" are illusory
for: "People of colour have never been an integral part of the Anglo-
American political community and culture because they did not enter the
(2 )
dominant society in the same way as did the European ethnics" . Moreover, 
European ethnics are set crucially apart from other groups by a fundamental 
component of the colonial complex, institutional racism.
While Blauner emphasised political-cultural elements in the racist 
practices and ghettoisation of "blacks", Harold Baron sought to develop a 
political economy of racism which saw its genesis in slavery and its salience 
in the duality of the labour market in the American capitalist economy. Baron's 
urban racism model posits racially hierarchical institutional sectors within 
the economy with black sub-sectors maintained by vicious circles of 
reinforcement at the economic, political and educational levels. These 
institutional discriminations and differentiations are interlocking, impersonal 
and mutually supportive so much so that explicit racial controls are 
unnecessary. The racism of the labour and housing markets, the educational
1) Other proponents of the internal colonialism paradigm are: Stokely 
Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power . . .  op. clt. Ch. 1. 
Eldridge Cleaver, Post Prison Writings and Speeches, (Vintage Books, 
New York 1969). For a comprehensive list, however, see R. Blauner 
op. cit. p. 75. and John Bracy in N. Huggins et al. (eds.) Key Issue In 
the Afro-American Experience Vol. II (Harcourt, Brace Johanovlch,
New York 1971), p. 260. 2
2) Robert Blauner, op. cit. p. 52.
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system and the polity, ensure: "the overall oppressive functioning of the 
system of urban racism", which was not at all dissimilar from colonial 
domination^ .
For Bitron, racism referred to the patterns of domination and exploitation
of "blacks" which are manifest throughout the history of black labour as well
as the ideology of black inferiority. It is thus both action and belief. "Race"
was urbanised following the massive twentieth-century influx of black labour
to the metropolitan epi-centre and it combines with capitalism to produce a
racially-differentiated opportunity structure in education, employment and
housing in consequence of which, black expectations and achievements are
subordinated and pathologised. The heavy concentration of "blacks" in the
central urban areas, together with their paradoxical exclusion from the
political power system, were, in reality, patterns of enforced residential
segregation and political subjugation respectively. American society was
in effect virtually a system of Apartheid, 'riie key problem is that
institutions in American society are based on racist assumptions and are
seen to be functioning efficiently and effectively only when they produce
disparities in black and white accomplishments: "A tenacious heritage of
racist ideology provides intellectual and symbolic unity for all these
separate institutional elements, litis ideology not only justifies the way
things are, but also serves its a framework for the setting of new goals
•Liitd solving of problems. In this manner, it operates as a regulator of
( 2 )
behaviour" . The result is racial patterns of role-arrangement based on 
principles of subordination and superordination, which when fully internalised, 
become componenls of personality. In this way, the racist ideology interacts 
with America's economic and social institutions to produce racist 
personalities and social structure.
What can lx: said of both manner's and Baron's dissertations is that 
they are at best racial by described politico-economic and social processes 
in American cities. Unlike Baron, however, Professor Blauner is 
indifferent to political economy, especially the economics of American 
capitalism. As he himself admitted: "Thus my perspective lacks a conception
1 )
2 )
H. Baron, op. cit. p. 144. 
Ibid. p. 167.
of American society beyond the central significance that I attribute to
racism . . .  there is no systematic exposition of capitalist structure and
dynamics; racial oppression and racial conflict are not satisfactorily linked
to the dominant economic relations nor to the overall distribution of
political power in Am erica"^ . It is not difficult to discern how this
deficiency mars Blauner's colonial analogy for it offers no analysis of the
extraction and export of an economic surplus. Nor could there be except
in the trivial sense of noting that the capitalist and merchant classes in the
ghettoes are not rcsidcntially of the ghettoes. This lament would situate
the internal colonialism thesis within the aspirations of nascent or
frustrated black entrepreneurs. The exportation of an economic surplus
is so crucial to colonialism that the concept only makes sense when defining
relationships between nation-states. Otherwise,any economically backward
region in a given country can be regarded as a colony of the more
developed ones and the concept of colonialism is emasculated to the point
of absurdity, ihun, as we shall see, an internal colony is impossible.
Are America's ghettocs products of institutional racism, or is it
possible to see a wider set of causal factors in ghetto formation? Some
sociologists and economists favour the latter approach and would identify
such elements as: the private housing market, Federal Housing policy's
neglect of lower income groups, the general decay of the inner city and
( 2 )
..ji-c-jrdinated urban renewal programmes . 'Phe existence of these 
variables alone demonstrates the overly simplistic treatment which "the 
ghetto" receives from the proponents of Institutional racism. But what is a 
ghetto? Blauner et al. make no distinction between a slum - which can 
have both black and white residents, a sub-standard area with overwhelmingly 
black Inhabitants, a black community comprising both poor and well-to-do 
homes, and a deprived region whose inhabitants are apparently immobilized 
not only by poverty, but by political and social barriers. These barriers 12
1) R. Blauner, op. cit. p. 13.
2) See O. D. Duncan & B. Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago - A 
Study of Residential Succession (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1957). Alan Spear, Black Chicago: the Making of a Negro Ghetto (University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1967).
are not necessarily externally imposed and this is brought out by Alan 
Spear's distinction: "The physical ghetto was the product of white racism 
but the institutional ghetto was the creation of black civic leaders and entre­
preneurs determined to make the black community a decent place to live 
in"^\ Spear nevertheless saw the operation of "racial proscriptions" 
throughout the pattern of black housing in Northern cities.
However, the explanation of the origins of ghettoïsation would appear 
to need a wider theoretical framework than "racism" even if only because 
houses must be a scarce commodity in a capitalist mode of production. To 
focus exclusively on racism is to accept this scarcity as sacrosanct and 
hence trivialise the analysis. Moreover, the spatial segregation of Negroes
may be part of the larger network of the social segregation of low status
( 2 )groupings . We will restrict ourselves here to two sets of observations
on post-war ghetto-formation. According to Eunice and George Greer,
the urban drift of the Negro after World War II coincided with an unprecedented
population explosion in America. ’Die population grew by 28 million in the
(3)years 1950-1960, 85% of which took place in 212 metropolitan areas' .
This phenomenon should lie considered in conjunction with the Kerner
Commission's estimate: "During the decade of the 1950's when vast numbers
of Negroes were migrating to the cities, only four million of the 16.8 million
new housing units constructed throughout the nation were built in the central
cities. T" '. se additions were counter-balanced by the loss of 1.5 million
(4)
centrai-cuy units through demolition and other means" . Tills, together 
with the Negro's chronically low income, could not but result in a hard 
core of slum dwellings which were transformed into ghettoes by other 123
1) Alan Spear, "The Origin of Hie Urban Ghetto 1870-1915" in Huggins 
et al. (eds. ) Vol. II op. clt. p. 154.
2) See below, Ch. V, for a development of this suggestion.
3) Eunice and George Grier, "Housing Segregation in the Great Society", 
in David Bromley and Charles Longino (eds.) op. cit. p. 71.
Kerner Commission Report, cited in D. Bromley and C. Longino 
(eds. ) op. clt. p. 44.
4 )
socio-political forces^ \  Ghettoes, then, cannot be explained in terms 
of "white racism", but as part of a theory of economy and social stratification 
in conditions of exploitation.
Rather than attempt to situate the ghetto in a theoretically coherent
system, within which, however, the concept might turn out to lie inadequate,
the 'institutional racists' merely cite colonialism cum racism as the cause
( 2 )
of black poverty . Yet the concept of colonialism is given extremely 
superficial treatment and neither the theoretical boundaries of a ghetto nor 
the relationships between a colony and capitalist exploitation is examined. 
Indeed, the whole concept of exploitation is left unclear. Similarly, the 
elucidation of the concept, internal colony contains no specification of what 
constitutes a colony. Such a specification would demonstrate the untenability 
of the concept at two levels. Firstly, a colony means a nation-state governed 
by a more powerful entity. A colony is a juridico-politically constituted 
territory and by definition external to the colonising power. This externality, 
however, is itself problematic, for it is based on the orthodox concept of 
national economics. 'Iliis difficulty is compounded by the concept internal 
colony which posit spatially separate regions whose transactions take the form 
of "unequal exchange". But regional transactions cannot be either external or 
internal to themselves so that both the juridical term, "colony" and the spatial 
designation, "internal colony" are theoretically senseless. Secondly, they 
L„.:. contain hidden conceptions of the capitalist mode of production, which 
contradict the notion of colonisation. For the "unequal exchanges" are a 
consequence of regional disparities in the distribution of the productive forces 
which in turn can only be an effect of capital accumulation. We may observe, 12
1) Note the moral theme which underlies the ghetto concept. It derives 
from the political economy of poverty. People are observed crowded 
into "degrading" social and economic conditions - the poor - and are 
assumed to be eternally confined therein because of a "poverty trap" 
or a "poverty cycle", or, if they are black-skinned, white racism.
Not surprisingly, then, the ghetto remains as conceptually undefinable 
as the "poor". For a poignant description of the circulation of misery 
and the chronic pathologies of the ghetto, see Kenneth Clark, Dark 
Ghetto (Victor Gollancz Ltd., Ix>ndon 1965). For a graphic presentation 
sec Raymond S. Franklin and Solomon Resnlk, The Political Economy 
of Racism (Holt Reinhart and Wilson Inc., New York 1973) p. 85. For 
excellent critiques of the various poverty theses see Charles A. Valentine 
Culture and Poverty (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1968).
2) We return to the problem of black poverty in our final chapter.
acial" andhowever, these disparities becoming the basis of "ethnic", "r
"nationalist'politics^ - of which Blauner's work is a part.
Because Blauner et al. have merely renamed "ghettoes" as "Internal
colonies", they cannot repudiate the argumentation of Oscar Handlin and
Nathan Glazer who pointed out that white immigrants to America had
experienced similar patterns of dislocation prior to their assimilation.
Addressing himself specifically to the internal colonialism thesis, Glazer
contended that comparisons between the socio-economic statuses of
( 2)
"blacks" and "whites" must allow for a time-span . Then "the black 
experience" turns out to be comparable in kind to that of other ethnic 
groups throughout America's history. Moreover, "internal colonialism" 
ignores the differential successes among Italian, Jewish, Irish and 
German ethnics. For example, the progress of Italians ha not been as 
rapid as that of German immigrants.
Oscar Iiandlln presented a similar argumentation. Negroes, he 
argued, are America's oldest inhabitants but "newcomers" to the city and
indeed their rate of socio-economic advancement is much quicker1 than
(3)that of earlier "white immigrants" ' .  Maudlin rejects the view that Negroes
should have achieved more than white immigrants in the 20th century because
(4)
of their longer stay in America . For,although Negroes are America s 1234
1) This is exactly what Michael Hechter misses in his otherwise 
interesting study. Internal Colonialism: 'Hie Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development 1.336-1966 (Routledge Si Kegnn Paul, Ixrndon 1973).
2) See Nathan Glazer "Blacks and Ethnic Groups: The Difference . . . "  
in Nathan Muggins, Martin Kilson and Daniel Fox (eds.) Key Issues in 
the Afro-American Experience, Voi. II op. cit.
3) See Oscar Mandlin, The Newcomers (Anchor Books, New York 1962).
4) The Internal colonialism thesis also disregards the condition of white 
immigrant workers in Western Europe where racism cannot Ixj said 
to be operative. See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack op. cit.
Nor is there any consideration of Paul Bamn's and Paul Sweezy's 
argument that one reason why "blacks" are permanent immigrants is 
the absence of a burgeoning capitalist economy and a rapidly growing 
demand for skilled labour which had up-graded white Immigrants in 
the first quarter of the twentieth century.
oldest inhabitants they are its youngest urban residents and their isolation 
in the rural South had made them incomplete Americans prior to migration. 
This justified both the "newcomers" and the comparison with European 
ethnics. Moreover, provided that the specific circumstances of Negro 
immigration is taken into account the immigrant-assimilation model 
is eminently applicable to "blacks". These circumstances are: their 
level of industrial skills and education, their mode of entry into the 
labour market, e.g. as strikebreakers or unionised labour, the state of 
the economy, the level of white trade union organisation, the housing 
situation in the given city and the general level of unemployment. In 
opposition to the internal colonial thesis, then, the immigrant-assimilation 
model assumes the inevitability of black social mobility in American 
cities. What unites them, however, is the postulate of an assimilated or 
integrated white society to which the Negro is being barred entry.
It is our view that the proposition which Manner et al. were 
concerned to repudiate - the applicability of the immigrant-assimilation 
model to racial minorities - does not need a theory of internal colonisation 
or "ghetto reservations". Rather, the whole concept of assimilation in a 
capitalist society should be seen as questionable, for the class and social 
disparities among "whites" and "ethnics" invalidate the notion that 
American society has "assimilated" its immigrants. But here we confront
____i ’ s self-confessed theoretical lacuna, and again as we examine the
notion of institutional racism. For the distinction lietwcen individual and 
institutional racism is purely quantitative. It is not a distinction but a 
focusing on the same phenomenon operating at a different social level.
As a 'distinction', however, it obscures the simple notion of racial 
discrimination upon which (he explanatory power of "institutional racism" 
rests.
If racism is posed as an explanatory concept of white behaviour, 
it cannot but lead to a model of racial discrimination designed to capture
the motivations of "whites" . At root, we are faced here with the
fundamental but questionable goal of sociology, the explanation of observable
behaviour. Explanation itself is a source of methodological dispute and
( 2 )
"behaviour" also needs conceptual classification . Thus when we speak 
of discriminatory behaviour - with its implied negative connotations - 
do we mean sporadic acts of discrimination or unvarying patterns and 
regularities? If this behaviour is reversed, i.e . if we have examples of 
positive discrimination, what does it mean for the thesis of racist 
motivation? Or, how do we account for non-discriminating actors 
and institutions or decreasing discrimination . . in a society allegedly
structured on racial discrimination? These issues must be clarified
1) D.J. Smith, Racial Disadvantage in Employment, Neil McIntosh 
and David J. Smith, The Extent of Racial Discrimination, (PEP,
London 1974).
P. L. Wright, The Coloured Worker in British Industry (Oxford 
University Press, London 1968).
Studies which re ly on "racial discrimination" would include:
W. W. Daniel, Racial Discrimination in England (Penguin 1968).
Simon Abbott (e d .), The Prevention of Racial Discrimination in 
Britain (Oxford University Press, London 1971).
B.W. Helneman, The Politics of the Powerless: a Study of the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (Oxford University Press 
London 1972), E.J.B. Rose et a l., op. clt. Ch. 19.
Louis Ferman, Joyce L. Kornbluh and J.A. Miller (eds.) op. cit. 
Lester C. Thurrow, Poverty and Discrimination (The Brookings 
Institute, Washington D. C. 1970). Anthony Pascal ed., Racial 
Discrimination in Economic Life (Lexington Books, D.C. Heath 
& Co., Massachusetts 1972). The supreme frequency of the 
'racial discrimination' framework makes further citations 
unnecessary. On both sides of the Atlantic almost every study of 
"blacks” leans heavily on this notion.
2) See Robert Brown, Explanation in Social Science (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London 1963). For comprehensive discussions, see 
May Bro dbeck (ed .). Readings in the Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences (MacMillan, London 1968); Max Weber in Edward A.
Shils and Henry A. Finch (eds.) The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences (The Free Press, New York 1949). These dissertations 
merely continue an empiricist tradition, in that behaviour,
past and present, is assumed to be a reality which the theorists 
analyse. The problem of validation then becomes Insoluble for 
it involves Interrogating the values of the theorist or building 
models of actors to which the explanation by definition corresponds. 
For example, a racially discriminating actor's behaviour is explained 
in terms of racism.
before the notion of "racial discrimination" becomes applicable to concrete 
acts and situations.
It may be argued, however, that the notion as it stands has some 
utility in research contexts, namely when:
(a) particular policies are apparently abnormal, e.g, the 
refusal to employ "blacks" as such, or, are expressive 
of a preference for "whites",
• (b) particular situations being a deviation from some norm
or standard, e.g. the higher level of rejection or 
unemployment among "blacks",^
(c ) racist statements accompany certain acts of exclusion, and
(d ) the victims of particular acts perceive them to l>e 
racially-inspired.
On the other hand, these empirical referents arc incomplete. The
researcher could include the cyclical state of the labour market and
employers' profit expectations, or specify his reasons for their exclusion.
Obviously it is the theoretical framework employed which selects and orders
the variables. If one starts with the assumption of "whites" being racially
prejudiced and a political economy which ignores or underplays the conditions
of the extraction of surplus labour, then "discrimination based on race"
becomes an inescapable conclusion, or frame of reference.
One treatise of which this could be said is Gary S. Becker's "The
(2 )
Economics of Discrimination"' . Given the fundamental ambiguity of 
"racial discrimination" it is surprising that economists have sought to 
quantify the concept Becker sought to supplement "the psychologists' 12
1) In Britain, two major investigations on "blacks in industry" took the 
sentiments of "management" as the critical index of racial 
discrimination. See Peter L. Wright, .op. clt. Chn. 4 and 5.
D.J. Smith, Racial Disadvantage in Employment, op. cit.
2) Cary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination ('Die University 
o f Chicago Press, London 1957).
Sec Anthony D. Pascal (ed .) op. cit.3)
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and sociologists'analysis of causes with an analysis of economic
consequences"^. This, of course, merely evades the difficulty of
conceptually clarifying "racial discrimination" for the "causes" are
precisely the criteria for the designation "discrimination". An analysis
of the economic consequences of discrimination which purports to be
applicable to all forms of discrimination cannot, therefore, simply admit
that "even the causes are not well understood". The haste towards
quantification is thus premature. Moreover, Becker's general attempt at
"quantification of non-pecuniary motivation" contains a fundamental
weakness in that he omitted a crucial pre-requisite to the quantitative
( 2 )
approach - that of unambiguously identifying the relevant variables
Implicit in Becker's analytical framework is a severing of any 
functional interconnection between discrimination and pecuniary gain. In 
other words, discrimination or, to use Becker's own words, a "taste for
(3)discrimination is seen as a socio-psychological thing in itself" . This
is well illustrated in the following passage: "Money, commonly used as
a measuring rod, will also serve as a measure of discrimination. If an
individual has a "taste for discrimination", he must act as if he were
willing to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced
income, to be associated with some persons instead of others. When actual
discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or forfeit income for
( 4 )
this privilege" . Becker contradicts himself here in selecting money as 
the measure of "non-pecuniary motivation". Moreover, this "taste for 
discrimination" is merely asserted not demonstrated either empirically or 
theoretically. We are being offered assumptions and hypothetical statements 
not statements of connections between phenomena. An individual is seen 
as discriminating if he sacrifices income in order to fraternise with W 
and not with N. It follows then that if he expects to be recompensed by W 
lie is non-discriminating. From this,we may then conclude as to the 1
1) G.S. Becker, op. cit. p. 3.
2) See D.J. Bartholomew and E.E. Basset, Lets I.ook at the Figures 
(Penguin, London 1971), Ch. 2.
3) G. S. Becker, op. cit. p. 6.
4) Ibid.
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1) G.S. Becker, op. clt. p. 3.
2) See D. J. Bartholomew and E. E. Basset, Lets Look at the Figures 
(Penguin, Ix>ndon 1971), Ch. 2.
3) G. S. Becker, op. cit. p. 6.
existence of discrimination, or, as may he the case, non-discrimination.
Recker simply takes discrimination as given and then proceeds to describe
its psychology.He compounds this methodological lacuna by constructing a
'discriminating coefficient' which as Kenneth Arrow observed remains,
at best, a model of assumed discrimination^.
A more critical observation can be made about "racial
discrimination". Discrimination is a relational term: it embodies the
notion of observable divergencies from a particular social standard.
Where, if extant, is the standard or norm? In the labour market, the
decisive criteria informing employers' policy preferences are profit-
orientated and all social behaviour is intrinsically discriminatory since
(2)
it involves choice . Employers' discrimination between workers is thus 
part of the scheme of tilings in a capitalist economy. Moreover, "ascriptive 
allocation", class inequalities and different opportunity structures prevail 
in every sphere of contemporary societies. 'Ihis pervasiveness of 
discrimination does not facilitate the clarification of racial discrimination.
On the contrary, it compounds an ambiguity. For racial discrimination can 
mean either that a set of persons called a race is being, or not being, se­
lected, or racially-motivated discrjminatlon. The first makes no reference 
to cause; the second is an attempted explanatory proposition aptly criticised 
by Prof. E. Schernierhorn: "F o r ’discrimination', as employed by writers 
in intergroup relations, is an invidious, moralistic term, it fastens a value 
judgement on the persons engaging in the designated acts. It implies that 
the people performing such acts are violating a widespread social norm and 
that really they shouldn't . . .  One can only applaud such humanitarian
(3)
sentiments while remaining puzzled over their explanatory value"' .
1) Kenneth Arrow, "The Theory of Discrimination" in Orley Ashcnfelter 
and Albert Rees (eds .) Discrimination in labour Markets (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton N. Y. 1973) pp. 6 and 8.
2) In an oblique recognition of this, one writer argued for a distinction 
between "discrimination which is necessary and right and discrimination 
which is unfair". SeeR.M . Cluion, in I..A. Forman et al. (eds.)
Negroes and Jobs? a book of Readings (University of Michigan Press, 
Michigan 1968), p. 326. Also G. Pecker, op. clt. p. S. for similar morals.
R. Schernierhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, op. clt. p. 7.3)
Schermerhorn’s comments were not followed through with an amoral
explanatory category, for the "dominant whites - subordinate blacks"
approach which he proposed is hardly less moral than "discrimination".
The difficulties surrounding "racial discrimination" are, however,
understandable, for discrimination itself appears to defy definition.
For F. H. Hankins "discrimination should not be confused with
differentiation or distinction". It is "the unequal treatment of equ a ls"^ .
Rut, as Blalock correctly points out, however much this definition avoids
moral evaluations, it founders on the question of equality, for "equals" are
a matter of individual perception in given social situations. Michael Banton's
definition is unhelpful: "Discrimination is the differential treatment of
( 2 )
persons ascribed to particular social categories . . .  " . This is
tantamount to saying that differential treatment is discrimination and 
vice versa. Moreover, if these persons are already ascribed to particular 
social categories their treatment is no longer discriminatory but normative.
Banton elsewhere criticises the concept but his alternative model of "roles"
s (3)
implicitly utilises discrimination
Blalock argued that we reject the notion of discrimination altogether 
in view of (he difficulties involved in its definition and operationalisation,
"for when we try to measure descriniination we usually obtain a measure
(4)
of inequality" . Secondly, the evidence of inequality does not confirm 
"discrimination" since other variables may lie operative. Finally, in his 
view, the concept of "minority discrimination" implies that all other 
individual attributes are equal and contains "a hidden theory of social 
causation"^. Later, however we find Blalock himself uncritically utilising 
the notion: "Economic and status factors are most likely to be the major 
determinants of minority discrimination if both the following hold . . .  "  ^ \  1
1) F.H. Hankins, "Social Discrimination", F.dwin R. Seligman (ed .) 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (MacMillan, Ixindon 19R3)p. 131.
2) Michael Banton, Race Relations, op. cit. p. 8.
3) Micuhel Banton, Racial Minorities, op. cit. p. 95.
4) Hubert Blalock, op. cit. p. 17.
5) ibid, p. 16.
6) ibid, p. 204 and Appendix B.
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This inconsistency derives from his unwillingness to specify the 
"independent variables". Blalock wrote: "I specifically wish to avoid 
a Marxian type of interpretation, namely, that discrimination results 
from a conscious, rational attempt on the part of elites to subordinate the 
minority to their interests. The processes involved are certainly more 
complex and usually much more subtle"^. This is an extraordinarily 
loose formulation. Its major weakness derives from a total mis-reading 
of Marx as well as Marxist texts on'Vace relations." A Marxian 
interpretation would not lie suggestive of a conscious rational majority 
conspiracy as Blalock suggests. Rather, it begins with the observation 
that employers discriminate generally,and for a specific economic purpose, i.e. 
in response to the independent variable of profit-maximisation. Their 
discrimination then cannot be termed racial. Fven if certain "Marxists" have 
lapsed into this vague expression, they are less obfuscating than Blalock's 
" . . .  one must allow for the possibility that innate biological differences 
account for some of the differentials . . .  power. His text remains 
eminently idealist,trapped within the presupposition of an omnipresent, 
racist Idea.
Similar critical remarks can be made of those studies which are
concerned with demonstrating black-white income comparisons as
evidence of discrimination. Here "race" is used as a central research
category. For "white" and "black" respondents are obviously selected
according to "race" to which the statistical analyses are then subordinated.
This preempts the issue and easily generates evidence of "widening
black-white income disparities". Some social scientists have expressed
understandable reservations about the statistical techniques used in
black-white income comparisons. Ihus Wohlstctler and Coleman mustered
some impressive technical criticisms of the professional literature as
(3)well as familiar statements on black-white income disparities . They 
criticised these studies for using simple averages, focusing on income
1) ibid. p. 109.
2 )  ibid, p. 111.
31 Albert Wohlstetter and Sinclair Coleman "Racial Differences in 
Income" In A. Pascal, op. cit. pp. 4-7.
sub-sets rather than total income to persons, ignoring regional and 
occupational migration, choosing arbitrary time-spans and comparison 
points in cyclical variations, and confusing the relationship between 
income changes and occupational distribution.
Wohlstetter and Coleman present what is arguably the most 
systematic statistical analysis of white and non-white income in the 
period 1940-1969. The theoretical significance of their work is that it not 
only exposes the weaknesses of the major studies of discrimination, 
but also how their methodological structure parallels those which 
postulate Negro genetic inferiority It is their view that the models 
of discrimination generally applied to black-white income patterns 
are simplistic even when divested of the dubious implication of racial 
causation.
From the multiplicity of variables involved in measuring income
disparities Wohlstetter and Coleman singled out as most important:
comparative age structure, education (including its quality) and occupational
distribution. Among their conclusions was that for the period 1962-1969
non-white Incomes were lower and more cyclically unstable than whites.
However, they grew relatively faster than white incomes since World
War II, and, crucially, Inequality among non-whites, measured in standard
( 2)
ways, is not much different from inequality among whites . "Racial discrimination 
derives from a confusing of choice lx;tween, and against, "races". It is thus 
intrinsically imprecise and, moreover, is not supported by the evidence 
of racial inequality on which it is grounded. For, as Wohlstetter and 
Coleman pointed out, similar income disparities exist among "whites" and 
"non-whites" as between them. Why should some inequalities be designated 
"racial" and surely fntraraclal income differences should be seen as in 
need of explanation^' tails,as a necessary pre-condition to the clarification 
of Inter-racial inequality. For tlie crucial need is for evidence of a norm 
or standard of non-discrimination, i. c., "universalism".
1) ibid, p. 44, 62.
2) ibid, p. 68.
3) According to Ba> . rd Rustin: "There are 2.5 million black workers in
the Trade Union . ud they earn an average of 50% more than those
blacks who are not unionised". See Daniel S. Davis (ed.), Mr Black 
Labour, Die Story of A Philip Randolph Father of the Civil Rights 
Movements (H.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1972) p. XI.
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Structural functioi alisfn assumes the existence of this "nnlvcrsalism". 
Thus, Blauner's assertion that mainstream sociology has neglected race 
and ethnicity displays an ignorance of the genealogy of race relations 
theory. For tlie whole corpus of race relations theorising is derived from 
the sociological tradition. Blauner's own writings are a variant of 
structural functionalism. He imputes a normative animism to institutions 
which is said to unite them in a vicious circle of racial oppression and 
colonial capitalist exploitation. America is racist society. Its institutions 
are controlled by "whites" who uniformly subordinate and dehumanise 
"blacks". Tills proposition of a white and institutional v.due consensus on 
"blacks" is a central element in Blauner's analysis. Racism is a function 
of slavery and an integrating element in America's function ally interlocked 
institutions. This analysis is deficient. A more sophisticated functionalism, 
that, for example,adumbrated by Robert Merton would have avoided the 
static and fatalistic implications of consensual whites and i tcgrated 
institutions^.
f
For how are "dysfunctions" set in? Blauner's "inad ■rtent"
discrimination approximates Merton's "latent functions"; 1 t . ven so, he
fails to clarify its relationship to capitalist exploitation. If racist
discrimination is necessary to capitalist exploitation,how is the exploitation
of white workers to be explained? It is to the credit of Blau er md Baron
that they take cognisance of American capitalism. But "cap talism" in their
usage is a mere term, which allows, for example, the curt is expression
( 2 )
racial capitalism" . Their analyses remain moralistic and superficial.
Indeed, a certain regression is made manifest in Roliert Blauner's
(3)favouring "independent black police forces in the ghetto"' .
For both Blauner and Baron, racism as a cultural legacy, is a
formative influence on white attitudes and institutions. Blauner posited
/
that: "The slavery experience has affected the white, as much as the
black, collective unconscious, and therefore there exist subliminal tendencies 123
1) Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (The Free Press 
of Glencoe, Ivondon 1964) Part 1.
2) Robert Blauner, op. cit. p. 45.
3) ibid, p. 103.
among whites to relate to blacks as the possession and property they 
once represented"^. Theorising on "race relations" begins therefore 
'with America's white racist culture which informs conscious and 
unconscious institutional practices; "to maintain an overall pattern of 
oppression". The invoking of the unconscious here is a covert admission 
that a conscious white racism is methodologically implausible. Yet 
Blauner, and even more so Baron, treats it as a Hegelian Spirit. In Hegel's 
world, the Spirit objectifies itself in empirical world-historical processes. 
In Blauner's analysis, racism materialises itself in institutional practices.
It is the demiurge of oppressive racial practices, black culture, 
ghettoisation and discrimination. Such a force can hardly lx? a mere 
product of the slavery experience. It must be anthropological, latent in the 
subliminal recess of the mind. Blauner's idealist zeal thus carries him 
over into Jung's "collective unconscious". This thesis of an unconscious 
racism allows a simple juxtaposing of interacting educational, political and 
economic institutions. But Blauner has not perceived that he has contra­
dicted himself. He has transferred racism from the super-ego to the 
unconscious eithout understanding the latter. For if racism is now 
unconscious then it is neither "whites" nor institutions which are 
responsible for Tacial opprcssiorfl
Blauner treats behaviour as a given, external to his theory. Because 
of this, he cannot demonstrate necessary relationships lx?tween racist 
values and behaviour. Indeed, the assertion that racism operates as a 
regulator of behaviour evinces a certain theoretical debility. A given social 
act is not a pure observation which the >ry is then called upon to explain. 
Rather, it is a phenomenal description constituted within a wider 
theoretical structure. Blauner's conception of theorising treats behaviour as 
theory-free observation. Thus, as part of demonstrating the efficacy of racist 
values, he treats racially discriminating behaviour as a fact which his 
theory explains. As a result, the level of determination in his analysis 
is extraordinarily low. Thus his thesis of "racial oppression" can be easily
1) Ibid, p . 202.
refuted by positing capitalist exploitation as the necessary condition for 
the objectification of racist values. Because the institutional racist school 
is epistemologically empiricist and methodologically idealist, it reduces 
theorising to apparently empirical descriptions of the workings of American 
society. "Whites" express themselves disparagingly about "blacks" and 
"discriminate" against them, therefore, the latter is caused by the former.
The Cartesian conception of causation in use here is part of the generally 
superficial analysis offered by the institutional racist school.
We would argue that since mental processes accompany all behaviour 
particular beliefs are always intertwined with social action^. These 
beliefs are not accessible to textual reproduction and correspondence. For 
any investigation and discovery of beliefs involve theoretical presuppositions 
so that there is no way of disengaging actors' beliefs from the conceptions 
of the theorist. Thus a belief,in an alleged logical relationship with 
behaviour,must be specified and analysed within a system of concepts. If 
the whole society is assumed to Ik; racist,such a conceptual scheme is 
impossible and the concept of the capitalist mode of production must be 
replaced will) "racial capitalism". Here again the analysis of the 
institutional racist school disintegrates. For, given the thesis of a racist 
culture and a racial capitalism, it becomes impossible to explain the 
emergence of non-racist, or liberal "whites". All whites have to be racists 
and,if sonic are not,it is because they have fortunately escaped the racist 
socialisation, just as in Parson's explanation of "deviants". 'ITiis subsidiary 
argument exposes the arbitrariness of the functionaist conception of socialisation.
The sociological theory which the institutional racist ’ school' 
embraces is that which regards explanation as the isolating of the cultural 
phenomena underlying the behaviour of actors. Theorising is, therefore,
I
the mapping of the external world of behaviour and beliefs within which the 1
1) As Fngcls admitted, 'We simply cannot get away from the fact 
that everything that sets men acting must find Its way through 
their brains - even eating and drinking which begins as a consequence 
of the sensation of hunger or thirst transmitted through the brain 
and ends as a result of the sensation of satisfaction". Karl Marx 
and Frederick Fngcls, Selected Works (Progress Publishers, Moscow 
1968) p. 610.
former is explained when the significance of the beliefs for individuals is 
ascertained. The epistemological unity between Max Weber and Talcott 
Parsons is made clear in the concept of social action which is distinguishable 
from behaviour because it is subjectively meaningful. Analysis, therefore, 
begins with the Zeitgeist or the cultural meanings embodied in individual 
acts.
The institutional racist 'school' may thus be regarded as part of
a tendency in American sociology toward the analysis of cultural values
and their institutionalisation. The most eminent representative of this
tendency, Talcott Parsons, formulated his preference for cultural analysis
in this way: "I do not think it is useful to postulate a deep dichotomy
between theories which give importance to beliefs and values on the one
hand, to allegedly 'realistic' interests, e.g. economic, on the other.
beliefs and values are actualised, partially find imperfectly , in realistic
situations of social interaction and the outcomes are always codetermined
by the values and realistic exigencies; conversely what on concrete levels
are called 'interests' are by no means independent of the values which have
been institutionalised in the relevant groups"^ . The first sentence in
this passage attempts to obscure the opposition between the idealist and
materialist approaches to social theorising. This is a methodological problem
to which we shall return. The second sentence stresses the omnipresence
of beliefs and values in social interaction. But there is no logical connection
between the two propositions. It is possible to accept that values and beliefs
are ubiquitous, and yet recognise "a deep dichotomy", at epistemological
and methodological levels, between Weber's "The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism" and Marx’ s ’Capital".
Parsons has glossed over the phenomenon of different objects of
study being generated by different epistemologies. But there are two further
( 2 )
points which must be made about his formulation . Firstly, his 12
1) Talcott Parsons, Structure and Processes in Modern Society (The 
Free Press, Illinois 1960) p. 173.
2) Apart from the analytical superficiality within the conflating of beliefs 
and values. For a more sophisticated treatment of the relationship 
lietween beliefs and values see Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and 
Values (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California 1968).
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subsumption of economic interests under values and Ixdiefs only appears 
to be dissimilar from the counterposing of ideas and behaviour. Here a 
general statement is made about a receiprocal relationship or 
dialectical interaction between base and supers! i ucture such that ideas 
come to have " life of their ow n"^ . This metaphorical expression is 
virtually unexaminable. Rut like Parsons' autonomy of values, its purpose 
is to justify analysing empirical minds (value systems). Secondly, the 
idealist methodology and circularity of Parsons' reasmi ;  is clear: Beliefs 
realise themselves in action, the outcome of which is pa tly determined 
by values. Fconomic interests are evaluated and ted t< i through 
institutionalised values. Values, then, determine vali s. Since a 
principle of primacy is absent, the nature of this dete n tion cannot 
ever be demonstrated, which is tantamount to saying i t ructural- 
functionalism cannot explain the source of values.
We have asserted that there is no logical mov< ?r fr"in a
recognition of the existence of beliefs and values in "i r ts" to denying
an opposition between idealist-materialist methodolog ;. here is,
however, a psychological movement. In other words, It ¡e part of the
credibility of the idealist approach flows from our kn< ?' a of ourselves
( 2 )as thinking beings . Since the individual explains hi; a behaviour in
1) For assertions to this effect see Fugene Genov e 'Materialism and 
Idealism in the History of Negro Slavery in the \i rlcas" in Laura 
Foner and Fugene Genovese (eds.) op. cit. p. I-1; Stanley Likins, 
op. cit. p. 61; J.V. Femia in "Moore and the Pn -conditions for 
Democracy", British Journal of Political Science, Vol. II, 1‘>72, p. 42; 
John Rex, "The Concept of Race in Sociological lieory" in Sami 
Zubaida (ed.) op. cit. p. 52. Roth Genovese and Rex claim this to lx? 
a Marxist position. Yet it is a viewpoint voiced repeatedly by "non- 
Marxists". Moreover, it contains an ontological separation of 
being and consciousness in contrast to Marx's: "We set out from 
real, active men and on the basis of their real life-process we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes 
of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are 
also necessarily sublimates of their material life-process, which is 
empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, 
religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding 
forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence. They have no 111 story, no development . . .  " lbe 
German Ideology (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1065) pp. 37-38.
Cf. Gilbert Ryle, 'Ibe Concept of Mind (Penguin Rooks, Middlesex 1973).2 )
pterms of "because I thought", it seems logical to explain all behaviour 
by beginning with men's thoughts. Materialism appears to omit thought, 
while idealism seems to do homo-sapiens justice by beginning with the 
psychological facts. The investigation of "race relations" is legitimate 
because "race" is a facet of men's consciousness.
The psychological attractiveness of idealism, however, is inimical 
to social analysis, which poses questions about the origin of beliefs and 
values, rather than treats them as explanations. Is the actor by definition 
knowledgeable and objective about his values and beliefs? For this and 
other reasons, the expression of beliefs does not necessitate or justify 
the social scientist treating them as what Poulantzas called "finalist 
explanations". Admittedly, all action is belief-bearing since man is by 
definition a psycho-physical entity. A cognitive and value element is, 
therefore, always coeval with action. We observe this in the possibility 
of lifting the bracketed phrases from the following sentence without altering 
its meaning: If individuals (believe that it is natural and necessary to) 
act as to satisfy their bio-economic interests, their actions may lie 
interpreted as orientated towards the realisation of (this idea) their 
gratification . 'ITic problem for the social scientist, then, is not one of 
"beliefs" versus "economic interests", but the specifying and justifying of 
the epistemological basis of his method of investigation. To illustrate 
further, racism is an allegedly pervasive value in white society, but so too is 
the value that material needs must lx? satisfied. Which is the autonomous 
value? It is clear that to explain the behaviour ofNvhited'in terms of racist 
values is no more plausible than an explanation based on material values.
Indeed, all value explanations are Inconclusive. This is close to Brian 
Barry's argument that they are intrinsically (autologous since "the evidence 
for a value is simply a description of the behaviour it is used to explain"^.
1) Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (Collier,
MacMillan, London 1970) p. 89. See also Jonathan Turner, The 
Structure of Sociological Theory (Dorsey Press, Illinois 1974) p. 245.
What both sets of criticisms fail to mention, however, is the 
theoretical source of this tautology and hence the alternative which 
is to construct a system of concepts and demonstrate their logical 
relationships.
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In the case of Blauner et al., the justification for "racist behaviour" is 
an alleged widespread white racism, as a set of values of which the same 
behaviour is an index.
It is a paradox that as the race relations literature thickens, 
research analysts and ethnomethodologists have invalidated the methodological 
basis of the discipline. For a powerful set of criticisms has been levelled 
at the discovery, survey,and measurement of "race consciousness" which 
demonstrates the thesis of an omnipresent white racism to be,at best, a 
speculative assertion.
We may identify two general criticisms of the research methods used
in the survey of racial beliefs and attitudes. Hie first derives from the
intersubjective position. For the ethnomethodologist, social statistics are
not a product of scientific interviewing techniques, observation, coding and
decoding. Rather, they are based on complex processes of negotiation
among actors each with his own "background expectancies"^. 'ITiis would
( 2)
explain the "race-of-interviewcr effect" on respondents - although 
virtually unstudied is the converse "race-of-respondcnt effect on 
interviewers". It has been argued that white interviewers and black 
respondents "negotiate" differently from black interviewers and black 
respondents. According to Shirley Hatchet and Howard Schuman: "The 
process for both races seems to be one of avoiding responses that might 
nTf. iiJ the interviewer of the "opposing" race and of being frank (or at
/3)
least franker) with interviewers of one’s own race . The racist,or 
prejudiced response then,may well be a result of the intersubjectivity of 123
1) See A. V. Clcourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (The 
Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois 1964) Chs. Ill, IV. For more general 
observations, see Herbert Hyman et al., Interviewing in Social 
Research (Chicago University Press, Chicago 1954) especially
pp. 150-170.
2) See Howard Schuman and Jean M. Converse, "The Effects of Black 
and White Interviewers on White Respondents in 1966", Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXV 1971, pp. 44-68.
3) Shirley Hatchet and Howard Schuman "White Respondents and Race
of Interviewer Effects", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 
Winter 1975-1976, p. 527.
the interview situation. Herbert Hyman et al. claimed to have clear 
evidence that "the presumed impersonality of the interview situation does 
not overcome the reluctance of Negroes to express their opinions freely 
to whites"^. Attempts to decrease the race-of-interviewer-respondent 
bias have gone in the direction of the racial allocation of interviewers.
This expedient can only be regarded as an admission that the extent of 
"prejudice" is a function of the racial constitution of interviewers and 
respondents. We have reason to challenge even this conclusion and will 
now do so as part of the second criticism of race research methods.
Hie second criticism emphasises the intrinsically theoretical 
nature of both questionnaire content and the interpreting of responses.
The positing of the subjective expectancies of "actors" as responsible 
for distortions in findings is an implicit recognition of the impossibility 
of theory-neutral fact gathering. Theory operates here at two levels.
Firstly, there is the assumption that interviewing produces accurate 
reflections or indices of mental states. Secondly, the questions posed to 
respondents invariably embody their answers. For example, if the term 
Negro defines a person of low status, the question, are Negroes inferior 
or undesirable as neighbours cannot but elicit affirmative responses.
Obviously, race survey questionnaires cannot but contain economic 
and status elements. Thus virtually every such survey produces "evidence" 
of some white prejudice. But given the omnipresent economic and status 
connotations in "whites" and "blacks" the designating of responses as 
racial, or racist, is profoundly enigmatic. In one survey: "Twenty 
questionnaire items concerning attitudes towards coloured immigrants 
were used to construct four attitude scales reflecting various dimensions 
of racial prejudice. The scale used here was labelled "competitive economic 
prejudice", since its component items reflect the view that whites should 
be given preferential treatment in job promotions, lay-offs, and appointment 1
1) Herbert Hyman et al. Interviewing in Social Research, op. cit. 
p. 159.
to supervisory status" ^ \  Tlie economic elements here are overwhelming.
Despite this, the authors classified their results under the rubric "race
prejudice". Moreover, the fact of a white respondent favouring preferential
treatment for "whites" need not be interpreted racially, but in terms of
utilitarian individualism. The respondent may reason that "whites" as
opposed to "blacks'Svould favour his economic survival in the competitive
labour market, or hope that they would,on being informed that he is so
disposed. Examples of "white solidarity" could therefore be interpreted
as evidence of an individualist calculation in competitive sin ations. To test
its existence, the question posed could be: if you knew that e ther whites
would not vote for your preferential treatment but blacks would, would
you favour a "white first" policy?
The racial interpretation of responses to theoretically ambiguous
questions is also evident in the notion of race-of-interviewer effect. Why
"race-of-interviewer',' if the responses of ghetto "blacks" to 'middle-class"
black interviewers exhibit familiar patterns of distortion? "Race-effect"
is specifically derived from the premise of racial stratification. This
results in the illegitimate use of the undifferentiated concept "Negroes"
in questionnaires. For there are no Negroes, but Negro businessmen,
( 2).
executives, lawyers, labourers, doctors, celebrities, etc.,etc. fhe 
question do you think you are superior to Negroes is therefore over- 
simp]¡‘■•,*e. Leaving aside the unfortunate unspecificity of superior, a more 
sophisticated code would be: do you think a Negro millionaire is superior 
to a Negro doctor? We would then be lx?ttcr placed to discuss the 
relationship between economic stratification and cultural Images of 
inferiority-superiority. America's, "poor whites", like Brazil's, may well 
turn out to be "Negroes" in all but name only. 12
1) Stephen L. Flkin and William H. Panning, "Racial Prejudice in 
English Cities", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, 
Summer 1975, pp. 166-167.
2) As Rashl Fein puts it: "there is no the Negro American - as there 
is no the white American. "There are many Negro Americans who 
live in conditions far better than the median Negro Amer'can. There 
are some who live far better than the median American" In Talcott 
Parsons and Kenneth Clark (eds.) op. cit. p. 124.
Some measure of the elusiveness of white racism and prejudice
is demonstrated by the conflicting results of surveys. In 1969, R. Rose
mid Nicholas Deakln took a sample of five hundred "whites" from five
areas with a high concentration of "blacks", as well as a national, control
group sample. Theresults show those'Whites"who felt an "unconditional
antipathy" to coloured immigrants to be 10% of the British population^.
Clifford S. Hill opened his first Chapter with: "Colour prejudice in
Britain is increasing" . He found, in 1965, that 20% of the population
were "severely prejudiced" and another 30% having a considerable amount
of prejudice. In 1961, Anthony Richmond found 33% of the population
(3)'Severely prejudiced* , while one decade before Rose's and Deakin's
(4)
survey, Michael Banton arrived at the same figure of 10% . Voices of
dissent have also been raised in the United States. Richard F. Hamilton 
examining data on white attitudes towards black rights by class, region, 
age, religion and party allegiance, discovered erratic and inconsistent 
patterns of tolerance and a general commitment to equal rights^ .
1) E.J.B. Rose and Nicholas Deakin, op. cit. p. 321. For criticisms 
of their research methods, see John Powan, New Society, 14 August, 
1969, p. 408. One co-author, N. Donkin, revised this figure 
upwards in a subsequent edition of Colour and Citizenship.
2) Clifford S. Hill, How Colour Prejudiced is Britain? (Victor 
Gollancz lid ., I/union 1965) p. 21.
3) Anthony Richmond, The Colour Problem: a Study of Racial Relations 
Penguin, Iondon 1961).
4) Michael Banton, White and Coloured, op. cit.
5) Richard F. Hamilton "Class and Race in The United States" in 
George Fischer (ed .) The Revival of American Socialism 
(Oxford University Press, New York 1971). See also P. B. Sheatsley 
"White Attitudes toward the Negro" in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. 
Clark (eds.)op. cit.; W. Brink and L. Harris, Black and White:
A Study of U. S. Racial Attitudes Today (Simon and Schuster, New 
York 1967); H. C. Frskine, "The Polls: Recent Opinion on Racial 
Problems", Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1968-1969, Vol. 32.
For further bibliographic references, see T. F. Pettigrew,
Racially Separate or Together? (McGraw-Hill Book Company,
New York 1971) p. 209.
In our view, these criticisms amount to a refutation of not only
the simplistic research models which inform investigation into the extent
of racism or race prejudice among "whites", but the perspective which
generated them. It would not be incorrect to say that the "white racism"
which permeates Euro-American society is manufactured by the theoretical
and methodological immaturity of social scientists. What is pervasive is
the assertion of white racism being pervasive. In this context, the 
*
ethnomethodological criticisms do not penetrate to the core problem of 
theory, in this case, the race relations perspective.
What is racism?
A major analytic difficulty with the perspective which emphasises 
white racism is the unsystematic nature of its exposition. Racism is 
rarely defined as a concept and distinctions are not made between its 
individual and institutional expression md its determinate function. The 
result is a certain confusion between 1 vels of abstraction, description and 
explanation. 'Ilie term is used to describe a particular body of texts, 
beliefs, attitudes and feelings as well as to account for practices of 
discrimination against "blacks" at the social, political and economic 
l e v e l s . I n  the literature "racism" designates: an aesthetic aversion 
to "blacks", an expression of belonging to another race, or that "blacks" 
are of a different (inferior) species, stereotyped expectations of a racial 
group,or the imputation of behavioural characteristics to an individual on 
the basis of his racial origin, or a belief which determines the behaviour 
of "whites^ and discriminating white behaviour. 1
1) Blauner, for example, defined racism as "a propensity to
categorise people who are culturally different in terms of non- 
cultural traits" and elsewhere "an historical and social project 
aimed at reducing or diminishing the humanity . . .  of the racially 
oppressed", op. cit. pp. 112 and 41 respectively.
Michael Banton preferred racism as the doctrine and racialism 
as its practice. Michael Banton, Race Relations, op. cit. p. 8.
Note that this is a mere terminological shift which leaves the 
theoretical relationship no different from Blauner’ s.
The explanation of this definitional arbitrariness can be located 
in the use of racism to designate Ixdiefs as well as explain behaviour 
construed as derived from these beliefs. The arbitrariness is inevitable, 
since the project is the analysis of observable black-white relations.
Yet it precludes the ascertaining of the alleged behavioural effectivity of 
racism. The condition for the introduction of theoretical rigour is the 
abandoning of the idealist-empiricist pursuit of the mental states of
i
everyday actors. For there Is, we contend, an inverse relationship between 
the level of conceptual precision and the degree of empiricism in a social 
investigation. It is because theorists think their problem as corresponding 
to an external reality that racism has the status of a mere term. An 
anti-empiricist position precludes this low level abstraction, for the definition 
of a racism would attain theoretical significance only when articulated within 
a consanguinary set of constructs. It thus becomes a concept and the 
theorist is then not free to redefine or manipulate its meaning according 
to different'bmpirlcal"expressions.
It is possible to distinguish a common core of race determinism 
and race supremacy in the various definitions of racism. On this basis we 
propose to specify the meaning of racism and examine: the conditions of its 
emergence, its relationship to the rate of exploitation as well as its 
alleged status as an ideology.
Racism means a "race" is congenitally inferior to another. It is 
obviously predicated on the concept of race. But certain political and 
economic conditions must be met before sustained racist theories become 
manifest. These are: labour exploitation, class inequalities and expressed 
opposition to either,or both. Exploitation is a relationship of economic 
non-equivalence between two groups standing in determinate relationships 
to the means of production. It necessarily generates economic,and political 
- in terms of access to the State machinery - Inequalities. These groups 
will be defined biologically, as superior-Inferior races, in proportion to the 
degree of class inequality and the opposition to exploitation. For this 
opposition necessarily explains Inequality in terms of social determination.
Such an explanation cannot find favour with the exploiting class.
The competing theories of biological determinism (Social Darwinism) and
1 1 1
social determinism may be seen as an intellectual efflux of class struggles. 
Thus, the necessary conditions for the emergence of racist ideas 
are class exploitation and class struggles. Both Marx: "The history of 
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles^ and historians 
of the'Idea of race"and racism lend support to this viewpoint. Not surprising- 
-ly.then, a notion of race and racial inferiority has been discovered in the 
ancient civilisations ' ,  feudal Europe' , nineteenth century Britain and 
A m erica^  and twentieth century Rwanda^ and this list is obviously not 
exhaustive. An idealist social study would focus on these intellectual 
phenomena rather than the class structure. Indeed, it would posit a racial
history of the world by equating and linking pro-slavery texts with
. (6)
Aristotle's denigration of the slaves nature in a chain of continuity
The problem of the emergence of race determinism and race 
supremacy is different the thesis of racism causing the intensity or 
intensification of labour exploitation. The generation of race and racism 
by exploitative relationships does not imply the determination of the latter 
by the former. Indeed, on the contrary, if these theories are produced 
as a result of the growth of opposition to class exploitation, then they 
cannot be conceived as a necessary and sufficient condition of "ultra­
exploitation". Thus the thesis of race and racism being a causal element 
in the compounded exploitation of black workers is untenable. The notion
1) 1 Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit. p. 39.
2) See Louis Ruchames, Racial Thought in America: From the 
Puritans to Abraham Lincoln, Vol. I, op. cit. Introduction;
Thomas Cosset, Race: The History of an Idea in America 
(Schocken Books, New York 1965).
Ramila A. Tliaper, Meeting of Experts on the Concepts of Race, 
Identity and Dignity, UNESCO, Paris 3-7 July, 1972, p. 6.
3 )  Paul Bohannan, African Outline, Penguin, 1/mdon 1964) p. 69.
4» Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, Ixmdon 1971);
I. A. Newby, The Development of Segregational Thought (The 
Dorsey Press, Illinois 1968); George M. Frederlckson, The Black 
Image in the White Mind (Harper and Row, New York 1972) p. 320.
5 )  See Philip Mason, Race Relations (Oxford University Press, London 
1970)pp. 14-15.
6) See Thomas Cosset, op. cit., Ch. 1.
of compounded exploitation is itself questionable. Is there a normal 
exploitation? 'Hie exploitation of "white workers" does not provide a 
comparable norm of exploitation since, for example, the situation of white 
female and low-paid workers disproves the existence of any remunerative 
homogeneity among "whites". The explanation is that capitalists are by 
definition continuously in pursuit of greater surplus value. This is a 
condition of the capitalist mode of production, which is independent of the 
social beliefs of the capitalist class. 'Finis, an intensification of exploitation 
is by no means a deviation inexplicable except with reference to some 
psychological or altitudinal quirk. The rate of exploitation is not constant 
or spatio-temporally uniform. For it is responsible to the structural 
exigencies dominating agents, both capitalists and workers, in mutual 
opposition within the capitalist mode of production. Class struggles,then, 
are a crucial moment in the determination of the rate of exploitation which 
must, therefore, manifest historical fluctuations. Only an idealist
analysis can attribute its intensification to an assumed idee fixe. Such an 
analysis would be not only inconsistent and fatalist but would necessarily 
Mrect struggles against "whites',’ rather than capitalism.
To admit the existence of voluminous racist texts is not to impute 
a behavioural effectivity to racist beliefs. We cannot ascertain whether or 
not actors "believe" their theories. Thus, it is illegitimate to posit a
tp
monolithic black image in the white mind,or astatic, Negrophobic mental 
preparedness. George Frederlckson's analysis concludes that there were 
" . . .  shifting and divergent white conceptions of Afro-American character 
between 1817-1914. White racialism considered as an intellectual and ideo­
logical phenomenon, was not a monolithic and unchanging creed during 
this period but a fluid pattern of b e lie f"^ . The problem with this 
conclusion, however, is that divergent and shifting viewpoints hardly 
constitute a belief. Rut Frederickson here raises the more fundamental 
question of racial ideology.
Fugene Genovese has traced a "fully developed racist ideology" 
to the nineteenth century from where It emerged to "conquer the Western
1 ) G e o r g e  M .  F r e d e r ic k s o n ,  op . c it .  p . 320.
W orld"^\ In their dissertation on institutional racism, I>ouis Knowles
and Kenneth Prewitt proceeded thus: "Our analysis begins with attention
to ideological problems in American society which historically and
presently sustain practices appropriately labelled "institutional racist".
We then turn attention to the procedures of dominant American institutions:
(2 )
educational, economic, political, legal and medical" . Their work mir­
rors the general reluctance on the part of race relations theorists to 
clarify whether racism is an ideology of slavery, "Negro slavery", or 
contemporary "racist practices". Indeed, why is it an ideology? What is 
the meaning of ideology as a concept and can a social formation contain 
a plurality of ideologies? The silences on these questions would suggest 
’ that ideology in race relations writings is simply a synonym for an idea 
as, for example, in Maiming Nash's definition: "The ideology of race is 
a system of ideas which interprets and defines the meanings of racial 
differences, real or imagined in terms of some system of cultural values. 
The ideology of race is always normative: it ranks differences as better
(3)or worse, superior or inferior . . .  . Here ideology, obviously
interchangeable with idea, is a term of no theoretical significance. What,
however, is ideology as a theoretically significant expression?
'Hie concept of ideology became an object of systematic sociological
(4)
study after the publication of Karl Mannheim's "Ideology and Utopia" 
Mannheim was concerned with the various ways in which an object presents 
itself to various subjects according to the differences in their social 
settings. This was part of a larger investigation into how mental 
structures, thoughts, ideas, etc. are,inevitably,differently formed in 
various historical contexts. According to Mannheim,ideology can be 1
1) Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. 
p. 130.
2) Louis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt (eds.) op. cit. p. 6.
3) Manning Nash, "Race and the Ideology of Race" in Paul Baxter 
and Basil Samson (eds.) Race and Social Difference (Penguin 
Books, Middlesex 1972) p. 111.
4) Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London 1972).
particular and general. The former refers to incorrect interpretations
of situations, lies or rationalisations. The latter denotes the historical
moulding of the mental structures of particular epochs and social groups.
Significantly, the general conception of ideology does not impeach the
validity of what is being said; it merely notes its existenial basis.
Ideology was for Mannheim a neutral sociological category to be used to
identify fundamentally opposed politico-philosophical perspectives. For
him, all thought is ideological for intellectual phenomena necessarily exist
in a constant state of confrontation and conflict. Even the Utopian
perspective, namely, that which challenges the dominant Weltanschauug
is an ideology in embryo. Ideology,then,is a neutral sociological term;
it simply depicts and expresses in terms of its own historical emergence
and the intellectual conflicts intrinsic to social differentiation: "The
distrust and suspicion which men everywhere evidence towards their
adversaries,at all stages of historical development,may be regarded as the
immediate precursor of the notion of ideology...We begin to treat our
adversaries' views as ideologies only when we no longer consider them as
calculated lies and when we sense in his total behaviour an unreliability
which we regard as a function of the social situation in which he finds
h im se lf '^ . But this approach, he cautioned, must not degenerate into
argument ad hominem which finds expression in the imputing of a logical
relationship between the social-class origin of a theorist and the truth
( 2)
content of his enquiry . Mannheim faces an intractable problem here.
Can a subjective being in a world of objective divisions resolve the question 
of objectivity? 12
1) ibid. p. 54.
2) ibid. p. 24. Note that Louis Althusser's conception of ideology 
is akin to Mannheim's. Ideology is countcrposed to science, but 
admitted to be a source of scientific theory. See Ix)uis Althusser, 
For Marx (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1969). pp. 199, and 232.
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How is truth to be grasped if historical differentiations within social 
systems are intrinsically disfigurative of intellectual phenomena? Mannheim's 
solution is "the free floating intellectual".
The two central criticisms of Mannheim’s conception of ideology 
concern his relativism and reductionism both of whose source can be 
found in his empiricism, i.e. his conception of reality as an atheoretical thing.
In nominating"free-floating intellectuals" as bearers of objective 
truth, Mannheim falls prey to the very assumption he had repudiated.
For, given the existential conditioning of all social thought, no group can be 
free-floating. Mannheim, therefore, did not resolve the problem of 
relativism. Indeed, in failing to ask whether the objectivity of knowledge 
is not itself existentially conditioned, Mannheim has to become a relativist.
He seeks truth but denies the possibility of its discovery except by a 
group with a specific relation to social reality. Maurice Mandelbaum put 
the matter succinctly: "Mannheim's ideological doctrine is wholly 
relativistic; his attempts to substitute relationism for relativism by means 
of a sociology of knowledge leads him to assume what had previously 
been denied: the possibility of objective knowledge"^ \  Mannheim's 
inconsistencies are a consequence of his assumption of a reality,independent 
of the knowing human subject, objective knowledge of which can be obtained 
by controlling the values of the knower. Yet since it is impossible to 
demarcate the value of the knower from the external reality, the latter's 
objective essence is unknowable, Thus, by definition, ideology too cannot 
be discovered.
In focusing on the knowing subject Mannheim may be said to have 
misconceived the problem of ideology. For what is more relevant to the 
analysis is the material basis of the existence of "adversaries" and 
"antagonists". This would involve formulating ciiteria of significant 
conflicts, as well as an analysis of the concepts of class consciousness 
and mode of production. Mannheim nowhere discusses how men come to 
be in conflict. Different group interests are merely asserted as endemic 1
1) Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge:
An Answer to Relativism (Liverrlght Publishing Corporation, New
York 1938) p. 32.
to society. Thus Mannheim reduces class to groups and ideology is seen
through a prism of group psychology^. Such an approach allows the
use of "ideology" to mean: the idiosyncratic views of individuals, statements
conceived as not in accord with "reality", non-scientific views, or ideas
expressed by an arbitrarily defined group. Mannheim's conception, then,
presupposes the existence of objective truth which the use of pure
sociological reason can grasp. His project is merely to demonstrate
how groups and interests deform reasoning processes and objective
inquiry: "Just as Kant once laid the foundations for modern epistemology
by asking about the already existent natural sciences, "How are they
possible?" so today we must ask the same question concerning the type of
knowledge which seeks qualitative under standing and which tends, at
least, to affect the whole subject. We must ask further from and in what
( 2)
sense can we arrive at truth by means of this type of thought" . The
sociology of knowledge,thcn,is merely called upon to lay bare the vitiating
of social thought by group loyalties, interests and conflicts.
Mannheim's conception of ideology,as opposed to that of George
(3)Lukács and Karl Marx' ' ,  severs it from class, class conflict and the
subjective conditions of revolution. It percolates through the writings of
such influential theorists as Talcott Parsons, A1 vin Gouldner, C. Wright
(4)M ills, Robert Merton and John Plainenatz. It is also the source of such 1
1 ) Karl Mannheim, op. cit. p. 19.
2) Karl Mannheim, op. cit. p. 261.
3) See George Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (Merlin
Press, London 1971) pp. 83*222.
Karl Marx, The German Ideology, op. cit. pp. 40-47; Capital,
Vol. 1, op. cit. pp. 573, 608-611.
4) See Talcott Parsons, The Social System, op. cit. pp. 267, 349-351; 
Alvin Gouldner, op. cit. pp. 47-51.
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, op. cit. p. 280.
John Plamenatz, Ideology (MacMillan, London 1970).
Robert Merton, op. cit. pp. 516-521.
From among these texts Robert Merton's discussion and 
interpretation of Mannheim must be considered the most lucid.
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formulations as: racial ideology, abolitionist ideology, management 
ideology, male ideology, middle-class ideology, national ideology . . .  
a social formation can exhibit an unlimited number of ideologies. The 
concept thereby loses all theoretical significance and relevance to a 
theory of social change! ^ Not surprisingly,then, it has become an academic 
expletive, used in interchanges of mutual recrimination, the very 
phenomenon which Mannheim sought to avoid. These are assertions 
which we shall now attempt to substantiate.
We may observe, in Mannheim's differentiation between 'particular 
ideology' and 'total ideology', an attempt to avoid treating lies, 
rationalisations and self-deceptions as "ideology". This differentiation 
is crucial. For his whole analysis rests on (he possibility of separating 
the psychological from the theoretical level. If no valid distinction can be 
made between the particular and the total his treatise is nullified,since 
ideology becomes unidentifiable.
For Mannheim, the concepts particular ideology and total 
ideology are similar in that they both deal with individual subjects but treat 
their ideas transcendentally, i.e. as a function of the subjects' life- 
situation.. They differ, however, for the total conception relates to the 
minds of historical epochs and to the theoretical rather than logical 
or factual divergences which preclude a discourse between individuals.
There are serious problems with this analysis to the extent that we 
may charge Mannheim with not having established a distinction between 
particular and total ideology, formal differences between them,or even 
a concept of ideology. He continuously conflates methodological and 
substantive levels of differentiation. Thus he confusingly uses "we" to 
denote both himself as analyst and empirical actors. In consequence, it 
is impossible to ascertain whether the concepts of particular and total 
ideology are Ids abstraction or everyday actors' usages and meanings.
'nils is important. For the latter case is not itself proof of a distinction.
1) We regard social change ns the transformation of specific relations
of production. In tills sense, every conception of ideology is an effect 
of conception of capitalist relations of production as well as the 
possibility of their abrogation. If they are seen as class relations of 
exploitation via commodity exchanges, then Ideology cannot be of 
"groups".
\
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Some individuals regard racist ideas as a lie, a scientific error as well 
as a total ideology dominating the slavery and post-emancipation periods.
If the former case, Mannheim is obliged to define existential conditions, and 
historical epochs, and clarify the relationship between psychological and 
theoretical explanations. Are they necessarily mutually exclusive?
Mannheim is silent on precisely these issues.
A particular lacuna in Mannheim is even more dislocative for his 
empiricist history of ideas. It may be observed that he does not offer an 
abstract definition of ideology but empirical descriptions of the mental states 
which he construes as ideological. It is logically impossible to distinguish 
between variants of an unspecified phenomenon. This Mannheim does 
demonstrate. To illustrate, 'particular ideology' may be a property of 
individuals or groups and its source is discoverable through analysis of 
their existential conditions. The method of discovering 'total ideology' 
is exactly the same,except that we examine the existential conditions of 
the epoch. Rut if the existential conditions of an individual are identical 
to those of the historical epoch, and Mannheim gives us no reason to 
exclude this possibility, then,there is no necessary difference between 
particular and total ideologies. Within the Mannheimian conception, then, 
it is legitimate to designate virtually any viewpoint as ideological. This, 
however, is not just the consequence of logical flaws in his work. He 
himself regarded all social theories as belonging to either particular, 
total,or utopian ideology. Thus, every theorist is idcalological including Mannehim.
'Ideology and Utopia' may be seen as part of a discourse about the 
status of ideas in society. "This book", Mannheim begins, "is concerned 
with the problem of how men actually th ink"^. His contribution focuses 
on the social genesis of ideas,theorising as well as the problem of objectivity. 
George Lukács, a contemporary of Mannheim, concerned himself with the 
relationship between ideas and the transformation of class consciousness.
His object is the clarification of the theoretical (subjective) conditions which 
must lx: satisfied if the proletariat is to become a revolutionary class.
Sociologists who reject this as an object of study would necessarily
1) Karl Mannheim, op. clt. p. 1.
\
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appropriate and popularise Mannheim's approach to ideology. Race 
relations theorists too would adopt the Mannhelmian notion of ideology, given 
their commitment to the analysis of groups and their world-view, rather 
than "class". Thus, no sociologist of "race relations" can be concerned 
with the relationship between "racial ideology" and bourgeois ideology.
For this would mean abandoning the assumption of a racial social structure. 
What race theorists must do in order to sustain 'racial ideology' is develop 
motions of internal colonialism and institutional racism.
In order to demonstrate the imaginary nature of "racial ideology" 
we shall return the focus on bourgeois ideology through a summary analysis 
of Georg Lukács' much neglected conception of ideology.
Lukács' approach derives from Marx's conception of social change 
in which philosophic-political theories are ideological correlates of capi­
talist relations of production. For Lukács, ideology is inseparable from 
the commodity-structure of bourgeois society; it is the subjective aspect 
of objective processes of reification and de-reification. The subjects are 
classes and their political behaviour (class struggles) is a reflex of these 
processes. The social relations of production in capitalist society are of 
commodity exchange. These generate forms of reification; theories of 
the immanence of the immediate reality. At the same time, however, 
the contradictions in the mode of production, e.g.,labour competition as 
o '¡,st working class industrial concentration, economic struggles and 
solidarity^ These foster a revolutionary, de-reifying consciousness 
as evinced by Marxism. Thought then, is'a factor in the total process, 
à  form of reality,'b^nd ideology, part of a revolutionary, dialectical process . 
Marxist Ideology in Inkacs' view functions to revolutionise working class 
consciousness through a unification of subject and object, theory and 
practice. Only a dialectical conception of social reality as a totality can 
make intelligible that which the capitalist mode of production endlessly 
reifies: " . . .  when the dialectical method destroys the fiction of the
immortality of the categories it also destroys their reified character and
(3)
clears the way to a knowlegde of reality" . In de-reifying social reality
1)
2 )
3)
Georg Lukucs, op. cit. p 171-173. 
ibid. p. 203. 
ibid. p. 14.
Marxist ideology treats all consciousness,including the economic 
categories of bourgeois economists,as fetlshised, but necessary forms, 
fundamentally illusory because specific to the capitalist mode of production.
Marxist ideology distinguishes itself from bourgeois thought by 
admitting to its self-transcendence through the development and ultimate 
disappearance of the proletariat. For Marxism is an ideology specific to the 
contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. It reflects the 
actual emergence, social existence, needs and consciousness of the working 
class not only because Marx wrote explicitly for the proletariat, but also 
because without this class,Marxism is ontologically impossible. Marxist ideology 
is dialectical. It recognises that its mass assimilation and practice leads 
to the diappearance of all ideology. It is true because its propositions and 
imperatives correspond to the level of development of the productive 
forces. Hie proletarian revolution it argues for is not based on a dream, 
or a morality,but a part of the logic of capitalist development. Bourgeois 
ideology on the other hand reifies the social structure by fragmenting the 
totality of social reality. Thus the conditions of bourgeois ideology are 
limited and limiting relative to the problems of social change and scientific 
knowledge.
True, scientific apprehension of social processes is alien to the 
bourgeoisie because of its place in the scheme of production. The 
proletariat, on the other hand, being the object of capitalist rationalisation 
ran "see clearly for the first time how society is constructed from the re l­
atione with each other . For example, it is a fundamental perception of 
Marxism that theproductive forces under capitalist commodity production 
had developed to the point where private property was redundant. Even if 
this Is grudgingly acknowledged by the bourgeoisie, neither individually 
nor collectively can it act on this historical fact, enmeshed as it is in 
capital accumulation. The matter is different with the proletariat. It is a 
social class whose theoretical knowledge leads to action without transition 
by virtue of its commodity s ta tu t  The task of Marxists, then, Is the imputation
1) I.ukacs, however, falls to demonstrate this intrinsic revolutionary
potential of the proletariat, as a commodity. Indeed, he asserts that 
it Is because the worker's "humnnity and his soul are not changed into 
commodities" that he Is revolutionary, ibid, p. 172.
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of class consciousness to the proletariat, to give it an understanding of 
itself as a commodity. The social theory, the analysis of a social 
problem which does not perform this function is an uncritical creature 
of capitalist reification.
Lukács' emphasis of praxis derives from his opposition to the
"contemplative, purely cognitive stance" which arbitrarily severs the
connection between thought and existence. This tendency has its roots in
Kant’ s epistemology and survives in sociological analysis: "As long as a
man adopts a stance of intuition and contemplation he can only relate to
his own thought and to the object of the mpirical world in an immediate
way. He accepts both as a ready-made -  produced by historical reality.
As he wishes only to know the world and not to change it he is forced to
accept both the empirical material rigidity of existence and the logical
rigidity of concepts as unchangeable. His mythological analyses are not
concerned with the concrete origins of the rigidity nor with the real factors
inherent in them. That would lead to its elimination. They are concerned
solely to demonstrate how the unchanged nature of these data could l>e
conjoined whilst leaving them unchanged and how to explain them as such" ^
Lukács has been criticised as an historicist, and humanist working
( 2 )
within a Hegelian framework . This criticism is justifiable. Lor 
his position on the inevitability of the dissolution of capitalism is predicated 
on a linear condition of historical evolution. However, "History and
1) ibid. p. 202.
2) See Ixjuis Althusser, For Marx (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1969)
pp. 31, 114n, 221n. We feel that Althusser's criticisms, however, miss 
an Important question for Marxist theory: can concepts represent processes 
without becoming historicist? If Lukács' "dialectics" becomes 
teleological in his attempt to capture processes of social change 
so too do Althusser's "structural causality" and "timeless history".
For Lukács, the internal contradictions in the development of 
capitalist commodity production generate a social force, the 
proletariat, which necessarily seeks the abolition of bourgeois relations 
of production. This abolition, hinges on the theoretical development 
of this class so that, for Lukács, It is not history which determines 
class consciousness, but class struggles, initially in the 
intellectual-theoretical sphere.
Class Consciousness" does contain an incisive theoretical analysis
of the capitalist social formation.' The concepts: productive forces,
relations of production,commodity production>reification and ideology are all
inter-defined^. Lukács’ project is the specification of the relationship
between base and superstructure. lie argues that theoretical production is
determined by the exchanges men enter into with nature and their fellow
men. 'rite commodity exchanges within capitalism qualitatively reify the
content of this theoretical production in so far as the relations of the
producers to one another appear as a relationship between things. Marx
broke with reification by turning his analysis on the concept of the commodity.
For Marx, a commodity is "a mysterious thing" as opposed to the clarity
of a relationship of exploitation based on custom, power, or personal
dependence: "In preceding forms of society, this economic mystification
arose principally with respect to money and interest-bearing capital. In the
nature of things it is excluded in the firstplace where production for the use
value, for immediate personal requirements, predominates; and, secondly,
where slavery or serfdom form the broad foundation of social production,
as in antiquity and during the Middle Ages. Here, the domination of the
producer by the conditions of production is concealed by the relations of
dominion and servitude, which appear and are evident as the direct motive
( 2 )
power of the process of production" . The mystification of the social 
basis of exploitation then,reaches an apogee in capitalism to constitute 
ideology, not as a subjective fantasy,but a conscious expression of the 
objective processes of capitalist production.
The anti-empiricist strain in "History and Class Consciousness" 
constitutes an embryonic but powerful criticism of contemporary sociology. 
For in recommending fealty to the actors' definition of the situation,they 
take the commodity structure of bourgeois society and the specific nature 
of Its agents as expressive of an immanent condition.They, as Lukács wrote 1
1) One inconsistency In this inter-definition, Lukács,as other Marxists 
like Althusser, Gramscl and Lenin,refer to Marxism as an 
Ideology. Hut even here he adds that it is specific to contradictions 
within capitalism and a part of the class struggle.
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. Ill, op. cit. p. 831.2 )
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of the Anabaptists, "start from the assumption of man as he exists and an
empirical world whose structure is unalterable^. This slavish copying of
the empirical world is exemplified in Talcott Parsons'definition of money
as "a generalised medium of exchange", and significantly in the writings of
Weber and Durkheim there is a deep pessimism about not men in capitalist
(2)
society as adjuncts of exploitation and alienation, but human nature . The 
ideological content of sociological texts is significant. For as we have seen 
this is precisely the kind of political economy and philosophical anthropology 
which informs race (relations) studies. It derives from empiricism.
Sociologists claim to be dissertating on reality as distinct from analysing 
concepts. The result is a "perennial play" on the term reality and general 
statements about the real world intrinsically susceptible to empirical 
falsification. For example, is money a generalised medium of exchange?
Within Ford's economic empire a part of the reality which Parsons claims 
to be explaining goods are allocated without monetary exchanges. Arguably, 
then, and this is what Parsons' formulation obscures, a global economy 
organised as a communal entity would dispense with money.
It is interesting that the disciplines of politics and sociology are 
organised around the "Hobessian" problems of power and order. For the 
fact that Thomas More's "Utopia", for example, is not chosen as the seminal 
text is part of the curtailment of discussions of an alternative social order. 
Similarly, Marx's "socialism" is dubbed impractical and dismissed by race
(3)relations theorists as incapable of eradicating race from society' . Marxist 
social scientists remain within the empiricist tradition in preparing to engage 
in "empirical" research on "race" and working class consciousness rather than 
develop the philosophical-anthropological and strategic implications of Marx's 123
1) Georg Lukács, op. cit. p. 192.
2) See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A study in Sociology (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London 1968), pp. 247-249, 362. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber,
An Intellectual Portrait (Anchor Books, New York 1962), pp.470-471.
3) See Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. Ch. ill, 
Stokcley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, op. cit. Moreover, consider 
the virtual absence of works dealing with the relationship between the 
eradication of capitalist commodity production and "racism".
scientific socialism Tlius, the many radical studies which have
concluded that the working class is apathetic, imbued with middle class
(2)
ideology,and racist .
Our original questions were: are racist ideas an ideology, the 
ideology of slavery, "Negro slavery", or contemporary "racist policies"? 
These questions we consider to be false; but affirmative answers are 
provided by race relations theorists. These answers suggest that racist 
ideas are conceived in structural terms, however much these theorists 
may not be aware of this. For, and this is Mannheim's singular 
contribution to the analysis of ideology, to designate an idea as ideology 
is to imply necessary relationships, i.e. a structure. This means that 
the necessity must be demonstrated through the specifying of this structure. 
The great weakness in Mannheim derives from this empiricist conception 
of social structure. This enabled him to play on such vague expressions 
as psychological interests, historical epoch, and existential conditions.
But this very vagueness prevented him from proving necessary relation­
ships and validates his project of a "formal functional analysis" of 
"how men actually think". Race theorists, following Mannheim have 
functionally labelled racism an ideology, generally without specifying 
the relationship between the two terms.
Let us, however, pursue the questions further.
The question, arc racist ideas an ideology is premature and 
incomplete. It must first lie established that many ideologies can exist 
in a social formation. Tills, as we have seen, cannot be demonstrated 
wuhuut nullifying the concept altogether. The question is incomplete because 12
1) Thus, we may isolate empiricism as responsible for the fact that 
" . . .  there has been relatively little progress towards the 
elaboration of a theory concerning the development of the subjective 
conditions of revolutionary situations". Harold Wolpe, "Some 
Problems Concerning Revolutionary Consclousness"ln Ralph 
Miliband and John Saville (eds.), Hie Socialist Register (Merlin 
Press, London 1970) p. 251. We would even propose that 
empiricist and non-empiricist practices are set within class 
struggles where the exploited class interrogates "reality" by 
abandoning the given definitions of the situation.
2) See, especially, Herbert Marcuse., One Dimensional Man (Routledge 
and Kcgan Paul, London 1964).
ideology must be posed as of a structure. Thus our second question, are 
racist ideas the ideology of slavery? We would answer negatively on two 
counts. Firstly, racist ideas preceded the existence of slave labour in 
the Americas. Secondly, this necessarily non-generalised mode of labour 
cannot generate notions of men’ s nature, only the nature of the slave, as in 
Aristotle'sisóme men are slave by nature? Slavery does not necessarily 
breed a pervasive racism. Greek and Roman slavery are a case in point^. 
Slavery is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the development of 
race theory and ideas of racial supremacy. The theoretical elaboration and 
dissemination of these ideas are a function of the extent of the opposition 
to men being held as property . Race supremacist notions are not 
exclusive to slave society. Even free labourers may be defined as racially 
inferior,arguably, as part of obscuring the political determinants of the 
rate of exploitation. Thus, racism is not an ideology of the exploitation of 
black wage labourers. The labour being designated "black labour" is itself 
a device aimed at mystification and division. However, this usage of racist 
ideas in a justificatory context does not constitute them as ideology except 
in the Mannheimian conception where ideology can be lies, rationalisations, 
or State propaganda. Indeed, a certain moralistic reductionism is implicit 
in the equating of ideology with the contextual usage of ideas. It becomes, 
then an argumentad hominem, a manifestation of a personal objection to 
particular forms of social control. Ideology thereby ceases to be 1
1) For discussions of how Greeks and Romans justified slavery non- 
racially, sec M.I. Finley (ed .) Slavery in Classical Antiquity 
(Heffer, Cambridge 1960); on the defence of North American slavery 
Eric McKitrick points out: "The Southern thinkers drew much from 
the notions of Aristotle on order and function in society. They 
examined Scripture, their Bible argument is really something more 
than an exercise in equivocation . . .  there was the "King Cotton" 
theory which showed how the iron necessities of world trade 
upheld slavery. The Southerners also appealed to Burke . . .  They 
even had recourse to science, a science that was not merely 
Southern . . . "  Slavery Defended: the Views of the Old South 
(Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1963) p. 2.
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theoretically relevant to class organisation and the analysis of political forces 
within the capitalist social formation.
We would argiie that ideology cannot be conspiratorily construed, i.e. as 
the ideas imposed by a ruling class or in terms of an "elective affinity" between 
values and group interests. The notion that racist ideas were the ideology of the 
South's plantation slavery is of this genre. Here ideology is unterchangeable with 
naturalisation; but since pro-slavery writers utilised "Negro inferiority", "the 
world market", "culture", and "history", it is unjustifiable to select one of their 
rationalisations as the South's ideology. We hope to avoid the arbitrariness and 
confusion surrounding ideology by defining it as the theoretical reproduction of 
relations of commodity production. Only generalised commodity production gives 
birth to ideology, to fetishised political economic concepts and the notion of a 
functional immanence between commodity production and human nature. Racist 
theory necessarily concerns the nature of races not the nature of man. While 
racist ideas are an efflux of a particular mode of labour exploitation, ideology 
constitutes an epiphenomcnon of capitalist commodity production. For processes 
of production which involve capital accumulation and the rigid calculation of 
individual inputs necessitate the imputation of immutable, individualist-utilitarian 
attributes to economic agents^ \  Hence, as Marx observed: "The categories of 
bourgeois economy consist of such like forms. They are 1
1) The following remark may lie taken as a domain confession of an 
economist: "The economist operates with an implicit assumption 
that goods are scarce and wants are insatiable, so that man in his 
economic capacity wants to earn as high an income as possible 
and in capitalistic economics - accumulate as much wealth".
Charles P. Kindleberger, Power and Money (Macmillan and Co. U d., 
London 1970) p. 7. C. B. MacPherson provides the historical 
dimension: "It was only with the emergence of modern market 
society,which we may put as early as the seventeenth century in 
England, that this concept of man was narrowed and turned into 
almost its opposite. Man was still held to be essentially a 
purposive rational creature, but the essence of rational behaviour 
was increasingly held to He in unlimited Individual appropriation, 
as a means of satisfying unlimited desire for utilities. Man 
became an infinite appropriator and an infinite consumer; an 
infinite appropriator because an infinite deslrer. "Democratic 
Theory: Essays in Rctrieval"(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1‘173), p. 5.
forms of thought expressing with social validity the conditions and 
relations of a definite, historically determined mode of production, viz., 
the production of commodities. The whole mystery of commodities, all 
the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour as long as 
they take the form of commodities, vanishes therefore, so soon as we 
come to other forms of production"^ \  Ideology is the theoretical 
reproduction of relationships of commodity exchange dominated by capital.
By this same token it cannot be racist. Racist ideas are not the reproduction 
in thought of capitalist relations of production; nor can they reify the 
commodity structure of bourgeois society. Indeed, ideas of racial inferiority 
are irrelevant to capitalist commodity production and even incompatible 
with relations of production which necessitate the labourer disposing of his 
labour power according to market exigencies. Thus, Governments would 
express no disinclination to engage in campaigns against "racial ideology" 
as much as others would seek to disseminate racist ideas. For the 
relationship between racist ideas and the capitalist mode of production is 
not one of logical necessity.
It is not that whether racism is an ideology or not depends on how 
the latter is defined, for it cannot be arbitrarily defined. If race relations 
theorists define and use "ideology" in an ad hoc,unsystematic manner, it is 
because they seek to add a materialist veneer to the idealist perspective 
which constitutes racism as a Negrophobic i^ogos determining history, a 
history of "race relations". Sidney 1 look's contrasting of Marx's 
materialism and idealism is here of some relevance. In Marxism, he argues: 
" . . .  we have a critical social behaviourism which does not deny that human 
beings are influenced by beliefs but which seeks to make intelligible the 
historical impact of dominant social beliefs - their rise, acceptance and 
decline - by interpreting them as forms of class behaviour . . .  The errors 
of the idealists arise from their attempts to deduce the character and 
existence of the given from the activity of the mind and from the fatal step 
by which the relatively autonomous activity of the mind becomes transformed
D Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. p, 76 (emphasis ours Y .W .)
into independence of complex material conditions"^. Hook, however,
does not comment on the relationship between the "given" and idealism,
and this is unfortunate. For it is the notion'of a given which logically
leads to either the pursuit and classification of correlations and regularities
(positivism) or ideational causation. The innate fatalism of an idealist
methodology is obvious. It is incapable of realising even C. Wright Mills'
(2)
liberal plea that social science enlarges the scope of human choice . For 
if the racist mind, an independent free-floating body of ideas, or deep-rooted 
psychological pre-dispositions and values, has causal responsibility, then 
we can do nothing but explore and interpret "race relations" ad infinitum, 
while,sporadically,despairing at "race riots" and exhorting all men to 
deeper humanistic contemplation.
We have seen that from its inception the analysis of the economic 
and social conditions of "blacks" in advanced capitalist societies was 
conceived within, and because of, certain philosophical-sociological traditions 
and perspectives. It derives initially from Simmel's sociology which George 
Mead, R. Park, W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki institutionalised in the
(3)Chicago School of Sociology in the early 20th century . We have 
repeatedly criticised its project of reproducing a conceptual map of the 
real world of social relations. So too did C. Wright Mills,although himself 
unware of its epistemological foundation: "Tendency II: Toward a systematic 
theory of 'the nature of man and society'. For example, in the works of 123
1) Sidney Hook,From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual 
Development of Karl Marx (Humanities Press, New York 1958), 
pp. 59-60.
2) C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Penguin Books, 
Middlesex 1971) Ch. 1.
3) Cf. Howard Becker "The parallel between Simmel and Thomas and 
Znaniecki seems close, and given the nature of Znaniecki's early 
training, it is quite conceivable that the precedent afforded by 
Simmel influenced him considerably . . .  Indications are given of the 
basic pattern of social interactions as developed by George Herbert 
Mead and others. But . . .  Mead in all probability drew on Hegel rather 
than Simmel"in Kurt H. Wolf (ed .), Georg Simmel (Harper Torchbooks, 
New York 1959) p. 227. For similar references to the influence of 
Simmel on the Chicago School, see Robert E. Paris, Chicago 
Sociology, 1920-32 (The University of Chicago Press, London 1920).
the formalists, notably Simmel and von Wiese, sociology comes to deal
in conceptions intending to be of use in classifying all social relationships
providing insights into their supposedly invariant features. It is, in short,
concerned with a rather static and abstract view of the components of
social structure on a quite high level of generability . . .  in so far as
sociology is defined as a study of some special area of society, it readily
becomes a sort of odd-job man among the social sciences, consisting of
miscellaneous studies of academic leftover. There are studies of cities
and families, racial and ethnic relations and of course, small groups.
As we shall see, the resulting miscellany was transformed into a style of
thought which I shall examine under the term liberal proclivity" ^ \  This
tendency cannot be but socio-psychological for in the real world of belief
bearing behaviour,explanation must focus on values,or beliefs. Thus, as
E. Franklin Frazier observed: "In Park's development of sociological
theory in regard to race relations, there are several important features
which are significant for the future of sociological theory in this field.
The original emphasis of this theory was upon the social psychological
aspects of race contacts. It was concerned primarily with an explanation
of behaviour in terms of attitudes. This was not only peculiar to Park's
(2)
theory, but it was characteristic of the theories of other scholars"' .
It is interesting to note that studies of "blacks" have not developed away 
from the framework pioneered by theorists in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. This should come ns no surprise for sociology, if 
anything, an empiricist mode of social analysis, is still a dominant 
theoretical practice. Thus, even the most sophisticated works of the 
conflict school, radical sociologists and black analysts concerned with the 
eradication of racism remain wedded to phenomenology, or normative 
functionalism' ' .  A "social problem" specific to contemporary social 
science -theTace problem"is taken as the reality of the 20th century. 123
1) C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, op. clt. pp, 30-31.
2) E. Franklin Frazier in G. Franklin Edwards (ed .), op. cit. p. 39.
3) For an example of a desperate, but unsuccessful, attempt to escape 
from sociology, see Rol>crt Staples, Introduction to Black 
Sociology, op. cit.
In this and the preceding chapter, we hope to have demonstrated
that the tradition of race (relations) studies is an off-shoot of the rise of
phenomenological and functionalist modes of social analysis which are
in turn variants of empiricism. It is not that these analyses set out only
to explain and not to change. If there is a conservative conspiracy, it lies
not in the rejection of Marx's political perspective but in a loyalty to an
empiricist epistemology within which social analysis begins with real actors
their behaviour, beliefs and definitions. We are,therefore,not surprised
that after over a half-century of theorising there is still "a race problem".
In 1904, W. I. Thomas could write, "Race prejudice is an affair that can
neither be reasoned with nor legislated about very effectively"^ . Frank
Tannenbaum echoed him fifty-three years later, " . . .  and a prejudice
(2 )
is of the hardest substance, harder to grind down than a diamond" . 
Myrdal's study, the Kerner Commission Report, the P. E. P. Reports in 
Britain, the liberal, radical and militant literature on "race relations", all 
testify to the profound influence of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Weber, Siminel 
and the Chicago and Harvard Schools of Sociology. We will not assert that 
the race (relations) perspective has not helped' ' ,  and cannot help "blacks", 
or for that matter "whites", and,therefore,should be abandoned. We will 
say, however, that in so far as social analysis remains steeped in the 
empiricist tradition, "race problems" will continue. On the other hand, 
if it is argued that the durability of the race (relations) perspective is to be 
taken as evidence of the intractability of "racism", then a legitimate 
demand can be made for a moratorium on "race relations" in order to 
iclocate resources to the investigation of the basis of this intractability.
We suggest the basis will be discovered in the practices of the sociology 
of "race relations". 123
1) W. I. Thomas "The Psychology of Race Prejudice" quoted in George 
M. Frederickson, op. cit. p. 315.
2) Frank Tannenbaum "Race Relations in Caribbean Society", in 
Vera Rubin (ed.), op. cit. p. 66.
3) Sec Melvin Tumin "Some Social Consequences of Research on 
Racial Relations", in Bernard E. Segal (ed.) Racial and Ethnic 
Relations (Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York 1972)
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CHAPTER 111
THE r a c ia l  e x p l a n a t io n  o f  s l a v e  lab o u r
From the 15th century onward,European Trading Companies began 
the colonial history'bf the New World by establishing therein settlements 
and,ultimately,plantation slavery based on imported African labour. These 
processes also formed the matrix of what are called Tace relations"^ Euro- 
American society.
Spanish traders and settlers with royal encouragement^ were the
. (2)first Europeans to implant forced labour and the production of primary
products for export in the New World. Thus the island of Hispaniola had
vast sugar estates producing siyar for export to Europe already in the first
quarter of the 16th century. Sugar production spread to Brazil by the mid
16th century then to British and other European colonial settlements. This
development went hand in hand with the importation of African slaves. By
the end of the 17th century "Negro slavery" was firmly established in the
New World and involved in the production of similar primary commodities.
But why slavery and why the enslavement of Africans? Indeed, is the 
latter question a valid one?
The investigation of the origin of slavery in the Americas is polarised 
into competing paradigms. The first stresses the motivational patterns and 12
1) G. K. Fieldhouse notes the influence of both the monarchy and 
mercantilism. He writes: "the metropolitan institutions created to 
govern Spanish America embodied this principle in that they alone 
dealt with colonial matters and were responsible only to the King. 
Chronologically the first was the Casa de Contractucion set up in 
1503 on the model of the Portuguese Casa da India. Its functions 
were to license all trade with the colonies; to organise shipping 
and navigation . . . . "  'fheColonial Empires (Weidcnfeld and 
Nicolson, London 1966) pp. 16-17.
2) Reference here is to the much debated encomienda, repartimiento and 
mita. See Silvio Zavala, New Viewpoints on the Spanish Colonisation 
of America (Russell and Russell, New York, 1968) Chs. VI, VIII and 
VIII; M. Ratekln, "The Early Sugar Industry in Española", Hlspanic- 
Americnn Historical Review, Vol. 34, 1954.
racial assumptions of Furopeans, while the second focuses on the economic
structure of European society and the world economy. Prof. Winthrop D.
Jordan is an eminent representative of the former approach^ \
Jordan's main concern is the social-psychology of sixteenthcentury
Englishmen, specifically their religion, social ethics and evaluation of
blackness where there was evidence of a troubled asceticism as well as a
quasi-religious antipathy to darkness. In effect.the pre-slavery attitudes of
Elizabethan Englishmen towards Africans were defined by the physical,
philosophical and cultural negation which the "darkies" represented.
Englishmen, already hypersensitive to blackness and sensuality, felt a
compelling aversion to the African's colour, heathenism and blatant sexuality:
"From the first, Englishmen tended to set Negroes over against themselves,
to stress what they conceived to be radically contrasting qualities of colour,
religion and style of life, as well as animality and a peculiarly potent
( 2 )
sexuality" . These interrelated characteristics evoked in Englishmen 
feelings of profound puzzlement and anathema. Above all, the impact of the 
African's colour was striking for: " . . .  one of the fairest-skinned nations
(3)
suddenly came face to face with one of the darkest peoples on earth, " '  and 
blackness was to Englishmen the personification of things vile.
Jordan's next step was to emphasise these "first impressions" on the 1
1) Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes toward the 
Negro 1550-1812 (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
Hill 1968). Jordan's work is of crucial significance not only because 
it is eminently representative of an idealist historiography and 
empiricism but also because it enjoys some currency as "the last 
word" on the subject. Reviewing "White Over Black" J.H. Plumb 
concluded: "It is good to see so many of the best American historians 
tackling one of the greatest historical problems of their society, the 
slave South and its complex repercussions. Among these Winthrop 
Jordan has won a deservedly high place with this magnificent book 
scholarly, perceptive, and intellectually sophisticated . . . "  in Allen 
Weinstein and Frank Otis Gatell (eds.) American Negro Slavery.
A Modern Reader (Oxford University Press, New York 1973) p. 409. 
See also George M. Frederickson "The Development of American 
Racism" in Nathan I. Huggins et al. (eds.) Key Issues in the Afro- 
American Experience (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc. New York 1971), 
Vol. 1, p. 244.
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grounds that they indicate the content of attitudes, which he defined as: 
"Thoughts and feelings (as opposed to actions) directed towards some specific 
object (as opposed to generalised faiths and beliefs) ' ^ } This emphasis allows the 
proposition of a movement from a mental state, a colour antipathy existing 
prior to,and intensified by,contact with "savage" Africans, to a "racial 
slavery". This is most clearly stated in: "Whatever the limitations of 
terminology as an index to thought and feeling it seems likely that the colonist’ s 
initial sense of difference from the Negro was founded not on a single 
characteristic but on a congeries of qualities which taken as a whole, seemed 
to set the Negro apart. Virtually every quality in the Negro invited prejorative 
feelings. What may have been his two most striking characteristics, his 
heathenism and his appearance, were probably prerequisite to his complete 
debasement. His heathenism alone could never have led to permanent enslave­
ment since conversion easily wiped out that failing. If his appearance, his 
racial characteristics, meant nothing to the English settlers, it is difficult to 
see how slavery based on race ever emerged, how the complexion as the mask 
of slavery ever entered the colonists' mind . . .  other qualities . . .  added up 
to savagery; they were the major components in that sense of difference which
provided the mental margin absolutely requisite for placing the European on
12)
the deck of the slave ship and the Negro in the hold . For Jordan, then,the 
perception of the African as a savage was a causal agent, not a rationalisation,
’ ' a necessary prerequisite to his enslavement. It was the feeling of a differ­
ence which tipped the balance and propelled Englishmen into "an unthinking 
decision" to enslave the "blackies".
We will offer a series of criticisms of Jordan’ s contribution to the 
clarification of the origin of African enslavement. Firstly, there is the 
absence of analytical differentiations. Despite the large volume of empirical 
material amassed, he failed to discuss the different types of confrontations 
which took place between Englishmen and Africans. Prof. Davis conceded 
that Jordan may have hit part of the truth in asserting a European tendency to
1) ibid. p. VIII.
2) ibid. p. 97. This crucial passage is Inconsistent with statements on 
pp. 61, 63, 64, 85 and 91, where Prof. Jordan, en passant, mentions 
the political and economic under-pinnlngs of Negro slavery.
associate Africans: " . . .  with Moorish infidelity and with Noah's curse of
Canaan which may have disposed some Europeans to regard them as fit
for bondage . . . "  But he advised that we consider: " . . .  that European slave
traders dealt initially as equals with African princes and merchants, and
negroes of royal blood who travelled to Europe were received with respect
and honour" ^ \  This remark illustrates the necessity of a close reading of
Prof. Jordan's peculiar use of "Englishmen". He failed to specify which
"Englishmen" saw Africans as "savages"; the captains of the slave ships,
the seamen who reportedly fared slightly less badly than the cargo, the slave
merchants, slave masters, English scribes, missionaries, ship builders,
explorers, settlers . . . ?  The force of Jordan's argumentation rests, in large
part, on this homogenising of a wide range of disparate phenomena and
activities under "Englishmen thought" and "the settlers felt". This is
illegitimate in a serious historical study, but unavoidable in a historiography
in which perceived racio-cultural differences constitute historical catalysts.
A second criticism pertains to Prof. Jordan's use of "attitudes". Given
their complexity, a major study of "attitudes towards the Negro" should at least
contain some preliminary theoretical specification. Prof. Jordan did not take
this precaution and compounded this deficiency by positing a causal connection
(2 )
between attitudes and behaviour . Not surprisingly, then, he confuses 
attitudes with opinions, poetic musings, rationalisations and ideology, and 
perates with the simplistic notion that an extended review of selected sixteenth 
and seventeenth century writers captures a general attitude towards the 
Negro. But Prof. Jordan's monumental documentation is not sufficient for 
describing a whole Zeitgeist. His full-blown annotations from "primary 12
1) D. Brion Davis, 'Die Problem of Slavery In Western Culture (Cornell 
University Press, New York 1966) pp. 281-282.
For similar observations see Keith Irvine, The Rise of the Coloured 
Races (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1972) p. 58. P. D. Curtin, 
The Image of Africa. (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1964) 
ch. 2. Christopher Fyfe "The Impact of the Slave Trade on West Africa" 
in Centre of African Studies, The Transatlantic Slave Trade from West 
Africa (University of Edinburgh, 1966) p. 85.
2) For some understanding of the extent of Jordan's oversimplification
see Martin Fishbeln (ed .) Readings on Attitude Theory and Measurement 
(John Wiley, New York 1962).
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sources" may well be an insignificant proportion of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century literature on Africans. Moreover, attitudes are elusive entities, and 
in order to discover them it is necessary to ask questions of respondents. This 
obviously poses problems for the historian seeking to investigate past attitudes. 
Manifold complications emerge when empirical attitudes are investigated in 
order to explain behaviour and they are surmounted only through the construction 
of concepts of economy and social structure from which behaviour is to be 
theoretically deduced.
Thirdly, Prof. Jordan ignores the crucial question of whether Elizabethan
perceptions of Africans were influenced by the knowledge of Africa's
"degradation" by the Iberians. In other words, were not Africans already
lowly-placed in an international status stratification system? Nor does Prof.
Jordan consider that Englishmen, envious of the Iberians’ success, may have
been powerfully affected by the commercial potential of Africans, and this
independently of their blackness, animality and irreligiosity. These omissions
underminejordan's claim to be dealing with "the raw materials of history".
Rather, as E. H. Carr convincingly argues, the historian works-up the raw
materials generated by his particular theory of h istory^.
Finally, Prof. Jordan is manifestly inconsistent in that his muted
concessions to economics all but destroy his notion of a racially based slavery.
Notably: "The case with the African was different: the English errand into
Africa was not a new or perfect community but a business turn . . .  The most
compelling necessity was that of pressing forward the business of buying
Negroes from other Negroes. It was not until the slave trade came to require
justification, in the eighteenth century, that some (our emphasis) Englishmen
( 2 )
found special reason to lay emphasis on the Negro's savagery" . And again, 
"Negroes became slaves, partly because there were social and economic
.,(3)necessities in America which called for some sort of bound, controlled labour"' . 123
1) E.H. Carr, What is History? (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1961).
2) Winthrop Jordan, op. cit. p. 27.
3) Winthrop Jordan, op. cit. p. 61.
Elsewhere, he admits that Africans had been brought to the Caribbean
Islands: ., to meet an insatiable demand for labour which was cheap to
maintain, easy to dragoon, and simple to replace when worked to death"^.
Here Prof. Jordan concedes that enslavement does not demand a sense of
difference as a prerequisite. Jordan's excursions into economics, however,
fail to make significant the fact that England's entry into slave trading and
the setting up of slave plantations took place a century after its initial contact
with Africa. It was after the establishment of colonies and the sugar industry
in the New World that English merchant's capital developed slavery into a
concerted and systematic enterprise. Because Jordan has not thought out the
theoretical relationship between economic structure and consciousness, he
fails to demonstrate the relationship between "prejudice" and slavery. Thus,
while Elizabethan pre-conceptions assured the African's enslavement, in the
case of Negro slavery in Virginia: "Slavery and prejudice may have been
equally cause and effect, continuously reacting upon each other, dynamically
. (2 )joining hands to hustle the Negro down the road to complete degradation" . 
Surely we must be dealing with different levels of prejudice in this continuous 
interaction. For if the prejudice is at the same level both before and after 
slavery,then slavery has no effect on it. If, however, we have different levels 
of prejudice, then it cannot be a case of equal cause and effect. The prejudice 
has to be more or less, before slavery than after. This means that they 
cannot at all be enjoined in a causal sequence to explain each other. For we 
would be left with an insoluble problem of separately demarcating their 
rr*«sppr.tive force. The whole argument becomes untenable unless a third 
category is introduced as the end-product of this interaction. Hence, Prof. 
Jordan's "complete degradation". We are,therefore,still without an explanation 
of the relationship between prejudice and slavery.
At root, it is his idealist theory of social action and his belief in "the 
power of irrationality in men" which cause his merging of two separate issues, 
slavery and "Negro slavery", into "a racial slavery". For, given "the 12
1) E. H. Carr, What is History? (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1961).
2) Winthrop Jordan, op. cit. p. 27.
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primacy of thoughts and feelings" and "the fundamental constants of . . .  
human avarice and exploitation"^, the investigation of attitudes takes a 
natural preference over an analysis of the economic structure of Elizabethan 
society.
Prof. Jordan's study is a bold attempt to construct a pre-slavery,
psycho-history of North American "race relations" - an approach shared by
two other historians, Carl N. Degler and Stanley Elkins. The notion of a
racially based slavery is essential to the whole edifice of his dissertation.
He wrote: "Understanding the way racial slavery began is both extremely
difficult and absolutely essential to comprehension of the white man's attitudes
toward Negroes. For once the cycle of debasement in slavery and prejudice
in the mind was underway it was automatically self-reinforcing. It is so easy
to see the dynamics of this cycle that most students of race relations in the
United States have looked no further; they have assumed that the degraded
position of the slave degraded the Negro in the white man's eyes - without
( 2 )
pausing to wonder why Negroes became slaves in the first place . . . "  .
Unfortunately, Jordan nowhere faced up to the theoretical problems generated 
by a cyclical historiography. Is the cycle self-propelling and hence,perpetual? 
This slide into fatalism is avoidable only by introducing other elements - which 
generates a second question. How are the factors which operate on the cycle's 
axis to be individually weighted? The absence of any discussion of slavery as 
. ? concept is illustrative of these deficiencies in Jordan's work and the easy 
marriage of slavery and "race" one of its consequences.
On the whole, there is a tendency to assume racial motivations in the 
white mind in discussing the structure of Afro-European relations. This lapse, 
however, is related to an Idealist procedure whose starting point Is not 
relations of production but a separable consciousness. It has resulted in the 
practice of interposing a notion of racial causation via an emphasis on the 
racial characteristics or thoughts of "actors". Racial slavery becomes,by 
Innuendo, racially-motivated slavery and the understanding of slavery itself 
either as a legal status or economic insitution is necessarily hindered. For
1)
2)
i b i d .  p .  X I V .i b i d .  p .  X .
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marriage of slavery and "race" one of its consequences.
On the whole, there is a tendency to assume racial motivations in the 
white mind in discussing the structure of Afro-European relations. This lapse, 
however, is related to an idealist procedure whose starting point is not 
relations of production but a separable consciousness. It has resulted in the 
practice of interposing a notion of racial causation via an emphasis on the 
racial characteristics or thoughts of "actors". Racial slavery becomes,by 
innuendo, racially-motivated slavery and the understanding of slavery itself 
either as a legal status or economic insitution is necessarily hindered. For
D
2)
i b i d .  p .  X I V .i b i d .  p .  X .
example, consider this quotation from Stanley Elkins: "All negroes or other
slaves within the province (according to a Maryland Law of 1663), and all
negro and other slaves to lie hereafter imported into the province shall
serve durante vita; and all children bom of any negro or other slave, shall
be slaves as their fathers were for the term of their lives. Elkins'
immediate comment was: "Such was the just legal step whereby a black skin
( 2 )
would itself ultimately be equatable with "slave"." But the law contains 
no such implication. It does not suggest the enslaving of coloured freedmen 
or their children, but the children of "negro or other slaves". It is, therefore, 
the twentieth-century historian who has read "race" into a seventeenth century 
edict.
In support of our charge that "racial slavery" is not serious historical 
analysis we may follow Prof. Elkins himself into a non-racial explanation.
In Virginia, Elkins argued: "The decade of the 1660’ s, inaugurated by the 
restoration of the Stuart monarchy, marked something of a turning point in 
the fortunes of the colony not unrelated to the movement there and in Maryland 
to fix irrevocably upon the Negro a lifetime of slavery. It was during this 
decade that certain factors bearing upon the colony’ s economic future were 
precipitated. One such factor was a serious drop in tobacco prices, brought 
on not only by over-production but also by the Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1661, 
and the market was not to lie fully restored for another twenty years. This 
ant, with rising costs and a disappearing margin of profit, that commercial 
production on a small-scale basis was placed under serious disabilities. 
Another factor was the rise in the slave population. Whereas there had been 
only about 300 in 1650, by 1671 there were, according to Governor Berkeley, 
2,000 slaves in a servant population of 8,000. This was already 25 per cent 
of the servants, and the figure was even more significant for the future, since 
the total white servant population in any given period could never be counted 
on to exceed their average annual immigration multiplied by five or six (the 
usual term in years, of their indenture), while the increase of slaves over 1
1) Stanley Elkins, Slavery. A Problem in American Institutional and
Cultural Life. (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1964) p. 40.
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the same period would l)e cumulative. Such a development would by now be
quite enough to stimulate the leaders of the colony - virtually all planters -
to clarify in law once and for all the status of life-time Negro servitude.
The thesis here is that a declining profit margin and the increase in the
slave population precipitated the planters' decision to legalise the life-time
servitude of the Negro. This argument contains a tautology deriving from
Elkins' vague conception of slavery. How can there be a rise in the slave
population before the legal clarification of slavery? On the other hand, if
Negroes were treated as slaves before they were legally designated as such,
( 2 )
then the legalisation is a secondary, if not irrelevant phenomenon . But 
whence this rise? If the planters had been importing Negroes as slaves, then 
surely their status is clear. If it is a matter of natural reproduction, it means 
that Negro children inherit a necessarily pre-existing slave status. We see, 
then,that even at the juristic level,Elkins’ argumentation is illogical. Finally 
there is the demographic explanation of the Negroes' life-time servitude: the 
planters were pushed into a legal clarification because of the rapid increase 
in the Negro population between 1660 and 1670. Yet the dates are inconsistent. 
Virginia, according to Elkins himself, effected "some kind of statutory 
recognition of slavery" in 1661, that is, before the increase in the Negro 
population.
Elkins’ venture into an economic explanation raises more questions 
Ilian it answers. However, his observations would question the tendency to 
advance the existence of race consciousness as a necessary or sufficient 
condition to the African's enslavement. They draw attention to the economic 12
1) ibid. pp. 44-45 (our emphasis).
2) This question of pre-enslavement treatment of Negroes is still a 
matter of controversy. Oscar Maudlin argues "The status of Negroes 
down to the 1660's was that of servants and so they were identified 
and treated down to the 1660's". Race and Nationality in American 
Life (Atheneuin, New York 1957) p. 7. Carl Degler claims an early 
"discrimination against Negroes" but he does not make clear the 
relationship between socially-motivated discrimination and economic 
and political discrimination. "Prejudice and Slavery" in Robin Winks 
(ed .) Slavery: A Comparative Perspective (New York University Press, 
New York 1972).
rationale underlying the introduction of slavery in the Americas. Only through
the persistent ignoring of evidence of this sort can the change of the Negro's
status in America from indentured to slave be explained in terms of "racial
prejudice". ^  Yet Carl Degler too posits the saliency of xenophobia in the
relatively rapid transformation of the African indentured servant into a
( 2)
slave. His viewpoint shows an affinity with M. I. Finley's "slavery outsider
(3)formula"' , where the outlander is seen as most suitable for enslavement, an 
outcome decided according to the balance of power between peoples.
Max Weber's definition of the plantation is suggestive of this power 
model. The plantation is "a capitalist development of the manor" arising 
from the coincidence of conquest and the possibility of intensive cultivation.
It "operates with disciplined servile labour. We do not find as in the case of 
the manorial economy, a large estate and individual small holdings of the 
peasants side by side but the servile population are herded together in barracks.' 
Weber's position appears to be that slavery should be seem as the outcome of a 
structural confluence of economic calculation and the balance of military power. 
For him, the employment of slave labour is possible and even mandatory under 
the following conditions:
1) where cheap maintenance of this labour is possible,
2) when opportunities exist for regular supplies through a 
slave market,
3) where agriculture or simple industrial processes constitute 
the predominant form of economic activity. ^  1
1) Cf. Carl Degler "Prejudice and Slavery" in Robin Winks (ed .) op. cit.
2) Carl Degler, Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Mcxlern America 
(Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1962).
3) M. 1. Finley, "The Idea of Slavery . . . "  in Laura Foner and Eugene 
Genovese (eds .) Slavery in the New World (Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs., New York 1969) pp. 260-261.
4) Max Weber, General Economic History (Collier Books New York 1961) 
p. 73. Weber uses "capitalist" in a peculiar sense for "servile labour" 
is not a capitalist form of labour exploitation.
5) Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (The 
Free Press, New York 1966) pp. 276-277.
This emphasis on calculation conforms to Weber's general proposition of an 
unending rationalisation of economic activity in human society and more so 
in Occidental civilisation. To the question why slavery, Weber, and as we 
shall see, Eric Williams, would reply because it may be the most rational 
form of economic organisation. Weber, however, did not seek to clarify the 
role of conquest,or what conditions determine who is enslaved. Is it the 
propertyless or the most physically and politically defenceless among them? 
Nieboer's oft-cited thesis suggests that an abundant supply of land and 
relatively defenceless communities invite enslavement or the imposition of 
some form of compulsory labour^. Rut why other communities? "Prejudice " 
as we have seen is not the answer, and why are some races or communities 
more powerful? Indeed, is it a question of "other" communities or the 
political forces therein.
From an analysis of the race relations question'Why were Africans 
enslaved,'¿nd its internally inconsistent answers,we move to a presentation 
of "materialist" attempts to transcend this perspective.
In his analysis of the origin of slavery in the Caribbean, Eric Williams 
effectively challenged the idealist historiography by displacing "race" into 
the economics of the sugar plantation. In uncompromising language,he wrote: 
"Slavery in the Caribbean has been too narrowly identified with the Negro.
A racial twist has been given to what is basically an economic phenomenon. 
Slavery was not born of racism: rather racism was the consequence of
slavery. Unfree labour in the New World was brown, white, black and yellow;
(2 )
fni-hnlic, Protestant and pagan.” This progression through a variety of races 
and religions signified, for Williams, the overwhelming economic concerns of 
the planters and their mercantile governments. 'Hie slave trade and slave 
labour in the New World began with the Indians who were decimated by 
European diseases and overwork. I3y the middle of the seventeenth ccnture, 
the plantations were being staffed with "white" labour comprising: indentured 1
1) Herman J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System (Ix-nnox Hill, New 
York 1971).
Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Andre Deutsch, London 1964) 
p. 7.
2 )
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servants, convicts, "rcdemptioners", former manorial tenants, war-weary 
Hermans, freedom-seeking Irishmen,and unrepentant trade unionists.
Williams' documentation of the traffic in unfree white labour to the New World 
is impressive and he made bold to compare the lot of the slave with that of 
the ordinary seaman during the Middle Passage^ \
The much-vaunted plentitude of land in the New World was, in Williams' 
view, a product of naked imperialist aggression resulting in the massive 
dislocation and destruction of the indigenous Caribbean communities. Similarly, 
the yeoman farmers were almost completely displaced through the introduction 
of large-scale plantations in the Caribbean, not the unsuitability of "white" 
labour in the tropics.
If race was irrelevant, why was the white servant not made a slave?
Williams offered as reasons; the gap between the needs of the plantation and
European sources of supply, the facility with which white servants escaped and,
most important, the relative cheapness of black labour: "The money which
procured a white man's services for ten years could buy a Negro for life . . .
as compared with Indian and white labour Negro slavery was eminently
(2 )
superior" . Having disposed of the "historically unsound" notion of black 
labour being intrinsically suited to plantation slavery, Williams posited 
slavery's relative superiority over peasant farming: "Under certain circum­
stances slavery has some obvious advantages. In the cultivation of crops like 
sugar, cotton and tobacco, where the cost of production is appreciably reduced 
on larger units, the slaveowner, with his large-scale production and his 
organised slave gang, can make more profitable use of the land than the small 
farmer or peasant proprietor. For such staple crops, the vast profits can 
well stand the greater expense of Inefficient slave labour. Where all the 
knowledge required is simple and a matter of routine, constancy and 
cooperation in labour - slavery - is essential, until, . . .  the land available for 12
1) See also Phi lip D. Curtin. The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census. 
(University of Wisconsin Press, London 1969) pp. 282-286. K. C. Davies, 
"The Living and the Dead" in S. Engerman & Eugene D. Genovese (eds.) 
Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 1975).
2) Eric Williams, op. cit. p. 19.
appropriation has been already apportioned. Slave labour becomes
dearer than free labour only when free labour is in abundance, and in
conditions of a plentitude of virgin land this is highly unlikely. The plantations,
then, could not have been staffed by wage labourers or by peasant producers.
Relations of production emerge from the given political, economic and
( 2 )
ecological habitat . Negro slavery, then, was an expression of the "economic 
rationality" of profit-seeking merchant capital, the relative cheapness and 
abundance of African labour, the fact of Africans being accustomed to settled 
agricultural activities, the risks of civil or international war involved in 
enslaving other Europeans on a mass scale, i.e..the politico-demographic 
impossibility of exporting European peasants as "slaves" to overseas 
plantations.
Williams' opposition to a racial interpretation of "Negro slavery" 
was rooted in an emphasis on profit and ownership. For him, once Africans 
entered the capitalist world-economy through the plantation, they come to 
represent a mode of labour exploitation. Negro slavery is thus a misnomer if 
it implies more than a description of the racial characteristics of the slaves: 
"The distinction between races in the Caribbean area, has for the most part, 
been a distinction between those who owned property, principally land, and 
those who did not; . . .  The distinction in race or colour was only the super­
ficial visible symbol of a distinction which in reality was based on the
(3)ownership of property."' ’  Williams' argumentation contains an important 
insight: the horror with which contemporaneity now regards slavery should 
not blind us as to its circumstantial rationality or deflect attention away 
fium the structural determinants of American slavery as an already existing 
system into which the African was introduced.
Williams' work has been designated "Marxist" and trenchantly 123
1) ibid. p. 6.
2) ibid. p. 5.
3) Eric Williams, Race Relations in Caribbean Society, in Vera Rubin 
(ed .) Caribbean Studies: A Symposium (University of Washington 
Press, London 1971) p. 54.
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criticised by Eugene Genovese who charged him with a mechanical materialism^.
Indeed, Williams' analysis is more of a sustained polemic against racial
interpretations of the origin of African enslavement than a systematic,
theoretical study of slavery in the Americas. Genovese, writing from a
"Marxist" perspective, takes the development and formation of social classes
as of decisive significance in the linking of New World slavery with the history
( 2 )
of Western Europe and Africa' \ "Class", however, was not to be conceived 
in strict economic terms, but in its ideological,psychological and cultural
(3)aspects' However, in his depiction of the European antecedents to slavery,
Genovese sided with those historians and economists who argue that the
mercantile phase of capitalist development in Europe was a crucial moment
(4)
in die colonisation of Ihc New World . Mercantilism constituted both an 
economic philosophy and policies geared towards the accumulation of wealth - 
initially precious metals - and its concentration within the borders of the 
nation-state. It was a theory of foreign trade coeval with the evolution and 
consolidation of national markets in 15th century Europe. However, it virtually 
dominated economic thought and policy up to the 18th century expressed an an 
obsessional concern with the balance of merchandise trade^. Thus the 
European state powers dealt with the planters on mercantilist terms seeking 1
1) Eugene Genovese, "Materialism and Idealism in the History of Negro 
Slavery in the Americas" in Ixiura Foner and Eugene Genovese (ed s .) 
op. cit. p. 241.
2) Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (Allen Lane 
The Penguin Press, London 1970) p. VIII.
3) ibid. p. 19.
4) ibid. pp. 25-26. See also B.J. Stein and B.A. Stein, The Colonial 
Heritage of Latin America (OUP London 1970) Ch. 1. D. Brion Davis 
op. clt. pp. 127-128. Eric Williams, British Historians and the 
West Indies (Andre Deutsch, London 1968) Ch, 1.
5) For an incisive analysis of mercantilism see Harry G. Johnson, On 
Economics and Society (The University of Chicago Press 1975) Ch. 18.
Genovese did not develop the theme of the role of merchant's capital in 
the slave trade and its interaction with slave production in the Americas.
Me focussed instead on the "paradoxical" situation of a developed Europe with 
an economy based on free labour producing a backward and irrational form 
of labour exploitation in other regions of the world. American slavery was an 
enigmatic reimposition of an outmoded form of economic organisation. It was 
a case of advanced Western European economies generating social retro­
gression and the recall of older modes of production. Genovese saw, however, 
an historical parallel in the so-called second serfdom in 16th and 17th century 
Eastern Europe when a massive demand for agricultural staples in the West 
generated more intense forms of labour exploitation: "The expansion of the 
Western European Economy encouraged social retrogression and the
reinstitution of older modes of production in both Eastern Europe and parts
(2 )
of the New World" . This designation of slavery as an archaic mode of
production suggests a pandering to a unilineal notion of historial change which
no doubt reflects the unsettled status of the concept mode of production. Why
is slavery in the Americas a mode of production? Why is it an anachronism
if, its persistence throughout the middle-ages and the beginning of the modern
(3)
period is a well-documented observation
A major weakness in Genovese's approach is a failure to specify 
whether Negro slavery was a function, effect, or necessary consequence of 
class formation in Europe. The first would see modern slavery, once 
arisen, as providing certain economic stimuli to the development of capitalism 
in Western European development. The second is self-explanatory, and the 123
1) Sir Matthew Decker put the matter bluntly: "There must be a large 
importation of Negroes to cause these growths in our plantations 
and of our cloathing accordingly . . .  may not this be said to be a 
transplanting of men for our benefit by taking them from one climate 
where by its heat they want no cloathing, and carrying them to another 
where they cannot live without it nor lie supplied by any other but 
ourselves." Sir Matthew Decker, Essays on the Causes of the Decline 
of Foreign Trade (London 1757) p. 178.
2) Eugene Genovese, TTie World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. pp. 22-23.
3) See Brion Davis, op. cit. Part 1.
146
third would offer theoretical statements about European capitalism 
necessarily producing "older" modes of production in other regions. It is this 
lack of conceptual rigour in Genovese which gives his "Marxist" analysis 
the moral tone which he evidently sought to avoid. Thus he assets that 
slavery in the Americas had "a racial basis". Ib is  popular assertion is, 
of course, profoundly ambiguous. It can mean that Africans were enslaved, 
which is inaccurate. For, more precisely, some tribally organised agri­
cultural labourers were enslaved. The designation "Africans" obscures the 
different political, economic and social background of the slaves. It also 
suggests that if these Africans had been of another "race", then they might 
not have been enslaved, which ignores the role of African chiefs and merchants 
in the slave trade. Finally, it implies the now untenable racially-motivated 
enslavement.
The limitations in Genovese's approach were unsparingly exploited 
by Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst who charged him with having no concept 
of a mode of production or of slave production^. Genovese's silences on 
the type of economic organisation within which the formation of classes unfold 
reflect the idealism-humanism within which the social relations of slavery 
are reduced to the consciousness of experiencing subjects. Thus Genovese 
does not clarify the relationship between the origin of slavery and capitalism. 
Their's is a valid criticism. For the promise to link the use of slavery 
with the capitalist world market Is not fulfilled in Genovese's chronological 
narrative of certain economic and political events in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century Europe. Their alternative to Genovese's historicism is then, the 
Investigation of the origin of African enslavement in terms of the following 
cor.jiinctural forces:
1) the possibility of a steady supply of relatively cheap 
slave labour from an already existing African 1
1) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Prc-capitalist Modes of Production 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ixmdon 1975) pp. 148-156.
slave tra d e d
2) the penetration of European merchant's capital into 
that trade, and
3) the limited demographic possibility of a mass conversion 
of Europeans or American Indians into slaves.
Slave plantations are to be seen then as part of the development of the 
international division of labour which sustained capital accumulation in 
Europe and a capitalist world market dominated by merchants and later 
industrial capital.
Immanuel Wallerstein has indicated that this division of labour can
be ethnically depicted as comprising: "a slave class of African origins located
in the Western Hemisphere, a "serf" class divided into two segments: a major
one in eastern Europe and a smaller one of American Indians in the Western
Hemisphere. The peasants of western and southern Europe were for the most
part "tenants". The wage workers were almost all west Europeans. The
yeoman farmers were drawn largely even more narrowly principally from
(2 )
northwest Europe" This ethnic depiction has to be justified or at least 
admitted to be a concession to a peculiar contemporary concern with race and 
ethnicity. For, it may be said that the salient feature of the 17th century world 
economy was the mode and rate of labour exploitation in particular regions as 
determined by the balance of class forces therein, not the racial composition 
of the classes involved.
The convergence within the viewpoints of Eric Williams, Hindess and 
Hirst, and Wallerstein derives largely from their appropriation of Marx's 
analysis of the creation of a capitalist world economy from the 16th century 12
1) On this point see Basil Davidson, "Slaves or Captives? Some notes 
on Fantasy and Fact" in Nathan I. Huggins, Martin Kilson and Daniel 
M. Fox (eds.) Key issues in the Afro-American Experience (Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, New York 1971) Vol. 1. Davidson's question why did 
Africans sell Africans is, however, misleading in so far as it is an 
expression of surprise. Did the inhabitants of the slave trading regions 
see themselves as "Africans"?
2) Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System: Capitalist 
Agriculture and the origin of the European World Economy in the 
Sixteenth Century (Academic Press, New York 1924) p. 82.
and the role of merchant's capital within this process. Marx situated merchant's
capital not merely within the emergence of national markets or Empires but
thè primitive accumulative phase of the development of capitalist commodity
production with a "world embracing commerce and a world embracing m arket"^.
Commerce, the transformation of products into commodities by buying cheap and
( 2 )
selling dear are indispensible moments in capital formation: "In order that 
capital may arise and take control of production, a definite stage in the 
development of trade is a s su m e v i In promoting world trade, merchant's 
capital promoted both the slave trade^  and slave production in the Am ericas^. 
Thus it was not the mere entrance of merchant's capital into the overland 
African slave trade which developed slavery in the Americas. Merchant's 
capital contributed to and co-existed with pnxluctive capital exploiting slave 
labour in the Americas. Hence the Dutch merchants who energetically 
expanded the slave trade and s lavery^  in the 17th century guaranteed their
1) Karl Marx, Capital (Laurence and Wishart, London 1972) Vol. Ill 
Ch. XX. Merchant's capital is that monetary flow which is "penned 
within the sphere of circulation" as a mediation between spheres of 
production. It is an "agent of productive capital", p. 327.
2) The movement of merchant's capital is M-C-M. His profit is a profit 
upon alienation without equivalent values being exchanged. "To buy 
cheap in order to sell dear is the rule of trade" Karl Marx, ibid. p. 329.
3) Karl Marx, Capital (Laurence and Wishart. I/mdon 1972) Vol. II, p. 33.
4) Merchant's capital is amoral. Its commercialising zeal knows no bonds. 
Marx describes its lack of morality: "Merchant's capital, \Oicn it holds 
a position of dominance stands everywhere for a system of robbery, so 
that its development among the trading nations of old and modern times 
is always connected with plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves and 
colonial conquest . . .  " Vol. Ill p. 331.
5) "The purchase and sale of slaves is formally also a purchase and sale 
of commodities. But money cannot perform this function without the 
existence of slavery. If slavery exists, then money can be invested
in the purchase of slaves. On the other hand, the mere possession of 
money cannot make slavery possible." Karl Marx, Capital Vol. II, p. 32.
6) Cf. P. D. Curtin "The Slave Trade and the Atlantic Basin in Nathan I. 
Huggins et al. (eds.)op . cit. p. 82. For a general history of 
Dutch merchant's capital predominance, see C. R. Boxer, The Dutch 
Seaborne Empire: 1600-1800 (Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1965).
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own displacement by hastening the rise of industrial capita l^ from the
( 2 )
cauldron of the Triangular Trade' ' .
Within these commercial exchanges it could be observed that the 
economic dramatis personae possessed different skin colours. But this is a fact 
of no significance because of its non-correspondence with class situations.
The merchants were both European and African. If the Europeans held the 
initiative in the blossoming of slavery, it is because they were representatives 
of the economic form M-C-m \  Their operations began and ended with money 
actively mediating between the system of slave production in the Americas and 
the generation of labour reserves in Africa’s "subsistence economies".
African traders and merchants of the Coastal Regions expressed a different 
economic form, C-M-C. They lwgan with an animate commodity, the sale 
of which enabled them to expand their consumption of other commodities. Inland
African traders by-passed the monetary mediation altogether with bare
(3)commodity - commodity exchanges' , since these societies were small-scale
(4)
systems based upon redistributive Iron Age agriculture 1
1) Observing England's industrial and commercial dominance in the 18th 
century, Marx wrote: "Commercial supremacy itself is now linked with 
the prevalence to a greater or lesser degree of conditions for a large 
industry. Compare, for instance, England and Holland. The history
of the decline of Holland as the ruling trading nation is the history 
of the subordination of merchant’s capital to industrial capital.
Karl Marx, Capital Vol. Ill, op. cit. p. 333. See also D. Brion 
Davis op. cit. pp. 9-10.
2) Cf. Eric Williams, op. cit. where what Marx says above about the 
decline of Holland as the rulingtrading nation. Williams suggests 
as the cause of the abolition of slavery. See also R. Sheridan "The 
Plantation Revolution and the Industrial Revolution" Caribbean Studies 
9 (3) 1969.
3) Walter Rodney has observed: "On the whole West African coast, slaves 
and other items of export were purchased by an assortment of trade 
goods, ranging from firearms to glass beadsP. Cited in Marion Kilson 
"West African Society and the Atlantic Slave Trade 1441-1865" in 
Nathan I. Huggins ct al. (eds.) op. cit. p. 45. But no distinction
is made here between (monetary) purchase and (goods) exchange and thus 
a signficant theoretical relation is obscured.
4) Cf. Marion Kilson, "West African Society and the Atlantic Slave Trade 
1441-1865" in Nathan I. Huggins ct al. (eds.) op. cit. p. 41.
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The origin of the enslavement of African labourers cannot,therefore,
be explained in terms of the racial presuppositions and attitudes of Europeans,
Its interpretation as such is traceable to: a'general failure to analyse the
economic structure of European and African societies at the time of their
confrontation, the theoretical lacunae surrounding slavery and the idealist
tendency to invoke "race" when analysing modern slavery. Indeed, the term
"negro slavery" mirrors a certain theoretical deficiency, an illegitimate
conflation of slavery as a mode of labour exploitation with the racial composition
and perhaps consciousness of the classes involved. For the conditions within a
mode of production,or labour exploitation,are not given in the consciousness
of subjects, in group perception and evaluation. Rather, these must be seen
as secondary sociological processes.
The enslavement of African labourers was part of an emergent global
system of production whose dynamism emanated from Western Europe's
accumulative compulsions^. Winthrop Jordan's idealist orientation led him
astray into the Elizabethan mind and the explanatory value of his dissertation
is thus marginal. From Marx and Eric Williams, we derive some understanding
of the role of merchant's capital and the Caribbean political economic setting.
It would remain but to examine the African economy and society in order to
discover why Africa's contribution to the development of world capitalism was
(2 )
for three centuries mainly restricted to human commodities
One obvious reason is the then comparatively low level of development 
of the productive forces,or division of labour. Tills resulted in not only a low 
degree of labour productivity and restricted buying power but the political 
and territorial fragmentation consistent with the absence of large-scale 
i o ' ration of economic production. A second set of consequences which 12
1) Cf. Karl Marx. "The discovery of gold and silver in America, the 
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal 
population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East 
Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting 
of black-skins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist 
production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of 
primitive accumulation". Capital, Vol. 1, op. clt. p. 751.
2) See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. (Bogle- 
L'Ouverture Punlications, London 1972). Nathan I. Huggins et al. (ed s .) 
op. cit.
fostered African supplies is the presence of a high level of disguised rural 
unemployment and the comparative underdevelopment of an African manufacturing 
industry. These conditions, however, were not included in P. D. Curtin's
"supply models" are political, and economic, referring respectively to inter­
tribal war and the profit motive of African chiefs and middle-men, as 
incentives to the capture and sale of human cargo. In Curtin's view: " . . .  the 
total supply from Africa was not only regular but followed a pattern of 
apparent response to rising prices and a high elasticity. Rut . . .  the individual
coastal regions appear to supply slaves in response to their own patterns of
(2)
political affairs, anarchy, civil and international war" . This formulation 
reflects an unfortunate preference for political conditions (modes of 
recruitment) over the economic structure - a lapse not unrelated to Curtin’s
(3)
neglect of the literature on "subsistence economies' .
Rather than highlight the well-researched theme of the European
'demand' for slaves, some "Africanists" correctly concern themselves with
(4 )
the pre-penetration economic organisation of African societies . Some of
1) P. D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade 1600-1800 in J. F. A. Ajayi and 
Michael Crowder (eds.) History of West Africa, Vol. 1 (Iojngman,
London 1971).
2) P. D. Curtin, Measuring the Atlantic Slave Trade, in S. L. Engcrman and 
Eugene Genovese op. cit. p. 114. See also ibid pp. 55-56 and 497-498.
3) See Paul Bohnnnnn and George Dalton (eds.) Markets in Africa (North­
western University Press, 1968).
4) See K. Annouka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1956). Basil Davidson, Black Mother: Africa, the Years 
of Trial. (Gollancz london 1961). C. W. Newbury, The Western Slave 
Coast and its Rulers. (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1961) Ch. 1 
and 2. J.D. Page, A History of West Africa (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1969) Ch. 6. Walter Rodney, op. cit. Ch, 4. Roger 
Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition 1760-1810 ( 
McMillan, London 1975) pp. 16-24 and Ch. 4.
two models of the African suppliers' role in the slave trade^\ Curtin's
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these investigations marginally acknowledge that the class structure is a
crucial 'supply' condition of slave trading^ .
These deductions are obscured within the perspective which ignores
the maritime slave trade and thus conflates the different statuses of the
arriving Africans into "Negro slavery". Thus Louis Ruchames' corrective
is timely: "The relationship between the English slave trade and the captured
(2 )
African slave had all the essential elements of a later American slavery .
This observation, however, has to be considered in conjunction with U.B.
Philips' "The first comers were slaves in the hands of their maritime sellers
(3 )
but they were not fully slaves in the hands of the Virginian buyers"' .
African labourers rather than British became servants for life,then, because 
they were already part of the international maritime slave trade. Their 
labour power was never their property to be disposed of under contractual or 
market conditions.
This status as unfree labourers militated against their eventual 
ownership of land as against that of the indentured servant. This crucial 
observation introduces a further argument. For the question why weren't 
"whites" enslaved can now be displaced. The question to be posed is: why 
at a certain moment arriving African^ were not made indentured servants. This 
was ruled out not only because they were "slaves in the hands of their 
maritime buyers", indeed, up to that moment they can be conceived as war 1*3
1) See Christopher Fyfe "The Impact of the Slave Trade on West Africa" 
in Centre of African Studies, The Transatlantic Slave Trade from West 
Africa, op. cit. p. 85. Walter Rodney, Mow Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa, op. cit.
" „ Louis Ruchames (ed.) Racial Thought in America: From the Puritans
to Abraham IJncoln (The University of Massachusetts Press, 
Massachusetts 1969), p. 221.
3) U.B. Philips, American Negro Slavery (Louisiana State University 
Press, I>ouisiana 1969) p. 75.
prisoners^ \  but also because indentured labour was inimical to profits.
U. B. Philips brings out this relationship: " . . .  no sooner was its service
over than it set up for itself, often in tobacco production, to compete with
its former employers and depress the price of produce. If the plantation
system were to be perpetuated an entirely different labour supply must be 
1 2 )
had' The fact that the (white) indentured service ceased pari passu with
the development of slavery' '  should therefore be taken as evidence of the
absence of feelings of racial brotherhood on the part of the planters. What
they needed was a class of labourers whose political condition made it
possible to preclude their having access to the means of production, durante
vita. To interpret their decision racially would therefore constitute a massive
( 4 )
oversimplification of "the formation of a mode of labour exploitation"
This oversimplification, however, derives from the assumption within 
the question: why were the African labourers enslaved? There is an 
assumption of a peculiarity about slave labour. Scholars appear puzzled.
How come this recrudescence of slavery in the post-enlightenment period of 
Western culture and emergent industrial civilisation? From the standpoint of 
this question, slavery is a Western Dilemma. This humanist approach has 
to focus on subjects the white mind or the ’negroidness’ of the Negro. But is
1) Cf. Henry Brailsford "After the Battle of Worcester, 1,500 Scottish 
prisoners were sold to Guinea merchants and set to work in the mines 
of Africa". The Levellers and the English Revolution (Cresset Press, 
Ixmdon 1961)pp. 333-334.
2) U.B. Philips op. cit. p. 74. See also Stanley Elkins for mention of 
a serious drop in tobacco prices in the 1660's op. cit. pp. 44-45. 
Kenneth Stamp writes confidently "The use of slaves in southern
. * agriculture was a deliberate choice among several alternatives made 
by men who sought greater returns than they could obtain from their 
own labour alone, and who found other types of labour more expensive". 
'Hie Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante Bellum South, Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York 1956) p. 5. See alsoT.J. Wertenbaker, The First 
Americans 1607-1690, (MacMillan, New York 1927), p. 47. 34
3) Cf. T.J. Wertenbecker, The First Americans 1607-1690 (Macmillan, 
New York 1927) p. 25. Wertenbecker correctly discusses slave labour 
in terms of the dissolution o f the Indentured labour system.
4) By a mode of labour exploitation we mean the specific form of 
remuneration and control of the direct producers in the labour process.
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oversimplification of "the formation of a mode of labour exploitation”
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Kenneth Stamp writes confidently "The use of slaves in southern
* agriculture was a deliberate choice among several alternatives made 
by men who sought greater returns than they could obtain from their 
own labour alone, and who found other types of labour more expensive". 
The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante Bellum South, Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York 1956) p. 5. See also T.J. Wertenbaker, The First 
Americans 1607-1690, (MacMillan, New York 1927), p. 47.
3) Cf. T.J. Wertenbecker, The First Americans 1607-1690 (Macmillan, 
New York 1927) p. 25. Wertenbecker correctly discusses slave labour 
in terms of the dissolution of the indentured labour system.
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remuneration and control of the direct producers In the labour process.
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slave labour any less moral than serfdom or wage labour? Consider the following
statement: "An office was set up in Manchester, to which lists were sent of
those workpeople in the agricultural districts wanting employment, and their
names were registered in books. The manufacturers attended at these offices
and selected such persons as they chose; when they had selected such persons
as their 'wants required', they gave instructions to have them forwarded to
Manchester, and they were sent, ticketed like bales of goods, by canals or
with carriers, others tramping on the wad, and many of them were found on
the way lost and half-starved. This system has grown up into a regular trade.
This House will hardly believe it, but tell them that this traffic in human flesh
was as well kept up, they were in effect as regularly sold to these (Manchester)
manufacturers as slaves are sold to the cotton-grower in the United States . . . " ^
The importation of slave labour from Africa should be of no greater theoretical
( 2 )
significance than labour movements in 19th century England . It may have
greater political significance in that the conditions of slave labour preclude
(3 )the slaves transforming the relations of production' . Our conception of slave 
labour possibly demonstrates why the theoretical significance cannot be greater.
Slave labour is an effect of a relationship between agents where the 
extracting of surplus value from the producers is not subject to negotiation, i.e ., 
it is set by neither custom, nor contract. Hie legal status of slavery merely 
re-affirms the social relation in which the producer as a possession does not 
negoti with his owner as to the rate of exploitation. Slave labour is at the 
polar end of a continuum of labour exploitation comprising,debt bondage, 
clientage, corvee, serfdom . . .  wage labour. This continuum is based on the 
capacity of an exploited class to negotiate over the boundaries of its exploitation.
In i t!.. , V o , the power of the non-owners of the means of production to 
determine the mode of labour exploitation to which they will be subjected is a 123
1) Ferrand’s Speech in the House of Commons, 27th April, 1843; cited 
in Karl Marx Capital Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 267.
2) As Marx put it: "For slave trade read labour-market, for Kentucky 
and Virginia, Ireland and the agricultural districts of England, Scotland 
and Wales, for Africa, Germany", ibid.
3) See Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst for a summary of failed slave 
insurrections, op. clt. pp. 120-123.
consequence of their solidarity and organisation^. Thus, when particular 
labourers are subjected to this mode of labour exploitation its investigation 
cannot begin at the level of their of their regional or biological 
characteristics, but with the balance of political forces within social 
formations. 1
1) ■ solidarity and organisation must not be interpreted as independent
ol the development of the productive forces. See Karl Marx, The 
Communist Manifesto (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971), pp. 40-41.
CHAPTER IV
THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION OF RACE RELATIONS”
Up to the early 1970’s a considerable hotly of literature was produced 
on the different patterns of "race relations" which emerge in North and 
South America after the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century^.
The consensus was that the Negro fared differently in the cultural, 
stratification and economic systems of these continents and that contemporary 
"race relations" in North America can be interpreted in terms of its 
unyielding chattelisation of the Negro. The underlying argument is 
that the different pattern of "race relations" in the American hemispheres 
reflect structurally different slave systems which are themselves explicable 
in terms of divergent legal and moral traditions.
Frank Tannenhaum most succinctly elucidated the proposition of 
a genetic continuity between the incomplete citizenship of "blacks" today 1
11 The literature on this subject is immense. 'Hie best bibliographic 
reference known to this writer is Magnus Morner, "The History of 
Race Relations in Latin America: Some Comments on the State of 
Research" in Laura Foner and Eugene D. Genovese (eds.), op. cit. 
Morner states the problem in this way: "Granting that the plantation 
provided the principle framework for slavery in the New World, 
another major problem arises. Why have Negro-White relations taken 
such a different course in Anglo and Latin America (c.g. Brazil), if 
the point of departure were the same? Were the differences already 
present during the time of slavery despite the common plantation 
framework? Or are they mainly a result of post-abolition conditions?" 
tlie major works of representatives of the two schools of thought on 
these issues are:
Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen (Random House, New York 1946). 
Stanley Elkins, op. cit.
Marvin Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas (Walker & Co., N. Y. 
1964).
Sidney Mintz, "Slavery and Emergent Capitalism" in I i^ura Foner and 
Eugene Genovese, op. cit. pp. 22-37.
David Brlon Davis, op. cit.
Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit.
Carl N. Degler, Neither Black nor White. (MacMillan, N. Y. 1971). 
Harniannus Hoetink, Slavery and Race Relations in the Americas: 
Comparative Notes on the Nature and Nexus. (Harper & Row Publishers, 
N.Y. 1973).
and the harshness of North American slavery: "The point of course is 
that in Ix-itin America the slave had legal and moral standing. He was 
known as a human being by State and Church. In the British West Indies 
and in the Southern States of the United States,he was a chattel until the day 
of emancipation. And it was difficult if not impossible to redefine overnight 
what was chattel yesterday into a full-blown citizen today"^. This 
emphasis on moral and legal traditions and assertions of structurally different 
slave systems conjoin the writings of Gilberto Freyre, Frank Tannenbaum 
and Stanley Klkins, and it is on this basis that we shall treat them separately 
from their foremost critics.
Freyre did not offer a sustained comparison of North American and
Iberian slavery but his works contain sweeping commentaries on, and
analysis of, both Portugal's colonisation of Brazil and the place of the slaves'
(2 )
descendants in Brazilian society . As regards the former, his historio­
graphy stressed the unfolding of values in the "integration of autochonous races
(3)and cultures different from the European culture"' . For Freyre, the key 
to the understanding of Brazil's unique racial history lies in the delineation of 
the interaction of cultures in an emerging Luso-Tropical civilisation.
However, he did not use sociological concepts to examine these historical 
processes but rather, historic facts to fit into an interpretative scheme which em­
phasised cultural motivations. Freyre’s works,then,are studies in social 
..¡story guided by a profound concern with cultural fusion and racial hybridism. 
These, he felt were fostered by the absence of cthnocentrism among the 
Portuguese as well as their ultra-liberal sexuality. His narrative of the 
Portuguese in Brazil, their ambitions, cosmology and appetites, combines 
philosophy of history, serious anthropological insights, journalistic analysis, 
anecdotes and mundane biographical sketches.
In Freyre's view, Portuguese and Africans who came to Brazil, 12
1) Frank Tannenbaum, "Race Relations in Caribbean Society" in Vera 
Rubin (ed.), op. cit. p. 66.
2) See Gillterto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves (Alfred A. Knopf,
N.Y. 1964).
Gilberto Freyre, The Portuguese and the Tropics, (Lisbon 1961) 
p. 275.
3 )
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albeit in different historical roles, became the Brazilians from Portugal 
and Africa over a period of time harmoniously integrated into a Luso-tropical 
society. Freyre was particularly concerned to trace Brazil’s "race relations" 
to easy-going patriarchical relationship between the masters and the slaves, 
particularly those between master and female s la ves^ . We are told that 
Portuguese slavery was of a benign, patronising quality. Slaves were made 
to feel participants in the microcosm of the Jotso-tropical civilisation - the 
Big House . A manorial rather than an industrial slavery prevailed adopted 
largely from the Moors and resulting in a Cerneinscliaft rather than a 
Gesellschaft on the plantations. This was because the Portuguese were 
unique among F.uropeans in not being tainted with colour prejudice. TTiis 
facilitated easy contact between Portuguese and Africans and this pervasive 
miscegenation which was the historic root of Brazil's "racial paradise".
For the result was a sociological inter-marriage of culturesand the assimilation 
and integration of tire African. This is where Freyre's works set the tone 
and background for the investigating of slavery and its underlying patterns 
in the study of contemporary "race relations". He himself, however, refrained 
from any systematic comparative enquiry into slave systems and "race 
relations" in the Iberian and Anglo-Saxon worlds. For this, we must turn 
to Frank Tannenbaum's "Slave and Citizen".
Tannenbaum felt that the differences in "race relations" in Brazil 
ua depicted by Freyre, and North America, were best explained by way of 
an analysis of slavery. But these differences were ultimately traceable not 
just to slavery but to the ethos of the slave systems. Thus he also set out to 
treat slavery as a moral phenomenon, to examine its ethical underpinnings 
... ; iade it more than just an economic, or even a legal institution:
"For if one thing stands out clearly from the study of slavery, it is that the 
definition of man as a moral being proved the most important influence both
(3)
in the treatment of the slave and In the final abolition of slavery" . The 123
1) See Gilberto Freyre, The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of
Modern Brazil (Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y. 1963) Ch. XII.
2) Gilberto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves, op. cit. pp. 3-11.
3) Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, op. clt. p. VII.
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morality of the slave system was embodied above all in religious tenets.
Thus whether abolition was peacable or turbulent depended on the strength of 
the Christian doctrine of human equality which Tannenbaum saw reflected 
in legal norms and political culture and impinging on the treatment of the 
slave. 'Hie unlversalistlc spiritual tenets of Catholicism endowed the slave 
in Iiitin America with a moral personality, while, in Protestant North 
America and the British West Indies he was denied the privileges of 
Christianity. As evidence of the moral force of Catholicism, he cited:
"The slave trade had been condemned by Pius II on October 7th, 1462, by 
Paul III on May 29th, 1537, by Urban VIII on April 2nd, 1639, by Benedict XIV 
on December 20th, 1741, and finally by Gregory XVI on December 3rd, 1839" ^ \  
These, and other facts, prove, in Tannenbaum’s opinion, that the Catholic 
Church, however ineffectively, was hostile to slavery from the start.
One other development out of Tannenbaum's stress on the role of 
ideas in social action is the positing of a causal connection l>etween the nature 
of slave systems, the mode of their dissolution and belief in the spiritual 
equality of men. For him, the cultural content of a social system has a 
crucial influence on actors' behaviour and a determining function as regards 
the historical transformation of that system. This approach raises a number 
of problems which we confronted in an earlier chapter. Let us here observe 
how Tannenbaum uses it to facilitate a hemispheric comparison of the slave 
systems, "race relations" and the socio-political dynamics of the transition 
from slavery to freedom.
The author constructed a three-fold classification of New World 
slavery based on the existence of an effective slave tradition, slave laws 
and religious institutions concerned with the Negro. All three elements 
were allegedly present in the Iberian prototype and conspicuously, crucially 
absent in the British, American, Dutch and Danish slave systems. The last 
system, French slavery, lacked both an effective slave tradition and Slave 
Laws. Within this three-fold classification, a sub-classification was made 
based on a criterion of severity which, In descending intensity, defined the
1) ibid. p. 62.
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Dutch, the French and Portuguese slave systems. But Tannenbaum did not 
limit himself to comparisons of the degree of leniency or severity of New 
World slavery. Equally important for him were the theological and legal 
impediments to manumission, the physical treatment of slaves, the practices 
relating to marriages and family rights, the position of slaves relative to 
criminal law and punishment and redress against masters.
In Tannenbaum's view, the Northern European Protestants who
settled in North America lacked a tradition or concept of slavery and for
this reason imposed the most extreme form of slave labour - chattelisation.
The Iberian settlers on the other hand saw their slaves as moral beings and
used their slave law, specifically, the I^ as Siete Partidas to facilitate the
antithesis of slavery - manumission. Thus for all its cruelty, abuse,
hardship and inhumanity, the atmosphere in Brazil and in Spanish America
made for mobility and ultimately, freedom: "In Brazil and Spanish America
the law, the Church and custom put few impediments in the way of vertical
mobility of race and class and in some measure favoured it. In the British,
French and United States slave systems the law attempted to fix the pattern
and stratify social classes and racial groups" ^ \  In the Iberian system,
there was an institutional facilitating of freedom; in the United States, the
evidence was overwhelming that the manumission of slaves was balked by a
multiplicity of sanctions. The whole weight of the judiciary was utilised to
ensure the permanent enslavement of Negroes and totally absent were the
intermediary gradations of freedom based on miscegenation which graced 
(2 )the Iberian system '. The crucial distinction was that North American law 
enshrined in social and political practices, canonised the notion that the 
,N gro is intrinsically a slave in contradistinction to the tacit Iberian 
assertion that, the Negro was made a slave. One made slavery immanently, 
permanently connotative of "Negro” ; the other stressed the incidental 
nature of Negro slavery.
Freedom, Tannenbaum asserted, is the negation of slavery and
1 )2 )
ibid. 1. 127. 
ibid.
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attitudes towards the former as well as the possibilities of its realisation 
should be the crucial category in a comparison of slave systems. These 
possibilities are defined by the historical setting as a whole but the I^s 
Sicte Partidas performed a unique function in New World slavery, constituting 
the final differentia specifica between the British, American and Iberian 
slave systems. This set of slave laws deriving both from Napoleon's Cotie 
Noire and Roman Slave I,aw made for the following ameliorations in Iberian 
as compared to Anglo-Saxon slavery:
1) partial wage labouring in cities by slaves,
2) the adoption of Catholicism by escaped slaves,
3) ownership of property by slaves,
4) a clear delineation of the slave's obligations,
5) the maintenance of ties of kinship among slaves, and
6) recognition of the legal rights of the slave against 
his master.
These developments endowed the Iberian slave with a moral personality and
foreshadowed the nature of "race relations" in the post-emancipation period
in that large numbers of coloured freedmen were created and integrated into
Brazilian society over a period of time. North American slavery, on the
other hand, dammed up the possibilities of freedom and maintained a rigid
structure of complete enslavement. In consequence, "race relations" in
the post-emancipation period remain pregnant with bitterness and violence^.
Moreover, the emancipated Negro in North America lacks the moral
( 2)
personality and the experience to deal with his new-found freedom . The
"race problem", then, was essentially one of the corrosive demoralisation
“ '*■ Negro by North American slavery to the extent that what was a "thing"
(3)could not be suddenly legalised into a citizen'
The publication of Stanley Elkins' doctoral dissertation in 1959 
constituted a challenging continuation of the Freyrc-Tannenbaum approach
D
2 )
3)
ib id . p . 1 1 0 .  
ib id . p . 1 1 1 .  
ib id . p . 1 1 5 .
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to  New W o rld  s l a v e r y .  E lk in s ' s in g u la r  c o n tr ib u tio n  w a s  a  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  
T a n n en b au m 's s c a t te re d  r e f e r e n c e s  to the im p a c t o f s l a v e r y  on the N eg ro ’ s  
p e r s o n a l i t y .  But go ing  fu r th e r  th an  T annenbaum  on s l a v e r y  i t s e l f ,  he  
co n ten d ed  th a t th e  d iv e rg e n c ie s  b e tw een  A m e r ic a n  and Ib e ria n  s l a v e r y  w e r e  
s o  p ro fou n d  th a t one w a s  d e a lin g  w ith  tw o d i f f e r e n t  s p e c ie s ^  \ In the  
A m e r ic a n  s y s te m , th e lin e  b e tw e en  s la v e  and f r e e  w a s  r ig id ly  d ra w n  both  
in  law  and c u s to m , r e s u lt in g  in  a  to ta l r ig h t le s s n e s s  o f the s la v e .  H o w ev e r, 
E lk in s  fo cu sed  on m a r g in a lly  d if fe r e n t  le g a l e le m e n ts  f ro m  T an n en b au m .
He e x a m in ed  th e  s la v e ' s  s ta tu s  in  N orth A m e r ic a  w ith in  th e fra m e w o rk  o f  
fo u r  m a jo r  le g a l c a te g o r ie s ;  t e r m  o f s e rv itu d e , m a r r ia g e  and th e  fa m ily ,  
p o lic y  and d is c ip l in a r y  p o w e rs  o v e r  th e  s la v e ,  and p r o p e r ty  and o th e r  c i v i l  
r ig h t s .  T h e s e  he contended  sh ow ed  a  c o m p le te  su b o rd in a tio n . O n ly  in  N orth  
A m e r ic a  w a s  th e  s la v e  con d em n ed  to  e te r n a l  s e rv itu d e , d en ied  th e  r ig h t  o f  
r e l ig io u s ly  sa n c tio n ed  co n ju g a l r e la t io n s h ip s , su b je c ted  to  a  s y s te m  o f  to ta l  
p o w e r , and in c a p a b le  o f  e n te r in g  in to  c o n tra c tu a l r e la t io n s h ip s . S la v e r y  in  
N orth  A m e r ic a  w a s  a  " c lo sed  s y s te m "  and i t s  im p ac t on th e  s la v e s '  p e r s o n ­
a l i t i e s  w a s  p ro fo u n d ly  d eh u m a n is in g .
B e fo re  w e  tu rn  to  E lk in s ' s a m b o lfic a tio n  th e s is ,  le t  u s s u m m a r is e
th e  re a s o n s  h e  p re s e n te d  f o r  th e  'c lo se d  n a tu re ' o f  N orth  A m e r ic a n  s l a v e r y .
It w a s  not an im p o rte d  o r  t r a n s f e r r e d  s l a v e r y ,  r a t h e r  it  w a s  " fa sh io n ed  on
th e spot"  and n e c e s s a r i ly  r e f le c te d  the e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  in d iv id u a lis t ic ,
l a i s s e z - f a i r e  c a p ita lis m  o f  e a r l y  A m e r ic a n  c o lo n is a t io n . T he r ig id i ty  o f
A m e r ic a n  s l a v e r y  a s  op p osed  to  th e flu id , Ib e ria n  s t r u c tu r e  w a s  e x p lic a b le
in  t e r m s  o f  th e  d if fe r e n c e  b e tw e en  the " lib e r a l  P ro te s ta n t, s e c u la r i s e d ,
c a p ita l is t  c u ltu re " , and . .  th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e  p a te rn a lis t ic ,  C a th o lic , q u a s i-
(2)
m e d ia e v a l c u ltu re  o f Spain  and P o rtu g a l and th e then New W o rld  c o lo n ie s "  , 
w h e re  th e r e  w a s  a  fin e  te n s io n  and b a la n c e , an  in te rp la y  o f in t e r e s t s  am o n g  
th e in s ti tu t io n s  o f c o lo n ia l s o c ie t i e s .  T h is  m ilita te d  a g a in s t th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  
to ta l p o w e r  b y  th e p la n te r  c la s s .  N orth A m e r ic a n  s l a v e r y ,  on  th e o th e r  hand, 
had no su ch  " ch eck s and b a la n c e s "  and th e re in  l ie s  th e  o r ig in  o f  " Sam b o" .
1 )  S ta n le y  E lk in s , o p . c i t .  p . 5 8 .
2 )  ib id . p . 3 2 .
According to Prof. Elkins: "Sambo, the typical plantation slave,
was docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, humble but chronically given
to lying and stealing; his behaviour was'full of infantile silliness and his
tasks inflated with childish exaggeration. His relationship with his master
was one of utter dependence and childlike attachment: it was indeed this
childlike quality that was the very key to his being"^\ "Sambo", and Elkins
was emphatic, was not a biologically-based characterisation of the slave's
personality. Africans, in his view, were not racially only culturally inferior
to Europeans. It was the apologetic scribes of the plantocracy and biased
historians who had wrongfully traced "Sambo" to the inferior African culture.
For " . . .  no true picture . . .  of African culture, " wrote Elkins, "seems to
throw any light at all on the origins of what would emerge, in American
„(2)plantation society, as the stereo-typed 'Sambo' personality" . "Sambo" 
was rather the product of the African’s attempt to adapt to a system of total 
power, bereft of his traditional cultural apparatus which might have 
amortised "the final shock".
This passage contains Elkins' thesis in a nutshell: "An examination 
of American slavery, checked at certain critical points against a very 
different slave system, that of Latin America, reveals that a major key 
to many of the contrasts between them was an institutional key. The presence 
or absence of other powerful institutions in society made an immense 
difference in the character of slavery itself. In I^ atin America, the very 
tension and balance among three kinds of organisational concerns - church, 
crown and plantation agriculture - prevented slavery from being carried by 
the planting class to its ultimate logic. For the slave, in terms of the space,
. «Mowed for the development of men and women as moral beings, the 
result was an "open system" a system of contact with free society through 
which ultimate absorption into society could and did occur with great frequency. 
The rights of personality implicit in the Church's most venerable assumptions 
on the nature of the human soul were thus in a vital sense conserved, whereas 
to a staggering extent the very opposite was true in North American Slavery
1 )
2)
ibid. p. 82. 
ibid. p. 97.
which operated as a "closed system "^. Negro slaves in North American
society, had been infantilised far beyond that which could be interpreted
as accommodation or feigned adaptation and, moreover, this phenomenon
was on a scale only parallel with the personality deformation among Jews in
Nazi concentration camps where too "instances of widespread infantilisation
were observed". To forestall criticisms that his choice of concentration
camps as a comparable institution to slavery was overdrawn, Klkins explicitly
rejected an inference that the plantation was even like a concentration camp.
It was more a case of the latter being "a highly perverted slave system and
(2)
a perverted patriarchy” .
Sambo, in Elkins' view, was not a feigned accommodation. Even so, 
he argued, sustained feigning becomes a genuine role-performance unless 
the role-player has experiences which enable him to imagine an alternative 
existence. The African had suffered five shocks - capture, transport, sale, 
the Middle Passage and plantation slavery - which had ruthlessly sapped his
(3)
psychological durability and caused a recourse to a childlike posture' .
Samboification was thus a definite theoretical possibility.
However much the samboification thesis may not have been conceived
as an analytical category in "race relations", some writers have utilised
(4)it as such' D. P. Moynihan’s family-instability thesis contains implicit 
and explicit reference to samboification and he approvingly cites Nathan 
Glazerfsand T. H. Pettigrew's utilisation of Elkins' thesis^ . Suffice to say 1
1) ibid. p. 81.
2) ibid. p. 104. 
ibid. pp. 98-101.
4) See the following: William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage 
(Basic Books, N. Y. 1968). Charles SIberman, Crisis in Black and 
White (Random House, N. Y. 1964). Iuiura Foner & Eugene Genovese 
felt "Elkins focused on the impact of slavery on the blacks, boldly 
introduced psychological models into historical analysis, and by 
implication related the slave background to a variety of current problems" 
op. cit. p. 1.
5) See Lee Rainwater and William Yancey (eds.), The Moynihan Report 
and the Politics of Controversy (M. I. T. Press, Cambridge Mass. 1967)
pp. 61-62.
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here that, by innuendo, the "samboification thesis” assumes Responsibility
for the inability of blacks to adjust to, and succeed in, the competitive
complex of modern American capitalism. Obversely, as Tanhenbaum
suggested, the reluctance of "whites" to accord "blacks" full citizenship
may be in recognition of their unpreparedness^. Moreover, by implication,
if it is the "master" who organises the initiation into adulthood, "black"
politics should be orientated towards influencing and appealing to "whites".
Prof. Hlkins' historiography has been challenged at almost every
(2 )
major point, and especially the notion of "Sambo" . Critics attack his 
assumption of a closed, homogenous, North American slave system as an 
over-generalisation, since North American slavery was spatio-temporally 
differentiated. Against Elkins, Prof. Genovese argued that all the slave 
regimes in the Americas were paternalistic and that the Old South was a
(3)"historically unique kind of paternalistic society" . The labour system
was of a "non-bourgeois” character so that the slaves escaped the psychic
impairment consistent with a brutally profit-orientated economy. Genovese's
accounts of the slaves lives demonstrate that they were not as culturally
denuded or cowed as Elkins portrayed. A ll forms of exploitation will
psychological resistance but the slave's personality was much
(4)
more complex and differentiated than Elkins allowed . Earl Thorpe saw 
Elkins' concentration camp analogy as misleading in that the identification 
with oppressive authority was not complete, but partial and sporadic' .
Finally, Roy Simon Bryce-Diporte advised that we treat Elkins' "Sambo" as 
a hypothetical construct only, since Elkins did not document the empirical 
existence of this stereotype^. 1
1) Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, op. cit. p. 111.
2) See A.J. Lane, (ed.), The Debate over Slavery: Stanley Elkins and his
Critics. (University of Illinois Press, London 1971).
3) Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 
(Panther Books, New York 1974) p. 5.
4) Eugene Genovese, In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern 
and Afro-American History (Random House, New York, 1971) pp. 73-102.
5) E.F. Thorpe in Ann J. Lane (ed .) op. cit. pp. 23-42.
6) R.S. Bryce-laporte in Ann J. Lane (ed .) op. cit. pp. 269-292.
It is also necessary to mention the differences in emphasis between 
Tannenbaum and Freyrc and Elkins. For Tannenbaum offered so many 
qualifications of his major conclusions that he stands apart from Elkins and 
Freyre. While he stressed the interplay of religious and legal traditions, 
and plantation economics, Elkins and Freyre emphasised the role of the 
pre-bourgeois, Iberian culture. The following quote from Freyre, strikingly 
similar to Elkins' argumentation, proves their intellectual affinity: "The 
Portuguese who as a people still predominantly pre-bourgeois and pre­
industrial in their attitudes, and who, after the 16th century especially, 
became settlers in non-European areas, adopted in such areas, when they 
found them in great plantations of sugar cane, a type of slavery also 
predominantly pre-bourgeois, and pre-industrial in its characteristics and 
in striking contrast with the predominantly industrial and bourgeois type 
of slavery which would lie always adopted by other Europeans in those same 
areas''^ . Secondly, however much Tannenbaum gave prominence to slave 
laws, he did not share Elkins' juristic obsession. "The slave system",
Tannenbaum admitted, "was broader in its impact than might lx; discerned
(2)
from a reading of the slave laws" , and while both Elkins and Freyre 
assumed an absence of miscegenation in North America, Tannenbaum felt 
that miscegenation was widespread in both systems, "but a source of pride"
(3)among Brazilians' Furthermore, for Tannenbaum, "Important as the
«1 ’ fr.-• es between Brazil and the U. S. were, flic similarities were
(4)
undoubtedly greater" . Elkins,on the other hand,argued, "But the differences 
between the two systems are so much more striking than the similarities 
that we may with profit use them not as parallels but as contrasts"^, 
r .  "  <Jie causal relationship which Tannenbaum posited between the moral 1
1) Gilberto Freyre, The Portuguese and the Tropics, op. cit. p. 79.
2) F. Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, op. cit. pp. 116-117.
3) ibid. p. 121.
4) ibid. p. 118.
5) Stanley Elkins, op. cit. p. 58. Elkins also misleadingly attributes 
to Tannenbaum a discovery of "staggering contrasts" in the two 
slave systems. Stanley Elkins, op. cit. p. 25.
aspects of slavery and the nature of its abolition does not figure in the 
works of either Freyre of Elkins. Elkins contented himself with a brief 
analysis of abolitionist spokesmen in North America within "a pai'adigm of 
anti-slavery thought", tracing their intellectual progress on an institutional- 
individualist spectrum^ \  His reliance on,or affinity with.Freyre and 
Tannenbaum is more of a highly selective appropriation from their 
interpretations of Latin American slavery. His particular contribution places 
North American slavery in a unique category of severity. The differences 
in emphasis among Freyre, Tannenbaum and Elkins do not undermine the 
commonality of their historiographic assumption that contemporary "race 
relations" are reflective of the moral and legal bases of Negro slavery. If 
this assumption is invalid,then different sets of social and economic 
processes surely must lx? examined,including the entire race relations 
framework.
A forthright and pungent challenge to the Freyre-Tannenbaum-Elkins
interpretation of slavery in the Americas came from Marvin Harris. He
counterposed Tanncnbaum's assertion of moral differences between Church,
Crown and Colonists in colonial societies, to an identity of economic interest.
ITiev all sought to control the greatest resource of the New World -  manpower
-  in order to exploit its fertile soil and precious metals, and this overriding
concern determined their behaviour patterns. Moreover, in Harris' view,
vas no need to contrast North American and Iberian plantation systems,
for within Latin America itself there were divergences. For example, there
were sharp distinctions between the plantations of Highland and Lowland
( 2 )
America, indeed, they were polar extremes . The major difference was 
i ' lato the level of capital investment which was higher in the Lowlands' 
economic units,especially on the sugar estates where the master ruled 12
1) Stanley Elkins, op. cit. pp. 175-193.
2) The Highland areas refer to Mesoamerica, the Central Andes of South 
America all through Mexico and the North of Venezuela, and finally 
through Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Northern Chile. The Lowlands 
would be the coastal and tropical and semi-tropical latitudes including 
Northern Brazil, the Caribbean Islands and Eastern South America. 
Marvin Harris, op. clt. pp. 1-2.
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supreme. These "BigHouses" were powerful enough to ignore both the 
Church and the Crown's representatives. Rut plantations not only differed 
regionally, they performed different economic functions from haciendas 
and were themselves divisible into 'engenhos' and'usinas'. "The business 
of the sugar plantation was to grow and refine sugar; that of the haciendas 
was to grow food to feed the peones and the haciendado's fam ily "^ . The 
'engenhos' were not unlike the haciendas in terms of labour organisation; 
they were both non-competitive and non-commercialised. Thus, patriarchal 
relations could and did prevail on the 'haciendas' and on the early 'engenhos', 
not, however, on the 'usinas' plantation or factory in the field. Freyre and 
Tannenbaum had failed to make this distinction and this is one reason why 
they posited a general Ilierian or Brazilian type and a decisive concern with 
legality on the part of the slavc-owners.
The plantation was the typical lowland economic organisation 
characterised by heavy capital investment, monoculture, sensitivity to 
fluctuations on the world market and a different kind of racial prospectus.
In the Lowlands: "Neither the State nor the Church had direct access to 
the slave population. The master stood between the Church and the State and 
the slaves. This was the reverse of the situation which existed in the Highland 
regions, where the haciendados frequently found it necessary to check with
( 2)
the Church and the State before they were able to make use of Indian labour"
"nt even so the famous New I,aws of 1542 which declared that the Indians
were to be regarded as free men, insisted that they were vassals of the King
of Spain. These laws were not expressions of humanist sentiment but part
of the Crown's attempt to pry loose the enslaved Indians from the increasingly
(3); -f|*l encomenderoes and slaveholders' ,
Harris was hostile to continental comparisons of slave systems:
"Better to dispute the number of angels on a pinhead than to argue that one
(4)country's slavery is superior to another's"' . He did, however, feel a
1) Marvin Harris, op. cit. p. 46.
2) ibid. p. 48.
3) Ibid. pp. 16-19.
4) ibid. p. 74.
need to challenge both Tannenbaum and Freyre on specific issues. Writing 
with a simplicity and forcefulness unusual for an academic, he flatly 
accused Freyre of intellectual dishonesty and suggested that he was a 
lackey of Portuguese imperialism. If, asked Harris, the Portuguese were 
colour blind, why had they managed to produce so few mixed types in their 
African colonies? Moreover, copulation with females of a different race is 
no indication of the absence of colour prejudice nor does it logically inhibit 
the development of a race-supremacist mystique. Indeed, a race-supremacist 
belief may precipitate copulation of this sort, since it invariably contains 
notions of the super-sexual prowess of the lower race.
The contrasting of legal codes and matrix of customs about slavery
initiated by Tannenbaum and Klkins betrayed a naive, legalistic orientation
which has no place in antropological studies. For, writes Harris, "In
Brazil as in everywhere in the colonial world, law and reality bore an equally
small resemblance to each other"^ . Thus: "The Crown could publish all
the laws it wanted, but in the lowlands sugar was king. If there were any
Portuguese or Spanish planters who were aware of the legal obligations towards
the slaves, it would require systematic misreading of colonialism, past and
nresent. to suppose that these laws psychologically represented anything
more than the flatus of a pack of ill-informed Colonel Blimps who didn't even
( 2 )
know what a proper cane field looked like" . In Harris' opinion, Tannenbaum's 
ca .ii.iil error was not to draw a distinction between abstract legality and 
actual institutional patterns. Tannenbaum's explicit hostility to "economic 
determinism" caused an over-emphasis on the secondary features of slave 
society and an aversion to the reality of political and economic power. For 
. in the frequency with which Popes condemned the slave trade which
he cited, was evidence of cither Christian hypocrisy or economic determinism, 
for the Iberian nations were the last to suppress the slave trade and 
emancipate their slaves.
Harris' criticism found an echo in Stanley Mintz'c careful review 
of Elkins' "Slavery". Mintz charged Elkins with an unjustifiable neglect of 
economics, especially the different levels and rates of capitalist development
1) ibid. p. 77.
2) ibid. p. 76
A
of the slave empires and a false assumption of an homogenous Iberian 
slavery. Tannenbaum and Elkins had also researched insufficiently into 
the legal institutional background of English’slavery. For a substantial 
legal and institutional tradition existed in English Law and practices towards 
slaves and villeins in sixteenth century England: "Slaves had numbered 9 per cent 
of the population in the Doomsday Book, but slave status had been gradually 
assimilated into villeinage thereafter"^. The existence or non-existence 
of a legal tradition was therefore invalid as an explanation of the differences 
between Iberian and English slavery.
Mintz noted that Elkins, in a constrained manner, had tried to
introduce economic elements into his interpretation of slavery, but like
Tannenbaum he "circumvents critical evidence on the interplay of economic 
(2 )
and ideological forces" . However, Elkins’ main error lies in his treatment 
of Iberian slavery as a "single phenomenon". This was unacceptable even 
for purposed of broad comparison, for slavery in Cuba, which Elkins had 
curiously neglected, had become just as viciously dehumanising as in North 
America once its plantations became capitalist industrial units. Since all the 
colonising societies possessed traditions and given the observed facts of a 
fluctuating dehumanisation of slaves in the slave systems of Spain, Portugal 
and North America, the issue should become: what were the factors militating 
against "the effective transfer" of traditions to the slave colonies of the 
North !!ua'opeans? For Mintz, the evidence supported the view that institutions 
of a legal and moral nature are subservient to economic exigencies. In Puerto 
Rico, in the period 1807-1873, as the plantation system mushroomed, economic 
exploitation and repression became more intense and just as systematic as that 
. f i ' ;j&th century Virginia. The institutional apparatus of the Iberians did 
not always protect slaves,and the grafting of metropolitan institutions on to 
the colonial corpus met with different successes in North and South American 
colonies.
Mintz’s crucial contribution lies in his exposure of the arbitrary 1
1) Sidney W. Mintz, "Slavery and Emergent Capitalisms" in I,aura Foner
& Eugene Genovese, (eds.) op. cit. p. 32.
nature of "the Iberian type" via an illumination of the periodic difference? as 
well as similarities between Spanish and Portuguese slavery. "Slave 
systems", he emphasised, had unacceptably static connotations and obscured 
the changing patterns of slavery in Intin America. Mintz cited evidence from 
Cuban and Puerto Rican slave history, which Tannenbaum and Elkins had 
overlooked, in order to demonstrate the contrasts between Spanish and 
Portuguese slavery as well as "the economic onslaught upon institution and 
tradition"^ .
In Mintz's view, the plantation must be seen dynamically, as an
emergent industrial system producing commodities for the colonial powers
which changed its organisational forms in response to their economic demands.
The early benign paternalism of the Iberian variant simply reflected the
embryonic state of Portuguese and Spanish capitalism. Another reason for
its manorial characteristics had to do with the nature of the crops grown.
It meant that, for some part of the year, slaves were substantially lion-
profitable in terms of maximising a cash profit, for: "Unlike the wage-earners
of early capitalism slaves represented a cost, diminishing capital when they
were not producing. This helps to explain the truly desperate efforts of the
slave-owners to increase their profit margins by compelling slaves to grow
their own foodstuffs, by enabling them to become artisans, by renting out in 
( 2 )
labour gangs, and so on" . This facilitated some slaves buying their 
freedom, especially if slave prices were then low, or the world demand for 
plantation produce was slack. Hence the high rate of manumission in Intin 
America was not morally but economically inspired. It is possible,in Mintz's 
view,to accept the position that the slave systems were different. Rut these 
i  differences, he stressed, were caused by the specific social and economic 
conditions of the two continents and fluctuations in the demand for staples 
in the metropolitan markets. The manorial ameliorations to slavery were 
part of the slaveholders' attempts to reproduce the plantation system and 
to protect themselves from uncontrollable world market price movements. 
When these exogenous market forces became utterly irresistible,so too did 12
1) ibid. p. 32.
2) ibid. p. 35.
abolitionist agitation and the opposition of the slaves. Mintz's response to 
Tannenbaum and Elkins is clear: the understanding of New World slavery 
is not facilitated by the ignoring of economics in preference for culture and 
tradition. Rather, it is only through focusing on economics that culture 
and legal norms can be identified as components of behaviour.
Unlike Mintz, D. Brion Davis did not concede any significant differences
in the slave systems^\ Thus he announced his critique of Tannenbaum and
Elkins by denying their thesis of salient discontinuities between slave systems
in the New World. His repudiation of Elkins' and Tannenbaum's interpretation
of slavery in the Americas centred on morality, religion, legality and the
issue of manumission. Slavery, he contended, has always been shot through
with the contradiction" involved in holding a man as chattel. This results in
an "institutional continuity" which nullifies any attempt the prove a
"morphological incomparability" of slave systems, although each has unique
features. In Davis' view, the differences among the slave societies in the
New World at the levels of philosophy, cultures, legal traditions and master-
slave relationships had been exaggerated. More specifically, Davis accused
Tannenbaum and Elkins of using a questionable strategy of moral comparison
and, even on that score, of presenting factually incorrect information. In
consequence, an historic injustice was done to British and North American
slavery,presented by Tannenbaum and Elkins as: "of a merely uniform
severity, the slave being legally deprived of all rights of person, property
and family, and subjected to the will of his owner and the police power of the
( 2 )
State, which barred his way to education, free movement, or emancipation' . 
This viewpoint can only be held at the expense of ignoring well-documented 
i j  *on evidence of organisational diversity and economic variations among 
the plantations in Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Virginia,
Maryland and Pennsylvania. In all these areas, the actual status of the slave 
was fluid and ambivalent, exemplifying, for Davis, the inherent tension 
involved In enslaving an entity which can itself own things. This ambiguity 
in defining a slave’s legal and moral status, the Impossibility of treating a
1) David Brion Davis, op. cit. Ch. Eight.
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a man wholly as a piece of conveyable property gave rise to numerous, if
sporadic, anomalies in the slave's condition, throughout the history of slavery.
The static treatment of Anglo-Saxon slavery was compounded by
Tannenbauin's and Elkin^omission of the prodigious barbarities perpetrated
by Iberian planters on their slaves at different periods. Various writers
testify to this, among whom the most oft-quoted are C. R. Boxer, Stanley Stein,
Elsa Goveia and Celso Furtado^. It is Impossible to regard Iberian
slavery as more sensitive to the humanity of the slave when,"...pn the great
plantations of Bahia . . .  a Capuchin missionary was told in 1682 that a Negro
„(2)
who endured for seven years was considered to have lived very long" . The
evidence points to a high slave mortality on Brazil's plantations and in the
mines. The 40, 000 slaves per year which Brazil was importing in the first
quarter of the nineteenth century did not visibly increase the number of slaves.
Given this high mortality rate, it is not surprising that, "Portugal and Brazil
were the only civilised nations that openly resisted attempts to suppress the
(3)African slave trade"' And since slave rebellions in Brazil were almost 
of epidemic proportions, the "mildness" of Iberian slavery was largely a myth. 
Rather, Davis emphasised,we should agree with Boxer that it was "a hell for 
Negroes" who lived "short, brutish and nasty" lives.
Contrary to Tannenbaum's assertion of the softening influence of 
Catholicism on the slaves' lot, neither civil nor religious authorities displayed 
any enthusiasm towards restraining the planters' treatment of slaves as 
dispensable objects: "In theory,of course,the Portuguese or Spanish slave 
possessed an immortal soul that entitled him to respect as a human personality.
But though perfunctorily baptised in Angola or on the Guinea coast,he was 
aj _ i \-#d and sold like any merchandise upon his arrival in America. Often 
slaves were herded in mass, stark naked, into large warehouses where they 123
1) C.R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1963). Stanley Stein, Vassouras, A 
Brazilian Coffee Country 1850-1900, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1957). Elsa Goveia, "The West Indian Slave Laws of the Eighteenth 
Century" in Laura Foner &  Eugene Genovese, op. cit. Celso Furtado, The 
Economic Growth of Brazil (Univ. of Calif., California, 1963).
2) ibid. p. 232.
3) ibid. p. 236.
were examined and marketed like animals . . .  The Spanish, who ordinarily
sold horses and cows individually, purchased Negroes in lots, or piezas de
Indias, which were sorted according to age and size"^ . Tannenbaum may
have been right in arguing that the Catholic Church did all in its power to
protect (lie Negroes' rights and humanity. Hut how much power did it have in
comparison to profit-obsessed slave traders and planters? The Iberians had
souls, so did the slaves, as the Church insisted; but the Iberians were also
bent on maximising the scope and the profit of their enterprises and the slave
was part of their expendable equipment. Iliis "inherent contradiction" has
plagued all slavery in Western culture and it is reflected too in Slave Codes.
Thus there are many problems involved in their assessment.
Tannenbaum had argued that the Las Siete Partidas, a codification of
ancient and Catillian slave customs, was the legal fundament of Iberian
slavery. Davis considered this choice of the I^ as Siete Partidas to lie highly
arbitrary, especially in view of the manifold actual deviations from its humane
provisions, but even so, the Partidas granted the master the right to do with
the slave as he wished and during its compilation by the "learned intellectuals"
it was recognised that the condition of Moorish slaves in Spain w’as "the most
( 2 )
miserable that men could have in this world" . Furthermore, there can be
no justification of Tnnnenbaum's ignoring of the Code Tortosa compiled in 1272,
a decade after the Lis Siete Partidas. Ibis Cotie vindicated the master's right
to inflict the harshest of punishments on his slave and pronounced a slave's
testimony acceptable only if it were given under torture.
As regards Tannenbaum's emphasis on manumission as a test case of
the relative severity of slave systems, Davis conceded that the phenomenon
of manumission was more common in Latin America, but rejected this as
evidence of leniency in the whole system especially since the black-white
ratio may have been a contributory factor to the different rates. And just as
"the principles and traditions were not so strikingly different as has been 
(3)supposed"' , so the figures on the manumitted: "In 1800 there were 123
1) ibid. p. 235.
2) ibid. p. 105.
3) ibid. p. 270.
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approximately 58,000 free Negroes in Virginia, or about one-eighth the
number of slaves. Tlie number of free Negroes had increased from about
2, 000 in 1782 to 30, 000 in 1810, which was a faster rate of growth than that
of the slave population. From 1790 to 1860 the number of free Negroes in
Delaware outnumbered slaves nearly 10 to 1. While this high population in
the border states can be partly explained by the migration of manumitted
slaves from the lower South, the fact remains that there were over 250,000
free Negroes in the slaveholding states on the eve of the Civil War. In 1888
after seventeen years of government sponsored emancipation, there were
still some 600,000 slaves in B razil"^ . Since Tannenbaum and Elkins had
ignored the history of slavery in Western civilisation as a whole, they lacked
a broad comparative perspective and hence lapsed into facile generalisations
about slavery in the Americas. Their criteria for establishing the comparative
harshness of America's slave systems were arbitrary because slavery was
not seen as part of a continuum and continuing contradiction. Throughout
history, to enslave a man has caused ironies and paradoxes, largely
because of the impossibility of completely 'chattelising' a human Ixing. For
Davis, this is the framework within which the myriad engimas and imponderables
ol slavery in the Americas are to be evaluated.
Davis' interpretation of slavery in the Americas as part of a
continuing moral contradiction can be contrasted to Eugene Genovese's focus
m i ’ >js contradictions. Since we are concerned here more with "race relations"
theories which imputes an axial role to slavery, we shall restrict ourselves
to selected themes in Genovese's works on slavery. Genovese presented his
contribution to the materialist-idealist controversy with a critique of both
( 2 )
F uac's "mysticism" and Harris' "ahistorical economic determinism'
In his view, the elucidation of the problem of slavery had been impeded by the 
rigid idealist and materialist approaches. Hie former harboured deficiencies 
of both a factual and theoretical nature for it ignored the material foundation 
of each particular slave society, and especially the class relations in preference, 
for an almost exclusive concern with tradition and cultural continuity. Hut 12
1) ibid. p. 264.
2) Eugene Genovese, "Materialism and Idealism in the History of Slavery", 
in 1 »iura Foner and Eugene Genovese (eds.) op. clt. p.
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equally untenable was the mechanical materialism of Eric Williams and 
Marvin Harris.
Their economic-determinist position which saw abolition as a mere 
political reflex of economic transformation had a parallel in the idealist 
emphasis on ideological correlatives to the exclusion of economics, especially 
class interests. Yet: "If the War for Southern Independence grew out of the 
failure to recognise the moral personality of the slave, then we need to know 
the reason why no such war or revolution occurred in the Northern States or 
in the British or Dutch West Indies, which in the Tannenbaum-Elkins Thesis 
also denied that moral personality. The other country in which abolition 
occurred amidst fearful violence was Saint Dominigue which then logically should 
have stood with the United States at one side of the polarization that Tannenbaum 
and Elkins posit: in fact, by their explicit account, it stood midway between 
the Anglo-Saxon and Iberian models"^ \  Manumission and emancipation had 
little or nothing to do with morals.
Abolition, for Genovese, was one of the crucial issues in the historical 
interpretation of slavery. It should be regarded, in his opinion, as a 
consequence of the internecine struggle between the plantocracy and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie. Whether it was peaceful or violent depended on the 
balance of pow'er between these two forces. Abolition took a relatively non­
violent course in Iatin America and the Caribbean because the plantocracies 
there were w'cak, disunited, absentecist, often outnumbered by slaves and 
coloured freedmen and ideologically dependent on the metropolitan bourgeoisie. 
Conversely, a powerful plantocracy as that of the American South could 
physically express opposition to abolitionist intervention from the 
n 1 aiopoles.
In order to transcend the difficulties involved in deciding which slave 
system was morally superior, Genovese postulated a pervasive paternalism 
in the New World slave societies and, elsewhere, proposed a conceptual 
specification of "treatment". The slave-holding regimes of the New World 
exhibited distinct patterns of paternalism which was in turn a function of 
institutional and moral legacies as well as the exigencies of world capitalism.
1) Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. p. 13.
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This paternalistic ethos was, however, spatio-temporally unstable; it was
more characteristic of the Brazilian North East than the South and the
nineteenth century than in the eighteenth in Brazil as a whole. The American
South too, in Genovese's opinion, possessed a patriarchal slave regime
despite its bourgois distortions. Thus it was not a question of paternalism
versus capitalistic exploitation and commercialisation - the core of Elkins'
thesis - for both the market for the plantation's agricultural staples and the
slave market influenced the slave-holding regime. Thus,the commercial
side, with the primary concern for profit maximisation, actually reinforced
( 1)
the paternalistic impulse,' in that the masters often ameliorated the slaves'
conditions in order that they may increase their work effort.
However, paternalism itself was not adequately clarified so that there
is enough leeway for it to be regarded as, and even used by Prof. Genovese
to mean; affective ties of community and dependency between master and
(2)
slave, a chauvinist condescension with strict authoritarian overtones ,
(3)
good treatment either in terms of physical or moral welfare' '  and an absence
(4)
or mildness of "racism" . Prof. D. B. Davis made a similar comment on 
"paternalism": "The meaning of paternalism is devastatingly clear when 
Genovese discusses specific situations of dependency, accommodation and 
resistence. The concept becomes hazy when extended as a general historical 
category. Genovese seems to have retreated from the term "seigneurlal" 
much as he earlier retreated from "feudal". Yet he still equates paternalism 
with a "pre-capitalist" stage and thus with various preceding forms of 
feudal or semi-feudal society. It is sufficient here to say that he has not 
moved far in clarifying the relationship between paternalism and capita lism "^.
ambiguousness of "paternalism" is compounded by its interchangeable 
use with "patriarchalism", "mediaevalism", "corporatism", and "seigeuriallsm 
In contrast, his analysis of "treatment" introduces a much-needed clarity.
1) ibid. p. 98.
2) ibid. pp. 96, 99-100.
3) ibid. pp. 98-99.
4) ibid. p. 111.
5) D. B. Davis, The New York Times Book Review, 29, September 1974, p.
6) Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. p. 76.
„(6)
2 .
Indeed, this essay constitutes a fertile development arising out of the discussions 
which Tannenbaum et al. initiate«/.* \ve shall now critically analyse it 
well as the problem of comparative "race relations".
Genovese demonstrated that "treatment" can be understood in three 
different senses; tiay to day living conditions, including labour conditions, 
more general living standards involving the slaves recreation and cultural 
existence and, finally, opportunities for freedom and citizenship. He 
correctly perceived that Frcyre, Hlkins,and Tannenbaum used treatment in 
the first, second and third senses respectively, and that their critics did 
not isolate the different categories. In Genovese's view, although the slave's 
treatment in a given slave regime may be 'good' in one sense and 'bad' in 
another, specific kinds of treatment can be compared and this could provide 
a basis for judgement as to the relative severity of the slave systems.
Against Genovese,it can lie argued that since the various categories 
of treatment are not logically related or comparable, any subsequent judgement 
of the nature of the slave systems must involve an arbitrary favouring of a 
particular category. For example, if Brazilian slavery was better placed in 
respect of space for the development of the slave's culture but worse in terms 
of nourishment and labour conditions, which slavery was milder? Genovese's 
conceptual analysis of treatment could well have displaced the whole problem 
of the comparative lot of America's slaves. But Genovese concedes too much 
in retaining the concept of treatment. He does not recognise that he has 
provided the basis for a change of terrain. Wc observe in the following 
passage how Genovese is led astray by "race relations". He writes: "A 
comparative analysis of treatment in any of the meanings must take place on 
at'least two different levels simultaneously. First, conditions must lx; 
measured or assessed at a given historical moment. Race relations or 
working conditions must be evaluated for Cuba, Brazil, Jamaica, Saint Domigue 
and Virginia for a certain year or decade, for each slave system reflected 
the exigencies of the world market at any given moment in time. Second - 
more difficult but probably more important -  conditions must lx* measured
Fugenc Genovese, "The Treatment of Slaves in Different Countries" in 
l.aura Foner and Eugene Genovese (eds.) op. clt. pp. 202-210. (Our 
amplia si s, Y. W .)
1 )
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or assessed according to corresponding points of historical development.
The second half of the seventeenth century in Barbados, for example, must 
be compared and contrasted with the second half of the eighteenth century 
in Saint Dotnigue or the middle of the nineteenth century in Cuba. One sugar 
boom has to be measured in economic and social effects against another.
These two sets of investigations . . .  should lay bare the details of life in time 
and place with due attention to the state of the world market and the 
technological level of each section of the slave economy"^ \  Surely, if 
treatment is multi-dimensional and functional to a multiplicity of economic 
and historical circumstances, then, any conclusive investigation across 
countries is methodologically impossible. 'Hie real problem is that Genovese, 
in clinging to comparative race relations, must retain "treatment" and inconsistent­
ly adhere to the orthodoxy of comparing countries. Moreover, if the world market 
and technology are to lx? investigated,then the treatment of slaves should be 
replaced with the "rate of labour exploitalion"for the former suggests a 
voluntarism on the part of the slave-owners inimical to the structural 
investigation of a mode of production. Hie political economic and social 
practices of the slaveowners were determined by their situation within the 
conjuncture of global commodity exchange. How they trailed their slaves 
depended on how they were treated by the world economy. Thus if we are
t
to investigate "the treatment of slaves" we need to develop a concept of 
economic structure. It was the world market which made the slaveholders 
Genovese’s Marxist historiography is of questionable theoretical 
viability. Although Marx's writings cannot be said to be a theoretically 
homogenous system, they are indisputably concerned with the analysis of 
social classes in social formations with specific inodes of production. For 
Marx, classes derive from particular social relations of production and their 
practices are not a consequence but a determinant of their consciousness.
This determination precludes the possibility of consciousness being the object 
of Marx's analysis. F.ven if ideational factors guide all social practice, 
theorising cannot hope to recapture the empi rical processes within this 1
1) ibid. pp. 204-205. (Our emphasis, Y .W .)
guidance^, The point of departure of Marx's analysis is,tl'< rt fori .the
economic structure and his project is not explaining behaviour, but the
investigation of the relations between classes in the given mode of production.
Their theoretical practice - the expression of various ideas, beliefs or intentions
is to be situated in a theoretical scheme rather than described as an external
regulator of their political practices.
Marx's analysis thus differs fundamentally from the subjectivist-
idealism of sociology where "men are not considered as the "bearers of
objective instances (as they are for Marx), but as the genetic principle of the
levels of the social whole. This is a problematic of social actors, of individuals
as the origin of social action: sociological research thus leads finally, not to
the study of the objective co-ordinates that determine the distribution of agents
into social classes and the contradictions between these classes, but to the
search for finalist explanations founded on the motivations of conduct of the
, " (2)
individual actors" . Marxian social analysis would therefore generate 
different "problematics" from History and Sociology. Genovese's writings 
l>elong to these orthodoxies. They promote a studied concentration on the 
ideational and motivational patterns underlying social interaction in "slave 
societies", lie arguesthat the goal of getting within" a society should me an 
a concern with its spirit in its dominant ideology, system of values and 
psychological patterns"' Genovese's works, tinted with Marxian terms, but 
directed at the psychology of slaveholding "and the slave-holding experience’,' 
are necessarily rife with theoretical and conceptual ambiguities. For,in his 
pursuit of the chimera of an historical materialist psychology, Genovese 123
1) Psychological models, historical-psychological models, and even the 
renowned, dialiectically-conceived superstructure are not 
methodologically qualified to take into account the whole chain
of ideas involved in even a single social act. The selecting of 
ideas from an assumed world view would need to be theoretically 
justified with reference to another type of model. Hut see 
Chapter III for a discussion of this methodological problem.
2) Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State", in Robin 
Blackburn (ed .) Ideology in Social Science (Fontana/Colllns, London
1972) p. 242.
3) Eqgene Genovese "Materialism and Idealism In the History of Negro Slavery 
in the Americas" in Laura Foner and Eugene Genovese (eds.) op. cit.
p. 251.
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operates on two levels of reductionism: 'class' becomes 'groups', groups 
of slaveholders and 'ideology' is equated with psychological patterns, or society’s 
spirit. He thereby becomes the supreme idealist. The question a Marxist 
analysis would ask of American slavery would be diametrically different from 
Genovese's. It would be to what extent, if at all, the investigation of slavery 
in the Americas clarifies the concept of capitalist relations of production, 
not "history".
A second crucial omission on Genovese's part is his failure to
observe that, at root,the divergencies between the two 'schools' are explicable
in terms of their different conceptions of modes of production. Admittedly,
these conceptions are rarely made explicit; but a theoretical analysis of texts
is concerned with making manifest even their unstated conceptual relationships.
Genovese reads his fellow-historians in pursuit of their psychological m odels^.
This concern with motivation leads him away from the political implications of
historical writing. To illustrate, Tannenbaum explained the "frictions" in
contemporary "race relations" in terms of the American Negro's sudden
( 2 )
introduction to Emancipation . The general implication of this explanation
is that the demand by the Civil Rights Movement for "freedom now" is
premature and self-defeating. Since the years 1941-1947 saw severe "race
(3)riots" ns well as strident black militancy in American cities, '  we may 
therefore justifiably Interpret Tannenbaum's rcniark:"What was chattel 
yesterday cannot be suddenly legalised into citizenship" as a caution to contemp­
orary America. Genovese did not consider this aspect of Tannenbaum's work 
to lx? of any significance. What impressed him was Tannenbaum's sensitivity 
to the cultural and spiritual dimensions of slave society.
■yd
1) Both George Fithugh and Ulrich Bonn Philips are called "racists". Eugene 
Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. p. 236. In Red and 
Black, op. cit. p. 262. For Genovese, Freyre's works are "an attempt 
at psychological reconstruction". Eugene Genovese "Materialism and 
Idealism . . . "  in L. Foner and E. Genovese (eds.) op. cit. p. 251.
Elkins' book "illustrates how quickly the discussion must pass into 
considerations of psychology and anthropology" Eugene Genovese in 
Laura Foner and Eugene Genovese (eds.) op. cit. p. 239.
2) Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, op. cit. pp. 112-115.
3) See Herbert Garfinkel, When Negroes March(Atheneum, New York(1969).
A similar emphasis on the psychological quality of Elkins "Slavery"
testifies to Genovese's abiding interest in motivations, values and
experiences. Elkins' book is said to have demonstrated "the remarkable
uses to which psychology can be put in historical inquiry. It has brought to
the surface die relationship between the slave past and a wide range of
current problems flowing from that p a s t"^ . We would contend that what
is remarkable about Elkins' work is the idealist assumption which orders
his concepts. 'Hie result is a fragile theoretical structure sporadically fortified
with a fervent anti-materialistic ethic. In Elkins, the relationship between
North American slavery and capitalism is as follows: "That very strength and
bulwark of American society, capitalism, unimpeded by prior arrangements
and institutions, had stamped die status of slave with a clarity which
elsewhere could never have been so profound and had further defined the institution
(2 )
of slavery with such clarity that die slave was, in fact, degraded" . Despite 
the powerful moral undertones in Elkins' interpretation, he conceptualises 
slavery primarily as a legal status. Ilis conception of capitalism derives 
from the neo-classical school's emphasis on profit rather than on the relations 
of production,or commodity exchange. Where Elkins considers slavery as 
an economic institution,he counterposes a profit-orientated, North American 
slavery to a pro-bourgeois, pre-industrial, Iberian system. Had he analysed 
the theories of slavery,or possessed a concept of slave production,he might 
not have taken Gilbcrto Freyre's description of domestic servitude in the 
declining North-East Brazil as representative of an Iberian type. But Elkins' 
whole contrasting of slave systems is suggestive of an unspecified capitalism- 
slavery distinction. The contrastturns out to be a humanist one, capitalistic 
slavery dehumanises the slaves, while a pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial 
slavery protects their personality, 'llius Elkins' moral indictment of American 
capitalism runs parallel with an idealisation of Latin American slavery. We 
may therefore understand the violence of Marvin Harris'reaction to Elkins' 
dissertation. 1 234
Harris' likening of die comparing of slave systems to the proverbial
1) Eugene Genovese, In Red and Black, op. clt. p. 96.
2) Stanley Elkins, op. cit. p. 61.
3) Harris hopes that Elkins will never experience being whipped by
masters differently disposed toward his "human dignity", op. cit. p. 75.
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mediaeval squabble may be an example of unscholarly polemicising. But
what he is ridiculing Is the scholasticism of the debate over slavery in the
absence of any clarification of what is a slave system. He effectively exposes
the inadequacies of the idealist school, without, however, displacing their
questions. To illustrate, Tannenbaum's thesis rests on legal and normative
criteria - laws, religion and tradition. His book could well be sub-titled
"the religico-juridical ethic and the spirit of slavery". This is a proposition
different from the assertion of different systems of production in the
Americas,which Elkins incorrectly attributes to him. It is not that Harris
misread Tannenbaum, as Genovese has argued. Rather,Tannenbaum misled
his colleagues by confusing slavery as a moral and legal status with slavery
as a system of production. Tannenbaum simply has no concept of slavery. ,
A spectrum of severity does not constitute a structural delineation of an
economic institution. Descriptions of brutality do not inform us as to the
standard of living or the degree of labour exploitation. Brutality, like leniency,
can l>e a form of social control. It has no logical relationship to the standard
of living. Harsh forms of punishment can be meted out to well-kept, but
recalcitrant slaves by a master incensed at their "ingratitude". Similarly,
a high standard of living, as Genovese observes, is not incompatible with
a high rate of exploitation^. Finally, the Iberian "ameliorations" to which
Tannenbaum drew attention may be explained with reference to the lack of
c..r ilai resources which caused the given slaveholders to rent out their slaves
( 2 )
to those better endowed with capital' , as well as the level of capital 
intensity on the given plantation^. Here Marvin Harris'underdeveloped 
focus on capital was given some sophistication by Barry Hindess and Paul Q.
Hu .-a. j c
They delineated three phases in the development of the use of slave 
labour in the Americas. In the first phase, when production is at subsistence 
level slave labour is employed In a supplementary capacity to the settler- 123
1) Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. p. 181.
2) Cf. A. J. R. Russell-Wood, "Colonial Brazil" in David W. Cohen and 
Jack P. Greene (eds. ) Neither Slave nor Free (The John Hopkins 
University Press, I>ondon)p. 87.
3) Cf. Marvin Harris, op. clt. pp. 44-49.
farmers. The second phase sees the dominance of merchant’s capital and
concomitant processes of agricultural production for export as well as
slave trading. Phase three involves a shift from the production of sugar and
tobacco to cotton as an industrial raw material for metropolitan markets.
It is in the last two phases that slave labour becomes the dominant mode of
labour exploitation. The purchase of slaves is an investment in the means of
production. Slaves,then,are part of capital equipment and the intensity of
their exploitation is determined by the exigencies of the credit system for the
purchase of slaves and the market situation of their produce^.
Ilindess' and Hirst's analysis of slavery in the Americas is marred,
however, by their not distinguishing between "exhaustion" and'bxploltation".
Their'lntensity of exploitation" refers to the mode of utilisation of the slaves’
labour and this cannot be designated "exploitation" without causing a confusion
with Marx's conception of exploitation. In contrast to the tangenital analysis
of Ilindess and Hirst, Fogel's and Gngerman's investigation into "the
capitalist character of slavery" and "the anatomy of exploitation" is of supreme
relevance to the question of the degree of exploitation of African labour in the
( 2)
history of North American slavery . Their conclusions on the comparative 
welfare of African slaves and the white proletariat call into question the 
tendency to see slavery in an opprobrious light with the implication that 
capitalist wage-slavery is superior. Fogel and Fngerman refute this 
implication by comparing, not contrasting, the two modes of labour exploitation. 
If their comparison is overdrawn it is because of their refusal to distinguish 
be tween exploitation per sc and capitalist exploitation. The "capitalist 
character of slavery" is a misnomer, a badly formulated description of "the 
exploitative processes of slave labour". Slave labour and wage labour are both 
relationships of non-equivalence. But there are crucial differences between 
them which, however, do not relate to the attitudes and experiences of agents 
but the conditions of their reproduction. Wage labour presupposes the 1
1) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 136.
2) Robert W. Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the Cross: 'lhe 
Economics of American Negro Slavery, (Little Brown and Company (Inc.) 
London 1974). Chs. Three and Four.
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development of merchant's capital into an independent entity and its
penetration into the sphere of production. In the processes of capitalist
commodity production, the surplus labour extracted from the producers
thereby takes a value form. With slave labour, the processes of the extraction
and realisation of surplus labour are not mediated by a money wage and so
there is no accumulation of capital, but primitive capital accumulation.^ In
both cases, the measurement of the degree of exploitation presents serious
, (2)computational problems, which partly explains the generally moralistic 
treatment of the concept of labour exploitation, the moral comparisons of 
slavery in the Americas as well as the theoretical inadequacies of "Time on
(3)
the Cross"' ' .
1) Slave labour produces either capital or revenue; wage labour, capital. 
Thus when slaveowners merely amass wealth, they are not 
capitalists. Marx makes the distinction between money and capital 
and between slave labour and wage labour precisely in order to 
clarify the difference lx^tween primitive accumulation and capitalist 
accumulation:"In themselves money and commodities are no more 
capital than are the means of pnxluction and of subsistence. They 
want transforming into capital. But this transformation itself
can only take place under certain circumstances that centre in this, 
viz., that two very different funds of commodity-possessors must 
come face to face and into contact; on the one hand, the owners 
of money eager to increase the sum of values they posses by buying 
other people labour-power; on the other hand free labourers . . .
Free labourers in the double sense that neither they themselves form 
part and parcel of the means of production, as In the case of slaves, 
bondsmen, e tc .... " Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 714.
2) Exploitation is a concept designed to illuminate a certain condition 
of class societies. Attempts at its measurement, as distinct from a 
qualitative illustration, involve solving the notorious "transformation 
problem" of values into prices. See Paul M. Sweezy, The Theory of 
Capitalist Development, (Mixlern Reader Paperbacks, New York, 1970) 
Ch. VII. A more conclusive analysis can be found in Ronald L. Meek, 
Economics and Ideology and Other Essays (Chapman and Hall, London 
1967) Parts Two and Three.
3) See Thomas L. Haskwell, "Review of Three Critiques of Stanley L. 
Engerman and Roliert W. Fogel, Time on the Cross", The New York 
Review of Books, Vol XXII, No. 15, Sept. 1975, pp. 33-38. Herbert 
Gutman, Slavery and The Numliers Game; A Critique of Time of the 
Cross (University of Illinois Press, Chicago 1975). Gutman's arguments 
do not seem to us convincing except when he challenges Fogel's and 
Engcrman's illegitimate extrapolations from the slave past in their 
"Epilogue: Implications for Our Tim e" pp. 258-265.
Slave labour may produce either revenue or capital and this
possibility is responsible for both the rate of exhaustion of slaves and their
exploitation. However, slave labour can be .'industrial, domestic or agricultural,
with plantation slavery being a sub-species of the last gen re^ . Slaves in
these different sectors would have different working and living conditions.
but we should expect the rate of exploitation to vary according to the
relationship between the slave’ s maintenance costs and value of the
( 2 )
commodities produced . The treatment of slaves should then be subsumed 
under the general questions of the forms of social control on slave plantations 
and the rate of exhaustion of slaves,and both these problems related to the 
rate of surplus labour extraction as determined by the capital, slave and 
goods markets. It is here that historians of slavery should focus their 
investigations, a strategy which eliminates the problem of the comparative 
harshness of American slavery and contemporary "race relations". That is 
to say, slavery should no longer be regarded as a subject for, or a sub-type of, 
"race relations".
The source of the manifest inadequacies and inconsistencies in the 
literature on American slavery and 'face relations"must be situated in the 
empiricist-idealist presuppositions of the race relations perspective. Rather 
than attempt to locate slave labour within a systematic theory of modes of 
production,historians and sociologists pursue a historical explanation of race 
relations by attempting to reconstruct and compare slavery as it really 1
1) "Negroes were not of course engaged solely in agricultural work and 
domestic service during slavery. The ablest slaves were trained as 
skilled labourers on the plantation and in town - as blacksmiths,
arpenters, masons, bricklayers, painters, shoemakers, harness makers, 
and so on. Some worked for their owners; some were hired out to 
private employers or to public agencies, some were permitted to work 
for themselves in return for a certain percentage of their earnings.
As mining and manufacturing began to develop, the use of slaves was 
expanded to quarrying, coal mining, iron milling, founding, textile 
milling and tobacco manufacturing. Slaves also worked on steamboats 
and maritime vessels and on the railroads in every capacity except 
as conductors". Arthur M. Ross "The Negro In the American Economy" 
in Arthur M. Ross and Herbert Hill (eds.) Employment Race and Poverty 
(Harcourt Brace and World Inc., New York 1967). p. 8.
2) Cf. Eugene Genovese "The Treatment of Slaves In Different Countries" 
in L. Foner andE. Genovese (eds.) op. cit. p. 207.
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was 1 ^  Thus, not conceptual strategies but terminological cameras are
being developed so that the picture - the resultant theories •• constitute
angled images of a slave past. The situation is one of slavery being investigated
through the prism of "race relations" and vice versa. It has not been discerned
that the recapturing of past beliefs and behaviour is an eminently inconclusive
enterprise and by definition inferior to an abstract theory which demonstrates
how agents must embody particular social relations of production. As Marx
observed in another context "Not only in their answers but in their very
( 2 )
questions there was a mystification" . 'Hie question,then,why was Brazil's 
slavery different from North America's.can only generate inconclusive 
debates. It derives from a sub-discipline - comparative "race relations" 
which randomly selectcs "differences" from the "slave systems" to explain 
equally arbitrary differences in world "race relations".
There are few texts on slavery in the Americas which do not pay some 
tribute to Tannenbaum's pioneering work and attribute to him the thesis of 
profound differences between "the slave systems". 'Hiis imputation must now 
Ik? questioned for there is enough textual evidence in "Slave and Citizen" to 
refute it: " . . .  in spite of the sharp contrasts here drawn, the slave systems 
in liitin and Anglo-Saxon America were not institutions differing absolutely 
one from the other. Differences there were and important ones but they were 
differences of degree rather than in kind . . .  In fact so inclusive was the 
influence o f slavery that it might be better to speak not of a system of slavery
(3)
in Brazil, Cuba or the United States but of the total pattern as a slave society" . 
These remarks indicate the same ambivalence and inconsistency which we have 
discovered in Winthrop Jordan, Carl Degler and Stanley Elkins. It may appear 1
1) In the words of R. Fogel and S. Engcrman " . . .  what is set forth 
represents the honest efforts of scholars whose central aim has been the 
discovery of what really happened" op. cit. p. 8.
2) Karl Marx, The German Ideology; cited in Ixnils Althusser, Reading 
Capltul (New left Books, London 1970) p. 53.
3) Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, op. clt. pp. 116-117. Again,
"racial and class mobility was ns characteristic in Southern slave states 
as in other slave societies in this hemisphere" p. 124. Elsewhere, 
Tannenbaum asserted that the process of change "was similar under 
slavery in this hemisphere regardless of the aegis under which it originated" 
p. 127.
enigmatic that scholars have not observed Tannenbaum's self-contradictions.
But there are two points to be made about this. First, Tannenbaum's
references to systemic similarities in American slavery are sporadic and
unsystematic. Second, those scholars who celebrate Tannenbaum's Thesis
could not discover 'the other Tannenbaum' in that the thesis of severe slavery
generating antagonistic post-emancipatory "race relations" is necessary to
race relations historians and sociologists. For in adopting the race relations
perspective, they logically pursue white attitudes and prejudice legacies
from the first historical confrontation.
However, in order to demonstrate that slavery has had a formative
influence on "race relations", it would be necessary to specify what constitutes
"race relations" and whether this influence resides in economic,institutional
or social-psychological legacies. Tannenbaum and Flkins on the other hand,
offered us underdeveloped social-psychological propositions which assume an
easy translation of attitudes into behaviour^ \  They both failed to generate
the concepts necessary for a theoretical marriage of the'slave past" and
contemporary social structures. Working within their tradition of historical
continuity, Degler was constrained to deny Tannenbaum's central postulate,
arguing: "The overall conclusion that emerges from the comparison of slave
systems is that the differences are not fundamental to an explanation of
differences in contemporary race relations . . .  We must look behind the 
( 2 )
practices of slavery" Degler's work contains the most detailed comparison 
of Iberian and North American slavery from a race relations perspective.
He maintains that "race relations" in Brazil are crucially different from 
North America's. These differences originated in the descent institutions of 
Brazilian and North American slavery, not in slavery.
A seminal passage summarises Degler's main argument: "The key 
that unlocks the puzzle of the difference in race relations in Brazil and the 
United States is the mulatto escape hatch. Complex and varied as the race 1
1) For Tannenbaum,easy manumission reflects a "friendly attitude" 
towards the slave and its systematic obstruction an "attitude of hostility". 
Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, op. cit. p. 69.
2) Carl Degler, Neither Black nor White, op. cit. p. 92.
relations in the two countries have been and are today the presence of a
separate place for the mulatto in Brazil and its absence in the I'nited States
defines remarkably well the heart of the difference"^. Brazilian society
has carved a special niche for the mixed bloods somewhere between black
and white. Thus its "race relations" are milder than North America's.
Specifically, segregation would be physically impossible in conditions of
multiple differences in skin colour. Similarly, a doctrine of racial purity
cannot emerge given the palpable racial homogenity of Brazilian society. At
the political level, the mulatto escape hatch demonstrates to lower class
"blacks" the real possibility of social ascension through "marrying lighter".
It also siphons off potential leaders of the black masses, who would have to
emerge initially from the better educated mixed-bloods, on to a middle-rung
of prestige. In both cases,black solidarity and insurgency are inhibited, even
precluded. Thus there is no scope for the development of black consciousness,
(2 )
Black Panthers or Black Muslims in Brazil . For Degler, the, the "hostility"
of North American "race relations" is to be explained in terms of the
historical failure of the mulatto escape hatch to develop therein.
Degler's explanation of the failure of the mulatto escape hatch to
develop in the United States is, however, vague and unsystematic. Indeed,
there is no explanation at all, but mere hints at possible causes: the absence
of white women in colonial Brazil, the greater class consciousness of Anglo-
Saxons and the relative autonomy of American wives who often challenged the
(3)miscegenating practices of their husbands' .  These factors may account 
for the different number of mulattoes in Brazil and North America; they do 
not explain why the mulatto escape hatch was merely "incipient" in the 
United States. Degler's strongest assertion rests on the concept of mores:
t) ibid. p. 224.
2) And indeed, Gilberto Freyre is reported to have asserted: "Negritude
is a mysticism which has no place in Brazil", Cited in Anani Dzidzlenyo, 
'The Position of Blacks In Brazilian Society (Minority Rights Croup, 
London, 1971) p. 14.
3) Degler argues also that the mulatto escape hatch was almost legalised 
in the British West Indian islands. Indeed, lie contends that this was 
done in eighteenth century Jamaica, without stating the reasons. Neither 
Black nor White, op. cit. pp. 229-241.
. . .  the definition of the Negro worked out was neither foreordained nor 
implicit. It was, rather, the consequences of the interaction of English 
mores in the special circumstances of settlement in North America 
Rut what is needed is a theoretical investigation of these circumstances.
Instead, Degler presents judicial and legislative examples of the defining of 
a Negro.
It is pertinent here to mention the absence of any rigorous analysis
of the theory of race by race relations theorists. Almost every historical or
sociological treatise on*race relations'discusses the theory only in order
to demonstrate its ambiguities at the biological level but'Veality”at the social
level. Issues generally omitted or unsatisfactorily treated are; the epistemological
basis of race theory,its social determination, i.e. the relationship between
the emergence of a world economy and race theory^and race in the context
of the augmentation of labour supplies on plantations.
To illustrate, Carl Dcgler's mulatto escape hatch merely reiterates
that in the United States, the mulatto isd'Negro". This means that race
and racial hybrids are defined according to external, phenotypical criteria
(2)
rather than genetic traits . The question then becomes one of explaining 
the dominance of the viewpoint that race is to be defined according to 
phenotypical characteristics. This where the eplstemoligical basis and the 
social determination of race theory become relevant. We would argue that 
the theory of race is an empiricist positivist classification of socio-economically 
constituted aggregates of people. The race concept is empiricist in its notion of 
real rather than theoretically-based biological differences within homo sapiens 
and methodologically positivist in its focus on their measurement and 1
1) ibid. p. 244.
2) Cf. Leonard Liebermarf'The Debate over Race" in James Curtis and 
John Petrias (eds.) The Sociology of Knowledge (Gerald Duckworth and 
Co. I^d., Ixmdon 1970). According to Lieberman, the use of genetic 
as opposed to phenotypical criteria generates different kinds of races.
He records "Class and IJ composed blood types of Negroes in the 
United States with those of African Negroes and concluded that North 
American Negroes have about 30 per cent genes from white 
populations", p. 572. The flaw here is that the notion of "white 
populations" already suggests the use of phenotypical criteria.
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correlation. It does not explain biological differences as such but describes
and emphasises selected ones^\
What is the relationship between the biologists' project of racial
classification and the economic exigencies of plantations producing for a world
market? Degler poses a different question: why is anyone known to be of
Negro blood or Negro ancestry defined as a Negro and hence accorded slave
status? His answer - the absence of the mulatto escape hatch - is circular,
for the mulatto escape hatch is itself explained in terms of racial awareness.
In answer to our question, we may observe a certain deviation from the
scientific definition of the Negro. This suggests that the Negro of the
plantation's logic is different from that of the biologist's. What is the social
function of Negro blood and Negro ancestry - the pillars of the planters'
Negro? The heterogeneity in the definition of a Negro in various slave states
suggests that the Negro race functioned as a plantocratic mode of augmenting
( 2 )
and maintaining the supply of labour . It was the need to deprive agents of
the right to own their labour and land which generated the South's racial
classification. The classification,then.is not racial but economic. The
Negroes who by various means acquired property in land and slaves, were
Hpvilirnated mulattoes or coloureds. Genovese has recorded that George
Fitzhugh, a deeply committed Southern "racist", saw slavery's salvation
(3)in a "disguised slavery" for non-slaveholding "whites"' . But "whites"
were slaves if we construe the possession of \  ~  white blood a
8 or 1 o ------
qualification for membership of the white race, and the fact of men of 100% 1
1) This approximates to the criticism made by the "lumpers" of the 
"splitters" attempt to specify a race. Cf. Leonard Lieberman, ibid, 
pp. 570-571.
2) For an example of the problem of legally defining a Negro in slave 
society see D. B. Davis op. cit. pp. 278-279. But for original 
documentation of the legal heterogeneity, see John Hope Franklin and 
Isidore Starr (eds.) The Negro in Twentieth Century America (Vintage 
Books, New York 1967) pp. 4-13. In Kentucky, 1/16 Negro blood 
qualified as Negro; in Alabama, in 1927, any amount; similarly in 
Arkansas 1910 "any Negro blood whatsoever"; in Florida in 1927, 1/8 
or more qualified as Negro.
3) Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made, op. cit. p. 209.
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'Negro blooif'being slaveholders^ means that "blacks" did enslave "whites".\t |i
If these whites are not perceived as whites by historians and sociologists today,
then.it is a clear case of the planters' definition of the situation being still
dominant. In our view, then, men are not racially defined and classified
because of human colour consciousness. European travellers and explorers
may have been impressed by the striking contrasts of the African's colour
and hair texture, but this is crucially different from sustained taxonomic
undertakings, A theory of rtce is the product of an empiricist-positivist
interpretation of acute economic cleavages and labour exploitation. This would
explain its shifting and controversial nature as well as its easy transformation
( 2 )
into racial determinism and race supremacy . Lieberman argues
persuasively that the debate over the existence of races between the "lumpers"
and the "splitters" has been strongly influenced by particular commitments to 
(3)egalitarianism . Significantly, the "three major races of the world"
1) Cf. Eugene Genovese, "The Slave States of North America" in David 
W. Cohen and Jack P. Greene (eds.) Neither Slave nor Free (The 
John Hopkins University Press, London 1972), pp. 267-271.
2) The first "scientific" treatise on race, Carl von Linneaus, Systema 
Naturae (1735), posited an association between race and behavioural 
characteristics. Von Linnaeus divided homo sapiens into four variants: 
American ("reddish, choleric, erect"); European ("White, ruddy, 
muscular"); Asiatic ("yellow, melancholic, inflexible"); and African 
("black, phlegmatic, indulgent"). Cited in Ixmis Snyder (ed .) The Idea 
of Racialism; its History and Meaning, (Van Nostrand Rienhold Company, 
New York, 1962) p. 11. Obviously there is a considerable amount of 
sociological observation in Linnaeus' classification and this tradition still 
continues among "biologists". Thus a recent study devotes considerable 
resources to demonstrating the existence and genetic inferiority of 
"Negrids" to "Europlds". John R. Baker, Race (0. U. P ., London 1974) 
rSrt 4. Bilker's sociology emerges sporadically. We are told: "The 
contributions of Negrids to the world of learning have, on the whole, been 
disappointing despite all improvements in facilities for their education" 
p. 503. Baker resolves to settle "the ethnic problem" by selecting "a 
technical term that will cover the whole subject of equality or inequality 
among the ethnic taxa of man", p. 6.
3) In his view: "The race concept itself developed in a dialectic that has been 
controlled largely by the same structural forces that generated the 
growth of racist and cqualltarian Ideology" op. cit. pp. 582-583. Biologists 
were attempting to support or refute particular positions on equality in 
developing the concept of race whose potential was later used to Justify 
European imperialism.
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"correspond to a pattern of continental economic differentiation. Similarly,
the forty different "racial types" elicited from respondents in a Bahian village
testify to the use of colour as an economic index^. It is not that 'race' and
'class’ coincide. Rather, the perception of racial characterics and racial
classifications reflect a rejection of a class conceptualisation of agents'
positions in the capitalist mode of production.
By treating the theory of race itself as a problem,we are able to
perceive that Degler's escape hatch is an economic institution (more developed
on Brazilian plantations) which caused certain agents to be defined as hybrids
and others (on North American plantations) either "white" or "black".
However, it is incorrect to say that North American slave society was polarised
into "blacks" and "whites". Such a racial theory existed and still does, but
the South had a class structure; there were poor whites, white planters, Negroes,
and free Negroes. There was no "racial polarisation" of American slave
society. legally and economically, the South was divided into slaveholders
and slaves. This legal division was racially arbitrary and there was no
correspondence between 'class’ and 'race' since Negroes too were allowed to
hold slaves. Degler takes race for granted and hence his unexplained notions
of racial patterns, racial stratification and racial polarisation. This general
incoherence leads him into contradicting the very basis of the mulatto escape
hatch. "Mulatto", he asserts, has "no social or legal significance . . .  in the
( 2 )
United States racial pattern" . Why then is the place of the mulatto, in both 
Brazil and the United States, the key to the understanding of their different 
"race relations"?
It is interesting to note that while Marvin Harris discerned the
(3)poli< i - 1 content and context of the theory of race' , Degler did not.
On the contrary, he suggests that "awareness of racial differences is 1
1) See Marvin Harris, op. cit. p. 58.
2) ibid. p. 102.
3) "All racial identity scientifically speaking is ambiguous. Whenever 
certainty is expressed on this subject, we can be confident that society 
has manufactured a social lie in order to help one of its segments take 
advantage of another". Marvin Harris, op. cit. p. 56.
inherent in m an "^ . Degler cannot pose the question under what economic
and social conditions does a physical difference become a racial difference.
Yet Harris' hypo-descent thesis is remarkably similar to the mulatto escape
hatch. Harris asserts that in Latin America as a whole, during slavery,
racial hybrids were not forced back into the Negro slave group because of the
absence of a system of "descent rule" which made white and black ancestry
synonymous with master and slave positions respectively. In Brazil,
( 2 )
mulattoes were slaveowners also . After Emancipation, mixed-bloods" 
were not automatically relegated to a "subordinate caste" and racial identities 
remained ambiguous. On the other hand, "hypo-descent" defined North 
American slavery resulting in a bi-racial pattern of stratification in which 
"whites" and "blacks" are rigidly defined and hierarchically ordinated. Today, 
this polarised pattern prevails in North America as opposed to I^ atin America, 
where a multi-racial pattern of stratification exists based on complex and fluid 
definitions. Harris' explanation of the absence of "descent rule" in Latin America 
(the converse of IXgler's mulatto escape-hatch ) diverged considerably from 
Degler's who emphasised the widespread misccgentatton in Brazil and "the 
consequent softening of racial animosity" which resulted in a benign treatment 
of mixed offspring. Against this, Harris cited evidence of Portuguese masters 
selling their mulatto children into slavery and stressed demographic and 
economic exigencies such as the need for skilled and semi-skilled labour and 
the absence of a Portuguese yeomanry to provide foodstuffs to the sugar 
plantations. But their common argument Is that the historical patterns of 
"race relations" in Brazil arc different from those of North America. Harris 
has the merit of precciving that "it is one’ s class and not one's race which 1
1) Carl Degler, Neither Black Nor White, op. cit. p. 208.
2) The same can be said of the U.S. Harris' argument is weakened 
considerably by the evidence of slave-owning "people of colour" in North 
America as well as "black" artisans and skilled workers. See John 
Russell, 'Hie Free Negro in Virginia 1619-1865 (John Hopkins, University 
Press, Baltimore 1913). John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro - North 
Carolina (Univ. of N. Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1943). E. Franklin 
Fazier, The Negro In the United States (MacMillan, N. Y. 1949). Richard 
Wade, Slavery In the Cities: the South 1820-1860 (Oxford Univ. Press,
N. Y. 1964). Eugene Genovese, "The Slave States" in David W. Cohen 
and Jack P. Greene (eds.) op. cit. pp. 258-277.
determines the adoption o f subordinate and superordinate attitudes between 
specific individuals in face to face situations"^. Harris confuses "class" 
and "status" and obviously, for him,"race relations" refer to social intercourse 
lietween races. But since, by Harris' own admission, Brazil’ s races are 
symbolic, ambiguous, innumerable and inconsistent,"race relations" cannot 
be said to exist in Brazil.
What then of the alleged continental differences in the patterns of
"race relations"? This is first and foremost a problem of theoretical approach,
for a'ilifference"is an observation pregnant with theoretical presuppositions.
Theorists of comparative "race relations" are trapped in a circle of
interminable comparison for failing to recognise that the differences are in
their theories. No other work on slavery and "race relations" corroborates
this as convincingly as Degler's "Neither Black nor White;' for it catalogues
a plethora of differences and similarities between American and Brazilian
"race relations". As Degler confessed "1 found the nuances of race relations
in Brazil so complex and yet so simple,so different from,and so similar to^
(2 )
those in the United States . . .  . What remains an enigma is Degler's
contention that there are deep contrasts between Brazilian and North American 
"race relations" and what makes his work speculative and Inconclusive is the 
absence of criteria of significant differences. For scientific investigations 
cannot be the extradicting of differences or similarities without clarifying 
the theoretical framework underlying this extradiction. Degler could not 
undertake such a project of theoretical specification for his methodology is 
idealist. "Race consciousness" defines his object of study. The result is a 
simple race relations continuum comprising the slave and post-emancipation 
periods within which the history of two continents is examined. Since this 1
1) Marvin Harris, op. cit. p. 61.
2) Carl Degler, Neither Black Nor White, op. cit. p. XX For observations 
on similar patterns of "race prejudice" and "racial discrimination" in 
Brazil as in North America, see Anani DzidZienyo, op. cit. Sec also 
Thomas Skidmore, Black Into White: Race and Nationality In Brazilian 
Thought (0. U. P ., New York 1974) pp. 173-218, for an excellent analysis 
of Brazil's 'whitening' policy. The notable works on the situation of 
"blacks" in Brazil have repudiated the popular and official Brazilian 
picture of good "race relations". See especially Octavio lanni "Research 
on Race Relations in Brazil" in Magnus Morner (ed .) Race and Class in 
Ijitin America (Columbia University Press, New York 1970).
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continuum disintegrates as soon as an attempt is made to specify "race 
relations", "the slave past" remains a historical mystery and post-emancipation 
"race relations" a vague referent of such varied phenomena as; 19th century 
acts of segregation, racial inequalities, attitudes of contempt for the Negro, 
race riots, and the general economic and social condition of "blacks". Since 
the investigation of any one of these phenomena would require a distinct 
conceptual scheme, "comparative race relations" must lie a theoretical 
impossibility.
The locating of the ultimate source of this theoretical sterility is not 
an easy matter. We could say that this is the consequence of the idealism 
of Freyre, Tannenbaum and their intellectual heirs. On the other hand, are 
these scholars themselves mesmerised by race consciousness and physical 
differences, or are they scions of bourgeois historiography with its in-built 
fascination for culture and rejection of "modes of production"? The 
answer is, in all probability, much more simple. The historical explanation 
ofTace relations?'is but an intrapolation of the sociology of "race relations" 
whose inadequacies, therefore, must reappear.
CHAPTER V
THE PROBLEMS OF STATUS AND RACIAL 
STRATIFICATION
The race relations perspective has discovered the following facts, 
facts which are regarded as problems of*race relations":
(a) expressions of a "them" and "us" awareness based on 
apparent colour differences^ .
(b) an ab normal frequency of demeaning responses to 
all "blacks" by all "whites", and
(c) socially segregative behaviour of "whites" towards
"blacks",even when economic criteria of status parity
. J 2 )arc satisfied
Sociologists of'Pace relation ¡fare concerned to explain these phenomena 1
1) Cf. Lewis C. Copeland, The Negro as a Contrast Conception in 
Edgar Thompson (ed.) Race Relations and the Race Problem, op. 
cit. Ch. 6. H. Hoetink, Slavery and Race Relations in the 
Americas, op. cit., Ch. 6.
2) There arc numerous case studies of these phenomena and a 
wealth of documentation. See, e.g. E. Franklin Frazier's analysis 
of the fears and frustrations of "the black bourgeoisie".
E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie (The Free Press, N. Y. 
1959) pp. 195-238. See also the autobiography of "famous" Negro 
writers where personal recordings of social rejection and 
avoidance are often graphically portrayed, e.g. W.E.B. Du Bois, 
The Souls of Black Folk (A.C. McClurg, Chicago 1903) p. 2.
A striking illustration of avoidance behaviour can be found in 
Ralph Ellison's ironic emphasis on the invisibility of the "black" 
man. Scc'PrologueJInvisible Man (Penguin 1952). This pervasive 
ostracism constitutes a powerful influence on black social 
scientists rejecting a class analysis and identifying with "the 
black race". For it Is in intimate social contact situations that 
racism seems most operative and class most Irrelevant. Social 
exclusion by whites, the impermeability for the Negro of "white 
society" may also be the root of black cultural nationalism and 
separatist political philosophy. What is missing in the literat­
ure is the analysing of social segregation among "blacks". But 
see E. Franklin Frazier, Black Bourgeoisie, op. cit.
within the framework of racial stratification. Rut ultimate responsibility 
is sought in the status configurations in Euro-American society within 
which social integration and segregation are determined, by men's status 
aspirations and life styles^ \
It is necessary, however, to offer some preliminary specification
of stratification in view of the different and often opposed senses in which
it is generally used. Stratification, or social stratification, refers to
patterns of inequality in the allocation and possession of goods and services,
(2 )
prestige and power . Weber used the term social honour to describe 
patterns of prestige allocation which form a system of status stratification. 
Status stratification is, therefore, a specific form of social stratification 
which is a more general conceptualisation of inequality. It suggests the 
existence of status criteria or prestigious attributes differentiating 
individuals as well as status groups based on these differentiations. We 
shall examine this and majortheories of racial stratification in terms of 
their explanatory relevance to the social segregation of "blacks".
The "Marxist" analysis has largely ignored the status order in 
capitalist society in preference to a "class analysis". But if the term 
"actor" is obscurantist because it ignores the class situation of the 
individual referent, so too an exclusive concern with the work situation 
of "blacks" sins on the side of reductionism. Thus "Marxist" works on 
"race relations" have left unexplained or inadequately explained a crucial 
area of the experiences of ’blacks", i.e . social rejection by "whites" 
including the multiplicity of humiliations with which they - especially "black" 
middle and upper income categories - are confronted. Baran's and 
£ :-.y's brief discussion of status may be read as asserting that American
1) Weber argued: 'With some oversimplification, one might say that
"classes" are stratified according to their relations to the production 
and acquisition of goods, whereas "status groups" are stratified 
according to the principles of their consumption of goods as 
represented by special "styles of life". Max Weber, Class, Status 
and Party In Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. ). From Max 
Weber (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London 1961) p. 193.
Ibid. p. 180.2 )
society is characterised by an increasingly complex, fluid and differentiated
status order determined by income disparities and occupational hierarchies^.
It manifests itself in the segregative and integrative peculiarities of
(2)
social intercourse observable in American society . Social intimacy, 
the polar opposite of social segregation, reaches its zenith when individuals' 
reciprocal evaluations of social prestige are congruent. Conversely, the 
systematic social isolation of a group may be regarded as attempts by 
incumbents of "high" status to restrict the entry to their group of persons 
who do not share their status virtues. The questions are however, why do 
Negroes incur a status demotion for those "whites" who interact intimately 
with them and is this demotion merely stratificatory?
In order to deal with these questions, we will follow through from 
a discussion of Max Weber's "status stratification", since most stratification 
theories derive from him and, moreover, it was he who originally 
propounded behaviourialconnotations existing in "status". For Weber, class, 
status and political organisation were often contiguous, but essentially 
parallel and reciprocal,even contrarily reciprocal,facets of power. Class 
was economically determined, however, whilst status reflected positive or 
negative social estimation of honour. The status system and status groups 
constitute not a polarisation of society but rather a gradation of positions 
determined by a variety of symbols to which prestige is attached. In his 
own words: "In contrast to classes status groups are normally communities. 
They are, however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the purely 1
1) For Baran and Sweezy "In such a social structure individuals tend 
to see themselves in terms of the 'status hierarchy' and to be 
motivated by ambitions to move up and fears of moving down", 
op. cit. p. 259. See also James Baldwin for an almost identical 
analysis of the Negro's "status". Nobody Knows My Name (Dial: 
New York 1969) p. 133.
2) See also Vance Packard who contends "The majority of Americans 
rate acquaintances and are themselves being rated In turn . . .  they 
believe that some people rate somewhere above them that some 
others rate somewhere below them and that still others seem to 
rate close enough to their own level to permit them to explore
the possibility of getting to know them socially without fear of 
being snubbed or appearing to downgrade themselves". Ilie Status 
Seekers (David McKay Company Inc., New York 1959) p. 6.
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economically determined 'class situation' we wish to designate as 'status 
situation' every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined 
by specific positive or negative social estimation of honour" ^ \  Weber 
was concerned to demonstrate the autonomy of the status system in relation 
to the economic and political orders. Mere economic power or wealth, 
he argued, was no guarantee of social honour and indeed the opposite has 
often been the case' . The economic nature and independence ofstatus’ 
were manifested by the fact that individuals at the same economic level 
do not necessarily establish social affiliations apart from those functional 
to business. In Weber's view, this reflected an underlying system of 
prestige based on symbolic possessions and exhibited by certain 'life ­
styles' as well as occupational peculiarities. The link he posited between 
behaviour and status is brought out clearly in this passage: "In content, 
status honour is normally expressed by the fact that above all a specific 
style of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle.
Linked with this expectation are restrictions on 'social' intercourse 
(that is, intercourse which is not subservient to economic or any other 
of business's 'functional' purposes). These restrictions may confine normal
marriages to within the status circles and may lead to complete
(3)endogamous closure"' Hie last point suggests that not only would 
members of privileged status groups ("whites") react sharply to incursions 
by pariahs and the nouvenux riches (economically mobile "blacks"),but that 
status groups can take an extreme development into a caste system of 
super ordination and subordination.
For Weber, status was a crucial element in not only social 
inte mrse but In economic and political action, class interests and class
struggles. For in all these situations the actor's estimation of honour had
(4)a determining role' Weber was sceptical of "class interests" unless 1
1) Max Weber in Mans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) op. cit. pp. 186-187.
2) ibid. pp. 187 and 192.
3) Ibid. pp. 187-188.
4) Status, in Weber's view, even impinged on the operation of the 
market, ibid. pp. 185, 192-4.
these were understood as ah empirically verifiable direction of n< ion 
with probable links with the class situation of a 'certain average' of people. 
Moreover, status-group affiliation can take precedence over class 
consciousness and class formation if certain intellectual and economic con­
ditions prevailed. In brief, men are (or potentially) status maximisers 
measured in terms of their drive for power and social honour and expressed 
primarily through their economic activities.
We turn now to a criticism of Weber's and Weberian theories of 
status stratification as applied to the social rejection and isolation of 
"blacks" by "whites".
Weber's theory of stratification has often been transformed into a
general theory of society by an even stricter demarcation of class,
status and power. W.G. Runciman, for example, sees it as such, since
it was 'self-evident' that inequalities in all societies are three dimensional,
institutionalised and capable of being ranked^. However, contrary to
Runciman's assertion, it is not at all obvious that inequalities of class, status
and power need not always coincide. For this view needs considerable
elucidation, including a specification of class, status and power. The
viability of stratification, or Weber's "tripartite distinction of inequality",
as a theory of society remains limited for another reason. "Stratification"
describes patterns of inequality consequential to and existing within class 
(2 )
polarisation . For example, within the bourgeoisie, rentiers, financiers, 
industrialists and landowners may be differentially placed vis-a-vis the 1
1) See W.G. Runciman "Class, Status and Power?" in J.A. Jackson,
(ed .) Social Stratification (Cambridge Univ. Press, London 1968) 
pp. 28-29. Runciman, as is the wont of stratification theorists, 
suggests that Marx was a student of stratification. For a cogent 
critique of this view, see James Stolzman and Herbert Garnberg 
"Marxist Class Analysis Versus Stratification Analysis as General 
Approaches to Social Inequality" in Berkley Journal of Sociology 
Vol. XV11I 1973-4, pp. 106-125.
2) Prof. Zygmunt Jordan's observation is here relevant " . . .  Class­
determining properties are classificatory and comparative concepts, 
that is, they do not signify a property which an object may have to
a greater or lesser degree but one it either has or has not got at 
a ll". Z. Jordan (ed .) Karl Marx (T. Nelson & Sons l>td., London 
1971)p. 23.
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State or a prestige system. Similarly, levels of consumption differ 
among the working class and this results in different status configurations 
among them, although their relationship to the means of production is 
necessarily uniform. Stratification theory cannot lie a theory of society.
For societies are not only stratified; they are divided fundamentally 
according to individuals' relation to the means of production. Ira Katznel son's 
attempt to regard race as "a special case of stratification" fails for 
ignoring this. Rven so, he did not adhere to Weber's schema in that he 
omitted status stratification and "class" is not analysed,but presented as 
an empirical,institutionalist category^.
However, in itself Weber's approach to status contains thi'ee major 
inadequacies. Firstly, his use of 'status' is more taxonomic than 
explanatory serving to delineate situations rather than demonstrate 
theoretical connections. We are not told why status should transcend class 
alignments and be incongruent with economic behaviour. This is related 
to an arbitrary separation of inextricably entwined phenomena which 
creates an appearnace of intellectual rigour and originality but 
conceals a laborious attempt to de-emphasise economics in society. Der­
ivatively, Weber made an artificial distinction between ownership, the production, 
acquisition and the consumption of goods. Thus he failed to demonstrate 
that status criteria and evaluation are manifestations of socio-economic 
disparities and that their sources are to lie sought in the organisation 
of economic life. Styles of life arc not mere occupational residues; nor 
do they originate from status as opposed to income groups.
Secondly, the monopoly of high culture and conventions by a 
status group can be explained with reference lo a classlficatory rather
1) See Ira Katznelson, op. clt. p. 17.
2) Hut Katznelson's difficulty is understandable given Weber's inadequacies. 
For Welier's writings on class and status are eminently un-systematic. 
Different definitions of the same terms are offered so that conceptual rigor 
disappears and we are never told how life styles (status) and life-chances 
(class) are related, but status und class consciousness.
/
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do they originate from status as opposed to income groups.
Secondly, the monopoly of high culture and conventions by a 
status group can be explained with reference to a classlficatory rather 1
1) See Ira Katznelson, op. cit. p. 17.
2) but Katznelson's difficulty is understandable given Weber's inadequacies. 
For Weber's writings on class and status are eminently un-systematic. 
Different definitions of the same terms are offered so that conceptual rigor 
disappears and we are never told how life styles (status) and life-chances 
(class) are related, but status and class consciousness.
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than a distributive notion of c lassa i For the power to monopolise status
symbols relates not to a drive for power or social honour but to
ownership of the means of production. Thus the symbolic elements which
Weber stressed, the feudal-aristocratic sub-cultural residues which
command social esteem out of proportion to their economic utility do not
reflect any autonomy of status stratification. Rather, their existence
is indicative of ownership of the means of production, generally land,and
that the bearers are beneficiaries of unearned income. Thus the social
esteem attached to them is not out of proportion to their economic utility.
For there are all sorts of material rewards, e.g., an improvement in
employment prospects, accruing from being deferential to, or knowing the
plumed and titled. These residues are therefore not ancestral symbols
but indices of current ownership of the means of production. Finally,
Weber's specification of the relationship between class and status is
unsatisfactory. His concept of class is based on the ownership of virtually
( 2 )
any marketable goods or services . This makes it indistinguishable from 
the concept of status. The resulting confusion reaches mammoth proportions 
in the literature on stratification where "middle class" remains a theoretical 
no man's land, but yet extremely popular in social surveys.
It is our view, that, in the light of these déficiences, theories of 
status stratification in the Weberian tradition have to be seriously revamped 1
1) See Z. Jordan, "Now, it is clear on the other hand that when we 
deal with classes in the distributive sense, that is, when a property 
is predicated of members of a class taken individually, we can 
easily order them hierarchically, for we are ordering individuals
a continuum according to a characteristic capable of 
greiation (such as education, size of income or prestige). Classes 
in the collective sense, however, cannot be ordered that way for 
the simple reason that the class determining properties are 
ciassificatory and not comparative concepts, that is, they do not 
signify a property which an object may have to a lesser or greater 
degree but one that it either has or has not got at all", op. cit. 
p. 23.
2) For Weber, " . . .  the various controls over consumer goods, means
of production, assets resources and skills each constitutes a particular 
class situation... In between are the various middle classes 
(Mittclstandsklassen), which make a living from their property or 
their acquired skills" Fconomy and Society, Vol. 3. (Bedmtnster Press, 
New York 1968) pp. 302-303.
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in order to be useful to the explanation of socially segregative behaviour towards
"blacks". Hubert Blalock rightly cautions Weberian status theoreticians, but
himself treads a knife-edge of ambivalence: "Sociologists may well tend
to over-estimate the degree to which individuals are primarily motivated
by considerations of status and power. Having generalised the notion of
"economic man" to that of "status seeking man", we may have minimised
the importance of other types of goals, with the inherent danger of assuming
that status and economic interests constitute a single "master motive" in
terms of which all forms of behaviour are to be explained. But while status
goals may not be all-important,they possess a characteristic that makes
their potential explanatory power considerable; they often can be satisfied by
a very limited number of alternative m eans''^. Blalock is here unkind to
his readers in not specifying these "other types of goals" and inconsistent
in finally admitting to "the considerable power of status goals". We shall
see that sociologists have not heeded Blalock's caution.in consequence of
which,explanations of the social and rejection of "blacks" remain trapped
within Weberian ambiguities and inconsistencies.
Weber posited that occupations and their attendant life-styles contain
important status implications. An eminent contemporary sociologist went
further and made occupational hierarchisation both a functional prerequisite
of all complex economies and,together with the kinship system,the basis of
( 2 )
stratific-bo». in American society . For Parsons, however, a
conspicuous exception to the mandates of kinship and occupation was
"ethnicity" which "tends to preserve relatively independent pyramids in the
(3)more general system"' .  One of the ways in which ethnicity modifies
the g aiystem of stratification is through "discrimination" which is
Parsons’ terms for "the non-acceptance of ethnic members in certain
(4)
statuses for which they are otherwise qualified . . . "  . I n  so far as 
the ethnic group possesses its peculiar sub-systems of values and culture,
1) Hubert Blalock, 
op. clt. p. 39.
Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations,
2) Talcott Parsons "Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social 
Stratification" In Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Upset (eds. ) op. clt.
3) Ibid, p. 118.
4) Ibid, p. 119.
ethnicity significantly affects the main class system. However, Parsons
interchangeably and thus confusedly uses social stratification, status and
class structure. Moreover, he does not document his assertion that
Negroes by virtue of their separate value system and culture possess a
. separate stratificatory pyramid. His use of "discrimination" to explain
the social segregation of the Negro is obviously clumsy, and "otherwise
qualified" betrays his misunderstanding of the whole problem of status
qualifications. Parsons' remarks on the "ethnic problem" and "the
negro case" are tangenital to his general analysis of social stratification.
He was not addressing himself directly to the problem of racial
stratification, which is a questionable omission in a discussion of the
American system of stratification.
For Parsons, American society conformed to an ideal type pattern
variable - univeralistic-achievement - which "gives first place to unit
qualities and performances which have adaptive functions for the system"
Rut the system's predilection for the universal!sation of the opportunity
structure extended only to the economic and class orders, for, in Parsons'
( 2 )
view, the status order is ascriptively based . By ascription-standards,
are allocated to persons on the basis of culturally assigned
identities. Thus, if persons are defined as being of a certain sex or race,
they will, because of this have more or less opportunities. Where
achievement or performance standards are employed, however, persons
will have varying opportunities and rewards allocated to them on the
basis of the imputed degree of correspondence between what they do and
a certain norm or standard. Alvin Gouldner has criticised, if not
iii,ui .¿red, Parsons'ascription-achievement dichotomy. He argued that
it obscures the phenomenon of rewards being allocated on the basis of
(4)
achievements which themselves depended upon prior ascription . 1
1) ibid, p. 112.
2) Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils et al. (eds.) Theories of Society 
(The Free Press, New York 1965), p. 257.
Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (Basic 
Book Inc. New York 1970)pp. 322-323.
3)
Developing on this insight we would posit that an individual's class 
position is ascribed. He is born into a system of social relations which 
determine his condition as a non-owner, or owner of the means of 
production. 'Iliis condition significantly affects his subsequent 
achievements in terms of access to economic and cultural resources as 
well as how he will be rewarded. Moreover, income in the form of 
profit may be classified within the mechanisms of both achievement and ascrip­
tion. In this sense,the two systems merge or rather,ascriptive mechanisms 
determine both modes of allocating rewards. Parsons' assertion that the 
economic and class orders tend to lx; universalistic and achievement- 
oriented,in contrast to the status order, is questionable for another reason.
It severs the links between class and status systems. Status criteria and 
life-styles are inseparable from economic classes and the material and 
social conditions of a given socio-economic formation. Parsons' emphasis 
on occupations is in the right direction. Yet, it too is theoretically 
threadbare, for he fails to pose the question why occupations are the source 
of social gradations^ .
Parsons' conception of ascription has been uncritically accepted and,
■ic w p  have seen,widely used by race theorists. What they have ignored 
is that since it is the cultural values within the social system which 
determine what is an ascriptive characteristic, it follows that skin 
colour is intrinsically neutral; Its social significance is Imputed by the 
social system. "Blacks" therefore are not of a lower status than whites
because they are black-skinned. Tints there must be some other condition
«
which determines the values and hence their being low-status. Indeed, 
v. j 11 see that this condition Is an economic one entirely removed from 
ideas of racial supremacy. 1
1) This failure is related to Parsons' general reluctance to discuss the 
concept of social relations of production as opposed to sporadic 
sorties into Marshall's political economy. A parallel can be found 
in Max Weber's remark, "As to the general economic conditions 
making for the predominance of stratification by "status", only 
very little can be said". Tills borders on scientific Irresponsibility.
Max Weber, in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds .) op. cit. 
p. 193.
The indifference to capitalist relations of production which 
characterises Parsons' structural functionalism appears responsible 
for the inadequacy of his explanation of status stratification "in the Negro 
case". Rut, on the other hand, other scholars have historicised the 
problem by positing a connection between the slave past and status 
stratification which has resulted in a racially stratified society. This is 
exemplified by the frequently met references to "the slave past" as to an 
historic "black box". We may take as an illustration C. R. Boxer's oft-quoted 
remark: " . . .  one race cannot systematically enslave members of another 
on a large scale for over three centuries without acquiring a conscious 
or unconscious feeling of superiority” ^ .  This invites at least three 
criticisms. Firstly, the notion that "the white race" enslaved "the black 
race" is a hyperbole of vastly ahistorical connotations. For it was but a 
tiny minority of "the white race" which enslaved - and generally in collusion 
with a minority of - members of "the black race". Boxer's formulation 
obscures the class differentiations anil responsibilities involved in the 
so-called European conquest and betrays a facile conspiratorial 
suggestiveness. Apart from this, his uncritical use of "race" ignores the 
vast literature and controversy surrounding its conceptual validity.
Secondly, if his remark is meant to explain the source of the low status 
of the Negro in contemporary society, then it is a non-sequitur. For is it 
impossible for the white race to acquire feelings of moral inferiority and 1
1) C. R. Boxer, op. cit. p. 56. Harold Baron is more revealing on 
"status" but he only raises the question: "Historically, blacks 
have been relegated to the bottom of the status ladder. Slavery 
soon defined a class to which only persons of African ancestry 
belonged". Harold Baron in Louis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt 
op. cit. p. 164. For similar unspecified remarks on the "slave 
past" and "status" see E. Rose and N. Deakin, op. cit. p. 48.
Daniel P. Moynihan in The Moynihan Report and the Politics of 
Controversy, eds. Lee Rainwater and W . L. Yancey (M. I. T. 
Cambridge 1967) p. 61. H. Blalock op. cit. Ch. 2. Max Weber 
in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) op. cit. p. 177. A high 
point of theoretical confusion is reached in: "Certain traits are 
present everywhere but more developed in the Negro as a consequence 
of his slavery background and his subordinate caste status also have 
been conducive to a high Negro crime rate". Arnold Rose "H ie 
Negro in America, the Condensed Version of un American Dilemma" 
(Harper and Row, New York 1964) p. 306.
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regret instead of superiority? Finally, it distorts Hie theoretical relation
between slavery and the constituting of race theory.
It is more plausible that the needs, duration and intensity of slave-
labour exploitation created a Negro race onto which was grafted deterministic
Darwinist associations^ . Robert Blauner put the matter bluntly: "It was
European conquest and colonial wardship that created the "Indian", an
identity irrelevant to men who lived their lives as Crow, Sioux or Iroquois.
And as a result of slavery the "Negro race" emerged from the heterogeneity
( 2 )
of African ethnicity" . More precisely, the designation Negro was applied
to labourers according to the demand for slave labour and thus "whites" too
became slaves, depending on the particular conception of "ancestry". The
point here is that ancestry or the past is always derived from, i.e . defined
with reference to, current economic and social conditions. This is as
relevant to slave plantations as to conditions of distribution in the capitalist
( 3 )mode of production ,  For to trace a group's genealogy presupposes the 
existence of criteria or exigencies which demarcate the group. Thus the "ancestry" 
oi a group is part of it being constituted. The contemporary’Negro", then, 
is an economic and social classification of an agent's location within the 
conditions of distribution in the capitalist mode of production, and "Negro 
ancestry" a consequence of this classification. 1
1) Cf. P. D. Curtin, 'Hie Image of Africa, British Ideas and Action, 
1780-1850 (The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1964),
Ch. 2. P. L. van den Rcrghe, op. cit. pp. 11-18.
2) Robert Blauner, op. cit. p. 13.
3) We shall preliminarily define a capitalist mode of production as 
characterised by relations of commodity exchange. labourers 
exchange their commodity labour power with non-labourers, i.e ., 
the owners of the means of production in return for a sum of 
goods which labour has produced as commodities. These relations 
contain processes of the extraction of surplus value and the 
accumulation of capital necessary for their reproduction. See the 
following chapter for further comments on the concept of the 
capitalist mode of production.
This crucial point is ignored by sociologists and historians 
who identify history, or ancestry, as the cause of the low status 
of "blacks". They treat ancestry as an historical fact rather than the 
result of a definite theoretical practice. They are thus unable to 
perceive that the lineage between the slaves and the Negro today is 
not racial, but theoretical. It is an effect of a particular conception 
of ancestry as based on certain phenotypical traits, i .e . , the 
criteria which the planters had used to augment their labour supply^ \  
Unable to think out the problem of the Negro's status as a theoretical 
problem, social scientists have appealed to history, seeing in the 
Negro's degraded ancestry the source of his low status today. They 
thereby create the notion of the slaves being the ancestors of "blacks" 
and the slaveholders the ancestors of "whites". It has not been 
observed that this conception is as arbitrary as the definition of a 
Negro offered by the various slave States. We shall elucidate this 
point. A conception of lineage is intrinsic to the concept of ancestry 
and indeed, of any historical perspective. 'ITius, an historian could 
legitimately consider African slaves as the ancestors of "whites" by 
siinplv modifying the boundaries of lineage. Such a modification would 
lx; less contrary to the conclusions of geneticists on "race". "Race" 
should thus be seen not as a "social lie", or an unscientific belief 
which strangely persists among actors, but the result of a definite 
(historical) theoretical perspective which attempts to impart to an 
economic classification ("whites" or "blacks") an element of political 
continuity and cohesiveness. 1
1) If "blacks" today are an economic categorisation with obvious 
status connotations, then.any concern with the refurbishing 
of the image of the Negro in "History" and "Culture" is 
naive, and Idealist. Thus Harold Cruse combines a denunciation 
of the relevance of Marxism to the black situation with a 
powerful emphasis on cultural regeneration. The Crisis of 
the Negro Intellectual (Morrow, New York, 1967).
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The failure to appreciate the nature of the "ancestral" aspect of
status stratification has resulted in not only vague allusions to slavery
but postulates of a separate "ethnic stratification" and an emphasis on
colour in discussing the social status of the Negro. 'Hie consensus
among sociologists appears to be that "blackness" is, for historical
reasons, a salient badge of low status, if not responsible for the general
condition of "blacks" in advanced capitalist soc ieties^ . John Rex linked
the stratificatory significance of colour to the colonial past: "Colour is
taken as the indication that a man is only entitled to colonial status and
this means that he has to be placed outside the normal stratification 
(2)
system" . As late as 1969, in their massive study of "British race
relations", E.J. Rose and N. Deakin made colour a fundamental factor:
"We therefore took the decision to concentrate on the factor of colour in most
of the commissioned research. Our discussions with social scientists who
agreed to undertake research for us convinced us that we must break
away from the focus of an immigrant host relationship and turn instead
to a study of a relationship l>etween groups . . .  distinguished by the 
(3)factor of colour"' \ Robert Blauner’s argumentation is also an example of
this tendency: "A continuing racist theme, with powerful social structural
consequences, has served to consolidate rather than to erase the distinctive
experience of the past. There is not other lower class group in America's
pluralistic society that has met in the past or meets in the present the
systematic barriers of categorical expulsion, blockage anil discrimination
(4)
based on race and colour" . We may voice some objections to this 1
1) See H. Blalock, op. cit. Ch. 2. E.C. Hughes "Dilemmas and 
Contradictions of Status", in L. Coser and B. Rosenberg (eds.)
Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings (McMillan, London 1964).
For an exhaustive exploration on the colour theme in social Interaction 
see Daedulus, Spring Edition 1967. A review of the contributions could 
constitute a thesis in itself. Suffice to say here that among such 
eminent sociologists as Edward Shils, Roger Bastide and F. Fernandes, 
only David Lowenthal managed to demonstrate the purely indexlcal 
nature of colour.
2) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. cit. p. 108.
3) E. Rose and N. Deakin e ta l., op. cit. pp. 5-6.
4) Robert Blauner "Black Culture Myth or Reality", in David 0. Bromley
and Charles F. Longlno, Jr., op. cit., p. 588. Ira Katznelson modifies 
the notion of racial exploitation somewhat by uruging "colour has been a 
mark of oppression related to, yet quite independent of, class" op. cit. p. 6. 
Blauner merely asserts racial exploitation and is silent on Its relationship 
to "class".
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formulation, for is it that the racist theme has social structural consequences
or that the social structure nurtures racism? In either case,what is social
structure? What are these distinctive experiences of the past that could
have been erased and how systematic are the "barriers" in the light of
evidence of faster generational mobility among "blacks" compared to some
other ethnics?^. The reference to America as'k pluralistic society" is
eclectic and rhetorical in so far as the writer nowhere spells out what is
a pluralistic society. Blauner's view of colour lieing the basis of
discrimination bears a similarity to Talcott Parsons' analysis of colour
as a symbolic phenomenon, whose historic meanings need not necessarily
( 2 )
be that of a stigma . Parsons correctly perceived that colour is an
unambiguous index of group membership but in stressing its "symbolic
nature','he shifted the emphasis away from the economic underpinnings of
the meanings attached to colour. Against both Blauner and Parsons, we
would argue that black skin merely informs that the given agent belongs
to an economically backward group and is, in all probability, himself
economically inferior. But black skin does not have the same
"symbolic" significance for all whites. Hence the degree of status
relegation and avoidance depend on the social position of the given white.
There is no general significance of colour in human society. This Parsons
overlooks because of his separating of cognition from social differentiation.
nius, the "functionalist" analysis of colour remains eminently descriptive
because of the symbolic treatment of an economic index, black skin.
For both Blauner and Parsons obscure the fact that whites
and blacks are particular social metaphors and status designations which
(3)are not based on actual skin colour . These terms identify status 1
1) Cf. Nathan Gla/.er "Blacks and Ethnic Groups: The Difference and 
the Political Difference it Makes" in Nathan I. Huggins et al. (eds). 
op. clt. pp. 203-208.
2) Talcott Parsons, "FullCitizenship for the Negro American" in 
Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Clark (eds.) op.cit.
3) Cf. Pierre Vallieres, White Niggers of America (Monthly Review 
Press, N. Y. 1971) Ch. 2. As is evident too from the existence 
of visually Caucasian Negroes. But see Jean Genets classic: "But 
who are the blacks? and what is their colour?" The Blacks (Faber, 
Ixmdon 1970).
groupings distinguished by the patterns of consumption. Hence, a 
racial identification may lie understood as a status group designation.
In the words or Immanuel Wallerstein: "Race, finally, is a particular 
form of status group in the contemporary world, the one which indicates 
rank in the world social system" ^ \  It is unfortunate that Wallerstein does 
not spell out whether by race he means a biological category, race 
consciousness or racial expressions. For each meaning has a different 
point of departure. He appears to be arguing that the last four hundred 
years have witnessed an interaction of different types of economic 
organisation within which some were dissolved and from which the 
capitalist mode of production became predominant and universal. These 
processes have generated their peculiar superstructures and the 
theory of race could be interpreted as an intellectual reflection of the 
global division of labour within which the white race commands a relatively 
privileged position. Racial expressions, e.g.,’ I am white', may therefore 
be seen as a manifestation of status group affiliations and hiérarchisation 
which transcend national borders. The concept of race, then, could be 
located in the context of the generalisation of the capitalist mode of 
production and racial expressions conceived as status assertions.
Two important consequences are that firstly, the individual's group 
is not just within his immediate residential or national environment,but all 
those who share a similar pattern of consumption. This is not a concession 
to Weber's separation of the conditions of consumption from production. 
Rather, it's a recognition that in conditions of commodity production or 
consumption according to any other criteria other than need, there will 
lie patterns of economic inequality out of which the social and cultural 
images of agents will develop. Put another way, patterns of consumption 
deriving from a class society ensure that the acquisition and possession 
of goods become a measure of the worth, or social rank of agents. This 
means that classificatory criteria will be attached to material goods over 1
1) Immanuel Wallerstein, Social Conflict in Post-Independence black 
Africa: The Concept of Race and Status Groups Reconsidered 
(McGill University, Reprint Series No. 34). p. 223.
213
and above, for example, moral qualities. Thus the possession and use 
of particular commodities will determine the status position of agents.
In conditions of capitalist commodity production where all goods are 
commodities access to which is determined by an agent's relationship 
to the means of production or location within a stratified system of wage 
labour we may identify two major groups or classes and a multiplicity of ranked 
status groupings. Given the 'reserve army of labour' function of "b lacks"^  
in the mctropoles, they cannot but be a lower status grouping than "whites". 
Secondly, the global nature of this mode of production and the relative 
economic underdevelopment of those regions peopled with "coloured races" also 
determine that "blacks" in the metropoles be of an inferior status 
ranking to "whites". 'Blacks"and'\vhites"are indices of social rank.
In positing the commodity structure of the capitalist social formation 
as the basis of status stratification.it becomes possible to perceive that the 
labour situation of "blacks" force their automatic relegation to the lower 
reaches of the status hierarchy. It is to be admitted that over the last ten 
years a certain percentage of "blacks" has achieved what is loosely called 
middle class status. This should not be expected to elevate the ranking of 
"blacks'/ per se,in the status order. Thus the economic achievements of 
individual "blucks"cunnot ensure fraternisation or social intimacy with 
their white economic peers. For example, a frequently voiced objection to 
having a "coloured person" as a neighbour is that, then, "the wholestreet 
will become black". Tills sentiment would be voiced about a member of 
any lower-income group, given visible indices of his economic situation 
such as style of dress, or speech and behavioural mannerisms. We would,
!' iore,argue that the pattern of social intercourse between "blacks" and 
"whites" is a variant of intercourse between lower and upper status 
groupings. Its conceptualisation as a race (relations) or ethnic problem 
is a peculiarity of the race relations perspective which begins with the 
posing of racial questions to empirical actors. Tlius, within this perspective, 1
1) Reference here is to the level of unemployment and underemployment,
as well as low levels of skills and,crucially,incomc among "blacks".
Sec the following chapter.
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the social avoidance of "blacks" by "whites" is pregnant with race and 
racism. If on the other hand, we abandon the empiricist conception of 
"whites", it becomes possible to discuss the general problem of status 
hierarchies as a condition intrinsic to socio-economic formations based 
on class exploitation, hence in which social rejection is a general condition.
The social ranking of agents in terms of their consumption of 
goods is a general condition of class societies. Thus status stratification 
is not a bourgeois phenomenon specific to the capitalist mode of production, 
or more precisely, the capitalist social formation. Status groupings within 
the working class are an effect of the existence of a stratified labour market.
Two radical political economists go further in arguing that the American 
economy " . . .  needs stratification; therefore, it needs inequitable rules to 
maintain the economic privileges and social equilibrium of the existing 
order. Segmentation in the economy leads to the "freezing" of social distinctions. 
Job career ladders are superficially contrived in order to nurture intra and 
intervocational status preoccupations among workers who have neither job 
satisfaction nor control over w ork "^\  The language here is functionalist 
and even conspiratorial. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that 
status concerns become a preoccupation for workers deprived of control 
over the labour process. What we would emphasise is that since capitalist 
commodity production intrinsically generates a hierarchical system of 
distribution and consumption only its abrogation would make material 
possessions and consumption irrelevant to social Intercourse, black and 
white skin would then lose their raison d'etre as status indices.
We have suggested the existence of a status order with international 
connotations. Yet, this is problematic, for it may be asked: who 
apportions the esteem on which the order is based? Thus Rex argues that 
we consider the super-imposition o f master symbols of legitimation in an 
essentially conflictual social order. In his view, the existence of status systems 
poses questions about the class nature of status characteristics and the 1
1) Raymond S. Franklin and William K. Taab "The Challenge of
Radical Political Economics", Journal of Economic Issues,
Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1974, p. 137.
conflict ramifications of assigning esteem. Rex's focus on the conflict
underlying "status" was aimed at repudiating the normative functionalist
! stress on common value elements as the basis of social ordcr^\ This is
inconsistent with his general emphasis on racist colonial values as the basis of
metropolitan race relations. Moreover, to posit a white value consensus on
blacks is precisely within a functionalist analysis. A radical approach would lie
not to deny the existence of values,or reject the notion of status,but to
specify the relationship to that which is presupposed, namely relations
of production, 'riuis to ask who accords status is to manifest an empiricist
( 2)
stance . For status is not a zero-sum quality possessed by empirical 
actors. Rather, it is a concept used to identify and explain different 
patterns of social intercourse. We deduce a positive or negative 
estimation on the part of actors on the basis of the concepts of intergrative 
and segrative behaviour. Without the concept of status, the social analyst 
would have to fall back on explanations such as: W is avoiding B because 
he does not like him. With the concept of status as a social image derived 
from the exploitation of labour, we may more specifically and correctly 
say that B’s social standing offers W no incentive to social intercourse 
with him and thereby place W's behaviour in a theoretical context.
Rex's reservations about "status" were also part of a reaction 
against the status-seeking man implicit in theories of race and ethnic 
relations. But his model is hardly more objective and it confuses status 
stratification with general social stratification. In his discussion of 
"minorities" and the stratification systems of "relatively stable advanced 
capitalist society',' he enumerated three dimensions,or three main images, 
of the total society - the images of the occupational community-power, and
1) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. cit. 
pp. 92-95.
2) As when Hubert Blalock rejects concepts which cannot l>e measured, 
op. cit. passim.
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educational structures^. Immigrant minorities are said to enter the
stratification system at some fixed point in the lower reaches. Yet the
host stratification system contains an international scale of status
comparisons which exists independently of the economic advances of
immigrant groups: "We have from time to time suggested that the
stratification system of society arises from the subjective picture or
model of social relations which comes to men's minds when they think
of their society as a whole . . .  But equally it is sometimes useful to look
at a wider picture which takes in not merely social relations within the
metropolitan country but within the whole imperial and colonial system . . .
We might if we wish speak of a stratification system which covered not
( 2 )
merely a single metropolitan country but a world-wide empire" . This 
passage,in its allusion to extra-territorial social relations,is commendably 
seminal. However, some objection can be- taken to "the subjective picture" 
being the basis of stratification. For, apart from the methodological difficulties 
involved in grasping what comes to men's minds, there is the problem of 
objective determinants and constraints on perception - a theme left 
unexplored in the Weberian tradition.
Status stratification cannot be conceptualised in isolation from 
class structure. But this is overlooked by those sociologists who are in­
clined to regard "status consciousness" as a determinant of behaviour.
For example, Robin Williams admits: "We are increasingly impressed
with the importance of a sense of threat in intergroup relations and with the
(3 )particular potency of feared loss of social prestige" . We would, however, 
question the notion that the nature of "intergroup relations" is determined 
by a positive or negative social estimation of honour. It is not people's 
perception of their position on the status hierarchy which determines 
their behaviour. For behaviour is not caused by, merely mediated through, 1
1) John Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. clt. pp. 94-95.
2) ibid, p. 105.
3) Robin Williams, op. cit. p. 376.
i
"culturally structured and shared" status sym bols^. Thus, to explain 
"whites" restrictions on social intercourse with "blacks", we need to 
take into account'the former's economic interests and the norms they 
underpin. These goals, or interests, in turn have to be placed in a 
structural (class) context since they generate different patterns of behaviour 
according to whether the actor buys or sells labour power. That is 
to say, fraternising with lower status incumbents ("blacks") induces not 
a status loss but an economic liability depending on class position and 
interests.
With this observation,it becomes easier to understand
the comparative virulence of the objections of working class "whites" to
residential or social intimacy with "blacks". Capitalists are by definition
in mutual competition and their social life is often a function of their
market interests. Workers, as sellers of labour power, find their social
life subordinated to the labour market, llius, if information about and
access to the labour and sex markets depend on "contacts" we can
( 2 )
appreciate why "blacks" are to be avoided . For the white worker,there
is the real possibility of ostracism from the neighbourhood, or community,
and the absence of any economic compensation from "blacks". Iliis holds
good for members of the white working class, but consider the businessman's
situation. As related by Blalock: "A businessman eager to rise in the
Chamber of Commerce may stand to lose a great deal if he invites a Negro 
(3)to his home . . . "  .  This should by no means lie taken for granted. For
it depends on whether the businessman's business caters for a Negro
1) • Cf. John Rex " . . .  those countries which use skin colour as a
means (emphasis ours) of discriminating between men". Race 
Relations In Sociological Theory, op. cit. p. 107.
2) According to Charles E. Silberman "virtually every study of how 
people find Jobs has indicated that the most common method is 
recommendation by a relative or friend, usually one working for 
the same employer; relatively few people finds Jobs through 
newspaper advertisements, and even fewer through government 
or private employment agencies". Crisis In Black and White 
(Vintage Books, New York 1964) p. 243.
H. Blalock, op. cit. p. 66.3 )
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market or not. However, the point is that the white worker's position on
the labour market could be endangered through fraternisation with a
Negro while the "businessman" may stand to gain a great deal^ . We may
therefore expect white workers to be more harshly segregative in their
behaviour towards "blacks" and to verbalise their opposition to
fraternisation and social integration in racist terms depending on the
extent of the distribution of the race perspective. These racist sentiments,
therefore, must be analysed as revealing of the dominant theoretical practice,
and the desire for expressions of disassociation to be in the most absolute
terms. They do not demonstrate the existence of "a race problem", which
is a conceptualisation peculiar to the type of sociological theory in use.
As we have seen, sociological studies on the social segregation of
"blacks" today have misunderstood "ancestry", paid insufficient attention
to group material achievements, commodity production and their relevance
to status stratification. Our alternative approach spells out criteria and
characteristics of status evaluation in terms of the stratified system of
wage labour, group accomplishments measured with reference to quantity
and quality of consumption, and individual achievements seen in terms of
factors such as income-size, job-type, level of education, area of
residence and house-ownership. In brief, the individual is ranked as part
of an economically constituted group. Ihis ranking is a theoretical
construct deduced from our conception of status stratification. It is not posited
as the empirical determinant of patterns of social intercourse but as a
conceptual link between the above-mentioned economic conditions and
socially integrative,or segregative behaviour. Actors do rank each other
but their criteria reflect the political economy of the given society and this
ranking is not a determinant of behaviour but a concept mediating between
(2 )
two structures - economic organisation and social intercourse . 1
1) For an analysis of the compromises business makes in order to 
penetrate the "black" consumer market, see Harold Baron "Urban 
Racism" in Ixmis Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt, op. clt.
2) It must be admitted, however, that the social rejection of blacks as
a status problem is an improvement on seeing it as a "race" problem. 
For It can then l>e perceived that some "whites" too face problems 
of social isolation and that instead of analysing the problems of racial 
hatred, identity and "black" self-hate we should proceed to, for example, 
the relationship between status and self-esteem generally.
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In remaining within the Weberian tradition of strictly separating 
the patterns of social intercourse from capitalist relations of production,
Williams et al. have had to assume a status-maximising propensity in 
men^\ Their great weakness consists in ignoring that, in social 
scientific explanations analytical separation of interrelated phenomena 
must be crowned with a synthesis if the investigation is not to relapse into 
atheoretical assumptions about human nature. It is quite legitimate to 
construct theories of status stratification to explain patterns of social 
intercourse, especially since the verbal behaviour of actors suggests 
the existence of subjective rankings. The fatal step is when the 
sociologist treats "status consciousness" not as a mediating category but 
a determinant of behaviour. For then, the philosophical anthropological 
implication is that "man must have status" and the investigation stops 
short at discovering more fundamental mechanisms and political economic 
relations. Titus, a mere concern with status does not explain why "whites" 
initiate the social segregation of "blacks". Their behaviour is derived 
from the economic interests which determine the intensity of restrictions 
on social intimacy with lower-status incumbents. We may say that 
the degree of segregation practised by W towards individuals placed lower 
on the status order is determined by the extent to which integrative 
behaviour or intimacy would,via ostracism, threaten the realisation of 
W's economic and social interests.
Our conception of status stratification radically dissolves Weber's, 
Parsons' and Rex's contributions to the understanding of the Negroes' 
position in the status order, by demonstrating how status stratification is 
roe*'id in modes or production and distribution. It is now possible, for 
example, to see where the Warner "caste school" went w ron g^  . The 1
1) For example, Walter C. Kaufmann "Status Concern" A. J. S. 12 Jan. 1957. 
H. M. Blalock, jn r ., "Status Consciousness", Social Forces, Vol. 37,
No. 3, March 1959. Hubert Blalock, op. cit. Ch. 2.
G. E. Simpson and J. Yinger "Racial and Cultural Minorities" (Harper 
and Row, New York 1965) p. 111-114. Vance Packard "The Status 
Seekers", op. clt.
Lloyd Warner, American Caste and Class (A. J. S. Vol. XLJII, Sept. 1936),2 )
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Warner argument was that "blacks” and "whites" were different castes, 
not in the classic Hindu sense, but defined by sanctions against inter­
marriage and blocked mobility for the lower group. We had, therefore, 
a caste system of impermeable boundaries based on racial traits. For 
Warner, caste implied rigidly blocked social mobility in the stratification 
system. It did not mean that black Americans will not make economic 
and cultural advancements; the caste line would, however, remain an 
insurmountable barrier to attendant prestige and acceptance into "the 
mainstream of American society".
The level of sociological sophistication in Warner's model leaves
much to be desired. Instead of the dubious comparison with, and choice
of, caste, he might have recognised as Weber did, that status groups
are often transfigured into closed endog'mous units through the restrictions
on social intercourse which they practise: "Where the consequences have
been realised to their full extent, the status group evolves into a closed
’caste’ . Status distinctions are then guaranteed not merely by conventions
and laws, but also by rituals"^. Moreover, since caste suggests
hereditary occupational specialisation, its applicability to the American
IVep South in the post-emancipation period was marginal to the extreme.
Warner's caste line was,in effect, a status frontier impermeable for the
(2)
Negro because of his comparably low social and economic achievement . 
More precisely, then, it was an economic frontier.
We hope to have demonstrated that the social inferiority of "blacks" 
vis-a-vis "whites" can be explained with references to the former's inferior 
consumption patterns. This further explains the limited social integration
3)
Max Weber in Gerth and Mills, op. cit. p. 188.
This one-sided impermeability is now being challenged, however, by 
self-imposed black restrictions on fraternisation with "whites" - a 
phenomenon confusingly called "black racism". Significantly, it comes 
with a dramatic discrediting of whites' ancestors, seen now not as the 
"founding fathers" but as exploitative slaveholders, a positive rewriting 
of black history and a deprecating of "white middle class affluence and 
white society"; cf. Stokeley Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, op. clt.
Visually Caucasian "blacks" do pass, however, Into "white" society.
But passing Is not unique to "blacks". Ixwer status and stigmatised 
"whites" also fake or obscure their genealogy and appearances in order to 
to accepted In "higher circles", Cf, Erving Coffman, Stigma,(Pelican, Ldn.1968| 
pp.92-113. Coffman's conception of stigma is, however, superficial in that 
he treats it in isolation from concepts of economic structure.
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between "blacks" and "whites", an explanation identical to that applied to 
limited social intercourse between intra-racial income groups' . The second 
problem, too, the social rejection of economically mobile "'blacks" by their 
white peers, does not require a racial explanation. For there must be identical 
patterns of integrative and segregative behaviour within the black and white 
communities, since actors necessarily prefer to fraternise with others who 
do not just possess congruent "life-styles", but who can improve their "life - 
chances". The racial analysis must pose as enigmatic or as evidence of 
racism the rejection of even those "blacks who-have-made-it" by "whites".
This is because this analysis follows Weber in separating the concepts "life ­
styles" and "life-chances". If we link the categories, however, we may 
observe that "blacks who-have-arrived" will be rejected only if their 
achievements cannot improve the life chances of the "whites" in question.
Black capitalists and millionaires will necessarily be invited to dinner just as 
frequently they avoid social intimacy with poor "whites" and "blacks". In this 
sense, in examining this issue the questions which "whites" and which "blacks" 
must always !>e raised. For social segregation is a general problem of men 
in exploitative societies manipulating their social intercourse to realise their 
economic class interests. "Blacks"are, therefore, faced not with "a race 
problem", or ethnic stratification, nor even with a status problem, but with 
the consequences of capitalist commodity production. Thus, the social 
rejection, exclusion and segregation of "blacks" are a sub-species of the 
general ostracism of lower status groupings and the accompanying expressions, 
Niggers, Chinks, Japs, Wogs, Spaghettis, Micks, Greasers, Frogs, Tinkers,
. . .  are but the verbalisation of an economically generated rejection syndrome. 
There is, then, no theoretical justification for construing any pattern of social 
avoidance as a "race problem" for its conditions of existence transcend the 
boundaries of "race relations". Rather, the problem to be posed is, what are 
the conditions of existence of capitalist commodity production?
CHAPTER VI
BLACK POVERTY AND THE I.ABOUR MARKET
Study after study of the socio-economic conditions of black workers
in the U. S. A. and Britain not only document the existence of a pervasive
poverty and deprivation, but also posit a specific context to it,as opposed
to the deprivation experienced by other fthnic m inorities^. These
assertions of Ixe Rainwater and W. Yancey express a commonly held view
point: "Negro poverty was of a special, more desperate kind. It was
the product of ancient brutality, past injustice and present prejudice
which had produced a twisted and battered cultural heritage, a community
excluded from the rest of society and buried under a blanket of
(2 )
circumstances" . Although the theory of social causation here is 
simplistic, the emotive language is partly justified by the persuasive 
evidence of chronic under-consumption among "blacks" in America.
In "The Other America", Michael Harrington estimated that between 
forty and fifty million Americans were living in poverty in the early 1
1) An interesting compilation of approaches to poverty can lx* 
found in: Daniel P. Moynihan (ed .), On Understanding Poverty 
(N. Y. 1969). Dorother Wedderbum (ed .), Poverty Inequality 
and Class Structure (Cambridge University Press 1974).
For an invaluable survey of American poverty and theories of 
it see: S. M. Miller and Martin Rein, Poverty Inequality and 
Policy in Howard S. Becker, Social Problems: A Mixlern 
Approach (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York 1967). See 
also Margaret S. Gordon (ed .) Poverty in America (Chandler 
Publishing C o ., Calif., 1965). Louis A. Ferman, Joyce L. 
Kornbluh and Alan Haber, Poverty in America: A Book of 
Readings (Univ. of Michigan Press, Mich. 1965).
2) Ix*e Rainwater and William Yancey (eds.) The Moynihan 
Report and The Politics of Controvery, op. cit. p. 2.
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1960's^ \ The poverty line was calculated $4, 000 annually for a family
of four members and $2, 000 for a single individual. Just over 50% of
(2 )
the black population could then be classified as poor .
The Kcrner Commission reported that, compared with "whites", 
"blacks" had completed fewer years of education, and less of them had 
attended high school, were likely to be unemployed and three times as 
likely to be in unskilled or service jobs, earned an average of thirty per 
cent less and were more than likely to be living in poverty. In addition, 
Negro housing was three times as likely to be overcrowded and sub­
standard and this disparity was even more pronounced when compared with 
(3)white suburbs . In 1967,the striking characteristic in socio-economic 
comparisons between black and white Americans was the high incidence 
of poverty among the non-whites. Poverty affected 11% of "whites" but
(4)fully 35% of "blacks" . This by no means implies that the other 65% of 
blacks were "middle-class", or rich,for 47% of these existed just on or 
slightly above the "poverty line" calculated in 1967 at $3,533 per annum 
for a family of four, llie more recent findings testify to continuing 
patterns of deprivation, in which between 33 and 35% of the black population
1) Michael Harrington, The Other America (MacMillan, N. Y. 1964)
p. 1 and Ch. 4. Sydney Willhelm, Who Needs the Negro (Schenkman 
Pub. Co. Inc., Cambridge, Massachusets 1970); "Time" Magazine,
June 17, 1974, p. 24. For systematic and most recent data on the 
economic condition of "blacks" in the 1970's see U. S. Bureau of the 
Census, Series No. 54, The Social and Economic Status of the Black 
Population in the United States, 1974, Washington, D. C. 1975.
2) The figure for Britain in 1970 was 7 to 10 million. The Times, 9th 
September, 1970. Studies of black poverty and deprivation in Britain
.li e virtually absent. As to the extent of the correlation between colour 
and economic deprivation, occupational distribution, high unemployment 
and low income, analysis points to an American situation in embryo.
Sec Sheila Allen, Race Today, April 1971, p. 112; David J. Smith,
Racial Disadvantage in Employment, op. ciC.; E.J.B. R oseeta l., Colour 
and Citizenship; A Report on British Race Relations, op. clt. Chs. 13 
and 14; S. Castles and G. Kosack, op. cit. Ch. 11.
3) The Kerner Commission Report, op. cit.
4) John F. Kain (ed.) Race and Poverty The Economics of Discrimination 
(Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. Y. 1969) p. 2.
remain poor .
During the years 1962-67, many studies of the economic situation
of "blacks" focused on their poverty as a race relations problem^ \
Within this we may briefly identify some four explanations of the
desperate level of black deprivation. The first posits the crucial salience
(2 )
of white racism, race prejudice, and racial discrimination . The
second and third explain poverty and its pathological socio-psychological
ramifications with reference to slavery or factors and proclivities 
(3)specific to "blacks"' Finally, there are the recent studies of black
poverty which direct a crucial focus on the labour market. This is a
theoretical advance, for the labour market is clearly the major source
of income and hence the determinant of workers consumption in its
(4)broadest sense' . What is not generally analysed is the theoretical basis of the 
concept poverty,and "blacks" and "whites" as comparative statistical categories.
1) This was part of the increased interest in poverty inspired by both 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in their War against Poverty. 
A.H. Halsey adumbrates this view: "President Johnson's declaration 
in 1964 of 'unconditional war on poverty in America' inaugurated a 
plethora of legislation, governmental programmes and social science 
literature. British Government and British social science have 
followed a parallel course". Poverty, he contends, increasingly serves 
as a euphemism for the racial conflict . . .  in D. Wcdderburn (ed .)
op. cit. p. 123.
2) See above, Ch. II.
3) For a typical statement, see Kenneth Stampp.The Peculiar Institution, 
op. cit. p. 2. See also the classic family-deficit model of Daniel P. 
Moynihan and criticisms of it in L. Rainwater and W. Yancey (eds.)
'Die Moynihan Report & Die Politics of Controversy, op. cit. and 
Lee Rainwater’ s stimulating "Five Paradigms on Poverty" from which
it can be deduced that the "moralising", "medicating" and "naturalising" 
perspectives are most generally applied to black poverty, in V. L. Allen 
(cd .) Psychological Factors in Poverty, (Academic Press, New York 
1970) Ch. 1.
4) See James G. Scoville (ed .) Perspectives on Poverty and Income 
Distribution (D. C. Heath and Co., N.Y. 1971). Louis Forman, Joyce 
Kornbluh and J. A. Miller (eds.) op. cit. Editors' introduction. Some 
writers argue, however, that the root of Negro poverty is not so much 
unemployment as low pay and underemployment. See Ina Coriline Brown, 
Understanding Race Relations (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs,
New Hersey 1973) Ch. 8. andJ.C. Kincaid, Poverty and Equality in 
Britain (Penguin Books, London 1973) Ch. 10.
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From the writings of economists, radical political economists and Marxists, 
several major arguments emerge: a large number of blacks are poor; blacks are 
proportionally poorer than whites; blacks arc victims of urban racism, economic 
racism and working class (Trade Union) racism; blacks have higher rates of 
unemployment than whites; and, finally, black workers are more exploited than 
white workers. Judging from their popularity, these arguments have become some­
thing of an unquestionable consensus among race theorists^. The first thesis 
employs a concept the "poor" whose 'relativity' is a by-word among writers on 
poverty^ . For all conceptions of poverty contain criteria of normal or desirable 
levels of consumption. This specification of this norm is the Achilles Heel of poverty 
theorists and, indeed, controversies over poverty reflect above all different concept­
ions of human needs as well as a general adherence to the economics of distribution.
The identification of the poor becomes, then, an arbitrary matter. This arbitrariness 
is compounded by racial comparisons of black and white incomes without regard to
(3)
regional, educational, vocational and intra-racial differences in income' .
"Blacks" and "whites" are simplistic and thus eminently misleading as
statistical aggregates. For Gus Tyler, their use creates "the mischievous myth that
(4)
poor means black and white means affluent" . For "while it is true that a much 
higher percentage of non-whites than whites is officially poor, it is equally true that 
in 1968 two-thirds of the poor were w h lte"^ . In Tyler's view, the concentration on 
inter-racial differences obscures the general maldistribution of income prevailing in 
American society and foster a black-white polarisation at the level of political 
action. It is part of the establishment's policy of "divide and rule".
1) It is significant that it is among economists rather than sociologists that we 
witness a shift from intersubjectivity and values onto the economic structure. 
This may be a consequence of the sociologists' professional indifference to 
political economy. RaIf Dahrendorf, no political-economic angel himself, 
saw fit to criticise the anti-economic bias of sociologists. See Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 29th March, 1975, p. 24. It does appear that a basic 
premise of sociology "men live* In society" is fictitious. Men produce in 
(anil so create) society and their social behaviour should thus be taken in the 
context of economic production.
2) Sec especially Ben R. Seligman (ed. ) Poverty as a Public Issue (The Free
Press, New York, 1965). •
3) It is related to the official practice of racially identifying applicants for 
incurance cards, welfare benefits, etc., which is perhaps the clearest case 
of the State's dissemination and consolidation of "race relations".
4) Gus Tyler "White workers Blue Mood" in Joseph Ryan ed. White Ethnics:
Life In Working Class America (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973)p. 125.
5) Ibid.
It should be pointed out that those studies of "the race problem" 
which focus on poverty have at least drawn attention to the income factor in 
the general economic situation of "blacks". Since income, however, is 
inextricably linked to employment, the labour market appears the 
legitimate point of departure for the explanation of low pay, unemployment, 
under-employment and general socio-economic deprivation. No retreat 
from racism, and racial discrimination has, however, taken place. Rather, 
underlying neo-classical economic analysis has been made more explicit.
Within this tradition, the analysis of employment is made within 
the framework of the demand and supply of labour as well as the mechanisms 
of entry into the labour force. The demand for labour is seen as determined 
by all or either of these factors: the amount of capital resources, the level 
of demand for goods and the technique of production. The supply of labour 
is seen as influenced by such factors as the age structure of the population, 
the functioning of systems of education and individual training and wage 
rates, 'Hie second category, modes of entry into the labour market, is 
considered subject to the influence of non-economic factors such as kinship, 
community ties and tradition, and informal processes of selection^ \
In explaining levels and rates of unemployment economic textbooks 
generally point to industrial or cyclical fluctuations, the level of agg­
regate demand, the rapidity and frequency of technological change and 
declining industries, the level of development and state of the infra­
structure of social services and the state of industrial relations, .including 
( 2 )
Trade Union organisation . These variables are, however, analysed 
as independent entities determining particular types of unemployment - 
frictional, lack of labour mobility, ignorance of job opportunities or 
sources of labour supply; seasonal as found in agriculture and holiday 1
1) See J. King, Labour Economics (MacMillan, London 1972).
2) B.J. McCormick and E. Owen-Smith (eds.) The Labour Market 
(Penguin, London 1968). A most comprehensive treatment is John
F. Burton et al. (eds.) Readings in Labour Market Analysis (Molt, 
Rinehart and Winston Inc., New York 1971). Finally, there is
J. M. Keynes' enormously influential, The General Theory of 
Employment Interest and Money (MacMillan, London 1970).
i l l
resorts; and structural which relates to demand deficiency, the price 
level and technological changes^. It is our view that these conventional 
categories of economic analysis lack theoretical depth for unemployment 
is treated as the result of policy preference, or the psychological states of 
men within institutions. This illustrates the moral character of the 
analysis. The frame of mind of consumers. Trade Unionists, investors 
and Governments remains un-theorised and conflict among these 
institutions is treated as anomic phenomena, disturbing the normally 
healthy state of affairs. Keyned "revolution'' is simply a rejection of 
this conception of normality: the market is normally in disequilibrium.
However, neo-classical economic concepts can only be dispensed 
with at a level of analysis which does not take the labour market as the 
ultimate institutional axis of economic production. Their application to 
the study of the position of "blacks" on the labour market has recently 
begun to be challenged by radical economists, a challenge marred, however, 
by an indiscriminate use of racism and capitalism. One such study, falling 
somewhere between economic and sociological analysis, is Harold Raron’ s 
"dual labour market" thesis^ .
Baron argued that in the metropolitan centres of America there is 
a racially dual labour market structure with a black sector (one-tenth 
to a quarter of the white) characterised by specific Institutionalised and 
subordinated roles. The two labour markets are subject to different demand 
and supply forces. This, in Baron's view, explains the racial differentiations 
in earnings and occupational distribution as well as the separate 
institutions and procedures for recruitment, training and promotion of 
workers. TTie racial dualism of the metropolitan labour market is a salient 1
1) A major controvu*>y in employment theory exists between the 
structural and aggregative theorists. The former sees unemployment 
as a consequence not of insufficient aggregate demand but of the 
transformations of the techno-structure. For discussions see
A. M. Ross (ed .) Unemployment and the American Economy (John 
Wiley & Sons Inc., London 1964) and G. Peter Plnz, Structural 
Unemployment Theory and Measurement (Department of Manpower 
and Immigration, Canada 1969).
2) Harold Baron, "The Web of Urban Racism" in I/niis Knowles and 
Kenneth Prewitt (eds.) op. cit.
component of the web of urban racism, but it also functions to create a 
reserve army of labour and hence increasing profits for corporate capitalism 
The black subsector is confined to providing a secondary labour force 
or "labour market flexibility" and it has specific consequences for black 
workers in the spheres of income and levels of employment. Thus 
black Americans are concentrated in low-paid jobs and declining industries, 
and suffer chronically and cyclically high levels of unemployment.
In seeing the black sub-sector as a dynamic entity, Baron was 
able to clarify the socio-economic differences among "blacks" as well 
as the fluctuations in their standards of living. As he wrote: "As a result 
of the extended economic boom, the wartime tight labour market and the 
change in public and private policies brought about by the civil rights 
movement, it is true that a top group of younger, better trained workers 
have improved their conditions enough in the last half dozen years to 
narrow the gap a little between themselves and their white competitors.
A middle group of approximately one half of the black workers has managed 
to share tenaciously in the prosperity by maintaining its same relative 
position in regard to whites. However, even the extremely favourable 
current' conditions have not been able to neutralise the effects of urban 
racism on the one third or more of the families in the cities that 
constitute 'the black under class' We may,therefore,say that in Baron's
view,'the race problem' concerns the socio-economic conditions of about 
7 million blacks in America who are permanently trapped in the black 
subsector by the inexorable forces of urban racism and American corporate 
capitalism.
Baron's thesis itself may now be critically analysed. Above all, 
it is open to the criticism of remaining at the level of description by not logic 
ally linking its categories. Baron vividly depicted the experiences of some 1
1) ibid, p. 149. Support for this description comes from other quarters. 
During the 1960's unemployment among 'blacks' was almost twice that 
of 'whites', a situation which still holds today. Among black youth, 
l)ctween 30 and 40% are unemployed. See Charles H. Hession and 
Hyman Sardy, Ascent to Affluence (Allyn and Bacon Inc. Boston 1969) 
pp. 784-785. See also Tom Kahn, The Economics of Inequality in 
L. A. Ferman et al. (eds. ) op. cit. U.S. Bureau of the Census Series, 
No. 54, op. clt., p. 23.
2?o
"blacks" on the labour market yet maintains that all "blacks" are victims 
of institutional racism. This is because of his commitment to 
Parsons' normative functionalism, for he is forced to conceive
• 1
the racist value as a generalised ethos. Thus, his thesis 
rests on the race relations method of correlating skin colour 
and living standards to the exclusion of other socio-economic variables 
such as age structure, educational and professional qualifications, and 
their quality. This procedure also involves an indifference to demand 
factors in employment, the supply of labour, the ramified imperfections 
of the labour market as well as local labour markets. In other words,
"the dual labour market" is based on a fictitious assumption that a 
Hicksian perfect market exists^ \ He then attempts to demonstrate that 
the experiences of'blacks"on the labour market are enigmatic, peculiar, 
and a racist-inspired imperfection. Baron's analysis of residential 
patterns and the polity followed the same lines. The numerical strength 
of "blacks" in given residential areas and political offices is compared to 
their overa ll demographic concentration.or ratio to "whites". Disproportional 
representations are then seen as reflecting the operation of racist 
criteria, racia l discrimination, or racial inequality. But how long have 
"blacks" lived in that city? What is their income level? Which "blacks" desire 
to have "whites" as neighbours? These issues Baron Inconsistently Ignores.
The point here is that the therms "black" and "white" are 
generalities needing considerable qualification if  the universality and hetero­
geneity of the phenomena or situations they describe are not to be 
(2)
obscured Baron does not analyse these terms. Hence, his depiction 
of the situation of "blacks" on the labour market implies the non-existence 
of white labour exploitation. "W hites" appear as champions and 
beneficiaries of a complicity to oppress "blacks". Yet this "consensus" 
view of white society is Inconsistent with Baron's admission that
1) See J. E. King, op. clt. Chs.1 and 3.
2) As S. Zubalda puts it: "The categories of 'race ', 'colour' and 
'ethnicity' although they re fer to group characteristics that may 
be socially salient are not necessarily adequate sociological 
designations, op. clt. p. 2.
"employers had fostered competition for jobs especially by employing
blacks as strikebreakers", and his brief distinction between "whites"
and "the dominant w h ites"^ . Thus Baron's approach obfuscates the
phenomena of labour stratification and competition which have historically
( 2 )
plagued the white working class .
Baron, we have argued, has merely exploited one of the labour 
market's imperfections. More critical is his neglect of the observation 
that the labour market is an institutional manifestation of commodity 
production. Thus, he is forced to ignore other crucial markets (the 
capital and consumer markets) which combine to form the system of 
capitalist commodity production. In consequence, his analysis remains 
at best a description of certain "facts" of racial discrimination. Like every 
analysis within the race prospective it contains a hidden notion of racist 
motivation which allows a coquetting with a militant anti-racism.
But even if we accept the dual labour market analysis as a general 
description of the channels of labour recruitment and the patterns of 
remuneration in a stratified and heterogenous labour market, there is 
still the possibility of regarding these phenomena not as a product of 
institutional racism, but part of the general problem of idle resources 
endemic to the atomistic form of extracting surplus value. For given a 
multiplicity of private owners of the means of production competitively 
involved with profit-maximisation, no equilibrium can be established 
between the level of aggregate demand and the utilisation of economic 
resources. Baron has no explanation of unemployment generally and thus 
resorts to "urban racism" as a substitute. For example, one type of 
u oloyment for which he offers a racial explanation that among low- 
skilled workers could be accommodated under "queue-unemployment". 1
1) Harold Baron, "The Web of Urban Racism" in Louis Knowles and 
Kenneth Prewitt (eds.) op. clt. pp. 21-22.
2) For example, as Karl Marx observed: "Every industrial and 
commercial center in England now possesses a working class divided 
into two hostile camps, English proletarians und Irish proletarians. 
The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor 
who lowers his standard of life", lx-tter to S. Meyer and A. Vogt in 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Britain (Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, Moscow 1953) p. 551.
This explains how unskilled jobs decrease not only relative to aggregate 
demand, but further, when firms demote their skilled workers into low 
job categories^ .
In Baron's interpretation one of the characteristics of the dual 
labour market was an occupational specialisation according to race with 
distinct advantages to "whites". For this results in a specific job 
classification (Negro jobs) and a "job-ceiling for Negroes". For Baron, 
this is an illustration of white racism. A less idealist approach would see it as 
employers attempting to cut costs, since occupational immobility at a 
certain level guarantees cheaper labour. This mode of allocating black 
labour is not racial discrimination for no doubt white labour is similarly 
utilised. The chronic vulnerability of black workers to this policy suggests 
that a structure operates to maintain them in reserve, i.e . as the latest en- - 
trants to the labour market with a distribution of skills and qualifications 
conducive to exploitation during cyclical,or unpredictable market 
vicissitudes.
Baron has appropriated theneoclassical treatment of the labour
market as a unitary phenomenon in which the allocation of labour is a function
of demand and supply. Any infraction of the laws of demand and supply appears
to him as racial discrimination - the explanation of the labour situation
(2 )
of "blacks". But the problem is that, as some economists stress , the 
various dimensions of labour market formation have discriminatory 
consequences for all workers. We have seen that the concept racial 
discrimination is poised ambiguously between two meanings: 'racially 
motivated discrimination' and 'choice between social categories which are 
defi:. d as a race'. Baron's emphasis on racial discrimination is thus a 
clear admission that he has not analysed the problem of labour market 1
1) For a clear exposition, see Juanita M. Kreps, Gerald G. Somers, and 
Richard Perlman, Contemporary Labour Economics: Issues Analysis 
and Policies (Wadsworth Publishing Co. Inc., California, 1974).
2) See Peter B. Doerlnger and Michael J. Piore, Internal labour 
Market and Manpower Analysis (D.C. Heath and Company 
Ijexington, Massachussetts 1971); Milton Freedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1971).
discrimination. For example, P. Doe ringer and M. Pi ore argue that the
labour market comprises a multiplicity of internal labour markets which
are intrinsically discriminatory: "In analysing the problem of employment
discrimination and in developing remedies, internal labour markets play
a central role. Such markets, as shown in earlier chapters, are designed
intentionally to "discriminate". They do so by selecting workers at the
ports of entiy and by conferring privileges upon the internal labour force
not available to those in the external labour market. Discrimination arises
because of the job security and advancement opportunities which exist for the
internal work force and because of the economics of developing and
retaining a trained work force which the internal market provides to
employers. Discrimination, in this sense, has a clear economic and
social rationale for both employers and workers and need not have racial
im plications"^. Doeringer and Piore do, however, posit the occurrence
of racial discrimination in the second meaning mentioned above,where
"discrimination results in the exclusion of racial minorities from certain 
(2 )jobs" . On the other hand, we find the authors perfunctorily conceiving
"race as an explicit determinant in hiring and promotion patterns" and
"a significant consideration in decisions affecting entry, internal 
(3)
allocation and wages" Ibis confusion over motivation is a result of 
a general reluctance by labour market analysts to consider the labour 
market in relation to the capitalist market economy as a system of 
commodity production. Moreover, why not the profit motive?
'Ibis reluctance in turn can lx- explained with reference to the 
penchant for treating "the labour market" as an empirical phenomenon 
rather than a conceptual relation. It is noteworthy that labour market 
analysts have not pnxiuccd a satisfactory definition of the labour 1
1) Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore, op. cit. p. 133.
2) ibid. p. 134. (Our emphasis, Y. W .)
3) ibid. p. 133. (Our emphasis, Y. W .)
m arket^. In economic textbooks,a market is defined as a place where 
buyers and sellers meet. We would prefer its definition as an autonomous 
relation which dictates the responses of buyers and sellers. Rithor 
definition, however, precludes the geographic delimitation of a market. 
Moreover, since every quality of labour is a sui generis, the empirical 
identification and classification of labour markets is necessarily 
problematic. The labour market is a valid concept only as a conceptualisation 
of the movements of the value of labour power. Otherwise, it obscures the 
fact that the worker sells not his labour but his power to labour and merely 
facilitates attempts to empirically categorise "groups" of sellers of labour.
It may be argued that the relationship between labour and capital
is the implicit crux of labour market analyses. Doeringer and Piore come
close to the problem of wage labour in arguing that "internal labour
( 2 )
markets are a logical development in a competitive market" . Similarly, 
a technological paradigm has been developed which unwittingly focuses 
on competition between capitals as being responsible for the displacement 
of black labour from the U. S. economy ' . This paradigm is organised 
around the observation of trends towards increasing capital intensity in 1
1) Or refuse to define it at all: See Lloyd C. Reynolds and Joseph 
Shlster, The Structure of Labor Markets (Harper Brothers, New 
York 1951); Robert L. Bunting, Employer Concentration in Ix>cal 
Labour Markets (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
Hill, North Carolina 1962). For working definitions, see Dale 
Yodden and Donald G. Peterson et al. Local Labour Market 
Research (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1948).
2) Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore, op. cit. p. 39.
3) See The Ad Hoc Committee, "The Triple Revolution" in Eric 
From (ed .) Socialist Humanism (Doubleday and Co. Inc., London 
1965); Sidney Willhelm, op. cit. Ch. VI. As Karl Marx 
commented, "For capital the worker does not constitute a condition 
of production, but only labour. If this can be performed by 
machinery or even by water or air so much the better. And what 
capital approrpiates is not the labourer but his labour - and not 
directly but by means of exchange". Eric Hobbsbawm, Pre­
capitalist Social Formations ( Ixiwrence and Wishart, London 1964) p. 99.
economic production resulting in significant decreases in the need for 
human labour, especially unskilled labour^. 'Die accelerated development 
of automated technology has consequences not only for the level of 
employment but the spatial distribution of unemployment in that 
industrial location of long single-storey factories drifts away from 
expensive, core, urban areas into the suburbs. It means also a decreasing 
demand for semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 'Hie consequence of this 
"rationalisation of production techniques" for black workers, concentrated 
as they are in the central urban areas, is a growing redundancy of their 
labour^.
The central argument of the Committee is that a Third Industrial 
Revolution has ushered in a new economic era based on cybernetics. This 
cylxirnetic revolution has critical consequences for the consumer and 
labour markets. It decreases the amount of labour employed and 
increased output at the same time. The result is "a historical paradox" 
in which, "a substantial proportion of the population is subsisting on 
minimal incomes, often below the poverty line at a time when sufficient
(3)
potential is available to supply the needs of everyone in the U. S. " .
Thus, closely linked to the non-gratification of needs is the shrinking
job market for both black and white workers. Black workers, the
Committee pointed out, were seeking entry into a labour market which
was ..ul ^nly vanishing but constituted a major break "on the almost
(4)
unlimited capacity of a cybernated productive system" . Sidney Willhelm 1
1) For useful distinctions between technology, technique, mechanisation 
and automation, see S. D. Anderman, Trade Unions and Technological 
Change (Allen and Unwin, London 1967) Ch. 3. See also I^nce E.
Davis and Richard A. Easterlin et al. (cds.) American Economic 
Growth (Harper & Row Publishers, N. Y. 1972) Part III, Ralph Gray 
and John M. Peterson, Economic Development of the United States 
(Richard!). Irwin Inc. 1974) Part IV, 11. F.J. Monkhouse, The 
Material Resources of Britain (Longman Group Ltd., London 1971) 
pp. 101-103. Eric Roll, The World After Keynes (Pall Mall Press, 
London 1968)p. 15.
2) It is significant that despite strident calls for a total ban on Immigration 
Britain’s immigration restrictions still admit professional and highly 
qualified "blacks".
3) Ibid. p. 414.
4) The Ad Hoc Gommltlee "'Die Triple Revolution" in Eric Fromm (ed.) 
op. cit. p. 414.
posits a similar thesis of a growing and inevitable redundancy of black 
labour. In his view, "the third technological era” means that "joblessness 
loses the peculiar quality of being a mere transitory moment that will 
fade upon the resumption of economic prosperity. The new technology 
informs the Negro of permanent, workless years even as the economy 
establishes new productive records and p ro fits "^ . Negro workers are 
being discarded from the labour force by the juggernaut of automation 
in a context historically distinct from that of white workers.
Two aspects of this argument will be cited. Willhelm notes that
the impact of technological realignments within American capitalism on
white workers had been spread over the century up to the restrictions on
white immigration in the early 20th century. White workers also shifted
from agriculture to industry in a period when technological transformations
in the latter were expanding job opportunities. On the other hand, the
impact of the "new technology" displaces the black worker from
agriculture and industry simultaneously. Willhelm's explanation of the
different consequences for white and black workers emphasises "economic
racism". He lacks a conception of capital and does not analyse the fact
that the displacement of labour affects both white and black workers. It
( 2 )
is the labour market which is being made redundant . This introduces 
the second strand of Willhelm’ s argument.
Like the Ad Hoc Committee, Willhelm regards as a paradox the 
fact of occupational deprivation existing side by side with an unprecedented 
development of the productive forces: "Today, the gross national prcxiuct - 
exceeding $900 billion - is higher in real dollars than ever; personal 
in omes stand at peak heights; consumption of goods and services 
skyrockets; the absolute number of persons employed exceeds all previous 
marks; everything required for survival at a respectable standard is 
readily available from a productive standpoint; corporate profits and 1
1) Sidney Willhelm, op. cit. p. 166.
2) This Willhelm himself admits. He also observes that the rate 
and timing of technological changes are unpredictable and, 
correctly, that "technology itself does nothing except within the 
parameters of social meaning". ibid, p. 137.
dividends are at new heights. Yet the literature on automation and the 
nation's economic activity provides a striking and overriding paradox:
On the one hand, there is apparent bountifulness in the potential of 
automation, capable of providing living standards never before 
contemplated . . .  The new technology permits liquidation of poverty, 
hunger and disease, eradication of housing, transportation, and clothing 
shortages; unimagined expansion of knowledge; extension of the human 
life span within the forseeable future. Still, with this new technology man 
can enslave man . . .  We shall see that these phenomena are 
paradoxical only in the context of a moral analysis of the capitalist mode 
of production within which the mode of appropriation and the conditions 
of distribution are conceived as a given, independent of capitalist relations 
of production. Thus, the Ad Hoc Committee appealed to President Johnson, 
while Prof. Willhelm structured his argumentation around genocidal 
white racist motivations.
There are a number of reasons why analyses of the employment
situation of "blacks" fail to explain, in the sense of demonstrating
necessary relationships within a structure, their social and economic situation.
Leaving aside the question of whether this situation is a legitimate object of
study, "blacks" have been designated "poor" even during periods of "full
employment" and indeed, given the fundamental relativism within both
these concepts, such analyses must be infinitely regressive. For each
could propose and describe'black poverty'oi;’fniddle class affluence','according
to its peculiar criteria of normal living standards. Similarly, economists
are by no means agreed as to what constitutes full employment or, for that
( 2 )
matter, employment . Thus, they are not at all confident as to the 1
1) ibid, p. 161.
2) As Prof. A. Sen observed " . . .  the question of measurement of 
employment has received remarkably little attention in economic 
history theory (it has come mainly in development economics and 
that only indirectly), and the limelight has been on the question 
of measurement of capital". Employment Technology and 
Development (Oxford University Press, London 1975) p. 4. John B. 
Wood, How Much Unemployment (IEA, London 1972). For analyses of 
the problems involved in defining and measuring unemployment, see 
Richard Perlman, Labor Theory (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., London 
1969) Part three.
determinants of the level of unemployment. Indeed,the set of factors
which is said to determine the level of employment is generally listed
without any specific weighting. Given this state of affairs in economic
theory, some labour market analysts find it convenient to cite racial
or racio-economic motivations in explaining the levels of black
unemployment. For example, observe here how J. F. K un conflates
Trade Union discrimination, racial discrimination and labour market
discrimination: "Labour market discrimination assumes a variety of
forms. Negroes are barred altogether from some fini s and industries.
In other circumstances firms hire Negroes but only for w skilled, low-
paying jobs and refuse to promote them. Other firms, v ile perhaps not
consciously following discriminating practices restrict tt ir recruiting
to sources and methods that limit the number of Negro a lu ants. Still
others sign labour agreements with discriminating unions. In many of these,
Negroes are barred from training and apprenticeship pn ranimes that
are prerequisite to certain trades, occupations or skille< o h s " ^ .  Kain
obviously means negative labour market and racial disci dn ition. But
labour market discrimination, including lack of access tr -ducation and
industrial qualifications, does not by Itself, however exp’ in Hie high
( 2 )
levels of black unemployment . In conditions of expans n, he demand 
for labour 'tightens' the labour market and it may then p iveljr 
discriminate. Moreover, the educational and professioi déficiences of 
black workers illustrate the functional subservience of i distribution of 
skills to exogenous economic circumstances such as the a of growth 
and investment policies, in a word, the demand for labour. 1
1) John F. Kain, (ed. ), op. cit. pp. 17-18.
2) Peter Rossi succinctly states one of the reasons "No amount of 
up-grading of skills or increased quality of education is going to 
make a dent in a society which does not need the newly skilled 
workers . . .  ". Cited by A.H. Halsey in DorothyWeederburn 
(ed.)op. cit. p. 132. See also A.H. Halsey et al. (eds. ), Education, 
Economy and Society (TTie Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York 
1967) Part II. For a depiction of the failure of retraining schemes
to integrate unemployed'blacks'lnto the labour market, see 
Juanita M. Krcps et al., op. cit. Chs. 24 and 25.
It may be said that the labour market analyses of the employment
situation of black workers revolve around the two leading classifications
of unemployment, the aggregative and the structural. Like in the queue
theory of the firm 's  labour p o lic y ^ , however, there is no mention of
the relationship between unemployment and the accumulation of capital.
Their conception of unemployment is official, i .e .  narrowed to the
difference between the employed and reported unemployed. Moreover, these
classifications are of disputed legitimacy. Thus, E. Gilpatrick argues
that 'aggregate demand' explanation of unemployment is indistinguishable
from  the structuralist explanation: "structural and demand unemployment
(2)
are so inter-related as to defy dichotomous enumeration . The use
of concept of the reserve army of labour would eliminate many of
the déficiences within the orthodox labour market analyses of black
unemployment. It has at least one important advantage. For the existence
of a sizeable amount of hidden unemployment among the labour force is
necessarily outside the purview of labour market analysis. The reserve
army of labour concept,on the other hand,emphasises the general disparity
between labour resources and labour force participation as contingent on
the fluctuations in the demand for labour induced by the rigours of
(3)
capital accumulation . The concept of unemployment is thus widened 
to illustrate the general underutilisation of resources in capitalist proces­
ses of production. From this it follows that the labour market is too 
narrow a concept for the analysis of unemployment, or black unemployment.
1) As if  in paraphrase of the reserve army o f labour concept, the queue 
theory asserts that for employers workers are laid out on a 
spectrum of desirability with different groups faring differently 
according to the demand for labour and with respect to their 
position in the queue. Cf. Juanita Kreps et a l., op. clt. p. 449.
TOe constituting o f these "groups" is not explained. Nor do the 
authors inform us what are the conditions of existence of the queue.
2) E.G. Gilpatrick, Structural Employment and Aggregated Demand:
A Study of Employment and Unemployment in the United States 
1948-64 (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1968) p. 215.
3) Sec below for an elaboration.
Indeed, Kain's analysis may even increase black unemployment in that 
implicitly the measures to be taken to solve the problem would be: a 
statutory minimum wage which could drive out of business those small 
firms which employ casual black labour; efforts to increase the 
competitiveness of black workers, which in turn displaces the unskilled 
worker; affirmative employment laws which leave the firm free to 
"discriminate" after employing a certain percentage of'hiinority group 
members".
Implicit in Kain's observations is the recognition that the social 
and economic problems which face "blacks" today are part of a larger set of 
related phenomena: the compulsion to maximise profit felt by investors, 
employers, cyclical fluctuations, the intrinsic underutilisation of the 
productive forces, and the theoretical and organisational immaturity of the 
labour movement. It is not a problem of the Negro, but one presented to 
him by the politico-economic and social conditions of capitalist commodity 
production. If there is a "Negro problem", it is because there arc too 
many social scientists for whom political economy is terra incognita.
The consequence is that the political economic theory which necessarily 
informs their social analysis remains untheorised^ . This professional 
aversion to political economy in favour of "the economics of the firm" 
can be seen in the context of the dominant tradition of pursuing a closer 
connection with a presumed real world.
It is a tendency reflected in the misunderstanding of the general 
problem of status stratification,and the concentration on discrimination 
in the labour market. The consequence for studies of the socio-economic 
situation of "blacks" today is the same in both cases, an emphasis on 1
1) A glance at major sociological texts on "social problems" confirms 
this view. See, for example, Harry C. Bredemeir and Jackson Toby 
Social Problems in America (John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York 1961); 
F. James Davis, Social Problems (The Free Press, New York 1970); 
Butterworth & Weir (eds.) Social Problems of Modern Britain (Fontana
1973); Russell R. Dynes et al. Social Problems (OUP, New York 1964) 
More radical interpretations of social problems, however, can be 
found In William J. Chambliss (ed .) Problems of Industrial Society 
(Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. Inc., London 1973) Howard S. Becker, 
op. cit.
"white racism", or a facile historicist conceptualisation, as typified by
Ray Marshall on "Negro-Union Relationship": "Like most other racial
problems the Negro Union relationship had its roots in slavery and
Reconstruction" ^ \  Another common approach is that articulated here by
Sidney Lens whose formulation straddles both "race prejudice" and
"job-consciousness": "The labour movement is dedicated to end racial
discrimination. But in many older unions there is still considerable racial
prejudice. Such organisations are highly job conscious - both leaders and
members want to control the number of skilled men entering the field
every year. If the labour market becomes flooded with skilled men they
know their rates will go down. For a long time therefore they excluded
Negroes in part because of prejudice and in part because of their job
( 2 )
consciousness" . But which is the significant factor? Lens' ambivalence 
could be resolved by his specifying the relationship between'job-consciousness" 
and "prejudice" through an analysis of lalxnir competition. Irwin 
Dubinsky comes close to this in interpreting general Trade Union discrimination 
with reference to the Trade Unions' Guild tradition and the "discrimination 
by default" which occurs as a result of Trade Unions withholding job- 
information from all potential applicants. Dubinsky too, however,
(3)emphasised "the outright racism" of Craft Unions' .
On the face of it the indictment of "racism" in the labour movement
is justified. Ray Marshall and other students of "blacks" and the Trade
Unions have catalogued a plethora or formal and informal processes of
U )
exclusion applied to black workers by’white dominated unions . 'Phis 1
1) Ray Marshall, 'Die Negro and Organised labour (John Wiley & Sons,
New York 1965) p. 15.
2) Sidney Lens, Unions and What They Do (Pittman's Sons, N. Y. 1964) p. 154.
3) Irwin Dubinsky, Reform in Trade Union Discrimination . . .  (Praeger,
New York 1973) pp. 25-26.
4) See Ray Marshall, The Negro and Organised Labour (John Wiley and 
Sons Inc., N. Y. 1965) Part It. Ray Marshall, The Negro Worker 
(Random House, N. Y. 1967). Robert C. Weaver, Negro Labour: A 
National Problem (Kennikat Press, N. Y. 1946) Ch. I, II and VII.
Herbert R. Northrup, Organised Labour and the Negro (Harper and 
Bros., N. Y. 1971) Herman Feldman, Racial Factors in American 
Industry (Harper Bros. N. Y. 1931) Sterling D. Spero and Abram L.
Harris, The Black Worker (Atheneum, N. Y. 1968) Milton Cantor, Black 
Labour in America (Negro Universities Press, Westpoint, Connecticut, 
1969) S. Castles and G. Kosack, op. cit. Ch. IV.
Trade Union hostility to black workers is seen as tantamount to an 
historical paradox. As Julius Jacobson contends: " If principle and logic 
prevailed, there would be no conflict between the Negro working class 
and the trade union movement since they share basic interests and 
needs that eliminate all rational reasons for serious friction between 
them. The most obvious common denominator is the economic position 
of the working class, an objective that should benefit both Negro and 
white w orkers"^ . The Trade Union objection and opposition to black 
workers, therefore, constitutes an enigmatic irrationality traceable to 
America's turbulent racial history. Jacobson's view is not 
unrepresentative of the most common explanation of "white" opposition 
to "black" workers. However, are white workers being irrational and 
what are the conditions of their becoming rational? The failure to discuss 
this is a grave theoretical retreat which must be exposed as engendering 
a fatalistic political resignation. It is usually the case that when social 
scientific theories lack theoretical depth the postulate of "human 
irrationality" is invoked. The humanist definition, the "Negro problem", 
is an effect of this debility. It follows from the common conviction that 
prejudice is an unreasonable human sentiment which defies logical 
explanation.
The syllogism which apparently informs these studies which charge 
"raciw..." in the labour movement seems to be: Trade Unions arc working- 
class organisations. Negroes are members of the working class. Hence, 
their exclusion by Trade Unions must be responsible to some psychological 
quirk or prejudice - racism. However, there are two assumptions 
coni. -in the premises which are of doubtful validity. It is assumed 
that:
a) Trade Union organisation of the working class is, by
(2 )
definition, an organisation for the working class
In other words, there is in this assumption an economistic 1
1) Julius Jacobson, The Negro in the American Labour Movement 
(Anchor Books, New York 1968)pp. 21-22.
2) This is a highly disputed assumption trenchantly questioned by, for 
example, V. I. Lenin. What is to be done (Progress Publishers, 
Moscow 1973).
conception of class interests, 
b) Trade Unions are structurally homogenous and that 
their responses to Negroes have been spatio-temporally 
uniform. This ignores the labour-policy differences 
between Craft and Industrial Unions^ and the accelerated 
integration of the American Negro into the labour 
movement after 1930.
We would contend that these assumptions betray a superficial understanding 
of the relationships between Trade Unionism and ideology as well as 
capital and wage labour. In a word, we are faced here with the common 
neglect of wider theoretical issues in the analysis of the labour situation 
of "blacks".
For the economic situation of "blacks" is not merely a 
function of their labour market position. Their relatively high level of 
unemployment no doubt contributes to their material deprivation. However, 
a large number of goods and services is provided by various State and local 1
1) For detailed evidence of Craft Union exclusion policy see Sterling 
Spero and Abram I„. Harris, The Black Worker, op. cit. Ch. IV,
Jack Rurbash, American Unions, Structure, Government and Politics 
(Random House, N. Y. 1967). According to Barbash, "the locus of 
discrimination is the craft unions and particularly the railroad and 
building trades unions", op. cit. p. 34. This view is confirmed in 
numerous other studies. See Scott Greer, I-ast Man In: Racial 
Access to Union Power. (The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois 1959) 
pp. 36-39. Sidney Lens, op. cit. p. 35. Ray Marshall, op. cit. 
pp. 128-129. On the other hand, the same author contends that 
Craft Unions were the only organisational mode of survival, "especially 
when Negroes were transported North by employers to be used either 
as strikebreakers, as cheap labour or in an effort to avert the 
unionisation of the enterprises", p. 21. I. Dubinsky attributes "the 
race riots" of Fast St. Louis in July 1917 to the strikebreaking policy 
of employers and the "racia l" fanaticism of the A. F. L . , op. cit. 
p. 26. Virtually every work cited here admits to "the equalitarian 
racial policy" of the CIO. But, see also Ray Marshall, The Negro 
Worker, op. cit. pp. 23-29 and James S. Olson, 'Race Class and 
Progress . . .  In M. Cantor (ed .) op. cit.
agencies so that the whole infrastructure of social services must be 
a relevant consideration. Secondly, certain patterns of economic 
inequality are independent of the labour market, for example inequality 
flowing from the ownership of property. Others are a result of endemic 
wage differentiation and would exist even if the so-called dual labour 
market were abolished. Finally, the level and movement of the prices 
of consumer goods are a crucial determinant of their availability. For 
all these reasons, the living standards of "blacks" must be analysed as 
part of an investigation of the prices of commodities. In effect, the 
explanation of black poverty is to be found in capitalist commodity 
production.
As we have seen, "Marxist" and radical writers do indict
"capitalism" with the ultimate responsibility for "the race problem".
Their expositions, however, are not satisfactory in that apart from the
uncritical acceptance of the race relations perspective, their treatment
of capitalism is unsystematic. O. C. Cox did not clarify the links between
capitalism and "race relations" except for sporadic references to "the
profit motive". The same can be said of Paul Raran and Paul Sweezy,
Harold Raron, Tom Christoffel^, and the radical economists and
sociologists who marginally discuss "racism" and "race relations" in
(2 )
their critique of modern capitalism . This is one of the reasons why the 
thesis of capitalism being the cause of "the race problem" lacks 
plausibility and persuasiveness.
The weaknesses in Marxist dissertations are generally exploited 1
1) Tom Christoffel "Rlack Power and Corporate Capitalism" in 
E.N. Schwartz and Robert Disch (eds.) White Racism (Dell 
Publishing Co., New York 1970).
2) See Howard Sherman, Radical Political Economy: Capitalism and 
Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective (N. Y. Rasic Rooks 
Press 1975). Ernest Mandel "Where is America Going", New Left 
Review No. 59 Jan-Feb 1970. Martin Nicolaus, "blacks: Students, 
Workers" New Left Review No. 54 March-April 1964. Raymond S. 
Franklin and William K. Taab, "The Challenge of Radical Political 
Economics" in Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. Ill No. 1, March 1974. 
Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich & Thomas E. Weiskopf (eds. )
The Capitalist System: A Radical Analysis of American Society 
(Prcntlcc-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1972). Victor Perlo,
The Economics of Racism (International Publishers, New York
1975).
by race relations theorists to the effect that Marx's texts are seen as 
inapplicable to "race". Prof. Leo Kuper championed this orthodoxy in 
these words: "Marxist theory, in emphasising the class struggle as 
the major determinant of political change, conceives of racial 
discrimination and exploitation as an aspect of class relations. In terms 
of this perspective, race conflict w ill most probably be resolved, and 
racial equality established as part of the world proletarian revolution. 
However, the application of this theory in its pure form to specific 
situations of racial conflict raises serious difficulties. There is not 
only a failure in solidarity lxHwecn workers of different race, but it is 
often workers of the dominant who demand the most extreme forms of 
racial discrimination. Moreover, members of the sulxmlinate race, 
are generally economically differentiated and do not constitute a single 
class . . .  The theoretical confusions within this passage are
formidable. We refer to Prof. Kuper's uncritical use of racial 
discrimination, exploitation and inequality as well as his suggestion 
that Marxist theory takes these categories for granted. This enduring 
falsification of Marx's mode of social analysis is compounded by the 
innuendo that Marxism cannot explain "the extreme forms of racial 
discrimination" demanded by "workers of the dominant race". Finally, 
there is the irresponsible arbitrariness of focusing on "the dominant 
race" ...Ihout a single mention of the dominant class within that race .
The theoretical deficiencies of race relations analysis, however, 
cannot be an excuse for treating Marx's analysis of capitalism and 
capitalist society as biblical constructs. On the other hand, this analysis 
is o ' Id in suspicion, or rejected on arbitrary, implausible and 
unclarified grounds. Admittedly, terms such as "capital", "capitalism" 
and "bourgeoisie" have been vulgarised by the emotional type of Marxism 1
1) Leo Kuper in UNESCO, op. cit. p. 9.
For other facile dismissals of ’Marxism' with reference to "race 
(relations) problems", see Ira Katznelson, op. clt. p. 6. Robert 
Bluuner, op. cit. p. 13. We say "facile" because the habitual 
procedure Is to simplify Marx's analysis after which Its irrelevance 
to "race" Is easily demonstrated.
which Alvin Gouldner has mentioned^. But this in itself is no justification
for the peremptory dismissals of "Marxist theory" and "Marxism" which
permeate the writings of race theorists in the sociological tradition.
Indeed, it may he .argued that the sociological tradition, including the
texts of Durkheim, Weber and Simmel, remain trapped in the ideological
forms of capitalist society and fails to explain the economic condition of 
( 2 )
"blacks . By an explanation we mean the demonstration of necessary 
relationships between phenomena or concepts, or of the absence of 
necessary relationships, such that the conditions of existence of the given 
phenomenon is implied,or specified. In this sense, Marx's analysis of the 
capitalist mode of production offers the most adequate set of concepts for 
the explanation of the social and economic conditions of "blacks". For 
his writings specify the mode of production within which the conditions 
which confront "blacks" would cease to exist.
1) Alvin Gouldner, op. cit. p. 6.
2) We have seen that the analysis of all the dimensions of "the black 
experience" must move to the economic level. On the other hand 
sociology appears concerned with the exclusion of the economic.
As Gouldner puts it: "Although aspects of sociological analysis 
make tacit assumptions about scarcity sociology is an intellectual 
discipline that takes economics and economic assumptions as given 
and that wishes or expects to solve the problem of social order 
under any set of economic assumptions or conditions". Alvin 
Gouldner, op. cit. p. 94. See W. G. Runciman's similar 
protestations about sociology in Social Science and Political 
Theory (Cambridge Univ. Press, London 1965) p. 1. Tills problem 
is not unrelated to the frustrating diffuseness of fundamental 
sociological concepts such as "social action" and "social structure 
Rclatedly, the conceptions of capitalism put forward by Simmel 
end Durkheim are distinctly moral. Durkheim sporadically refers 
to the class war, saw "the conflict between capital and labour" as
a manifestation of the anomic division of labour and regarded 
socialism as "a cry of pain". See Emile Durkheim, The Division 
of Labour in society (The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois 1947)
Book III, Chs. 1 and II. Weber's fetishisation of monetary forms 
of economic accounting leads him to argue for the general * . 
superiority of capitalist ("formal rationality") commodity production. 
The Theory of Economic and Social Organisation (The Free Press, 
New York 1966) pp. 205-210.
Marx's analysis, however, is susceptible to a variety of readings
a susceptibility deriving from the different epistemological currents within
"Capital" and, indeed, throughout his texts^ \  Thus,'Capital is amenable
( 2)
to a historicist-evolutionary , essentialist (the appearance-essence or, 
reality distinction) and structuralist re-constitutions. Moreover, in 
"Capital" the logical, historical and moral arguments are not always 
systematically separated. Finally, some of its concepts are inherently 
ambiguous, others Marx himself used ambiguously. These theoretical 
configurations all impinge on the development of a Marxist explanation 
of "race relations". Indeed, we hope to show that a'Marxist 
explanation of race relations'is epistemologically untenable, except as a 
theoretical displacement of'Vace relations'.'
In the historical or evolutionist reading of "Capital", capitalism 
is regarded dialectically, as a necessary but transient stage in the 
development of human civilisation within which antithetical forces are
(3)inexorably operative' ' .  Capitalism emerged from the womb of feudalism
1) It is to Althusser's credit that he drew attention to the problematic 
epistemological and theoretical structure of Marx's writings. Although 
his notion of epistemological breaks is unacceptably hermetic. Mar., 
'coquetted' throughout his life with not only Hegel but also with Spinoza 
and Feuerbach. Althusser's repudication of his earlier bifurcation 
instructive: 'When Capital Volume One appeared (1867), traces of the 
negellan influence still remained. Only later did they disappear 
completely: the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875) as well as the 
Marginal Notes on Wagner's 'Lchrbuch der politischen Okonomie' (1882) 
are totally and definitively exempt from any trace of Hegelian influence". 
Lenin and Philosophy (New Left Books, London 1971)p. 90.
2) i his may be said to be the kind of reading dominant in the 1960’s.
Ctilain works testify to this. R. Hilton, Capitalism, What's in a Name", 
Past and Present, No. 1. Feb. 1957; Maurice Dobb Studies in the 
Development of Capitalism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1963).
Eric Hobsbawm, Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, op. clt.
3) "The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the 
economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set 
free the elements of the latter". K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit.
p. 715. In "Antl-Duhring", Frederick F.ngels posits history as a process 
of evolution whose laws of motion historical materialism extracts. Antl- 
Duhring (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow 1959) p. 43. Thus 
the frequent references to the disappearance of the peasantry In 16th and 
17th century Europe and the universalisation of the wage relationship. See 
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. Part VIII, Vol. Ill, Chs. 20 and 27; 
Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, op. cit. Ch. 6. 
Eric Hobsbaum (ed .), op. cit. Introduction, pp. 67 and passim.
after the completion of processes of primitive accumulation and the
creation of the free labourer^ .
The historical basis of capitalism is not mere private property,
profit maximisation or accumulation ad infinitum. However much the growth
of the system depends on these processes, they themselves are contingent
on the epoch-making buying and selling of labour power. Capitalism should,
therefore, be taken to mean a mode of production based on wage labour in
which the products of labour are themselves commodities. Moreover, the
augmentation of capital takes place precisely through the continuous
extraction of surplus value or labour exploitation. Contrasting the feudal
and capitalist inodes of production, Laclau states: "The feudal mode of
production is one in which the productive process operates according to the
following pattern: 1. the economic surplus is produced by a labour force
subject to extra-economic compulsion; 2. the economic surplus is privately
appropriated by someone other than the direct producer; 3. property in the
means of production remains in the hands of the direct producer. In the
capitalist mode of production, the economic surplus is also subject to
private appropriation, but as distinct from feudalism, ownership of the
means of production is severed from ownership of labour power; it is that
permits the transformation of labour-power into a commodity, and with
( 2 )
this the birth of the wage relation"' . Thus, it appears, both historically 
and theoretically correct to regard the essential characteristic of capitalism 
as wage labour.
In emphasising the historically transitory nature of capitalism.
Marx pointed to evolutionary processes of disintegration rooted in the 
contra ictions which plagued the system. Capitalism, however, has an 1
1) As Marx puts it " ...w ith capital. 'Hie historical conditions of its 
existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of 
money and commodities. It can spring into life only when the 
owner of the means of production and subsistence meets in the 
market with the free labourer selling his labour power. And this 
one historical condition comprises a world history". Capital, Vol. 1, 
op. cit. p. 170."
2) Ernesto Laclau,"Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America)' New 
Left Review, May-June 1971, pp. 33-34.
historical raison d'etre. It "sows thé seeds of its own decay" reaching
its developmental zenith through the unending revolutionising of the
productive forces. For,inevitably,thèse processes of production become
increasingly social and clash with the private ownership of the means of
production. Given Marx's frequent references to historical facts and
his explicit approval of an evolutionary review of "C ap ita l"^ , Marxists
cannot be reproached for stressing the developmental processes within 
(2 )
capitalism . This emphasis is also visible in the economico-historical 
analysis of "the race problem"carried out by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. 
Capitalism had become "monopoly capital" and the transformation of its 
technostructure and the problem of realising the economic surplus best 
explain the fate of the Negro today.
Yet these changes in the technostructure are also the harbinger of the 
Negro's liberation from poverty. This thesis graces the works of 
contemporary radical, liberal and "free market" economists in the U. S. 
Modern'lndustrlal capitalism" is seen as having reached its apogee in the 
development of the productive forces to the extent that the tradition of work 
for income, i.e. wage labour, was now in conflict with the productive forces. 
Proof of this is the American economy's deviation from the goal of economic 
organisation - a fuller gratification of human needs. While radical and 
liberal economists stress this moral failure, the neo-Keynsians focus 
on the problem of secular stagnation. The economy could produce far 
more than its distribution mechanism allows and this In turn limits the full 
employment of resources. The observations and propositions of these 
liberal and radical economists appear as vindications of Marx's historical 
analysis of capitalism. Robert Theobald, for example, argues for the 
abolition of money: "Provision of income as a right w ill bring us to 
understand that money itself is an anachronism in a cyberated era. Money 
was needed to ration scarce goods and industrial services in the past, but 
it is a highly unsatisfactory means of determining priorities in a cybernated 1
1) See Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. pp. 17-18.
2) See Paul Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development (Monthly 
Review Press, New York 1942).
era. Society will find it more satisfactory, in terms of scarce resources
to distribute more types of goods and services without money payments"^
Ralph Parkman cites an extensive literature which challenges traditional
(2 )
conceptions of work and leisure . Milton Friedman is one of a number 
of economists who favour a "negative income tax" scheme which in some
(3)respects approximates the slogan "to each according to his need" . But
these theses do not approach the question of capitalist relations of
production. Capitalist commodity production is not analysed theoretically
so that the dislocative inflationary consequences of the artificial stimulation
of demand are assumed to be a necessary price of growth. Moreover, the
qualifications within the proposals acquire the flavour of strategies for economic
(4)
stabilisation and "the regulating of the poor" . James Tobin, for example, 
would have an income guarantee which alleviates poverty and at the same 
time maintains the incentive to worli. ^However, the radicalism of these 
"neo-Keynesian solutions" to the general problem of unemployment and 
poverty is contained in their taking the level of development of the 
productive forces as their point of departure. Their profound limitation 
lies in their reluctance to examine capitalist relations of pnxluction and 
pose the question of the production of use values. In our context, what is 
noteworthy is the neglect of this economic literature by virtually every 
race relations text. Nor is this surprising, since the "explanation" of 
"race relations" consists in demonstrating their reality and naturalness.
1) Robert Theobald "The Guaranteed Income in Perspective", in
Thomas A. Naylor (ed.). 'Die Impact of the Computer on Society 
(Southern Region Educational Board, Atlanta 19 ) p. 64. For
relevant bibliographical references, see Robert Theobald,
The Guaranteed Income: Next Step in Economic Evolution,
Doubleday Books, New York 1966).
2) Ralph Parkman, The Cybernetic Society (Pergamon Press, New 
York 1972), Ch.3.
3) See Milton Friedman, op. clt.; Christopher Green, Negative Taxes 
and the Poverty Problem, Tlte Brookings Institute, Washington D. C.
1967).
4) Cf. Frances Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor 
(Tavistock Publications, I/mdon 1972).
5) See James Tobin "Improving the economic status of the Negro",
Daedalus, op. clt. pp. 889-895.
"Vulgar economy" Marx writes " . . .  sticks to the appearances in
opposition to the law which regulates and explains them "^. Numerous other
remarks on the distinction between appearances and the real movement of
things have been interpreted as evidence that Marx operated with a realist
( 2 )
epistemology . Thus, NormanGeras contends that,for Marx.a scientific
(3)work should "uncover the reality behind the appearance which conceals it " '
If such a reconstitution of Marx is correct, then,for Marxists, "race 
relations" are appearances which Marxist theory can penetrate to the 
essential relations of capitalist society. Race would then be a "symptonri'of cap­
italism. This thesis finds expression in: "...many of the pervasive social 
problems that we see around us - inequality, alienation, racism, sexism, 
militarism, destruction of environment, consumerism, imperialism, etc ...
- are significantly and systematically related to the economic institutions 
that make up a capitalist society. To understand how to deal with these
problems and to achieve a better society, we must understand the internal
(4)
structure and dynamics of capitalist society'. These "social problems" 
are taken as empirical entities "that we see around us". Yet the first 
difficulty with this empiricist proposition is:howdowe know when the 
reality is grasped? The answer to this question,given by Karl Popper,is that 
we never know. Thus, any empirical falsification of a theory is its invalidation.
If the Marxist thesis is that racism is a symptom or a reality of capitalism,
1) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 307.
2) See Russell Keat and John Urry , Social Theory as Science (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, I^ondon 1975). Roy Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science 
(Alma Book Company, Leeds 1975).
3) Norman Geras "Marx and the Critique of Political Economy" in Robin 
Blackburn (ed. ) Ideology in Social Science (Fontana/Collins, London 
1972) p. 285.
4) R.C. Edwards et al, (eds. ) op. cit. pp. 3*4.
5) Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London 1963) p. 105. Popper, however, disagrees with "essentialism".
For an assessment of Popper's "empiricist" epistemology, see Karel 
Williams, "Facing Reality: a Critique of Karl Popper's Empiricism",
Economy and Society, Vol. 4, 1975. We would argue that the 
Impossibility of Popper's position inheres in his assertion that certainty 
Is Impossible, while at the same time posing the existence of "reality" 
ns certain.
Z l O
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the anti-Marxist position can merely point to instances of "race" in pre­
capitalist or non-capitalist societies and the Marxist explanation Incomes 
untenable. We need hardly add that this is the standard repudiation of the 
Marxist explanation of "race relations", effective because Marxists have 
entered "enemy terrain", i.e. "race relations". Secondly, what are the 
"internal dynamics of modern capitalism" which would explain "race relations"
- the capitalists' drive for profit, the law of value, competition, monopoly 
capital, the reserve army of labour? Why are these concepts more real than 
others, such as commodity production, wage labour and the class struggle.
Finally , the realist reading necessarily lapses into a concept of monocausality. 
Thus, it is highly significant that each Marxist text on "race relations" 
emphasises a different essence, or constituent of capitalism. The "racist 
capitalism" of radical theorists is also an effect of the essentialist reading.
For, in order to 'materialise' racism, it is then possible to link it with what is 
considered the essential feature of capitalism, generally the motive of the capitalist.
It may be observed that the historical and essentialist readings belong
to the same epistemological genus^. Their question is: what is the
essential characteristic of modern capitalism. To answer this question
it is necessary to investigate history, necessarily, the feudalism from 
( 2 )
which it emerged' .  The debate between Sweezy and Dobb is part of this 
project. The feudal past is investigated in order to prove the core 
constituent of capitalism as being wage labour (Dobb) or, on the other 1
1) Paul Sweezy cited Iiegel with relish:"in the process of scientific 
understanding, it is of importance that the essential should be 
distinguished and brought into relief in contrast with the so-called 
non-essential. But in order to render this possible we must know 
what is essential . . .  ", The Theory of Capitalist Development, 
op. cit. p. 12. The following works also belong to (his tradition: 
Werner Sombart, Hie Quintessence of Capitalism, (Howard Fertig, 
New York 1967); Max Weber, 'Ihe Protestant iilhic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, op. cit. For a Weberian counterpart to the 
Sweezy-Dobb debate, see Robert N. Green, Protestantism and 
Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and its Critics (D. C. Heath and 
Company, Boston 1959).
2) See Paul Sweezy et al., The Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism (New Left Books, hmdon 1976).
hand, market trade (Sweezy/^.
As testimony to the elusiveness of historical essences,the debate
shifted to the essential feature of feudalism where a similar difficulty
emerged in that historians could produce no certainty as to what is
( 2 )
feudalism . It is at this point that interest in the debate waned,or 
rather,diminished to be rekindled, however, by Andre Gunder Frank
(3)and Ernesto Iüclau' . In our view,the most significant feature of this 
"historical" controversy is Iiiclau’s generally unnoticed substitution of 
the capitalist and the feudal modes of production for "capitalism" and 
"feudalism". Laclau's break is important for an understanding of Eugene 
Genovese’ s entombment in the psychological essence of slavery in the 
Americas. Genovese's renowned ambivalence over the relationship between 
slavery andcapitali: t production suggests an interpretation as that of a "Marxist" 
theorist caught in a paradigm shift. Structuralist concerns were affecting 
at least "European Marxists", and capitalism was being replaced with 
the capitalist mode of production. Genovese was, however, and still is, 
within the historicist-rcalist problematic and its concomitant idealist 
methodology: History is the recapturing of historical reality as the actors 
themselves experienced it. The task of the historian is to observe, ex-
1) We may note here a certain conceptual looseness among the 
protagonists and even visible in Ernesto Laclau's emphasis 
on "wage labour", op. cit. Marx distinguished between the 
labourer, the free labourer, and the wage labourer, who was 
not merely employed for money wages, but produced capital.
See Eric 1 lobsbawm (ed .), Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, 
op. cit. pp. 99-120. When these distinctions are not adhered to 
the debate necessarily becomes inconclusive.
2) See Owen Lattlmore "Feudalism in History" Past and Present, 12, 1957. 
Eric Hobsbaum speaks of a vast category of "feudalism" which spans 
the continents and the millennia and ranges from, say, the emirates
of Northern Nigeria to France in 1788, from the tendencies visible 
in Aztec society on the eve of the Spanish Conquest to Tsarist Russia 
in the nineteenth century", op. cit. p. 63.
3) See Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in 
IvitIn America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (Monthly 
Review Press, New York 1969), Ernesto Laclau, op. cit.
tract and record these experiences. Historical explanation is thus reduced 
to a search for an ethos since these experiences are actuated by ideas and 
cul’ ure. What gives Genovese's work a Marxist flavour is his premature 
appropriation of Ihc tentative results of the Sweezy-Dobb debate. Payments 
in kind are evidence of a natural economy, within which a paternalistic 
ethos could function; money payments, proof of a ruthless capitalist 
calculation. We may understand why Genovese works border on an apology 
for the South and why he insists that Northern capitalism introduced a 
more iniquitous racism.
Cast in chronological and factorial terms of reference, the Sweezy- 
Dobb debate over the essential characteristics of feudalism and capitalism 
can now be seen to have artificially separated moments of a single 
phenomenon - "the long duration of feudal production"^ \  Banaji's analysis 
is a critical refutation of the characterisation of "the feudal mode of 
production" as»a natural economy to which a commodity economy can be 
Counterposed. The purpose of Marxist theoretical abstractions, he insists, 
is the identification of processes. Simple abstractions, a la Sweezy, Dohb 
et a l . , and 'lnetaphysical scholastic formalism which deduced its 'modes of 
production' from the simple categories present in various epochs of production" 
cannot identify the laws of motion of the social process. This identification 
leads to evolutionism when simple abstractions are utilised. A particular 
factor is seized upon at a particular time in history, for example, wage 
labour, which is then regarded as a watershed in the transition to a 
different mode of production. Yet, as Banaji shows, as a matter of historical 
record, there were significant pockets of slavery and wage labour within 
feudal enterprises.
The difficulties with the historica 1 analysis are formidable, and
indeed, the most popular repudiations of Marxism have come from within this 
(3)reading' Firstly, since capitalism's downfall is inevitable, no criteria 
of adequate political strategies need be formulated: the development of
1) Jarlus Banaji, "The Peasantry in the Feudal Mode of Production:
Towards an Economic M(xiel", The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 3, 
No. 3, April 1976.
2) ibid, p. 304.
3) See Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historlciam (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London 1957). Tlic Open Society and its Enemies, 2 Vols. (Routledge 
und Kegan Paul, London 1962),
analyses of revolutionary class consciousness and the concept of a socialist 
mode of production is not seen as a necessary condition of struggle.
Given this theoretical vacuum, sociologists construct theories of social 
change around the problem of identifying a sovereign element in hi story. 
Either of two was found: technology and man. Marxism is criticised for 
being a technological determinism and countermanded with the actors 
meaning as the motive force of civilisational development. It may be said 
that "capitalist" as a term of abuse constitutes a direct result of the 
historicist reading and the criticisms of it. And since the focus is on the 
capitalist, as a man, a certain legitimation of the notion of historical white 
exploitation becomes unavoidable.
Louis Althusser's intervention appears to be an abnegation of the 
historicist tendency paving the way for historiography without history, and 
modes of pnxluction without a problematic causation. A more than brief 
exposition of the promise of Althusser’s reading of Marx is not necessary 
to our analysis. Thus, suffice to say that Althusser rejects the 
Hegelian totality with its expressive ideational causation in favour of a 
structuralist totality in which elements were both subordinate and 
relatively autonomous. Thus, contradictions are multi-levelled and 
processes within the structure are over-determined. The dimensions of 
cause and effect are therefore not distinct: " . . .  the effects are not 
outside the structure are not a pre-existing object, element or space in 
which the structure arrives to imprint its mark: on the contrary . . .  the 
whole existence of the structure consists of its effects in short . . .  the 
structure, which is merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements 
is nothing outside Its e ffec ts "^ . Within this epistemological and theoretical 
re-situating of Marx's texts, the notion of historical continuity collapses.
A structure possesses differential temporality at its levels so that Its 
transmutation cannot be explained within linear periods^and a de-centred 
dominance in which subjects are trflgers. History does not have active 
subjects.
Etienne Balibar's attempt at de-historicising Marx took the form
1) Louis Althusser and Etienne Ballbar, op. cit. p. 189,
255
of an extraction of a set of invariant elements of the mode of production.
These elements form an atemporal combination which defines the economic 
structure of every society^ \  Bali bar interprets Marx's method in the 
following manner: "Marx's aim was to show that the distinction between 
different modes is necessarily and sufficiently based on a variation of the 
connexions between a small number of elements which are always the 
same. The announcement of these connexions and of their terms 
constitutes the exposition of the primary theoretical concepts of historical 
materialism, of the few general concepts which form the rightful beginning 
of his exposition and which characterize the scientific method of Capital, 
conferring on its theory its axiomatic form; i.e. the announcement of a 
determinate form of this variation, one which directly depends on the 
concepts of labour-power, means of production, property, etc., is a
(2 )
constantly necessary presupposition of the 'economic' proofs in Capital".
History, i.e. change, is constituted by the displacement of the element-
labourers, non-labourers and means of production. The uniquely contradictory
nature of the capitalist mode of production rests on the dual force of two
rules of combination, property connection and appropriation connection.
For the worker is maximally separated from both the Instruments of labour
and the products of labour, a separation which increases with the
development of capitalism and which guarantees the displacement of its
property and real appropriation connection.
The denial of even a historiography in "Capital" is manifest in the
work of Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst who themselves are sharply
(31critical of Althusser and Balibar' .  Their text initiates a total rupture with 
the orthodox Marxist debate over the essential characteristic of capitalism.
The debate can now be seen as the effect of an empiricist question: what is 
the major feature o f modern capitalism? Posed in this way, the conditions 
of existence of the capitalist mode of production cannot be investigated.
Thus, the debate is extraneous to the class struggle. Capitalism is a concept. 1
1) ibid, p. 215.
2) ibid, p. 225.
3) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit.
It has neither essence nor history, however much its analysis may involve
historical illustrations. Althusser's structuralism is conceived as an essen-
tialism in disguise, and his reconstitution of Marxism as "a science of
history" a capitulation to Spinoza's epistemology^. Similarly, Balibar's
general theory of modes of production is rejected as a contradictory
(21
combination of eternal and transitional modes of production . What
Mindcss and Hirst do not emphasise is that Althusser's epistemological
position is a realist variant of empiricism. Althusser rejects the project
of theoretical validation via a correspondence between thought and the
real object. However, he conceives thought as appropriating the real-
concretti?^ Men can therefore write real history and transform it into a
( 4 )science . But how is the appropriation of the real object to be identified?
Althusser's criticism of Marx's totality is not a theoretical act 
but a demonstration of guilt by association, with Hegel. Marx's totality 
within which elements are organised around a principal contradiction, 
that between capital and labour, is replaced with a Spinozist totality 
comprising relatively autonomous and overdetermined elements. This 
conception provides no basis for ascertaining the transformation of the 
totality as opposed to the displacing of its instances. Since there is no 
concept of significant contradiction - as in Parsons' structural functionalism 
and Simniefs conflict sociology - the instance which could dissolves the 
totality is unidentifiable. Thus, within Althusser's structural analysis, the 
capitalist social formation is characterised by a multiplicity of overdetermined 
conflicts fused by an'ahscnt economic instance. AsGlucksman observes: "he 
is not very specific about how in a revolutionary situation, the overdetermined 1
1) Ibid, p. 316.
2) ibid, p. 274.
3) Louis Althusser and Etienne Bali bar, op. clt. p. 56.
4) The marriage between history and structural analysis is well 
expressed by M. Godelier "A history is possible, and can be 
scientific only on the basis of results won by preliminary 
structural research, and the results of these historical researches 
will also contribute to the development of structural research". 
Rationality and Irrationality in Economics (New Left Books, London 
1972) p. XXXIII.
contradiction actually fuses into mass action, and implies that this 
occurs only through political activity, so revealing the tendency to 
overpoliticisation or voluntarism. In his scheme the fusion of the 
contradiction appears to result in the disappearance of the structure in 
domination and Althusser provides no indication of how fusion is effected 
at the political level and of how the masses and subjective experience and 
consciousness are interfused with objectively existing contradictions"^. 
This political sterility follows logically from Althusser's historical 
materialism. What is not recognised is that relevance to class struggles 
is not guaranteed by the assumption of either history,or a concrete 
reality. Rather, theoretical Investigations are relevant in so far as they 
are internally coherent, a condition which neither'history'Yior"rea1ity' 
assures.
The structuralism of Althusser, Balibar and Godelier presupposes 
a reality which, in their view, empiricism confuses with the observable, 
but which can only be appropriated through abstraction. Rut this 
presupposition is itself empiricist for it treats "reality" as an atheoretical 
object which is the common theoretical object of all analyses. The 
structural perspective wotdd concede the reality of racial, ethnic and 
class conflicts and offer interpenetrating, or materialist explanations of 
them. In Althusser's case, the economy is determinant in the "last 
instance". The reality o f these conflicts is an empirical given. They are 
seen as social events not theoretical constructs. In this very empiricism 
lies the source of the atomisation of the working class.
Our questioning o f "reality" is not an idealist exercise which must
degenerate into solipsism. Rather, it is a strategy similar to that which
has shorn "facts", "truth" and "history" of their imputed epistemological
authority.Berkeley's immaterialism and Hegel’ s idealism are both based on
• ♦ »»
the assumption of a theoretically-free world. 'Hie former's concern is 
with the relationship between matter and perception; the latter's, world 1
1) Miriam Glucksman, Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social
Thought: A Comparison of the Theories of Claude Lévi-Strauss
and Louis Althusser (Routlcdge and Kcgan Paul, London 1974) p. 130.
2) See I.C. Tipton Berkeley, The Philosophy of Immaterialism
(Methuen, London, 1974) p. 11.
historical development and the Spirit. These are both empiricist projects
claiming to study the given. To question the status of "reality" is asking
for clarification of whether it means objects that are: independent of an
individual^ perception, independent of human conscipusness, o ra  supra-
theoretical entity. The first meaning does not define reality as an entity opposed
to ideas. Thus, social theories can also be regarded as reality.
"Reality" in the last two senses is self-coiitradictory: an object independent
of all human perception presupposes a perception of it, and an object
independent of all theories can only be a theory of God.
Althusser is not faithful to his notion of a "symptomatic reading",
for his reconstruction of the system of concepts underlying the words in
Marx's texts retains "history" and "reality" as Marx's concepts. To be
sure, they are Althusser's. What,thenfof his structuralism? Glucksman
distinguishes between structural and structuralist approaches: "The former
is explicitly empiricist, the latter anti-empiricist"^ . In this sense
Althusser is not a structuralist, but a structural theorist. Realism, a variant
(2 )
of empiricism, ¡^structural . It posits an exogenous reality, or 
appearances, whose structure is to be discovered and extracted via the 
application of theory. It is empiricist in that an atheoretical reality is 
assumed. The structuralist approach interrogates the very concept of reality 
by analysing the epistemology of texts which asserts its presence. The 
crucial question is: is there a structural as well as a structuralist Marxism? 
Or, going further, is It possible to speak of "Marxism" in view of the 
epistemological and methodological heterogeneity of Marx's texts? On the 
other hand, this heterogeneity ceases to lie problematic if placed in the 
context of Marx's intellectual development, and his struggle against bourgeois
1) ibid, p. 46.
2) This is not arbitrary. For if a structure is a relationship visible 
in its effects, then the effects of reality can only be discovered
by Investigating the concept Itself. To say that a given phenomenon 
is real is merely to say that it is a fact of a given theory. At this 
stage the validation of the fact is yet to be carried out. %
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economists and necessary residences on their terrain. For example,
Marx entered "history" in order td demonstrate the specific conditions 
of existence of the capitalist mode of production. For: "It would 1« 
inexpedient and wrong therefore td present the economic categories 
successively in the order in which they have played the dominant role 
in history. On the contrary, their order of succession is determined 
by their mutual relation in modem bourgeois society and this is quite the 
reverse of what appears to be natural to them or in accordance with the 
squence of historical development. The point at issue is not the role 
various economic relations have played in the succession of various social 
formations appearing in the couise of history; even less is it their sequence 
"as concepts" (Proudhon) (a nebulous notion of the historical process), but 
their position within modern bourgeois society." (1) Does Marx rescue, 
reject, or reconstitute history, as a science? Either activity 
divests the term history of its canonical and demiurgic status and leads 
to the recognition of the need to construct other modes of theoretical proof.
In this sense, Marx's historical illustrations and evolutionism are not 
Hegelian residues but necessary theoretical preliminaries which carve out 
the terrain for him to construct a concept of the capitalist mode of production.
Marx's texts,then,are not historical investigations. If they constitute
a "science of history" it is exclusively in Marx's emphasis on the present
as the key to the understanding of the past. Indeed, e relatively unknown
passage from the "Grundrisse" may be cited: "In order to develop the laws
of bourgeois economy . . .  it is not necessary to write the real history of
the relations of production. But the correct observation and deduction of
these laws, having themselves become in history, always lead to primary
equations . . .  which point towards a past lying behind this system. These
indications together with a correct grasp of the present then offer the key
to the understanding of the past - a work in its own right which, it is to be
( 2 )
hoped, we shall undertake as well" . To begin with "the laws of 1
1) Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
(Lawrence and Wisliart London 1971) p 213
2) Karl Marx, Grundrisse, (Allen Lane, London 1973) pp. 460-461.
See also Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
op. cit. pp. 210-211. As EricHobsbawm observed:"Marx concentrates 
his energies on the study of capitalism, and he dealt with the rest of 
history In varying degrees of detail, but mainly In so far as it bore on 
the origins and development of capitalism", op. cit. p. 20.
260
bourgeois economy" is not methodologically rrbitrary. For the "genesis 
of capitalism" presupposes the specification of capitalist social relations 
of production. This is extremely important. For the development of the 
concept of the (capitalist mode of production thereby becomes the 
precondition and basis of any "historical" writing within the Marxist 
tradition^ \
Within a structuralist reading, it is possible to argue that Marx
(2 )
has no concept of reality , or history. When he writes of an essence, or the 
real behind the appearances, he means necessary relationships which the 
empiricism of political economy obscures. Political economy has a 
concept of reality. This is why it sticks to appearances; namely, it 
constructs concepts whose adequacy is measured according to their 
correspondence to reality. But appearances are nothing but the conceptions 
of political economy in the same sense as "race relations" are the dominant 
conceptions derived from the theoretical practice of an empiricist social 
science. Marxists are not to penetrate "race relations" in the sense of 
admitting to their real existence and exposing their material substratum. 
Rather, their epistemological and theoretical lineage should be laid bare 
as a precondition to changing the terrain and the object of study. For if 
" . . .  the relation between wage labour and capital determines the entire
(3)character of the mode of production" , then, it is wage labour which 
constitutes the germ of class antagonisms. On the other hand, social 
science creates and classifies different antagonisms under such rubrics 
as poverty, deviance, industrial relations, race relations, sex relations, 
and so on. The question isj why are these problems regarded not 
as the product of a particular epistemology, but as the realities of life?
We stressed the "development" of the concept of the capitalist mode 
of production In view of the absence in Marx of a systematic use of
1) This viewpoint can lie found, for example, in Eric llobsbawm:
"Marx concentrated his energies on the study of capitalism, and 
he dealt with the rest of history in varying degrees of detail, but 
mainly in so far as it bore on the origins and development of 
capitalism", op. clt. p. 20.
2) Note that "Capital" is subtitled "A Critique of Political Economy"; 
as texts,that is.
Karl Marx, Vol. Ill, op. ctt. p. 880.3 )
random geographic and chronological designations of modes of production
-"A sia tic " and "ancient—which suggest that he had not thought out its
specificity as a concept. Ixmis Althusser says as much: "Marx did give
u s  any theory of the transition from one mode of production to another,
i.e. of the constitution of a mode of production" . Jo tins Bancjl contends that
the concept mode of production has two distinct meanings. The first is
simply the labour process. The second is "a broader and more specifically
historical meaning. Modes of production are variously called: 'forms of
production', 'forms of the social process of production', 'epochs'in the
economic development of society', 'epochs of production, periods of
( 2 )
production' . Banaji, however, does not attempt to resolve this ambivalence. 
This is an unsatisfactory state in which to leave the issue. For then,the 
field is left open for the empirical ide ntifying of a mode of production and 
the problem of the relationship between the productive forces and relations 
of production remains enigmatic.
The empirical conception of a mode of production reduces the concept
toa national economy. A mode of production is seen as a regional instance
,(3)
of a more general phenomenon, for example, "a system of production
Discussions deriving from this conception would revolve around the manner
in which the capitalist mode, i.e. European economies or urban industrial
enclaves in the 'Third World' Impinge on "non-capitalist" or "traditional"
(4)
modes of production . We may observe here how Dorothy Smith attempts 
to transcend the regional conception: " . . .  we do not lx.-gin with the notion 
of the nuxie of prcxluction as a distinct institutional zone, roughly equatable 
with that of economies but with the concept of the mode of production as the basic 
organisation of the society, and thus with the family as one aspect of the social 1
1) Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, op. cit. p. 197.
2) Jarvis Banaji, op. cit. p. 301.
3) Ernesto Ixiclau, op. cit.
4) See Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth (eds. ) for stimulating 
discussions of these issues, Beyond the Sociology of Development: 
Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, IxMidon 1975).
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relations which are determined by the mode of production"^ \  Smith does, 
however, lapse into a technicist conception in arguing that:"The term
„ (2)
industrialisation identifies, though rather loosely, a mode of production"
Here modes of production are defined in terms of the instruments used
within the labour process. The concept of relations of production is omitted
and the particular forms which these instruments may assume are thus
ignored. For Norman Long, a mode of production is " . . .  that complex
made up of the forces of production (i.e . technical rules, resources,
instruments of labour, and labour power) and the social relations of
production . . .  These social relations are principally defined in terms of
the owernship and control of the means of production and of the social
product. Thus, in theoretical terms a mode of production equals the
combination of social relations of production and the level of development
of the productive forces: comparing for example, the capitalist with the
feudal mode we find that both systems exhibit quantitatively different
(3)relations and forces of production" . In this definition,emphasis is on 
the combination of social relations of production and the productive forces.
In his conclusion, however, Long abandons the combination and emphasises 
production relations contending that'ln non-hacienda zones there exists a 
multiplicity of modes based on capitalist semi-capitalist, and non-capitalist
H )production relation^
A mode of production as an economy is a residue of the empiricist 
search for an economic counterpart to the politically sovereign nation-state.
It creates insuperable theoretical difficulties in defining economic"sovreignty", 
"dependence',' and "underdevelopment"^. The empiricist conception cannot 
m
1) Dorothy Smith "Women, the Family and Corporate Capitalism” ,
Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. XX, 1975), pp,55-56.
2) ibid.p. 56.
3) Norman Iomg, "Structural Dependency, Modes of Production and
Economic Brokerage in Peru", in Ivar Oxaal et al. (eds. ) op. cit. p. 267.
4) ibid, p. 278.
5) See Philip J. O'Brien, "A Critique of Latin American Theories of 
Dependency" in Ivar Oxaal et al. (eds. ) op. clt.
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explain why similar techniques or means of production structure different 
relationships between agents. For industrialisation conduces the possibility 
of both 'labour exploitation and its abrogation and its tempo is not independent 
of property forms. 'Die failure to contemplate the relationship between 
the relations and forces of production is manifested in the frequent 
substitution of "relations of production" with "social relations of productions". 
Given the generality of the term "social relations", the social relations of 
production may be conceived as the mode of appropriation, property 
relations, relations within the labour process, relations of distribution. e tc. Yet 
can relations of production be non-social? Is not sociality already implicit in 
"relations"? Marx writes: "In the social production of their existence, men 
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, 
namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the 
development of their material forces of production"^ \  Relations of 
production independent of men’s will can only be theorised at the level of 
valueeffects for they are not social-intentional. Therefore, there can be no 
definition of the relations of production except with reference to these 
effects, t.e. the nature or value form of the go(xis produced.
Our reading is opposed to that suggested by Hindess’ and Hirst’ s
postulate of an articulated combination such that "There can be no definition
of the relations or of the forces of production independently of the mode of
(2 )
production in which they are combined" . The authors Intervene in this 
discussion at two specific levels. Like Balibar, they regard the "Preface" 
as strongly Hegelian. At the same time, however, they reject Balibar’ s 
Spinozist conception of mode of production. ’To the Hegelian conception of 
the .«f production whose very reproduction is also a moment of its 
dissolution Reading Capital opposes the Spinozist conception of nuxie of 
production as eternity. In the one conception the structure produces Its 
dissolution as a necessary effect, in the other it produces as effects its own
conditions of existence. Nothing in the latter concept can entail its dissolution 1
. . ( 3 )
1) Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
op. cit. p. 20.
2) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 11.
3) ibid. p. 274.
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More important, however, is their definition of a mode of production:
" an articulated combination of relations and f( ces of production 
structured by the dominance of the relations of production. The relations 
of production define a specific mode of appropriate > >f surplus labour 
and the specific form of social distribution of the m< is of production 
corresponding to that mode of appropriation of surplus labour . . .  'Forces 
of production' refers to the mode of appropriation of ature, that is, to the 
labour process in which a determinate naw material is transferred into a 
determinate product" ^ \  Thus, the productive forces are not the elements 
of the labour process but their articulation.
The second point of their intervention streises the necessity of 
establishing the correspondence lietween the forces and relations of 
production in defining any particular mode of production. That is to say, the 
validity of the concept mode of production as an articulated combination of 
corresponding forces and relations of production depends on the demonstrating 
of a logical necessity between the articulation of the elements of the labour 
process and the mode of production of surplus labour. Proof of the existence 
of the existence of the primitive communist, ancient, slave and feudal 
modes of production is then adduced within the concepts of this theory of 
modes of production.
We do not think Hindcss and Hirst have satisfactorily resolved the 
question of the relationship between the relations of production and the 
forces of production.
We contend further that their concept of a mode of production has the 
character of a static model because of their category of a general corres­
pondence. Marx has no concept of a general mode of production. The 
"Preface" does not represent a concatenation of invariant corresponding 
forces and relations of production. The relations of production are not 
combined into a model of economic organisation. The relations of production 
are "appropriate" to a given stage in the development of material productive 
forces. Every stage has an appropriate set of prod ction relations, and 
thus, Indeed, Marx nowhere speaks of a general correspondence between 1
1) ibid. pp. 9 - 10.
Vthe productive forces and the relations or production^ . A general concept
of mode of production presupposes a general correspondence between the
relations and the forces of production. For Marx, such a correspondence
is ruled out by class conflict, class conflict which furthers the development
of the productive forces: "Without conflict, no progress: that is the law
which civilisation has followed to the present day. Until now the forces of
..(2)production have developed by virtue of the dominance of class conflict"
The exploitation of labourers and the utilisation of natural elements
generate the development of labour productivity to the point where living
labour becomes unnecessary to economic production. Under this condition
( 3 )there would be no mode of production , and thus there can be no general 
concept mode of production.
Their definition of the forces of production collapses the concept 
into the occupational distribution of functions within the labour process. 
Similarly, the relations of production are conceived as the social division of 
labour. The authors then argue: "The concept of a determinate labour 
process is sufficient to define a technical differentiation of functions between 
the agents of production, but it is impossible to deduce a determinate social
1) This "correspondence" may be a question of "translation". For 
example, "entsprechen" is translated correspondence in Robert
C. Tucker, The Marx-Rngels Reader (W. W. Norton and Co. Ltd.,
New York 1972) p. 4. and Michael Evans, Karl Marx (George Allen 
and Unwin Ud., London 1975) p. 61. However, in Karl Marx, A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, op. c it .,"appropriate 
to'ls the translation of "entsprechen". Correspondence is obviously 
stronger than appropriate to, and not a few political scientists and 
sociologists cling to the former in order to demonstrate ambiguities, 
or inconsistencies in the "Preface".
2) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Work, Vol. 4, pp. 91-92 cited 
in Michael Evans, Karl Marx, op. cit. p. 79.
3) This assertion raises the problem of the operation of the law of value 
in a communist mode of production. We would argue that it operates 
in the so-called lower phase, i.e. commodity production orchestrated 
by the proletarian dictatorship. The literature on this problem is 
hardly extensive. See, however, Wlodimierz Brus, The Market in a 
Socialist Economy (Routledge and Kegun Paul, London 1972).
Charles Bettelheim, Economic Calculation and Forms of Property 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1975).
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division of labour from these functional d ifferences"^. The forces of
production are here reduced from the mode of appropriation of nature to
functional differences in the technical division of labour and, similarly,
relations of production are conceived as social division of labour. It then
becomes "impossible" to deduce the latter from the former. This
impossibility, however, is based on a tautology. The productive forces are
defined as the articulating of their elements by the relations of production.
By definition, then, there is a unity which precludes the possibility of assigning
a "primacy" to cither productive forces or relations of production. Moreover,
in raising the question of primacy the authors implicitly problematise the notion
of corresponding forces and relations of production. In ignoring the stage o f
development of the productive forces, liindess and Hirst are forced to argue for
both correspondence and primacy. What is the nature of this primacy in the light of
of their emphasis on correspondence and combination? What articulates the
relations of production? Class struggle. What articulates class struggle?
Here there must be a silence, or we are faced with a circular return to the
( 2 )
relations of production.
The authors are also inconsistent in their characterisation of the 
relationship between modes of production and modes of appropriation.
This inconsistency is hidden by the non-specification of the terms: forms of the 
mode of production, forms of appropriation of the surplus product variant 
and forms of a determinate mode of production. These terminological shifts 
allow a theorist infinite latitude in positing specific relationships. Not 
surprisingly,then, the authors could claim that "the mode of appropriation 
of the surplus product can serve as an initial index of the existence or 
non existence of a mixle of production"^, admit to two modes of appropriation^ 
and yet construct concepts of four determinate modes of production.
Furthermore, the mode of appropriation is sometimes conflated into 
mechanisms of appropriation - rents, wages, or labour services. To 1
1) ibid, p. 12.
2) Indeed, class struggle is not theorised, merely "essential" to Marxist theory.
3) ibid, p. 183. P‘ 9f
4) ibid, p. 10.
appropriate is to alienate an object from its owner. Appropriation
/herefore presupposes ownership. But while ownership is a social relation,
it is by definition also private. It signifies that an object belongs to a
specific agent or agency. T  re can be no modes or forms of appropriation.
The space of the concept is intrinsically limited to one type or "case",
while the mechanisms of appropriation may take forms. The authors'
confusion over the concept mode of appropriation is also evinced by the
following. At one point we are told: "the relations of production define a
specific mode of appropriation of surplus labour"^. Elsewhere, "a con-
„ ( 2 )ceivablc mode of appropriation, then, defines the relations of production"
The relationship between the forces of production and relations of production
is also arbitrarily designated as "a complex unity", "an articulated
combination", and a correspondence "structured by the dominance of the
relations of production". This in our view expresses the authors' difficulty
with the problem of simultaneously demonstrating a correspondence between
concepts one of which has "primacy".
We define the forces of production as the specific elements used in
the appropriation of nature, i.e. raw materials, tools and labour power.
A stage in the development of the productive forces is a periodisation of
technical processes within the combination of these elements, for example,
manufacturing, industrial and automated techniques. As Marx puts it:
"It is not the articles made but how they are made and by what instruments
that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. Instruments of
labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which
human labour has attained, but they are also indications of the social
(3)conditions under which that labour is attained" The development of the
productive forces is internal to the relationship between men and nature.
It is for this reason that the labour process can be analysed "independently
(4)
of the particular form it assumes under given conditions" . Thus, the 1
1) ibid, p. 9.
2) ibid, p. 12.
3) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, op. cit. p. 180.
4) ibid, p. 177.
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form of development of the productive forces is determined by the relations
of production. Marx says the productive forces develop not because of, but
within the framework of the relations of production^ \  Thus the condition
of 'appropriateness' between the relations of production and the given
stage of development of the productive forces lies in the formal structuring of
the productive forces by the relations of production. The development of the
productive forces is an autonomous set of transactions between men and
nature. The relations of production impose formal limits on, and
( 2 )
ultimately "fetter" these transactions . We define the relations of 
production as specific economic exchanges between agents which define 
them as classes. They constitute the economic structure of society. These 
exchanges are thus mechanisms of labour exploitation. In the capitalist 
mode of production litis takes place through a system of commodity 
exchange - the wages system - through which surplus value accrues to the 
capitalist class.
In Balibar's general theory of modes of prcxluction, the appropriation 
and property connections outlive all possible combinations of the elements. 
Hindess and Hirst follow Balibar in arguing that "surplus labour is a 
necessary element in all possible modes of production. They differ not in 
the existence o f surplus labour but in the mode in which it is appropriated.
It may be appropriated collectively as in primitive communist and 
advanced communist (socialist) modes of production, or it may be
(3)
appropriated by a class of non-labourers as in capitalism and feudalism"
This postulate o f the eternality of the appropriation connection is not 
theoretically demonstrated, and indeed, betrays a misunderstanding of the 
concept of appropriation. The conditions of existence of appropriation rule 
out the possibility of "collective appropriation". A collectivity does not 
appropriate the products of its labour; it redistributes them. In a communist 1
1) Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
op. cit. p. 20.
2) Marx asserts: "From forms of development of the productive forces 
these relations become fetters", ibid, p. 21.
3) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 10. Marx wrote, however, 
"If the whole working-day were to shrink to the length of this portion 
(lubour time for subsistence Y.W. ), surplus-labour would vanish, a 
consummation utterly impossible under the regime of capital".
Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 530.
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mode of production, the surplus labour-necessary labour distinction collapses. 
Surplus labour is labour alienated from the producers. Marx's observation 
here brings this out clearly: "Capital has not invented surplus labour.
Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of 
production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working-time 
necessary for his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to 
produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production 
. . .  It is, however, clear that in any given economic formation of society, 
where not the exchange value but the use value of the product predominates, 
surplus labour will be limited by a given set of wants which may be greater 
or less and that here no boundless thirst for surplus labour arises from the 
nature of production its e lf"^ . In economic formations where use value 
predominates, the extraction of surplus labour is modified by natural 
wants: "Hence, in antiquity over-work becomes horrible only when the
object is to obtain exchange value in its specific independent money form;
(2)
in the production of gold and silver" . There is nothing in this passage or
in the Critique of the Gotha Programme which suggests that Marx considered
surplus labour to be a feature of every economy. In the Critique of the
Gotha Programme, Marx is demonstrating the conditions of production in
the lower phase of communist society when the need for expanded reproduction
precludes the possibility of the labourers reviewing the full proceeds of their
labour. In communist society, the collectivity does not appropriate surplus
labour. It allocates the global labour time such that production and consumption
are a unitary process of the distribution of use values. Hindess and Hirst
have an absolutist conception of surplus labour. Thus, they ignore its
quantlative variations in conditions of class struggle and cannot conceive
of the possibility of its non-existence. They claim: "Surplus labour, that
is, labour over and above necessary labour exist in all modes of production
because the conditions of reproduction of the labourer are not equivalent
(3)to the conditions of reproduction of the economy" . But what is this
1)
2)
3)
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 235. 
ibid.
Barry Hindcss and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 26.
economy, separate from labourers in communist society? We see here 
how the general concept mode of production vitiates their analysis. The 
economy is real, absolute and eternal.
The authors' assertion: "No surplus product, no mode of production 
and therefore no social form ation"^ is based on a confusion of the concepts 
surplus labour, necessary labour, surplus value and necessary consumption. 
Surplus value is the difference between the value of what the labourers 
produce and what they consume. 'Hie value of what they consume is 
relatively necessary labour. For it represents the labour time congealed 
in the production of goods consumed by the labourers relative to conditions 
of class struggle and the level of labour productivity. As the quote above 
from Marx shows, surplus labour too is relative. There is no general 
concept of surplus labour, or necessary labour, because there is no general 
concept mode of production. In the capitalist mode of production, the 
working day is divided into labour necessary for the reproduction of the 
labourer and his family (V)and labour which produces capital (C). It is 
possible to argue that C is unnecessary labour, labour pumped from the 
labourer because of the "boundless thirst for surplus value". It may be 
necessary from the capitalist's standpoint of expanded reproduction, ad 
infinitum. The necessity stops there. In the communist mode of production, 
necessary labour includes the labour time required for simple reproduction, 
i.e. the generation of the inputs necessary for expanding the production of 
use values. Thus the concept of "the appropriation of surplus labour by
(3)the mechanism of the redistribution of the product is self-contradictory' . 
Appropriation is necessarily private, although it takes atomistic or 
■. i ,rate forms. A collectivity's setting-aside of part of its produce in 1
1) ibid, p. 27.
2) ibid, pp. 26-27.
3) ibid, p. 11. Indeed, the authors contradict themselves in admitting 
"The appropriating of surplus labour presupposes that means of 
production are in the hands of the capitalist since otherwise there 
would be no necessity for the labourers to obtain means of 
consumption through the use of their labour power", p. 10. We 
may add, since labour power is not property in a communist mode 
of production, there is no necessary nor surplus labour time.
economy, separate from labourers in communist society? We see here 
how the general concept mode of production vitiates their analysis. The 
economy is real, absolute and eternal.
The authors' assertion: "No surplus product, no mode of production 
and therefore no social form ation"^ is based on a confusion of the concepts 
surplus labour, necessary labour, surplus value and necessary consumption. 
Surplus value is the difference between the value of what the labourers 
produce and what they consume. 'Hie value of what they consume is 
relatively necessary labour. For it represents the labour time congealed 
in the pnxluction of goods consumed by the labourers relative to conditions 
of class struggle and the level of labour productivity. As the quote above 
from Marx shows, surplus labour too is relative. There is no general 
concept of surplus labour, or necessary labour, liecause there is no general 
concept mode of production. In the capitalist mode of production, the 
working day is divided into labour necessary for the reproduction of the 
labourer and his family (V) and labour which prtxluces capital (C). It is 
possible to argue that C is unnecessary labour, labour pumped from the 
labourer because of the "boundless thirst for surplus value". It may be 
necessary from the capitalist's standpoint of expanded reproduction, ad 
infinitum. The necessity stops there. In the communist mode of production, 
necessary labour includes the labour time required for simple reproduction, 
i.e . the generation of the inputs necessary for expanding the production of 
use values. Thus the concept of "the appropriation of surplus labour by
(3)
the mechanism of the redistribution of the product is self-contradictory 
Appropriation is necessarily private, although it takes atomistic or
,rate forms. A collectivity's setting-aside of part of its produce in
1) ibid, p. 27.
2) ibid, pp. 26-27.
3) ibid, p. 11. Indeed, the authors contradict themselves in admitting 
"The appropriating of surplus labour presupposes that means of 
production are in the hands of the capitalist since otherwise there 
would be no necessity for the labourers to obtain means of 
consumption through the use of their labour power", p. 10. We 
may add, since labour power is not property in a communist mode 
of production, there Is no necessary nor surplus labour time.
case of exigencies, or for future consumption is not the appropriating of surplus
labour. Indeed, the concept is tautologous. Surplus labour is appropriated
labour, in the sense that it is an expenditure of labour power that accrues to
non-producers, g ra tis^ . In the capitalist mode of production this surplus
labour, or surplus value, is used to generate capital, the expanded reproduction
of the means of production. Hindess' and Hirst's conception of surplus labour
means simply the unconsumed part of the global product and this explains why
(2 )
they assert that "surplus value must always be extracted by some means" \
In other words, society must contain mechanisms ensuring that all its produce
is not consumed. Their conception then, does not differ from that of the idealists 
(3)
whom they criticise .
The commitment to the construction of a general concept mode of
production leads Hindess and Hirst astray from what is perhaps their most
original insight, namely that appropriation is the defining characteristic of the
capitalist and precapitalist modes of production, hi this sense, these are only
two possible nuxlcs of production - exploitative and non-exploitative. The so-called
slave, feudal,Asiatic ancient and capitalist modes of production are but variants
of the exploitative mode of belonging to what Marx called the "pre-history of human
society". The specificity of the capitalist variant lies in its continual production
of exchange value and the universallsatlon of wage labour. A non-exploitative
"mode of production of material life" is an association of producers engaged in the
(4)
reproduction of the conditions of redistributing use values 1
1) Cf. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, op. cit. Ch. XVIII.
2) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 27.
3) , ;-J, p. 24.
4) The problems which puzzle students of modes of production -  the pockets 
of wage labour and commercial activities in antiquity and medieval Europe 
us well as the persistence of use value production in the capitalist world 
economy -  lose their enigmatic character as soon as we abandon the 
project of the chronological classification of economic history and 
concern ourselves with the conceptions of labour exploitation within 
historical texts. In this sense,Karl Polanyi's classification: reciprocal, 
market, and redistributive economies is defective in that it Ignores
the labour process. See Karl Polanyi,"The Economy as Instituted Process" 
in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (eds.)
Trade and Market In Early Empires (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 
1957).
n \
case of exigencies, or for future consumption is not the appropriating of surplus
labour. Indeed, the concept is tautologous. Surplus labour is appropriated
labour, in the sense that it is an expenditure of labour power that accrues to
non-producers, g ra tis^ . In the capitalist mode of production this surplus
labour, or surplus value, is used to generate capital, the expanded reproduction
of the means of production. Hindess' and Hirst's conception of surplus labour
means simply the unconsumed part of the global product and this explains why
(2 )
they assert that surplus value must always lie extracted by some means" .
In other words, society must contain mechanisms ensuring that all its produce
is not consumed. Their conception then, does not differ from that of the idealists
u u , , , (3) whom they criticise
The commitment to the construction of a general concept mode of
production leads Hindess and Hirst astray from what is perhaps their most
original insight, namely that appropriation is the defining characteristic of the
capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. In this sense, these are only
two possible modes of production - exploitative and non-exploitative. The so-called
slave, feudal,Asiatic ancient and capitalist modes of production are but variants
of the exploitative mcxle of belonging to what Marx called the "pre-history of human
society". The specificity of the capitalist variant lies in its continual production
of exchange value and the universalisation of wage labour. A non-exploitative
"mode of production of material life" is an association of producers engaged in the
(4)
reproduction of the conditions of redistributing use values 1
1) Cf. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, op. cit. Ch. XVIII.
2) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 27.
3) :.-J, p. 24.
4) The problems which puzzle students of modes of production -  the pockets 
of wage labour and commercial activities in antiquity and medieval Europe 
as well as the persistence of use value production in the capitalist world 
economy — lose their enigmatic character as soon as we abandon the 
project of the chronological classification of economic history and 
concern ourselves with the conceptions of labour exploitation within 
historical texts. In this sense,Karl Polanyl's classification: reciprocal, 
market, and redistributive economies is defective in that it ignores
the labour process. See Karl Polanyi,"The Economy as Instituted Process" 
In Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson (eds.)
Trade and Market in Early Empires (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 
1957).
Structural theorists are correct in contending that there is no 
general concept mode of production in Marx's texts. The term is used 
always in a qualified conjunction with others. The attempt to construct 
a "general concept mode of production"is therefore peculiar to 
structural theorists. Ilindess and Hirst condemn the historicist enter­
prise of a general theory of modes o f production without realising that 
they thereby nullify the possibility o f a general concept mode of production. 
The following passage applies to both projects; the construction of a 
general theory (Balibar) and a general concept (Ilindess and Hirst) of 
modes of production: "A general theory of modes of production must 
represent each particular mode as a particular variant form of a single 
general structure. The general theory is therefore a structuralism: it is 
a theory of a structure and the possible forms in which it may be realised. 
In this case, the structure is the mode of production in general . . .  .
A general concept of a mode of production is also an eternity and as such 
an impossibility. For example, if the m<xle of production of material life 
takes place under conditions of complete automation of the labour process 
such that living lalx>ur is redundant, then no set of relations of production 
can be defined. There would be no economy, or mode of production, 
although there would be a way of producing material goods.
In our view, then, any attempt to construct a general concept mode 
of production, as opposed to a determinate mode of production, necessarily 
leads to a model of an economy. This is alien to Marx's project, for there 
can be no general economy. An economy is always of a particular 
structure. "Eine Produktionswelse" is necessarily unspecified ami in 
Marx's texts, it is always "die Produktionsweise", qualitatively designated 
as "bourgeois", "feudal", "ancient’,' etc. A mode of production as a 
concept can only become a glorified substitute for economy, or a 
specification of general conditions o f productions. Marx puts it this way: 
"The conditions without which production cannot be carried on. This means 
in fuct, tliat the essential fuctors required for uny kind of production arc 
indicated. But this amount actually, as we shall see, to a few very simple
1) Ibid, p.7.
definitions which are further expanded into trivial tautologies"^. Any 
general concept of a mule of production faces the intractable problem 
of "reproduction, "dissolution" and "transition". These are false 
(insoluble) problems derived from the initial project of specifying general 
conditions of economy. It is not a mode of production which comes into 
being, or dissolves, or remains at rest. Rather, particular relations of 
production generate class struggles which both develop and fetter the 
productive forces. A different particularity is induced by a specific stage 
in the development of these productive forces. At a certain stage of develop­
ment of the pruluctive forces - and these may be manufacturing, industrial 
or automated - these elemental exchanges between agents become 
incompatible with the former's further development. For example, 
relations of commodity exchange within which the exchange value of labour 
power limits the circulation and production of commodities ipso facto 
place a barrier on the development of automated production.
It is highly significant that Hindess and Hirst admit to the urgency
of the need for the construction of "a theory of monopoly and finance capital,
(2 )
or a theory of the capitalist mode of production dominated by these forms"
It shows the authors' conception of capitalist relations of production to be as yet un­
theorised. The capitalist mode of production is necessarily dominated by 
capital and its sectoral fractions with their conflicts are not forms external 
to the relations of production. Not to perceive this prevents the 
comprehending of the duality of capital which allowed Marx to posit an
apparent contradiction: "The real harrier of capitalist production is capital
(3)itself " v . A sim ilar error occurs in their account of the capitalist
trans' Mon of the labour process where modern industry is said to
involve a movement "from the unity of means of labour and labour power
constituted by the tool, to the unity of means of labour and object of
(4)
labour constituted by the machine" . This formulation obscures the 1
1) Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
op. clt. p. 191.
2) "Letter to Economy and Society" in Economy and Society, Vol.4, 1975, p.232.
3) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. Ill, op. clt. p. 250.
4) Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, op. cit. p. 11.
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process of the labourer being a living tool in competition with, and tied to, 
dead labour. In Marx's words, "The instrument of labour when it takes 
the form of a machine, immediately becomes a competitor of the workman 
himself" . "In manufacture the workmen are parts of a living mechanism. In the 
factory we have a lifeless mechanism independent of the workman who becomes its 
niere I ivingappendage^^fhe worker beingannexed to the machine has its 
counterpart in the capitalist's subservience to the periodiccycles of capital 
accumulation. Ilindess' and Hirst’ s conception of the capitalist mode of 
production, scattered surreptitiously throughout their text, ignores these 
critical moments. They fail to develop an adequate analysis of the 
capitalist processes of production as the necessary precondition for the 
analysis of "pre-capitalist iruxles of production".
For Marx the development of the concept of the capitalist mode of 
production does not terminate at the level of theoretical proof of the 
existence of the concept. Rather, the concept is a part of the analysis of 
capitalist processes of production as the domination of capital. Now since 
capital only exists as movement, the concept of imxle of pnxluction with 
corresponding forces and relations of production i s necessarily limited to 
the analysts of pre-capitalist modes of production. Marx's comments may 
be here relevant: "Capital as self-expanding value embraces not only 
class relations, a society of a definite character resting on the existence 
of labour in the form of wage labour. It is a movement, a circuit­
describing process going through various stages, which itself comprises 
three different forms of the circuit describing process. Therefore it can 
be understood only as motion, not as a thing at rest. Those who regard the
gaining by value of independent existence as a mere abstraction forget
(3)that the movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in actu . In 
the capitalist mode of production the processes of production generate 
the accumulation of capital through the extraction of surplus value from 
labourers whose labour power is an exchange value. The production of 
commodities is a means to the production of capital. 'Ibis is what 1
1) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 430.
2) ibid, p. 422.
3) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. II, op. cit. p. 108.
distinguishes commodity production from capitalist commodity production:
"The mode of production in which the product takes the form of a commodity,
or is produced directly for exchange, is the most general and most embryonic
form of bourgeois production^ \  The capitalist mode of production produces
capital through a mode of appropriation of surplus labour which works by
means of commodity exchange. 'Hie condition of existence of capital is the
alienation of the labourer from the product of his labour. Marx formulated
the concept of capital in the following manner: "The concept of capital
implies that the objective conditions of labour - and these are its own
products - acquire a personality as against labour, or what amounts to the
same thing, that they are established as the property of a personality other 
(2)
than the workers' . The products of labour become a force against labour
(3)
when they are alienated as part of an endless cycle of capital accumulation . 
This growth of capital has specific consequences for the growth, utilisation, 
spatial distribution and organisat ion of the labouring class.
'Hie constant increase in the extraction of surplus value and its 
transformation into productive capital necessitates the expanded reproduction 
of labour power or the mass of labourers which services capital. This 
expanded reproduction of labour power is possible because labour processes 
develop unevenly and create disparities in labour utilisation, i.e . regional 
labour surplusscs. Any shrinkage of the sectors containing pre-capitalist 
labour processes releases labour reserves which act as a lever in the 
determination of wages. In Marx's words:"If the quantity of unpaid labour 1
1 ) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, op. cit. p. 82.
2) Karl Marx in Eric llobsbawm (ed. ) op. cit. p. 118.
3) It follows from this that the abolition of capitalist commodity production 
begins with the labourer's taking control over the products of their 
labour. This act, through "despotic inroads into the rights of 
property" is not a sufficient condition for the abolition of commodity 
production per se. For this, a crucial prerequisite is that no labour 
time be embodied in the production of material life. It is in this 
context that capital's inexorable displacing of living labour should be 
understood. Capital, however, is its own contradiction and this 
displacement is limited by capital itself. Thus there are objective 
limits to the Introduction of automation. See Kurl Marx, Grundrissc, 
op. cit. pp. 51-52.
\supplied by the working class, and accumulated by the capitalist class,
increases so rapidly that its conversion into capital requires an
extraordinary addition of paid labour, then wages rise,’ and, all other
circumstances remaining equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion.
Rut as soon as this diminution touches the point at which the surplus labour
that nourishes capital no longer supplied in normal quantity, a reaction
sets in: a smaller part of revenue is capitalised, accumulation lags and
the movement of rise in wages receive a check The accumulation of
(2 )
capital is the growth of the proletariat . This growth, however, leads to 
a point where labour becomes scarce and expensive relative to the 
mechanisation of the labour process. Investments in this direction then 
displaces labour and effects a disparity between the demand for and the 
supply of labour.
The reinvestment of surplus value in order to augment its magnitude 
determines the degree of utilisation and spatio-temporal distribution of 
labour resources. The accumulation of capital is accompanied by its 
concentration and centralisation. These developments emerge from the 
competition between individual capitalists. Capitalists confront one another 
as atomistic commodity producers vying over the augmentation of their 
investible surplus. Fluctuations In the demand for commodities, the price 
of labour, or raw materials, the spatial distribution of enterprises, all 
these factors result in the expropriation of capitalists by capitalists:
"Capital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand, because it 
has in another place been lost by many. This is centralisation proper, as 
distinct from accumulation and concentration"' . Accumulation and 
centrallsatlon,then, give rise to a regional concentration of productive 1
1) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, op. cit. p. 620.
2) Capital accumulation means therefore not processes of re-investment 
but "the reprcxiuction of capitalist relations of production on an 
extended scale". Cf. Geof Hodgson, "The Theory of the Falling 
Rate of Profit", New Left Review, No. 84, March-April 1974. This 
Luxemburgian conception avoids the associating of capital 
accumulating with the mere heightening of capital-intensive processes 
of production.
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p.626.3)
in
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forces and employment and at the same time increase the disparity between
demographic growth and the labour absorbtive capacity of the productive
forces in other regions^. In consequence,there emerges relatively
higher rates of unemployment in particular regions and hidden
unemployment, Marx’s latent form of the industrial reserve army, in the
agricultural sector. For these same reasons, the reserve army of labour
within metropolitan regions will comprise "migrant" labourers. The
phenomenal emigration of workers from both the American South and the
'Third World' is a case in point. In these regions, or sectors, labour
was repelled by the mechanisation of agriculture (including the deliberate
curtailment of agricultural production in the South) without a commensurate
(2)
development of industrial production . A simultaneous drift of metropolitan 
workers to the expanding industrial sector effected the access of "migrant" 
workers to the relatively labour intensive infrastructure - postal, transport 
and hospital services and to "the reserve army of labour".
The industrial reserve army is generated by the conflict between 
capitals and between capital and lalxiur. both conflicts result in the
1) For an account of the monumental level of unemployment in the 
'Third World', see Edgar O. Edwards (ed .) Employment in Developing 
Nations (Columbia University Press, New York 1974).
2) This passage in Marx is exceptionally appropriate: "As soon as 
capitalist production takes possession of agriculture, and in proportion 
to the extent to which it does so, the demand for an agricultural 
labouring population falls absolutely, while the accumulation of the 
capital employed in agriculture advances, without this repulsion 
being, as in non-agricultural industries, compensated by a greater 
attraction. Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly 
on the point of passing over into an urban or manufacturing proletariat, 
and on the look-out for circumstances favourable to this 
transformation. (Manufacture is used here in the sense of all 
non-agricultural industries). This source of relative surplus- 
population is thus constantly flowing. But the constant flow towards 
the towns pre-supposes, in the country Itself, a constant latent 
surplus-population, the extent of which becomes evident only when its 
channels of outlet open to exceptional width." Capital, Vol. 1, op. clt. 
p. 642.
Itransformation of the labour process, the centralisation of already 
existing capital and the concentration of production within a decreasing 
number of units. The concept deviates radically from the orthodox economic 
analysis of unemployment. The latter is inadequate by virtue of being 
isolated from the processes of capital accumulation. It takes the nature and 
volume of employment as given and hence, cannot raise the problem of the 
productive utilisation of labour resources. From our analysis, judging 
from the level and fluctuation of black unemployment, unemployed "blacks" are 
a part of the "reserve army of labour" consistent with the under-utilisation 
of human resources in capitalist production and functioning to cushion 
long term cyclical dislocations within the exigencies of capital accumulation^. 
However, the increasing redundancy of their labour is because the absolute 
demand for labour progressively decreases as a result of the incessant changes 
in the technical composition of capital. These developments also affect the 
variable constituent of capital so that a smaller proportion is transformed 
into labour power. It is the relationship between constant and variable 
capital which determines the demand for labour. It decreases relatively to 
the magnitude of total capital, in textbook language, the volume of 
investment - and increases in a diminishing proportion to the rate of 
investment of growth of total capital. Growing unemployment among blacks is 
responsible to increasing disinvestment in labour resources. For this and demo­
graphic reasons, the fate of a large section of black workers must, therefore, 
approximate that of the "stagnant form" of the reserve army " . . .  a part 
of the active labour army, but with extremely irregular employment.
Hence, it furnishes to capital an inexhaustible reservoir of disposable 
labor . ver. Its conditions of life sink below the average normal level 
of the working-class; this makes it at once the broad basis of special 
branches of capitalist exploitation. It is characterised by maximum of
1) For evidence of the causal relationship between the business 
cycle, war and black unemployment, see Sidney Willhelm, 
op. cit. Ch. IV. James Tobin echoes here a common observation:
"The fact Is that the economy has not operated with reasonably 
full utilisation of Its manpower and plant capacity since 1957".
J. Tobin In L. A. Ferman et al. (eds.) Negroes and Jobs: A Book of 
Readings, op. clt. p. 532.
,
working-time, and minimum of wages. We have learnt to know its chief 
form under the rubric of "domestic industry". It recruits itself constantly 
from the supernumerary forces of modern industry where handicraft is 
yielding to manufacture, manufacture to machinery. Its extent grows, as 
with the extent and energy of accumulation, the creation of a surplus- 
population advances. But it forms at the same time a self-reproducing and 
self-perpetuating element of the working-class, taking a proportionally 
greater part in the general increase of that class than the other elements.
In fact, not only the number of births and deaths, but the absolute size of 
the families stand in inverse proportion to the height of wages, and 
therefore to the amount of means of subsistence of which the different 
categories of labourers dispose. This law of capitalistic society would 
sound absurd to savages, or even civilised colonists. It calls to mind the 
boundless reproduction of animals individually weak and constantly hunted 
down"^. This passage constitutes a succinct summary of workers', or the "black 
experience’ in all its pathological ramifications. The instances of low 
wages, low level of education and industrial skills which are characteristic 
of black workers are an effect of their reserve army status. Because of 
capital accumulation, they 'over-supply' the "labour market" and are 
therefore vulnerable to the extraction of both relative and absolute surplus 
value.
We recall Marx's distinction: "The surplus value produced by
prolongation of the working day, I call absolute surplus value. On the other hand,
the surplus value arising from the curtailment of the necessary labour time,
and from the corresponding alternation in the respsetive lengths of the two
( 2 )
components of the working day, 1 call relative surplus value". As a 
"stagnant form" of the reserve army black workers compete Intensively 
amongst themselves and with other forms of the reserve army as well as the 
active army for the opportunity to serve capital. This facilitates their use 
as cheap labour (the extraction of relative surplus value) and, in so far as 
they are compelled to work overtime, the extraction of absolute surplus 
value. Race relations theorists appear to grope for an understanding
1)
2)
ICarl M a r x ,  C a p i ta l ,  V o l .  1, o p .  c i t .  p. 6 4 3 .  
ib id , p .  3 1 5 .
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of these forms with the notion of a racially-inspired super-exploitation of "blacks". 
If, however, we ask why "blacks" today, rather than, why blacks? the racial 
suggestiveness disappears. For we may then perceive that the logic of capital 
accumulation imposes these forms of exploitation on all workers, but that given 
the cyclical and uneven nature of this accumulation, the imposition must be 
spatio-temporallyvariegated. Again, the comparatively high level of unemploy­
ment among "blacks" would suggest that they constitute the greater portion of 
the reserve army of labour. But if the concept is seen as encompassing both the 
employed and the unproductively active, then not black, but female labourers 
may be said to comprise the bulk of unused labour resources^.
Indeed, within the terms of the following categories of the unemployed,
"blacks" are not necessarily over-represented among the unemployed: "open
unemployment , underemployment , the visibly active but underutilized
including disguised underemployment, hidden unemployment and prematurely
(2)
retired workers' . The demand for labour as well as the relation between the 
demand for and the supply of labour has crucial effects on the labourers organ­
isation in struggle against the encroachments of capital. Capital is dead labour 
set in motion against living labour such that labourers are thrown into seemingly 
endless processes of competition. Capital accumulation is consistent with the 
separation of the supply of labour from the supply of labourers. For competition 
among capitals increases, but disproportionately, both the demand for labour 
•iid the flow of labourers. Since the latter stabilizes wages and increases the 
labour expenditure of the employed, they organise themselves to curtail this 
flow. labourers, then, are Inherently in competition in conditions of capitalist 
production. 1
1) This, indeed, is Harry Braverman's position. He asserts that in the 
American economy " . . .  the female position of the population has liecome 
the prime supplementary reservoir of labour". Harry Braverman, Labour 
and Monopoly Capital (Monthly Review Press, New York 1974) p. 385.
See also Wally Seecombe, "Housework under Capitalism", New Left 
Review, No. 83, Jan-Feb 1974. The concept of productive-unproductive 
labour appears much misunderstood. All workers by definition produce.
We may, however, categorise their activities into: those which produce 
consumer or capital goods, goods useful for the destruction of life, goods 
and services specific to the extraction of surplus value and Its redistribution 
among different capitals. For a useful summary of Marx's use of the 
concept, see Ian Gough, "Marx and Unproductive Labour", New Left 
Review, No. 76, Nov-Dec 1972.
2) Cf. Edgar O. Edwards (ed .) op. cit. pp. 10-11.
\The omnipresent reserve army of la •• set in motion by the laws
of capital accumulation is therefore an inte^ ’ element of the intrinsic
competitiveness of wage labour and as such i petition between labourers:
"The essential condition for the existence an for the sway of the bourgeois
class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital
is wage labour. Wage labour rests exclusively on competition between the
labourers" ^ .  This competition, however, must not be interpreted
voluntaristically and it is not at all eradicated by Trade Union organisation.
Given die non-social ownership of the means of production, the owners of
mere labour power must compete amongst themselves on the so-called
labour market. Manifestations of this competition would be hostility towards
capital-intensive technology anti new entrants to the labour market, and the
(2 )
forming of closed trades or crafts . Marx expected labour competition
to decrease, with the inexorable industrial concentration of workers leading
to dieir revolutionary association. The abolition of labour competition on
the other hand begins with workers control over the labour process,and the
production of use values. Both conditions are necessary and they are in
turn contingent on the level of development of the productive forces, and Marx's
theory. Wage labourers must be in explicit competition among themselves
over occupational jurisdiction and mobility and the respective and relative
prices of their labour. They engage in veiled competition with the
unemployed and are torn by the division into organised and unorganised
(3)workers' . An empiricist social science interprets this competition as
regional, national, sexual and racial realities. Thus, Ix.-ggett, for example,
posits that "racial differences engender an uneven distribution of class
(4)
.consciousness within the working class' . Leggett has, in our view, 
inverted the relationship. For it is the "racial differences" which are an 123
1) K. Marx and F. F.ngels, Selected Works, Vol. 1. pp. 45-46.
See also Wage Labour and Capital, ibid. pp. 91-94.
2) See Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit. Ch. XV, Section 5.
3) For a useful analysis of these phenomena, see Jack Barbash, 
op. cit. pp. 7-8 and Ch. 11. Ray Marshall, op. clt. p. 26.
Milton Cantor (ed .) op. cit. p. 139.
Legget, op. clt. p. 7.4)
Ieffect of the uneven distribution of class consciousness. But even so,
this consciousness is not "uneven". It is atomised, a condition attributable
to the nature of social scientific theoretical practices as well as the
capital movements ** investment shifts and the perfection of labour
displacing industrial techniques -  which repel sections of the labour force
and throw them into competition with others.
It follows from this that the gamut of objections by "white" workers
to "blacks" are but part of the enduring conflict between wage labour and
capital, where the labourers are not organised politically as a class opposed
to capitalist relations of production. Secondly, that Trade Unions are
defencist organisations of the working class reflecting its theoretical
entombment in the commodity fetishism of bourgeois society and as such
cannot but perpetuate even intensify the labour competition out of which they
were partly born^\ For the first organisation of workers (the Craft Union)
aimed at preventing the cheapening of labour (and was thus anti-capitalist)
through the operation of "closed-shops” , but thereby formalised the
competition with the unskilled and unemployed. Trade Unions, a development
out of Craft Unions, have always been classic organisations of simultaneous
resistance and accommodation to capitalism and the understanding of this
structural ambivalence is crucial to any explanation of "white working
class racism". We may say that the degree of "revolutionary working 
(2 )
class consciousness" Is in inverse proportion to the frequency with which 
workers respond to attempted intensifications of exploitation by isolating 
other workers.
Not surprisingly, the distinction between trade union consciousness 
in'1.. volutionary working class consciousness is an established one in
1) See Sydney and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism 
(Augustus M. Kelley, New York, 1965) Ch. 1.
Alfred B. Badger, Man in Employment (MacMillan, London 1966) 
pp. 27-8 and Ch. 4. J.A. Banks, Trade Unionism (Collier-MacMillan 
London 1974). See Ch. 1. for a conclusive analysis of the 
relationship between trade unions and guilds. 2
2) Or, as perhaps Althusserianstriay prefer,the scientific, theoretical 
understanding of the capitalist mode of production by the exploited 
agents.
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Marxist political w riting^ . Marx himself did not offer precisely
formulated reasons and criteria for his differentiation; but it may be
inferred from his writings that the highest level of working class
consciousness is attained when the abolition of the wages system has
(2 )
become the watchword of the labour movement . Working class agitation 
organisation and struggle within the confines of wage labour are historical 
forms of defence against the encroachments of capital. In this defensive 
stage, not the wages system, but any agent of the diminution of the wage 
level becomes an object of hostility and opposition.
It is a moot point whether industrial unions constitute a realisation 
of Marx's optimism that, with the development of capitalist industry, 
workers would subsequently form themselves into a revolutionary 
combination. However, we may say that it was the decrease of labour 
competition involved in the transition from craft to industrial unionism
(3)
which ameliorated the labour situation of "blacks" in America . This 
fact highlights the decisive influence of working class political organisation 
on the socio-economic situation of "blacks". Industrial unionism, and the 1
11 See Richard Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade
Unionism (Pluto Press, London 1971) for a well documented 
analysis of Marx's appraisal of Trade Unionism. W. Lenin's 
statement to the effect that the working class by itself can only 
attain union consciousness does not distinguish between trade 
unionism as a political strategy and trade unions as organisations.
V. Ijenin, op. cit. pp. 31-32. Lenin's scepticism, however, 
pales beside Frank Tannenbaum's "Trade Unionism is the 
conservative movement of our time. It is the counterrevolution".
The True Society (Jonathon Cape, Ijondon 1964) p. 3.
2' Jv»rl Marx, Selected Works, Vol. 1. p. 229. Here Marx suggests 
this to be the ultimate in the development of working class 
consciousness standing opposed to spasmodic struggles against 
the movements of the price of labour.
3) Not that the Craft Unions are "racial", Ray Marshall marginally
moves away from race with .; "The foregoing evidence demonstrates 
widespread racial discrimination, but it should be emphasised 
that racial restrictions by the building-trade unions are not 
due entirely to racial reasons". The Negro and Organised Labour, 
op. cit. p. 129.
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diminution of labour competition which it fosters, leaves unresolved
the other ramifications of capitalist labour exploitation - unemployment,
redundancies, low-pay, work conditions - i.e . the existence of wage
labour and commodity production itself. For since the means of
consumption and welfare remain commodities, the easing of industrial labour
competition does not prevent or eliminate competition over commoditised
goods and services such as housing, schooling and higher education^ \
These other levels of competition over "scarce" goods and welfare
amenities can be explained in terms of the thesis that inter-class
struggle becomes intra-class struggle in specific theoretical-subjective
conditions. Race relations analyses in which anti-immigration demonstrations
and opposition to'hussingf'are "race problems", make a particular contribution
to the formation of these theoretical-subjective conditions. But if we conceive
the economic basis of modern society as the perpetual production of surplus
value via commodity production, we may explain not only status
stratification, but black poverty, unemployment and the so-called poor
white or working class racism. Since neither behaviour nor historical
events is fully clarified by a methodohtgical emphasis on actors'
( 2 )
imnferances , and given the strict relationship between class consciousness 
and the industrial experiences of "blacks", what needs to be analysed is 
not the racist sentiments (race prejudice) which are expressed in the 
course of opposition to "black" workers - and it is obviously incorrect 
to treat prejudice as a cause - but the factors responsible for the given 
level of political development of "white" workers. In other words, we 
must examine the relationship between the development of class 1
1) Reference can be made here to 'white' opposition to Headstart,
AFDC payments to 'blacks' and "bussing". In support of an 
interpretation of this in terms of economic scarcities, see 
Thomas Sowell, Black Education, Myths and Tragedies (David 
McKay and Co., New York 1972).
2) As John Rex succinctly put it: " . . .  the reasons which men give 
In order to account systematically for their behaviour are 
added after the behaviour is complete, and are not adequate to 
uccount for it". Race Relations in Sociological Theory, op. cit. 
p. 137. This makes u 11 the more enigmatic Rex's emphasis on a 
colonial ideological legacy to explain white opposition to black 
workers.
consciousness and ideology.
Arguing for a more serious consideration of Marx's theory of 
working class consciousness, Michael Mann delineates four levels of concept­
ualisation : "Firstly, we can separate class identity - the definition of 
oneself as working class as playing a distinctive role in common with 
other workers in the productive process. Secondly, comes class opposition 
- the perception that the capitalist agents constitute an enduring opponent 
to oneself. These two elements interact dialectically; that is to say 
opposition itself serves to reinforce identity and vice versa. Thirdly, 
is class totality - the acceptance of the two previous elements as the 
defining characteristics of (a) one's total situation and (b) the whole society 
in which one lives. Finally, comes the conception of an alternative society 
a goal towards which one moves through the struggle with the opponent.
True revolutionary consciousness is the combination of all four . . .  .
The Movement or development of working class consciousness is from 
everyday political affiliations and collective militancy to the perception 
of phenomenal omnipresent interconnections and then the theoretical 
transcendance of the extant social order. Trade Union consciousness 
reflects the stage of mere opposition to capitalism. It is an ambivalent form of 
class struggle. The ambivalence in this opposition finds expression in the 
simultaneous denunciation and practice of excluding the Negro worker.
What it illustrates is the spatio-temporal vicissitudes of the transition 
from lower to higher forms of class consciousness as well as the intrinsic 
limitations of trade unionism as a revolutionary strategy.
The development from fragmented solidarity and sectional 
militancy to an hegonomic alternative consciousness and collective action 
would obviously depend on the dissolution of bourgeois ideology. For the 
"naturalness" of capitalism either "because human nature stinks" or 
because non-commodity production is "practically impossible" and 
potentially totalitarian, this naturalness is reflected in the wage-lxiund 
economism of Trade Union struggles. As Alan Fox noted "It is probable
1) Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western
Working Class (MacMillan, London 1973) p. 13. Tills, however, cannot
he a series of linear stages, generalised within the worker's movement.
A
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that for much of the time most men do not perceive the conventional
and arbitrary social arrangements under which they live, and suppose
them to lie the only possible ones given 'the nature of things' - a notion
which usually includes a belief in an unchageable 'human nature' . . .
what this all means is that when union or work group representatives take
their place with managers at the negotiating table they do so . . .  as men
who have already been socialised, indoctrinated and trained . . .  'i^Fox 's
observation, although it contains a simplistic approach to political
socialisation, is a rare one and this highlights the fact that social theorists
have too readily taken Trade Union wage-demands at face value. There
has been a reluctance to examine the theories of society which underlie
working class "militancy", which is then counterposed to abstract 
(2 )
theories and theorising . Yet insofar as the demand for the highest of 
wages, i.e . the "watchword" of the abolition o f wage labour, is shunned 
by working class militants and "revolutionary" parties because "it is 
utopian", then, at root, it is the theoretical subservience to bourgeois 
ideology which perpetuates wage labour and labour competition.
"White" workers arc therefore not to be seen as racially 
discriminating in the sense of being racially motivated. For, insofar as 
they accept the immutability of the labour market and the immanence of 
commodity exchange, they must favour guerilla struggles within the wages 
system and "black workers arc tjien a distinct economic threat". As Cayton 
and Mitchell correctly argue: "It would be fruitless to attempt to understand 
the situation of the Negro in industry from the point of view of emotional 
racial antipathy alone. The existence of racial prejudice in both employee 
and employer groups is, of course, an indisputable fact, but it is only when 
we view race prejudice within the broader perspective of its role in the 
conflict between classes that we gain some insight into the problems 1
1) Alan Fox "Industrial Relations: a Social Critique of Pluralist 
Ideology", in John Child (ed .) Man and Organisation (George Allen 
& Unwin lid ., London 1973) p. 217.
2) This fundamental error in the’Ynt lit ant^app roach which de-emphasiscs 
the Influence of widely disseminated ideological constructs and 
stresses crisis situations and working class material activity at the 
point of production is that it treats "experiences" as raw theory- 
free events.
confronting the Negro in industry"^. Yet they too succumbed to the
common confusion between the existence and the operation of race
(2 )
prejudice . An’lndisputable fact" of the existence of a prejudice does 
not sociologically imply its behavioural agency. Moreover, the fact that
o n n «
the Negro-labour policies of both racially-prejudiced and non-prejudiced
employers are often identical suggests the operation of other conditions.
For example, an employer's labour policy is not independent of the
(3)labour organisation of his employees' \ As Smith and others have shown, 
what is often interpreted as employers' prejudice and racial discrimination 
could be seen as their fears of labour disruptions from the established 
(white) labour force, in the event of "fair employment practices" towards 
the Negro. Either way,then,a concept of class is necessary.
All workers are,therefore,trapped in a vortex of the over­
supply of labour which capital movements generate, the capitalists’ drive 
to minimise lalxiur costs and tiic protective econoinism of Trade Unionism. 
It is, therefore, possible to situate the racist sentiments of "white" 
workers and the "anti-racist" struggles of "black" workers in terms of 
labour competition and,ultimately, their theoretical-political positions. 
This means that had the problem of the development of the theoretical- 
subjective conditions of revolution been "the problem of the twentieth 
century" the nature of these struggles could not have been economistic. 
Instead of this we are Innundated with race relations texts so that it is not 
generally recognised that theories of the social rejection of "blacks", 
racial inequalities, black poverty and racial discrimination contain hidden 
conceptualisations of the mechanisms of capitalist commodity production.
Their problem is "race". Hut they necessarily, sporadically 
change terrain so that the capitalist mode of production emerges here 
and there. It is this which gives the impression that our object of study is 
not distinct from theirs. It is distinct, however, for we investigate the 1
1) Horace R. Cayton and George S. Mitchell, Black Workers and the 
New Unions (McGrath Pub. Co., Maryland 1939) p. lx.
2) ibid. pp. 17, 37.
3) See David J. Smith, op. cit. pp. 5, 57 and Ch. VI.
capitalist mode of production and the logically necessary relations between 
its agents embodied in the term "classes" . Race relations 
cannot remain on this terrain.for "race relations" áre not theoretical 
relationships but as sociologists admit, illusions in the minds of 
empirical actors. Thus, the designation, "black workers" is an effect 
of not conceiving capitalist relations of production as fundamental to the 
understanding of the exploitation of labourers in the capitalist mode of 
production. Yet how is the selection of "blacks" as an object of study 
to be justified? This is a question the race relations investigation must 
answer. For why not yellow or pink workers? Nor must a "specificity" 
of the situation of particular workers which constitute them as "blacks" be 
presumed, or taken as obvious. It must be demonstrated prior to the 
investigation. Yet it is impossible to carry out such a demonstration.
For the specificity of the black workers' situation is a specificity of labour 
exploitation.
This observation, however, is still within the empiricist terrain 
of "race relations". We make it in order to illustrate the theoretical 
superficiality of such studies and as part of their displacement. For the 
term "black workers" is impossible as a concept. It is an empirical 
referent that has no empirical reference. Who are these black and white 
workers? The skin colours of workers are not polarised into black and 
white. Even so, a worker is not the person^but a specification of a 1
1) E.P. Thompson captures the anti-empiricist current in Marx's 
concept of class: "There is today an ever-present temptation to 
suppose that class is a thing. This was not Marx's meaning, in his 
own historical writing, yet the error vitiates much latter-day 
'Marxist' writing. It', the working class, is assumed to have a real 
existence, which can be defined almost mathematically — so many 
men who stand in a certain relationship to the means of production . . .  
If we remember that class is a relationship and not a thing we cannot 
think In this way". The Making of the English Working Class, (Penguin, 
Middlesex, 1968) pp. 10-11. But why then "English Working Class"? ,
2) For the capitalist, as Marx observes: "The worker here is nothing 
more than personified labour time. All Individual distinctions are 
merged in those of "full-timers" and "half-timers". Capital, Vol. I, 
op. cit. p. 243. A capitalist cannot be concerned with race, only 
with the exploltability of the labourer.
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particular relation to the means of production, an embodiment of "particular 
class relations and class interests". To impute a colour to this relationship 
is to make it as absurd as, in Marx's phrase, a "yellow logarithm". 
Metaphorically, who are "black workers"? The poor? the underpaid ? the 
unemployed and under-employed? But these are merely manifestations 
of certain conditions of labour exploitation, labourers, the utilisation of 
whose labour power conforms to the vagaries of capital accumulation. 
Workers can be neither white nor black. Such designations have political 
purposes. Their "reality" derives from the institutionalised research which 
continues not in the interest of "science" or "black liberation", but as a 
political strategy of divida et imperia.
1
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